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STATE OF IDAHO 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF MICHAELS. CORNELL 
AND ARLIE M. CORNELL. 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
Appealed from the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and 
for Clearwater County 
Honorable MICHAEL J. GRIFFIN, District Judge 
Samuel T. Creason 
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
Karin Seubert 
Attorney for Respondent-Respondent 
2Date: 1/26/2015 
Time: 09:04 AM 
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Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal. 
User: BARBIE 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell 
Date Code User Judge 
7/11/2012 NCOC BARBIE New Case Filed - Other Claims Randall W. Robinson 
BARBIE Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Randall W. Robinson 
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Aherin, Rice & Anegon Receipt 
number: 0002377 Dated: 7/26/2012 Amount: 
$96.00 (Cashiers Check) For: Cronell, John 
Henry (other party) 
PETN BARBIE Petition For Supervised Administration And Randall W. Robinson 
Removal Of Trustee 
NOHG BARBIE Notice Of Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
HRSC BARBIE Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Randall W. Robinson 
08/21/2012 03:30 PM) Petition for Supervised 
Administration and Removal of Trustee 
APER BARBIE Other party: Cronell, John Henry Appearance Randall W. Robinson 
Darrel W. Aherin 
8/16/2012 NOAP TEMP Notice Of Appearance Randall W. Robinson 
APER TEMP Other party: Johnson, Toni C. Appearance Karin Randall W. Robinson 
Seubert 
TEMP Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Randall W. Robinson 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Seubert, 
Karin (attorney for Johnson, Toni C.) Receipt 
number: 0002622 Dated: 8/16/2012 Amount: 
$66.00 (Cashiers Check) For: Johnson, Toni C. 
( other party) 
MOTN TEMP Motion to Continue _and to Set Scheduling Randall W. Robinson 
Conference 
8/17/2012 OBJC JALLAIN Objection to Motion to Continue and to set Randall W. Robinson 
Scheduling Conference 
8/21/2012 HRHD CHRISTY Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Randall W. Robinson 
on 08/21/2012 03:30 PM: Hearing Held Petition 
for Supervised Administration and Removal of 
Trustee 
CMIN CHRISTY Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Randall W. Robinson 
on 08/21/2012 03:30 PM: Court Minutes Petition 
for Supervised Administration and Removal of 
Trustee 
HRSC CHRISTY Hearing Scheduled (Status 10/01/2012 10:00 Randall W. Robinson 
AM) and Scheduling Conference. All parties 
must be present for hearing. 
8/22/2012 ORDR BARBIE Order Continuing Hearing and Setting Scheduling Randall W. Robinson 
Conference 
8/23/2012 AFFD KBR OWNING Affidavit of Service Randall W. Robinson 
9/17/2012 AFFD BARBIE Affidavit of Karin Seubert Randall W. Robinson 
MTDM BARBIE Motion To Dismiss Randall W. Robinson 
NOHG BARBIE Notice Of Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
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Page 2 of 10 Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal. 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell 
Date Code User Judge 
9/27/2012 MOTN KCONNOR Motion to Vacate Respondent's Notice of Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
on Motion to Dismiss 
MOTN KCONNOR Motion to Strike Affidavit of Karen Seubert Randall W. Robinson 
10/1/2012 CONT KBROWNING Hearing result for Status scheduled on Randall W. Robinson 
10/01/2012 10:00 AM: Hearing Continued and 
Scheduling Conference. All parties must be 
present for hearing. (OFF THE RECORD) 
10/3/2012 HRSC KBROWNING Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Randall W. Robinson 
11/27/2012 01:00 PM) 
KBROWNING Notice Of Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
10/11/2012 NODT JALLAIN Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Toni Randall W. Robinson 
Johnson 
10/12/2012 MOTN JALLAIN Motion to Shorten Time Randall W. Robinson 
MOTN JALLAIN Motion for Protective Order Randall W. Robinson 
10/17/2012 TPMO JALLAIN Telephonic Motion Hearing - held 10/17/2012 Randall W. Robinson 
CMIN JALLAIN Court Minutes Randall W. Robinson 
ORDR JALLAIN Order of Protection from Discovery Randall W. Robinson 
10/18/2012 RSPN JALLAIN Response to Motion for Protective Order Randall W. Robinson 
AFFD JALLAIN Affidavit of Darrel W. Aherin Randall W. Robinson 
11/1/2012 MEMO BARBIE Memorandum Of Law Randall W. Robinson 
11/15/2012 RSPN JALLAIN Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Randall W. Robinson 
AFFD JALLAIN Affidavit of Margaret M Watkins Randall W. Robinson 
AFFD JALLAIN Affidavit of Darrel W Aherin Randall W. Robinson 
11/20/2012 BREF BARBIE Respondent's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Randall W. Robinson 
Dismiss 
11/27/2012 APER KBR OWNING Other party: Cornell, Kareen Appearance Randall W. Robinson 
Theodore 0. Creason 
CONT KBROWNING Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Randall W. Robinson 
on 11/27/2012 01 :00 PM: Continued 
HRSC KBROWNING Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Randall W. Robinson 
01/08/2013 01:00 PM) 
KBROWNING Notice Of Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
CMIN BARBIE Court Minutes Michael J Griffin 
1/8/2013 HRHD CBAKER Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Randall W. Robinson 
on 01/08/2013 01 :00 PM: Hearing Held 
CMIN CBAKER Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Randall W. Robinson 
on 01/08/2013 01 :00 PM: Court Minutes 
1/11/2013 HRSC JALLAIN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
02/06/2013 02:00 PM) 
JALLAIN Notice Of Hearing - Briefing schedule: T. 0. Randall W. Robinson 
Creason must submit Brief by 01/23/2013; Reply 
Briefs due by 02/01/2013 
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Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal. 
User: BARBIE 

































































Memorandum RE: Repsondent's Motion to 
Dismiss 
Motion To Mediate 
Judge 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Respondent's Brief in Reply to Brief of Surviving Randall W. Robinson 
Spouse 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled Randall W. Robinson 
on 02/06/2013 02:00 PM: Hearing Held 
Court Minutes 
Notice of Service 
Michael J Griffin 
Randall W. Robinson 
Notice Of Taking Deposition of Toni C Johnson Randall W. Robinson 
Motion for Substitution of Party (IRCP 25(a)(1) Randall W. Robinson 
Notice Of Hearing for 02/26/2013 at 11 :00 AM Randall W. Robinson 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/26/2013 11 :00 Randall W. Robinson 
AM) 
Memorandum Opinion 
Judgment for Dismissal 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
02/26/201311:00 AM: Hearing Held 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Michael J Griffin 
Randall W. Robinson 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Randall W. Robinson 
02/26/2013 11 :00 AM: Court Minutes 
Motion for Consolidation (IRCP 42(a)) Randall W. Robinson 
Petitiom by Kareen Cornell as Personal Randall W. Robinson 
Representative of the Estate of John Henry 
Cornell & as Surviving Spouse of John Henry 
Cornell, Deceased Beneficiary of the Revocable 
Family Trust of Michael S Cornell & Arlie M 
Cornell for Supervised Administration & Court 
Ordered Distribution 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees Randall W. Robinson 
Affidavit in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Randall W. Robinson 
Attorney Fees 
Motion to Dismiss 
Motion for Protective Order 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Notice of Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion For Protective Order Randall W. Robinson 
03/13/2013 03:00 PM) 
Objection to Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
Hearing result for Motion For Protective Order Randall W. Robinson 
scheduled on 03/13/2013 03:00 PM: Hearing 
Held 
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ROA Report 
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User: BARBIE 































































Hearing result for Motion For Protective Order 
scheduled on 03/13/2013 03:00 PM: Court 
Minutes 
Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees 
Claimed by Toni C Johnson against the Trust 
Motion To Disallow Costs And Attorney Fees 
(I.C.R.P. 54(d)(6)) 
Memorandum In Support 
Judge 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion To Disallow Costs Randall W. Robinson 
And Attorney Fees (I.R.C.P 54(d)(6)) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/10/2013 09:00 Randall W. Robinson 
AM) Motion To Disallow Costs And Attorney 
Fees 
Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Toni C. Randall W. Robinson 
Johnson 
Filing: L2 -Appeal, Magistrate Division to District Randall W. Robinson 
Court Paid by: Aherin, Darrel W. (attorney for 
Cronell, John Henry) Receipt number: 0001115 
Dated: 4/2/2013 Amount: $61.00 (Cashiers 
Check) For: Cornell, Michael S. (subject) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Randall W. Robinson 
Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal Randall W. Robinson 
Order for Briefing Randall W. Robinson 
Stipulation Rescheduling Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
Continued Hearing result for Motion scheduled Randall W. Robinson 
on 04/10/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing Continued 
Motion To Disallow Costs And Attorney Fees 
Notice Of Service Randall W. Robinson 
Amended Notice Of Hearing for 06/04/2013 at Randall W. Robinson 
4:00 PM 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Second Randall W. Robinson 
Motion to Dismiss 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss Randall W. Robinson 
06/04/2013 04:00 PM) 
Brief in Support of Appeal Randall W. Robinson 
Motion for Order Shortening Time for Hearing - Randall W. Robinson 
Telephonic Conference for 05/17/2013 at 2:30 
PM 
Motion to Stay Proceedings Randall W. Robinson 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Stay 05/17/2013 Randall W. Robinson 
02:30 PM) Telephonic Conference 
Objection to Motion to Stay Proceedings 
Motion to Augment Record 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
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Page 5 of 10 Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal. 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell 
Date Code User Judge 
5/17/2013 HRHD JALLAIN Hearing Held (Motion to Stay 05/17/2013 2:30 Randall W. Robinson 
PM) Telephonic Conference 
CMIN JALLAIN Court Minutes Randall W. Robinson 
NOTH KCONNOR Notice Of Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
5/20/2013 ORDR JALLAIN Order - Denying Karreen Cornell's Motion to Stay Randall W. Robinson 
the Proceedings 
5/22/2013 AFFD JALLAIN Affidavit of Theodore O Creason Certifying a Randall W. Robinson 
Portion of the Desposition of Toni C Johnson and 
Exhibits of April 22, 2013 
MEMO JALLAIN Memorandum in Oppostion Re: Motion to Randall W. Robinson 
Dismiss 
5/23/2013 HRSC KCONNOR Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/04/2013 03:00 Randall W. Robinson 
PM) 
5/28/2013 REPL KCONNOR Respondent's Reply Brief Re: Motion to Dismiss Randall W. Robinson 
6/3/2013 MOTN JALLAIN The Estate of John Cornell's Motion to Disqualify Randall W. Robinson 
the Law Firm of Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC 
MEMO JALLAIN Memorandum in Support of the Estate of John Randall W. Robinson 
Cornell's Motion to Disqualify the Law Firm of 
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC 
6/4/2013 HRHD CHRISTY Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Michael J Griffin 
06/04/2013 03:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion to 
Augment Record 
DCHH CHRISTY Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Michael J Griffin 
06/04/2013 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Keith Evans 
Number of Transcript Pages for hearing 
estimated: 
LESS THAN 100 Motion to Augment Record 
CMIN CHRISTY Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Michael J Griffin 
06/04/2013 03:00 PM: Court Minutes Motion to 
Augment Record 
ORDR CHRISTY Order Augmenting Record Randall W. Robinson 
HRHD JALLAIN Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled Randall W. Robinson 
on 06/04/2013 04:00 PM: Hearing Held 
CMIN JALLAIN Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled Randall W. Robinson 
on 06/04/2013 04:00 PM: Court Minutes 
6/10/2013 BREF BARBIE Brief of Estate of John H. Cornell Randall W. Robinson 
BREF BARBIE Brief In Opposition to Appeal Randall W. Robinson 
6/11/2013 ORDR CHRISTY Second Order Augmenting Record Randall W. Robinson· 
6/21/2013 MEMO JALLAIN Memorandum Opinion Re: Kareen Cornell Randall W. Robinson 
JDMT JALLAIN Judgment for Dismissal Randall W. Robinson 
SCAN BARBIE Scanned: Randall W. Robinson 
SCAN BARBIE Scanned: Randall W. Robinson 
7/1/2013 REPL CHRISTY Appellant Rely Brief Randall W. Robinson 
7Date: 1/26/2015 Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County User: BARBIE 
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Page 6 of 10 Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal. 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell 
Date Code User Judge 
7/2/2013 BARBIE Filing: L2 -Appeal, Magistrate Division to District Randall W. Robinson 
Court Paid by: Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
Receipt number: 0002068 Dated: 7/2/2013 
Amount: $61.00 (Cashiers Check) For: Cornell, 
Kareen (other party) 
NOTA BARBIE NOTICE OF APPEAL Randall W. Robinson 
APDC BARBIE Appeal Filed In District Court Randall W. Robinson 
7/3/2013 CCOA BARBIE Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal Randall W. Robinson 
7/5/2013 AFFD BARBIE Affidavit In Support Of Memorandum Of Costs Randall W. Robinson 
And Attorney Fees· 
MEMO BARBIE Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees Randall W. Robinson 
7/9/2013 MOTN CBAKER Motion To Disallow Costs And Attorney Fees Randall W. Robinson 
MEMO CBAKER Memorandum In Support RE: Motion To Disallow Randall W. Robinson 
Costs And Attorney Fees 
7/10/2013 MOTN BARBIE Motion to Mediate Randall W. Robinson 
NOHG BARBIE Notice Of Telephonic Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
HRSC BARBIE Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Motion Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
07/30/2013 01:45 PM) 
7/12/2013 ORDR CHRISTY Order for Transcript on Appeal Randall W. Robinson 
7/15/2013 MOTN JALLAIN Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees Randall W. Robinson 
Claimed by Toni C Johnson against the Trust 
7/17/2013 BNDC BARBIE Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 2311 Dated Randall W. Robinson 
7/17/2013 for 200.00) 
7/25/2013 HRSC BARBIE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/03/2013 10:00 Randall W. Robinson 
AM) 
BARBIE Notice Of Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
7/30/2013 HRHD CHRISTY Hearing result for Telephonic Motion Hearing Michael J Griffin 
scheduled on 07/30/2013 01:45 PM: Hearing 
Held Set Up Meet Me 
DCHH CHRISTY Hearing result for Telephonic Motion Hearing Michael J Griffin 
scheduled on 07/30/2013 01:45 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Keith Evans 
Number of Transcript Pages for hearing 
estimated: 
LESS THAN 100 Set Up Meet Me 
CMIN CHRISTY Hearing result for Telephonic Motion Hearing Michael J Griffin 
scheduled on 07/30/2013 01:45 PM: Court 
Minutes Set Up Meet Me 
8/2/2013 BNDV CHRISTY Bond Converted (Transaction number 254 dated Randall W. Robinson 
8/2/2013 amount 130.00) 
BNDV CHRISTY Bond Converted (Transaction number 255 dated Randall W. Robinson 
8/2/2013 amount 70.00) 
TRAN KCONNOR Transcript of a Motion to Dismiss Randall W. Robinson 
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Page 7 of 10 Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal. 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell 
Date Code User Judge 
8/13/2013 NOTH JALLAIN Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion to Disallow Costs Randall W. Robinson 
and Attorney Fees 
9/3/2013 HRHD JALLAIN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Randall W. Robinson 
09/03/2013 10:00 AM: Hearing Held Mr. Aherin 
to appear by Telephone 
CMIN BARBIE Court Minutes Michael J Griffin 
9/6/2013 MEMO JALLAIN Memorandum Opinion Re: Attorney Fees and Randall W. Robinson 
Costs 
ORDR JALLAIN Order Re: Attorney Fees and Costs filed on July Randall W. Robinson 
5, 2013 are hereby DENIED. 
9/13/2013 MOTN JALLAIN Motion to Augment Record Randall W. Robinson 
9/26/2013 MOTN CHRISTY Motion to Augment Record Randall W. Robinson 
NOTC CHRISTY Notice of Hearing RE: Motion to Augment Record Randall W. Robinson 
HRSC CHRISTY Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/05/2013 10:30 Randall W. Robinson 
AM) to Augment Record 
10/7/2013 NOTC JALLAIN Notice of NO Objection Randall W. Robinson 
10/18/2013 BRIE JALLAIN Appellant's Brief Randall W. Robinson 
10/29/2013 ORDR BARBIE Order Granting Motion To Augment Record Randall W. Robinson 
ORDR BARBIE Order RE: Augment Record Michael J Griffin 
11/1/2013 STIP CHRISTY Stipulation to Augment Michael J Griffin 
11/4/2013 HRVC CHRISTY Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Michael J Griffin 
11/05/2013 10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated to 
Augment Record 
11/20/2013 BREF JALLAIN Respondent's Brief Michael J Griffin 
12/4/2013 BRIE JALLAIN Appellant's Reply Brief Michael J Griffin 
12/11/2013 NOHG BARBIE N9tice Of Hearing RE: Appeal Michael J Griffin 
HRSC BARBIE Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Michael J Griffin 
02/18/2014 08:30 AM) 
2/18/2014 HRHD CHRISTY Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal Michael J Griffin 
scheduled on 02/18/2014 08:30 AM: Hearing 
Held 
DCHH CHRISTY Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal Michael J Griffin 
scheduled on 02/18/2014 08:30 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Keith Evans 
Number of Transcript Pages for hearing 
estimated: 
LESS THAN 100 
CMIN CHRISTY Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal Michael J Griffin 
scheduled on 02/18/2014 08:30 AM: Court 
Minutes 
4/8/2014 ORDR JJENSEN Order Remanding Case Michael J Griffin 
ORDR JJENSEN Order Re: Appeal Michael J Griffin 
CHJG JDUGGER Change Assigned Judge Randall W. Robinson 
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Page 8 of 10 Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal. 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell 
Date Code User Judge 
5/13/2014 MOTN JDUGGER Motion To Remove Trustee Randall W. Robinson 
MEMO JDUGGER Memorandum In Support Randall W. Robinson 
RE: Motion To Remove Trustee 
NOHG JDUGGER Notice Of Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
RE: Motion To Remove Trustee 
HRSC JDUGGER Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 05/27/2014 Randall W. Robinson 
03:00 PM) Motion To Remove Trustee 
APPL JDUGGER Application For Appointment Of Trustee Randall W. Robinson 
ACCP JDUGGER Acceptance Of Appointment Randall W. Robinson 
NOHG JDUGGER Notice Of Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
RE:Application For Appointment Of Trustee 
HRSC JDUGGER Hearing Scheduled (Application for Appointment Randall W. Robinson 
of Trustee 05/27/2014 03:00 PM) 
5/23/2014 OBJC KCONNOR Objection to Motion to Remove Trustee & Randall W. Robinson 
Application for Apointment of Trustee 
5/27/2014 HRHD LMCMILLAN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Randall W. Robinson 
05/27/2014 03:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion To 
Remove Trustee 
HRHD LMCMILLAN Hearing result for Application for Appointment of Randall W. Robinson 
Trustee scheduled on 05/27/2014 03:00 PM: 
Hearing Held 
CMIN LMCMILLAN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Randall W. Robinson 
05/27/2014 03:00 PM: Court Minutes Motion To 
Remove Trustee 
6/16/2014 MEMO . BARBIE Memorandum Opinion RE: Remand Order Randall W. Robinson 
SCAN BARBIE Scanned: 06/18/2014 Randall W. Robinson 
JDMT BARBIE Final Judgment RE: Remand Order Randall W. Robinson 
CDIS BARBIE Civil Disposition entered for: Cornell, Kareen, Randall W. Robinson 
Other Party; Cronell, John Henry, Other Party; 
Johnson, Toni C., Other Party; Cornell, Arlie M., 
Subject; Cornell, Michael S., Subject. Filing date: 
6/16/2014 
SCAN BARBIE Scanned: 06/18/2014 Randall W. Robinson 
6/20/2014 MOTN CHRISTY Motion to Correct Clerical Mistakes Randall W. Robinson 
NOTC CHRISTY Notice of Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
HRSC CHRISTY Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Correct Clerical Randall W. Robinson 
Mistakes 07/07/2014 02:15 PM) 
7/7/2014 HRHD LMCMILLAN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Randall W. Robinson 
07/07/2014 02:15 PM: Hearing Held to Correct 
Clerical Mistakes 
CMIN LMCMILLAN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Randall W. Robinson 
07/07/2014 02:15 PM: Court Minutes to Correct 
Clerical Mistakes 
ORDR LMCMILLAN Order Clarifying Citations Randall W. Robinson 
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Page 9 of 10 Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, etal. 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell 
Date Code User Judge 
7/10/2014 NOTA KCONNOR NOTICE OF APPEAL Randall W. Robinson 
KCONNOR Filing: L2 -Appeal, Magistrate Division to District Randall W. Robinson 
Court Paid by: Creason, Theodore 0. (attorney 
for Cornell, Kareen) Receipt number: 0002085 
Dated: 7/10/2014 Amount: $81.00 (Cashiers 
Check) For: Cornell, Kareen (other party) 
BREF KCONNOR Appellant's Brief Michael J Griffin 
7/14/2014 MISC BARBIE Clerk's Transmittal of Court File and Certificate of Michael J Griffin 
Appeal to District Court 
7/22/2014 SCHE BARBIE Scheduling Order Michael J Griffin 
HRSC BARBIE Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Michael J Griffin 
09/09/2014 10:00 AM) 
8/5/2014 BREF BARBIE Respondent's Brief Randall W. Robinson 
8/7/2014 CONT BARBIE Continued (Oral Argument on Appeal Randall W. Robinson 
09/23/2014 10:30 AM) 
8/12/2014 BREF BARBIE Appellant's Reply Brief Randall W. Robinson 
8/21/2014 BARBIE Notice Of Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
9/11/2014 ORDR CHRISTY Order Staying Appeal Michael J Griffin 
9/22/2014 JDMT BARBIE Judgment Michael J Griffin 
SCAN BARBIE Scanned: 12-30-2014 Michael J Griffin 
9/23/2014 HRHD CHRISTY Hearing Held: Scheduling Conference (OFF THE Michael J Griffin 
RECORD) 
CONT CHRISTY Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal Michael J Griffin 
scheduled on 09/23/2014 10:30 AM: Hearing 
Continued to 10/15/2014@ 11:30 a.m. 
HRSC CHRISTY Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument-on Appeal Michael J Griffin 
10/15/2014 11 :30 AM) Hearing will be conducted 
in Nez Perce County 
10/15/2014 HRHD CHRISTY Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal Michael J Griffin 
scheduled on 10/15/2014 11 :30 AM: Hearing 
Held Hearing will be conducted in Nez Perce 
County 
DCHH CHRISTY Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal Michael J Griffin 
scheduled on 10/15/2014 11 :30 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Keith Evans 
Number of Transcript Pages for hearing 
estimated: 
LESS THAN 100 Hearing will be conducted in 
Nez Perce County 
CMIN CHRISTY Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal Michael J Griffin 
scheduled on 10/15/201411:30AM: Court 
Minutes Hearing will be conducted in Nez Perce 
County (Nez Perce County clerk will email 
minutes from hearing.) 
10/24/2014 MEMO CHRISTY Memorandum Opinion Michael J Griffin 
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Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2012-0000277 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, eta!. 
User: BARBIE 
In The Matter Of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell 
Date Code User Judge 
10/24/2014 SCAN CHRISTY Scanned: 11-7-2014 Michael J Griffin 
ORDR BARBIE Order Re: Appeal - Magistrate's Order of June 16, Michael J Griffin 
2014 Affirmed 
SCAN BARBIE Scanned: 11-7-2014 Michael J Griffin 
12/2/2014 BARBIE Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Michael J Griffin 
Supreme Court Paid by: Creason, Theodore 0. 
(attorney for Cornell, Kareen) Receipt number: 
0003458 Dated: 12/3/2014 Amount: $129.00 
(Cashiers Check) For: Crone!!, John Henry (other 
party) 
NOTA BARBIE NOTICE OF APPEAL Michael J Griffin 
APSC BARBIE Appealed To The Supreme Court Michael J Griffin 
BNDC BARBIE Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 3459 Dated Michael J Griffin 
12/3/2014 for 434.90) 
12/3/2014 CCOA BARBIE Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal Michael J Griffin 
12
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorneys for John Hemy Cornell 
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t?oQ C:: .:,--:·: DY ___ ,.,.......__ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED 
ADMINISTRATION AND REMOVAL OF 
TRUSTEE 
Petitioner, John Henry Cornell, states and represents to the Court that: 
1. Petitioner's interest in this matter is that of a beneficiary under The Revocable 
Family Trust of Michael S. and Arlie M. Cornell. 
2. Arlie M. Cornell died on November 9, 2008 and Michael S. Comeii died on 
December 15, 2009. 
3. Under the terms of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie 
M. Cornell, dated November 1, 1996, hereinafter "The Trust," Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. 
Cornell, or the survivor between them, were Co-Trustees. The Trust further provided that upon 
the death or incapacity of the last survivor of the initial trustees, Toni C. Johnson and John H. 
Cornell would act as successor trustees. Toni C. Johnson is 50 years old and John H. Cornell is 
47 years old. 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION 
AND REMOVAL OF TRUSTEE -- 1 
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Petition Supervised Admin & Removal.docx 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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4. After the death of Arlie M. Cornell, Michael S. Cornell modified The Trust to 
appoint Toni C. Johnson as successor trustee upon his death or incapacity, and John H. Cornell 
as trustee in the event Toni C. Johnson could not act. 
5. Section 1.06 of The Trust provides that amendments to The Trust could be made 
"during the joint lives of the Trustors" ( emphasis added). 
6. Toni C. Johnson has been serving as sole successor trustee since the death of 
Michael S. Cornell. 
7. No inventory of the assets in The Trust at the time of the death of Michael S. 
Cornell has been provided. 
8. The Trust, Section 4.03 provides as follows: 
On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the Trustee 
shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal 
remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the 
following beneficiaries: TONI C. JOHNSON AND JOHN H. CORNELL. 
9. The main asset of The Trust is house and real property. Toni C. Johnson has been 
residing in the house since Michael S. Cornell's death. The property remains in the name of The 
Trust and has not been distributed to the two beneficiaries. Toni C. Johnson has paid no rent 
during her tenancy of the premises. 
10. Toni C. Johnson has mismanaged The Trust in that she has used a substantial 
amount of the monies available to pay both expenses of maintaining the real property, where she 
has resided for two and one half years, and to pay her personal expenses. No money has been 
distributed to John Henry Cornell. 
11. Toni C. Johnson has breached her fiduciary duty to settle and distribute The Trust 
in accordance with the terms of The Trust. 
12. The best interest of The Trust would be served by removal of Toni C. Johnson as 
Trustee. Margaret Watkins, the sister of Arlie M. Cornell, is qualified to succeed Toni C. 
Johnson as trustee. Margaret Watkins has offered to serve as Trustee to preserve the assets of the 
Trust and save The Trust money. 
13. The Trust should be subject to supervised administration because supervised 
administration is necessary for the protection of the beneficiaries in the estate. 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION 
AND REMOVAL OF TRUSTEE -- 2 
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Petition Supervised Admin & Removal.docx 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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14. That John Henry Cornell has incurred legal fees and costs as a result of the 
wrongful conduct of Toni C. Johnson as trustee and should be compensated for those expenses. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests that: 
1. The Court fix a time and place for hearing. 
2. Toni C. Johnson be removed as trustee for cause. 
3. Margaret Watkins be appointed as successor trustee, to act without bond. 
4. The Court order the delivery of the assets and records of The Trust to Margaret 
Watkins. 
5. The Court order that The Trust be subject to supervised administration. 
6. The Court order legal fees and costs incurred personally by Petitioner caused by 
the wrongful actions of Toni C. Johnson be paid by Toni C. Johnson, personally, or from Toni C. 
Johnson's share of The Trust. 
7. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED this q~ day of~ , 2012. 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION 
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
By /j~t,J-~ 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
AND REMOVAL OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE -- 3 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho N:\Comell , John\Pleadings\Petition Supervised Admin & Removal.docx 
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VERIFICATION 
JOHN HENRY CORNELL, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says: 
That he is the Petitioner in the above-entitled matter, that he has read the foregoing 
Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee, well knows the contents thereof, 
and verily believes that the facts therein stated are true. 
) ss. 
) 
I, AlfUJ L LA Uc ~ ' a notary public, do hereby certify that on this 
__ day of June9o12, personally appeared before me JOHN HENRY CORNELL, who, being 
by me first duly sworn, declared that he is the Petitioner in the foregoing document and that the 
statements therein contained are true. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal on 
the day and year first above written. 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION 
AND REMOVAL OF PERSONAL REPRESENT A TNE -- 4 
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Petition Supervised Admin & Removal.docx 
AMYL. LAWE 
Notary Public State of Nevada 
No. 07-1423-1 
My Appt. Exp. December 7, 20·14 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorneys for Petitioner, 
John Henry Cornell 
CARR.IE 8:-ci 
CLERK - DISTRICT CCL!F:T 
CLE/~RW/,T~R ccu::TY 
ORO;:T:O, ID.a.HO 
2012 JUL 11 Pi11 Y 51 
CASE tW. (.J./ 2_·:}..ll 
BY 1uO DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
TO: TONIC. JOHNSON: 
NO. ~l/lO)l,l.11 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTE that on Tuesday, August 21, 2012, at the hour of 
3:30 p.m. (Pacific), or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, at the courtroom of the above 
entitled court, in Orofino, County of Clearwater, Idaho, the court will call on for hearing the 
petitioner, John Henry Cornell's, Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of 
Trustee. 
DATED this 10th day of July, 2012. 
NOTICE OF HEARING -- 1 
N:\Comell , John\Pleadings\Notice ofHearing.docx 
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Byfu zJ.~ 
. 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 




JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
I '-- :.J 
I r--
/~. AUG16 2~ · 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 




Case No. CV 2012-00277 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
Karin Seubert of the Law Firm of Jones, Brower & Callery, P .L.L.C. , hereby enters an 
appearance as attorney of record for the respondent, TONI C. JOHNSON in the above entitled 
matter. 
DATED this I~ day of August, 2012. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Karin Seubert 
Attorney for Respondent 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE -1-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
APPEARANCE was, this 1.r- day of August, 
2012, 
~ hand-delivered by providing a 
to: 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By ~ ~ 
Karin Seubert 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE -2-
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Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
. ___ Cl/ t 1- ~ J 1-=r .. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
MOTION TO CONTINUE AND 
TO SET SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Karin Seubert of Jones, 
Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l), hereby moves this Court to continue 
the hearing on petitioner's Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee currently 
scheduled for August 21 , 2012 at 3:30 p.m. until such time as is determined at a scheduling 
conference to be set at the earliest date convenient to the court and counsel. 
This Motion to Continue is made for the reason that Respondent ' s counsel has only recently 
been retained and the current hearing setting does not allow sufficient time for said counsel to 
prepare for said hearing in order to protect Respondent's interests. 
MOTION TO CONTINUE AND TO SET 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE -1-
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DATED this / S- day of August, 2012. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO 
CONTINUE AND TO SET SCHEDULING 
CONFERENCE was, this __j£ day of August, 
2012, 
/ hand-delivered by providing a 
to: 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By r~~M~ 
Karin Seubert 
MOTION TO CONTINUE AND TO SET 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE -2-
Karin Seubert 
Attorney for Respondent 
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RUG-·17-2012 12:09 From:RHERIN RICE RNEGON 2087463650 
AHERIN, RlCE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston! ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorney for John Henry Cornell 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OP CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO CONTINUE 
AND TO SET SCHEDULING 
CONFERENCE 
COMES NOW the attorney for John H. Cornell, Darrel W. Aherin of Ahcrin, Rice & 
Anegon, and responds to the Motion to Continue filed by Toni C. Johnson. 
The status of the trust property may be compromised by delay in getting the issue before 
the Court John H. Cornell objects to a continuation of his petition and requests the opportunity 
to provide the Court with the back ground so the Court can assist the parties in getting this matter 
re!-lolved. 
OBJECTION TO CONTINUE AND TO SET SCHEDULING 
CONFERENCE -- I 
N:\Comell, John\Pkadings\Objcction to Motion to Continue and to Set Scheduling 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
22
AUG-17-2012 12:09 From:AHERIN RlCE ANEGON 2087463650 To:lc:084769315 
DATED this / (p ~ay of August, 2012. 
::E&JJ~L 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DARREL W. AHERJN, hereby certify that on the //:, ~ day of August, 2012, I 
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC., 
Attorney at Law 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
0 U.S. Mail 
D _)land Delivery 
r.g,/" Facsimil~ 
OBJECTION TO CONTINUE AND TO SET SCHEDULING 
CONFERENCE -- 2 
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Objection to Motion to Continue and to Set Scheduling 
Aherln, Rice & Anegon 




JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
ORDER CONTINUING HEARING AND 
SETTING SCHEDULING 
CONFERENCE 
The Court having reviewed Respondent's Motion to Continue Hearing and to Set 
Scheduling Conference and good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing on 
petitioner's Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee currently set for August 
21, 2012 at 3:30 p.m. is hereby vacated and a telephonic scheduling conference is hereby set for the 
1 . . 0 vCD ber ~ S'~- day of~ t, 2012 at the hour o± lo·~po_ a.m~. Counsel for respondent shall initiate 
the telephone call. 
DATED this l/(5( day of August, 2012. 
JUDGE RANDALL ROBINSON 
ORDER CONTINUING HEARING & 
SETTING SCHEDULING CONFERENCE -1-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
CONTINUING HEARING AND SETT]J1G 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE was, thi~ day 
of August, 2012, 
hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
_X_ mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
-to: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho St. 
P.O. Box 854 
By ~ 
ORDER CONTINUING HEARING & 
SETTING SCHEDULING CONFERENCE -2-
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorneys for Petitioner, 
John Hemy Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE -- I 
N :\Cornell , John\Pleadings\Affidavit of Service.docx ser 
NO. 2012-277 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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Case No. ()J \Z,,2,,1 
F,ied j \ti,\ l:k _ 
at "\ c;--s o'clock h -M IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF~ VVl( itL-. Irr / STATE oF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE coUNTY oF cLEARWATEU L!....!.J_ ,roi~~ 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
By . f)Qj ,'fJ;uf,~.~ 
. _ . epu.y 
CASE NO. CV 2012-277 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and says: That he is now and at all times herein 
mentioned was a citizen of the United States, over the age of twenty-one years, not a party to or interested in the 
above entitled action and competent to be a witness therein; 
That on AUGUST 1, 2012, at 4:47 PM. at the address of .6 MILES UP DENT BRIDGE ROAD FROM JUNCTION WITH RIVERSIDE AVE., OROFINO, ID 83501 this affiant duly served a PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION AND REMOVAL OF TRUSTEE; AND NOTICE OF HEARING in the 
above-entitled action upon TONI C. JOHNSON by then and there personally delivering a true and correct copy thereof into the hands of and leaving same with said TONI C. JOHNSON . 
E. L. RENO, PROCESS SERVER 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to be~
~
 
Notary Public m and fo, the State ofldah; 
Residing at Lewiston, Idaho 
/~):1~ SERVICE: /(--/  
AFF-PERS-2/05 
RENO & ASSOCIATES 
P.O. BOX 104 
LEWISTON, ID 83501 
My commission expires: April 23, 2018 
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Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
By i/J C.rk-
DGpu!}' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of Nez Perce ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
AFFIDAVIT OF KARIN SEUBERT 
KARIN SEUBERT, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am the attorney of record for Respondent Toni C. Johnson in the above-entitled 
matter; 
2. Counsel for Petitioner John H. Cornell has confirmed that John H. Cornell died on or 
around August 20, 2012 leaving no issue. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of the Revocable Family 
Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell dated November 1, 2011. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and accurate copy of the First Amendment to 
the Revocable Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell dated August 6, 2009. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KARIN SEUBERT -1-
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DATED this )!/;t;t day of September, 2012. 
KARIN SEUBERT 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _/!;tj;ctay of September, 2012. 
-
·-
•, ' V =, --
.. -<::. 
,, . 
'' .,., ')11 ,,l\' 
CERTIFICATE'OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
KARIN SEUBERT was, this~ day of 
September, 2012, 
to: 
hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By ~~ 
Kaiin Seubert 







ARLIE M. CORNELL 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL and ARLIE M. CORNELL, husband and 
wife, residents of the State of California, County of Orange, desire to set forth a Trust upon the conditions and for the purposes hereafter set forth. This Trust will be known as the 
"MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL REVOCABLE TRUST DATED 
.,# d V' ' I ' 99 ' . II 
ARTICLE ONE 
Section 1.01 Trust Estate 
All property hereafter transferred or conveyed to and received by the Trustee to be held pursuant to the terms of this instrument is herein called the "Trust Estate" and shall be held, 
administered, and distributed by the Trustee as provided in this Declaration of Trust. 
Section 1.02 Meaning of Words 
a) The term "Husband" shall mean MICHAEL S. CORNELL; 
b) The term "Wife" shall mean ARLIE M. CORNELL; 
c) The term "Truster" shall refer individually and collectively to Husband and Wife. 
Section 1.03 Trustee Designation 
Husband and Wife are hereby designated as Co-Trustees of all trusts created by or to be created pursuant to this Declaration 
of Trust. Should either Husband or Wife become unable because of death, incapacity or other cause, to serve as such a Co-Trustee, 
or should either resign as such a Co-Trustee, before the natural termination of all trusts provided for in this Declaration, the 
remaining Co-Trustee, Husband or Wife, shall thereafter serve as 
sole Trustee as provided in this Declaration. The term "Trustee" 
as used in this Declaration shall refer collectively to Husband 
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and Wife so long as they shall serve as such Co-Trustees and thereafter to such of them as may serve as sole Trustee. This paragraph is subject to Section 9.01. 
Section 1.04 Additions to Trust Properties 
a) At any time during the continuance of any trust hereunder, its Trustees, in their sole discretion after consideration of the possible tax consequences thereof to all concerned, is authorized to receive additions of cash or other properties to such trust, 
subject to any conditions to which such Trustees may agree, from 
any source whatsoever without limitation, whether by gift, will, 
or otherwise. However, the Trustees shall accept all assets 
which any person or persons may give, devise, and/or bequeath by last will and testament to any trust or trusts hereunder as well 
as all assets which may be transferred to such trust or trusts pursuant to the express provisions of any other trust document or documents of any kind. 
b) Furthermore, at any time any person or persons may designate 
any trust hereunder as the beneficiary, primary or contingent, of 
any insurance, pension, or other death benefit, relating to the life of anyone (such designation to be presumed to be revocable 
unless it is expressly irrevocable) and, until such benefit 
matures by reason of death, the Trustees shall have no 
responsibility whatsoever with respect thereto, it being intended that, unless and until the trust which is the designated beneficiary of such death benefit becomes the owner of the insurance proceeds as actually become payable by reason of death. 
c) All additions, unless specifically designated to a certain trust or trusts hereunder or unless there is only one trust then in existence hereunder, shall be considered as made to the Trust 
as hereinafter defined. Any addition, including any income 
earned thereon prior to actual receipt of the addition by the trust, shall be added to the corpus of such trust and thereafter held, managed, and distributed by its Trustees as a part of the 
corpus to which the same is added. 
Section 1.05 Separate Property to Remain Separate 
All property now or hereafter conveyed or transferred to the Trustee to be held by the Trustee pursuant to this Declaration 
which was community property, quasi-community property, or 
separate property at the time of such conveyance or transfer, 
shall remain, respectively, community property, quasi-community property, or the separate property of the Trustor transferring 
such property to the Trustee. 
When separate property is held in the Trust, it may be withdrawn from the Trust on the sole signature of the Trustor who put it in the Trust. This applies to real property, as well as personal property. 
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Section 1.06 Amendment and Revocation 
At any time during the joint lives of the Trustors, jointly as to Community Property and individually as to his or her own separate property, Trustors may, by a duly executed instrument; 
a) Amend 
provisions) 
this trust agreement 
in any manner and/or 
(including its technical 
b) Revoke this trust agreement in part or in whole, in which latter event any and all trust properties shall forthwith revert to such Trustor free of trust. Such instrument of amendment o~ revocation shall be effective immediately upon its proper execution by Trustor(s), but until a copy has been received by a trustee, that Trustee shall not incur any liability or responsibility either (i) for failing to act in accordance with such instrument or (ii) for acting in accordance with the provisions of this trust agreement without regard to such instrument. 
ARTICLE TWO 
Section 2.01 Trust Income 
During the joint lives of the Trustors, the Trustee shall at least annually unless otherwise directed by both Trustors in writing, pay to or apply for the benefit of Husband and Wife, all of the net income from the Trust Estate in the same proportion as each of their respective interests in the Trust Estate. 
Section 2.02 Protection 
Incapacity 
of Truster in Event of 
During the joint lives of the Trustors, should either Trustor become incapacitated as defined in Section 2.03 below, the Trustee may, in the Trustee's discretion; 
a) Pay the entire net income of the Trust Estate in monthly or other convenient installments to the remaining competent Trustor; or 
b) Apply such portion of the net income, up to the whole thereof, of the Trust Estate as the Trustee may deem in his absolute discretion reasonable and proper for the benefit of the Trustor so adjudged to be incompetent or unable to manage his or her own affairs; or 
c) Declare void and without effect, any attempt by the Trustor to exercise the reserved rights of revocation, amendment, withdrawal of assets, control over Trustees, etc., unless a court of competent jurisdiction determines otherwise or Trustor's 
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disappearance constitutes incapacity. During any period of either Trustor's incapacity, this Trust is irrevocable and unamendable. As Trustors do not intend that any taxable gift be deemed made by reason of such irrevocability, it is expressly provided that, notwithstanding the foregoing, Trustors shall at all times have the power to appoint to any person, designated in any way in this agreement as a vested or contingent beneficiary, any and all assets contained in this trust at the time of Trustor's death, said power being exercisable, however, only by specific reference to said power in Trustor's will duly provided for probate. 
Section 2.03 Incapacity 
In.the event that any Trustee or any beneficiary hereunder comes into possession of any of the following: 
a) A court order, which such Trustee or beneficiary deems to be jurisdictionally proper and still concurrently applicable, holding a person to be legally incapacitated to act in his or her own behalf or appointing a guardian to act for him or her, or 
b) Duly executed, witnessed, acknowledged written certificates, at least one of which is then unrevoked, of two licensed physicians (each of whom represents that he or she is certified by a recogriized medical board), each certifying that such physician has examined a person and has concluded that, by reason of accident, or mental deterioration, or similar cause, such person had, at the date thereof, become incapacitated to act rationally and prudently in his or her own financial best interests, or 
c) Evidence which such Trustee or beneficiary deems to be creditable and still currently applicable that a person has disappeared, is unaccountably absent, or is being detained under duress where he or she is unable effectively and prudently to look after his or her own interests. 
Then, in that event and under those circumstances: 





b) Such incapacity shall be deemed to continue until such court order, certificates, and/or circumstances have become inapplicable or have been revoked, and 
c) The named successor trustee shall immediately become the Trustee, acting with all the rights and powers described herein. 
Any physician's aforesaid certificate may be revoked by a similar certificate to the effect that such person is no longer thus incapacitated, executed either by (i) the original certifying 
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physician or (ii) two other licensed, board certified physicians. 
No Trustee shall be under any duty to institute any inquiry into 
a person's possible incapacity, but the expense of any such 
inquiry reasonably instituted may be paid from trust assets. 
Payment for said inquiry refers both to a reasonable inquiry as 
to the incapacity of such individual and to that inquiry as to 
the revocation of such a Certificate. 
Section 2. 04 Protection in the Event of Catastrophic 
Illness 
If both Trustors are living and a catastrophic illness affects 
one of the Trustors, then the remaining Trustor may divide the 
Trust assets in such a way as to qualify the infirm Trustor for 
state assistance payments and may remove the infirm Trustor as a 
Trustee of this Trust. A catastrophic illness is one which is 
reasonably anticipated to extend for a period of six (6) months 
or longer, and which renders the affected Trustor incompetent or 
in need of full time care. If competent, a Trustor may make the 
determination to divide the Trust Estate in accordance with these 
provisions. If the Trustor affected by the catastrophic illness 
is not competent to manage his or her affairs, then the division 
shall be made by the person designated as the affected Trustor's 
attorney-in-fact in his or her durable power of attorney, or by a 
court appointed conservator of the affected Trustor. 
From and after the division of the Trust assets, the share of the 
Trust Estate set aside for each Trustor shall be his or her sole 
and separate property for all purposes, and if that property 
remains part of the Trust Estate, subject to the terms and 
conditions set forth within this trust agreement. The Trustor 
who is not infirm may use assets of the infirm Trustor to 
purchase an annuity or other assets which do not disqualify the 
infirm Trustor from state assistance. 
Section 2.05 Principal Invasion 
During the joint lives of the Trustors, should the net income of 
the Trust Estate be insufficient to provide for the care, 
maintenance or support of the Trustors as herein defined, the 
Trustee may, in the Trustee's absolute discretion, pay to or 
apply for the benefit of the Trustors, or either of them, or any 
of their dependents, such amounts from the principal of the 
Trust Estate as the Trustee may, in the Trustee's absolute 
discretion, from time to time deem necessary or advisable for 
the care, maintenance or support of the Trustors. As used in 
this section, the term "care, maintenance or support of the 
Trustors" shall mean: 
a) The providing of proper care, maintenance and support for 
the Trustors, or either of them, during any period of illness, or 
other want or necessity; 
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b) The maintenance of the Trustors, and each of them, in the 
manner of living to which they, and each of them, are accustomed 
on the date of this Declaration; 
c) The support and maintenance in the manner in which they are 
accustomed on the date of this Declaration whether adult or 
minor, dependent on the Trust ors, or either of them, for such 
support and maintenance; and 
d) The education in the manner desired by the Trustors of any person, whether adult or minor, dependent on the Trustors, or 
either of them, for such education. 
ARTICLE THREE 
Section 3.01 Provisions After First Death 
On the death of either Trustor, leaving the other Trustor 
surviving him or her, the then Trustee shall collect all insurance proceeds payable to the Trustee by reason of such death, all bequests and devises distributable to the Trust Estate 
under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Trustor and convey the assets according to the instructions set forth herein. The Trustee may use all income and principal for the benefit of the surviving Trustor. 
Section 3.02 Last Expenses 
On the death of the first of the Trustors to die, the Trust shall pay either from the income or principal of the Trust as the Trustee in the Trustee's absolute discretion may determine, the 
expenses of the deceased Trustor's last illness, funeral, burial 
and any inheritance, estate or death taxes that may be due by 
reason of the deceased Trustor' s death, unless that Trustee in his or her absolute discretion determines that other adequate provisions have been made for the payment of such expenses and 
taxes. 
Section 3.03 Surviving Spouse 
The Trustee shall hold, administer and distribute all Trust 
assets for the benefit of the surviving spouse, both as to income 
and principal, unless otherwise herein provided. 
ARTICLE FOUR 
Section 4.01 Second Death 
On the death of the Trustor last to die, herein called "Surviving Trustor", the principal of the Trust and any accrued or 
undistributed net income from the Trust shall go to the successor 
35
Trustee and the Trustee shall apply and distribute the net income 
and principal of the Trust Estate as set forth herein. 
Section 4.02 Payment of the Second Death Expenses 
On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trustee shall pay 
either from the income or principal of the Trust or partly from 
the income and partly from the principal of the Trust, as the 
Trustee in his or her absolute discretion may determine, the 
expenses of the Surviving Trustor's last illness, funeral, burial 
and any inheritance, estate or death taxes that may be due by 
reason of the inclusion of any portion of the Trust Estate in the 
Surviving Trustor' s estate for the purposes of any such tax, 
unless the Trustee in his or her absolute discretion determines 
that other adequate provisions have been made for the payment of 
such expenses and taxes. 
Section 4.03 Trust Income and Principal Distribution 
On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate 
and the Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the 
net income and principal remaining in the Trust into two(2) equal 
shares and distribute them to the following beneficiaries: 
TONIC. JOHNSON and JOHN H. CORNELL 
a) If any child, for whom a share of the Trust Estate has been 
set aside, should die prior to the above distribution, then the 
Trustee shall distribute all of such deceased child's share of 
the Trust Estate to his or her surviving issue in equal shares. 
If any issue are minors, the funds from the Trust Estate shall be 
held in a bank, savings and loan or money market fund and used 
for their care, welfare and college education. Any funds 
remaining shall be distributed at age 25. If there is no 
surviving issue, then all of the deceased child's share of the 
Trust Estate shall be added to the shares set aside for the 
benefit of the Trustors' other living child, as hereinabove 
provided, including proportionately both the distributed and the 
undistributed portions of each such share, to be distributed as 
an equal part of such other shares. 
b) If all of the Trustors' beneficiaries outlined above should 
die prior to final distribution of the Trust Estate, all of the 
Trust Estate not disposed of as hereinabove provided shall be 
distributed one-half (1/2) to the persons who would then be the 
husband's heirs and the other one-half (1/2) to the persons-who 
would then be the heirs of the wife. The identities and 
respective shares of the aforesaid heirs to be determined in 
accordance with the intestate succession laws of the State of 
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California then in effect relating to the succession of separate 
property not acquired from a predeceased spouse. If either of 
the Trustors have no such heirs, then all of the Trust estate 
shall be distributed to the aforesaid heirs of the other Trustor. 
Section 4.04 Trust Termination 
Unless sooner terminated as otherwise provided herein, all of the 
trusts provided for herein shall terminate on the death of the 
survivor of the Trustors and their children living at the date 
that any of the trusts created hereunder first becomes 
irrevocable. 
Section 4.05 Simultaneous Death 
Should both Trustors die simultaneously or under any 
circumstances rendering it difficult or impossible to determine 
which Trustor predeceased the other, each Trustor shall, for the 
purpose of disposing of his separate property be deemed to have 
predeceased the other Trustor. 
ARTICLE FIVE 
Section 5.01 Non-Income Producing Property 
During the lives of either of the Trustors, the Trustee is 
authorized to retain in the trusts provided for in this 
Declaration, for so long as the Trustee may deem advisable and in 
the best interest of such trusts, any property received by the 
Trustee from the Trustors, or either of them, whether or not such 
property is of the character permitted by law for the investment 
of trust funds. After the death of the last Trustor to die, the 
Successor Trustee may retain any such property in the trust 
provided for in this Declaration only so long as such property is 
productive of income, (subject to Section 5. 08 of Article 5 
herein) . 
Section 5.02 Trustee Powers 
The Trustee shall, with respect to any and all property which 
may at any time be held by the Trustee in trust pursuant to this 
Declaration, whether such property constitutes principal or 
accumulated income of any trust provided for in this Declaration, 
have power, exercisable in the Trustee's absolute discretion at 
any time and from time to time on such terms and in such manner 
as the Trustee may deem advisable to: 
a) Sell, convey, exchange, convert, improve, repair, partition, 
divide, allot, subdivide, create restrictions, easements, or 
other servitudes thereon, operate and control; 
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b) Lease for terms within or beyond the term of any trust 
provided for in this Declaration and for any purpose, including 
exploration for and removal of gas, oil and other minerals; and 
enter into any covenants and agreements relating to the property 
so leased or any improvements which may then or thereafter be 
erected on such property; 
c) Encumber or hypothecate for any trust purpose by mortgage, 
deed of trust, pledge or otherwise; 
d) Carry insurance of such kinds and in such amounts at the 
expense of the trusts provided for in this Declaration as the 
Trustee may deem advisable; 
e) Commence or defend at the expense of any trust provided for 
in this Declaration such litigation with respect to any such 
trust or any property of the Trust Estate as Trustee may deem 
advisable and employ, for reasonable compensation payable by any 
such trust, such counsel as the Trustee shall deem advisable for 
that purpose; 
f) So long as the original trustee or trustees are managing the 
Trust, they may invest and reinvest in common or preferred 
stocks, securities, investment trusts, bonds and other property, 
real or personal, foreign or domestic, including any undivided 
interest in any one or more common trust funds, whether or not 
such investments be of the character permissible for investments 
by fiduciaries under any applicable law, and without regard to 
the effect any such investment may have upon the diversification 
of investments. Trustees are specifically authorized to invest 
in Mutual Funds, Limited Partnerships, option accounts (covered 
or not), including, but not limited to, Currency, Index, Stocks, 
Futures, Commodities, Precious Metals, etc., traded on the 
Chicago Board of Trade or other nationally recognized Boards of 
Trade. Trustees expressly have the authority to trade on margin. 
g) Vote, by proxy or otherwise, in such manner as Trustee may 
determine to be in the best interests of the trust provided for 
in this Declaration, any securities having voting rights held by 
the Trustee pursuant to this Declaration; 
h) Pay any assessments or other charges levied on any stock or 
other security held by the Trustee in trust pursuant to this 
Declaration; 
i) Exercise or not exercise, as Trustee may deem best, any 
subscription, conversion or other rights or options which may at 
any time attach, belong or be given instruments held by it in 
trust pursuant to this Declaration; 
j) Participate in any plans or proceedings for the foreclosure, 
reorganization, consolidation, merger or liquidation of any 
corporation or organization that has issued securities held by 
the Trustee, or will issue securities to be held by Trustee in 
38
trust pursuant to the terms of this Declaration, to deposit 
securities with and transfer title or securities on such terms as 
Trustee may deem in the best interest of the trusts to any 
protective or other committee established to further or defeat 
any such plan or proceeding; 
k) Enforce any mortgage or deed of trust or pledge held by 
Trustee in trust pursuant to this Declaration and at any sale 
under any such mortgage, deed of trust or pledge, to bid and 
purchase at the expense of any trust provided for in this 
Declaration, any property subject to such security instrument; 
1) Compromise, submit to arbitration, release with or without 
consideration and otherwise adjust any claims in favor of or 
against any trust provided for in this Declaration; 
m) Distribute gifts of up to $10,000.00 per year per donee out 
of principal or interest or in any proportion of the two that the 
Trustee, in his sole discretion, deems advisable; 
n) Invest in and guarantee a business or Trustee of the Trust 






to any limitations expressly set forth in this 
and faithful performance of Trustee's fiduciary 
to do all such acts, take all such proceedings, and 
such rights and privileges as could be done, taken 
by an absolute owner of the trust property; and 
p) So long as both of the original Trustees are serving as 
Trustees hereunder, either of them shall have the power to bind 
the trust in any and all transactions, including, but not limited 
to ( 1) collecting receipts; ( 2) paying disbursements; ( 3) 
securing assets; (4) writing checks and making withdrawals from 
bank accounts; (5) purchasing, selling and pledging securities 
and other property; and (6) exercising any power conferred on the 
Trustees pursuant to the terms of this Declaration of Trust, and 
the action of either original Trustee may be relied upon by third 
parties dealing with those Trustees or either of them. 
q) The trustee is empowered to buy, sell, trade and deal in 
options, precious metals, stocks, bonds and securities of all 
nature (including "short" sales and speculative option 
transactions i.e. uncovered puts and calls, option spreads, 
option straddles, and option combinations) and commodities of 
every nature, and contracts for the future delivery of 
commodities of every nature on margin and otherwise; and for such 
purpose to maintain and operate margin and commodity accounts 
with brokers; and in connection therewith to borrow money and to 
pledge any and all stocks, bonds, securities, commodities and 
contracts for the future delivery thereof, held or purchased by 
the trustee, with such brokers as securities for loans and 
advances made to the trustee. 
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r) The successor trustee has the authority to enter the safe 
deposit box in Trust ors' names, individually or as Trustees of 
the Trust, and remove the contents thereof. 
Section 5.03 Power to Borrow 
The Trustee shall have the power to borrow money for any trust 
purpose ( including from the probate estate for the purpose of 
paying taxes) on such terms and conditions as the Trustee may 
deem proper from any person, firm or corporation, including the 
power to borrow money on behalf of one trust from any other trust 
provided for in this Declaration, and to obligate the trusts, or 
any of them, provided for in this Declaration to repay such 
borrowed money. 
Section 5.04 Power To Loan to Trusts 
The Trustee is authorized to loan or advance Trustee's own funds 
to any trust provided for in this Declaration for any trust 
purpose and to charge for such loan or advance the rate of 
interest that Trustee, at the time such loan or advance is made, 
would have charged had such loan or advance been made to a person 
not connected with such trusts having a net worth equal to the 
value of the principal of such trust. Any such loan or advance, 
together with the interest accruing on such loan or advance, 
shall be a first lien against the principal of the Trust to which 
such loan or advance is made and shall be repaid from the income 
or principal of such trust as in the discretion of the Trustee 
appears for the best interest of such trust and its 
beneficiaries. 
Section 5.05 
The Trustee is 
property from and 
Estate with or 
representative of 
Section 5.06 
Purchase of Securities 
authorized to purchase securities or other 
to make loans and advancements from the Probate 
without security to the executor or other 
the estate of either Trustor. 
Manner of Holding Title 
The Trustee may hold securities or other property held by Trustee 
in trust pursuant to this Declaration in Trustee's name as 
Trustee under this Declaration, in Trustee's own name without a 
designation showing it to be Trustee under this Declaration, in 
the name of Trustee's nominee, or the Trustee may hold such 
securities unregistered in such condition that ownership will 
pass by delivery. 
Section 5.07 Expense and Proceeds Allocation 
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this· Declaration, 
the Trustee shall allocate all receipts and expenditures received 
40
or incurred by Trustee in administering the trusts provided for 
in this Declaration to the income or principal of each such trust 
in the manner provided in this Declaration to the income or 
principal of each such trust in the manner provided by the 
Revised Uniform Principle and Income Act in effect on the date of 
this Declaration in the State of California. 
Section 5.08 Trustors' Residence 
After the death of the first Trustor to die, the Trustee is 
authorized to retain in any trust or trusts provided for in this 
Declaration for the personal use of the Surviving Trustor any 
property occupied by the Trustors as their principle place of 
residence at the time of death of the first Trustor to die for so 
long as the Surviving Trustor may desire to occupy such residence 
property. During such retention, the Trustee shall pay, from 
either the income or principal of the trust provided for in this 
Declaration as the Trustee may deem in the best interests of such 
trusts and their beneficiaries, all taxes and assessments levied 
or assessed against such property and all costs of keeping such 
property properly insured, maintained and repaired. Surviving 
Trustor shall not be obligated for payment of rent. On written 
request of the Surviving Trust or, the Trustee may sell such 
property and replace it with other property, to be retained in 
trust in the same manner as the replaced residence property, 
suitable in the Trustee's judgment as a residence for the 
Surviving Trustor. 
ARTICLE SIX 
Section 6.01 Coordination with Truster's Probate Estate 
a) At any time during the continuance of the original trust 
hereunder and after the first Trustor's death, its Trustees may 
distribute to the deceased Trustor's probate estate, as a 
beneficiary of such trust, cash and/or other property out of any 
assets then held by such trust, including any which are 
classified as postdeath trust income, to whatever extent such 
Trustees, in their sole and uncontrolled discretion, deem 
advisable in the best interest of Trustor's beneficiaries 
generally. 
b) To relieve Trustor's probate estate from the burden of 
paying them, any estate, inheritance, succession, or other 
similar death taxes which may be imposed as a result of Trustor's 
death, as well as funeral, last illness, and administrative 
expense, debts, and other proper charges against Trustor's 
estate, may at any time be paid out of any assets then held by 
the original trust hereunder, including any which are classified 
as postdeath trust income, to whatever extent the Trustees of the 
original Trust hereunder, in their sole and uncontrolled 
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discretion, deem advisable and in the best interest of the 
Trustor's beneficiaries generally. 
c) All other provisions hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, 
under no circumstances shall any restricted proceeds, as 
hereinafter defined, be either directly or indirectly (i) 
distributed to or for the benefit of Trustor's executors or 
Trustor's probate estate or (ii) used to pay any obligations of 
Truster's estate. The term "restricted proceeds" means: 
1) All qualified plans, individual retirement 
accounts, or similar benefits which are received or receivable by 
any Trustee hereunder which, if paid solely to a beneficiary 
"other than the executor" of the Trustor I s estate, would be 
excluded from Trustor's gross estate for federal estate tax 
purposes under Section 2039 of the Internal Revenue Code in 
effect at Trustor's death; and 
2) All proceeds of insurance on Trustor's life which, 
if paid to a beneficiary other than Trustor's estate, would be 
exempt from inheritance or similar death taxes under applicable 
state death tax laws. 
However, the term II restricted proceeds II shall not include any 
qualified plan or similar death benefits which would not in fact 
be excluded from Trustor' s gross estate under the applicable 
subsection of Section 2039 even though such benefits were 
receivable by a beneficiary other than Trustor' s executor nor 
shall it include any life insurance proceeds which would be 
subject to no greater state or federal death tax should this 
restriction not exist. 
Section 6.02 Direction to Minimize Taxes 
In the administration of the trust hereunder, its fiduciaries 
shall exercise all tax related elections, options, and choices 
which they have, in such manner as they in their sole but 
reasonable judgment (where appropriate, receiving advice of tax 
counsel) , believe will achieve the overall minimum in total 
combined present and reasonably anticipated (but appropriately 
discounted) future administrative expenses and taxes of all 
kinds, upon not only such trust, but also its beneficiaries, the 
other trusts hereunder and their beneficiaries and Trust or I s 
probate estate. Without limitation on the generality of the 
foregoing direction (which shall to that extent supersede the 
usual fiduciary duty of impartiality), such fiduciaries shall not 
be accountable to any person interested in any trust or in 
Trust or I s estate for the manner in which they shall carry out 
this direction to minimize overall taxes and expenses (including 
any decision they may make not to incur the expense of detailed 
analysis of alternative choices) and, even though their decisions 
in this regard may result in increased tax or decreased 
distribution to a trust, to the estate, or to one or more 
beneficiaries, there shall in no event be any compensation 
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readjustments or reimbursements between any of the trusts 
hereunder or any of the trust or estate accounts or beneficiaries 
by reason of the manner in which the fiduciaries thus carry out 
said direction. 
ARTICLE SEVEN 
Section 7.01 Incontestability 
The beneficial provisions of this instrument (and of Trustor' s 
Last Will and Testament) are intended to be in lieu of any other 
rights, claims, or interest of whatsoever nature, whether 
statutory or otherwise, except bona fide pre-death debts, which 
any beneficiary hereunder may have against or in Trustor's estate 
or the properties in trust hereunder. Accordingly, if any 
beneficiary hereunder asserts any claim (except a legally 
enforceable debt), statutory election, or other right or interest 
against or in Trustor's estate, Trustor's Will, or any properties 
of this Trust, other than pursuant to the express terms hereof or 
of said Will, or directly or indirectly contests, disputes, or 
calls into question, before any court, the validity of any 
provisions of this instrument or of said Will, then: 
a) Such beneficiary shall thereby absolutely forfeit any and 
all beneficiary interests of whatsoever kind and nature which 
such beneficiary might otherwise have under this instrument and 
the interests of the other beneficiaries shall be proportionately 
increased and/or advanced; 
b) All of the provisions of this instrument, to the extent that 
they confer any benefits, powers, or right whatsoever upon such 
claiming, electing, or contesting beneficiary, shall thereupon 
become absolutely void and revoked; and 
c) Such claiming, electing, or contesting beneficiary, 
acting as a Trustee hereunder, shall automatically cease 
Trustee and shall thereafter be ineligible either to 
remove or become a Trustee hereunder. 
if then 
to be a 
select, 
The foregoing shall not be construed, however, to limit the 
appearance of any beneficiary as a witness in any proceeding 
involving this instrument or said Will nor to limit any 
beneficiary's appearance in any capacity in any proceeding solely 
for the construction of either of said documents. 
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ARTICLE EIGHT 
Section 8 . 01 Accrued Income on 
Beneficial Interest 
Termination of 
Whenever the right of any beneficiary to payments from the net 
income or principal of any trust provided for in this Declaration 
shall terminate either by reason of death or other cause, any 
accrued net income from such trust undistributed by the Trustee 
on the date of such termination shall be held, administered and 
distributed by the Trustee in the same manner as if such income 
had accrued and been received by the Trustee after the date such 
beneficiary's right to receive payments from such trust 
terminated. 
Section 8.02 Periodic Accountings 
A Trustee shall be entitled to pay himself reasonable 
compensation from time to time without prior court order and 
shall be reimbursed for all out-of-pocket expenses incurred in 
administering the Trust. 
During the lifetime of either Trustor, the Trustees shall account 
only to the Settlors or the survivor of them, and their written 
approval shall be final and conclusive in respect to transactions 
disclosed in the account as to all beneficiaries of the trust, 
including unborn and contingent beneficiaries. After the deaths 
of both Trustors, the Trustees shall render an accounting from 
time to time but not less frequently than annually after any 
prior accounting regarding the transactions of any trust created 
in this instrument. 
Accountings shall be made by delivering a written accounting to 
each beneficiary entitled to current income distribution, or if 
there are no current income beneficiaries, to each beneficiary 
entitled to current distribution out of income or principal in 
the Trustees' discretion. If any person entitled to receive an 
accounting is a minor or is under a disability, the accounting 
shall be delivered to his parents or the guardian of his person 
if he is a minor or to the guardian or conservator of his person 
if he is under any other disability. Unless any beneficiary, 
including parents, guardians or conservators of beneficiaries, 
shall deliver a written objection to the Trustees within sixty ( 60) days after receipt of the Trustees' account, the account 
shall be final and conclusive in respect to the transactions 
disclosed in the account as to all beneficiaries of the trust 
including unborn and unascertained beneficiaries. After 
settlement of the account by agreement of the parties objecting 
to it or by the expiration of the sixty (60) day period, the 
Trustees shall no longer be liable to any beneficiary of the 
trust including unborn and unascertained beneficiaries, in 
respect to transactions disclosed in the account, except for the 
Trustees' intentional wrongdoing or fraud. 
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Section 8.03 Spendthrift Provision 
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Declaration, no 
beneficiary of any trust provided for in this Declaration shall 
have any right, power or authority to alienate, encumber or 
hypothecate his or her interest in the principal or income of 
such trust in any manner, nor shall such interest of any 
beneficiary be subject to claims of his or her creditors or 
liable to attachment, execution or other process of law. 
Section 8.04 Distribution in Kind or Cash 
On any division of the assets of the Trust Estate into shares or 
partial shares and on any final or partial distribution of the 
assets of the Trust Estate or any trust provided for in this 
Declaration, the Trustee, in its absolute discretion, may divide 
and distribute such assets in kind, may divide or distribute 
undivided interests of such assets, or may sell all or any part 
of such assets and make di vision or distribution in cash or 
partly in cash and partly in kind. The decision of the Trustee, 
either prior to or on any division or distribution of such 
assets, as to what constitutes a proper division of such assets 
of the Trust Estate or any trust provided for in this Declaration 
shall be binding on all persons in any manner interested in any 
trust provided for in this Declaration. 
Section 8.05 Definition of Children 
The terms "child" and "children" as used in this Trust shall mean 
the lawful issue of the Trustors or either of them and include 
children legally adopted by the Trustors or either of them. 
ARTICLE NINE 
Section 9.01 Trustees 
The following will act as Trustees in the fallowing order of 
succession: 
FIRST: The undersigned, MICHAEL S. CORNELL, 
ARLIE M. CORNELL, Wife, together as co-trustees. 
Husband and 
SECOND: At the death or incapacity of the last survivor of the 
undersigned, TONIC. JOHNSON and JOHN H. CORNELL shall act as Co-
Trustees. 
THIRD: A trustee chosen by the majority of beneficiaries, with 
a parent or legal guardian voting for minor beneficiaries; 
provided, however, that the issue of any deceased child shall 
have collectively only one vote. 
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ARTICLE TEN 
Section 10.01 Perpetuities Savings Clause 
In any event and anything to the contrary herein contained 
notwithstanding, the trusts created in this agreement shall 
terminate upon the day next preceding the expiration of twenty-
one (21) years after the death of the undersigned and their issue 
now living. In the event these trusts shall not have previously 
terminated in accordance with the terms provided for in this paragraph, the Trustee shall distribute the Trust Estate as it 
shall then be constituted, together with any net income, to the beneficiaries then entitled to the income from the Trust Estate in the same proportions in which they are entitled to such income. 
ARTICLE ELEVEN 
Section 11.01 Governing Law 
It is not intended that the laws of only one particular state 
shall necessarily govern all questions pertaining to all of the 
trusts hereunder. Rather; 
a) The validity of the trust hereunder, as well as that 
validity of the particular provisions of that trust, shall be governed by the laws of whatever state having any sufficient 
connection with such trust will support such validity. 
b) The meaning and effect of the terms of this trust instrument 
and of any other trust instrument related hereto shall be governed by the laws of the state in which the initial trust 
under that trust instrument was created, that is, California in 
the case of this instrument, and such other state as may be designated in the governing instrument of any trust receiving an 
appointment hereunder. 
c) The administration of the trust hereunder shall be governed by the laws of the state in which that trust is then being 
administered (based on the location of the principal off ice of 
the Trustee then having custody of that Trust's principal assets 
and records), which state's courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over that administration of the trust with respect 
to any period during which it was thus being administered in that 
state. 
The foregoing shall apply even though the situs of some trust 
assets or the home of the Trustor, a trustee, or beneficiary may 
at some time or times be elsewhere. 
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Section 11.02 Invalidity of Any Provision 
Should any provision of this Declaration be or become invalid or 
unenforceable, the remaining provisions of this Declaration shall 
be and continue to be fully effective. 
Section 11.03 Successor Trustees 
Any successor Trustee taking office pursuant to Article Nine of 
this Declaration shall forthwith succeed to all title of the 
prior Trustee and shall have all the power, rights, discretions 
and obligations conferred on such Trustee by this Declaration. 
1. We, and each of us, have read the foregoing Declaration of 
Trust; The foregoing Declaration of Trust correctly states the 
terms and conditions under which the Trust Estate is to be held, 
managed, administered and disposed of by the Trustee; 
2. We, and each of us, approve such Declaration of Trust in all 
particulars; and 
3. As the Trustee named in such Declaration of Trust, we and 
each of us, approve and accept the trusts provided for in such 
Declaration. 
EXECUTED ON THIS I J ,_- DAY OF ------'-# __ ,_,/_. _____ , 19 -rl,, AT 
.$'0\t\):.... A,,A.... , CALIFORNIA. 
BY: __ ~---"-'-----L-=-'L---.,...~,::_-------- TRUSTEE MICHAELS. CORNELL 
BY: _ .... &L=---~-"---~hJ.,,_,___.__--t~-~.df.--. .... 'L.-'~ I/ _______ TRUSTEE iRLit' M. CORNiLt 
BY: __ ~---~~-~• ~~-~~---~,..(,~,/ ___ ~TRUSTOR 
MICHAELS. CORNELL 
BY:---4~64-4,.4.~....,,L"""'-'----"'--}1,J...:......fc__::,.............._~~".Ltt.C,£..J(A,r.e,_...,.~~···~·----TRUSTOR 
ARLIE M. CORNELL 
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ST A TE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
)SS 
COUNTY OF (J rr¥''7t,_ ) 
oN /I- , -9 G , BEFORE ME, hl ~ (}kw:-1J.,~ PERsoNALLY 
APPEARED MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL __x_ PERSONALLY ~o\_m TO ME OR 
PROVED TO ME ON THE BASIS OF SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE TO BE THE PERSONS WHOSE 
NAMES ARE SUBSCRIBED TO THE WITHIN INSTRUMENT, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY EXECUTED 
THE SAME IN THEIR AUTHORIZED CAPACITIES, AND THAT BY THEIR SIGNATURES ON THE 
INSTRUMENT THE PERSONS, OR THE ENTITY UPON BEHALF OF WHICH THE PERSONS ACTED, 
EXECUTED THE INSTRUMENT. 
WITNESS MY 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Hurd Tllorntc~ ? 
Comr.i. &10782:'J 
~-wnOTARY PU6L!8. C!,!..':'O:,;;;,\ !) 
ORAN"r: CO',,,_ ( 0 
Comm. E
0
x~.-J2~.'--.:..·:. :::ooo _. 
.( 
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:MEMORANDUM OF TRUST 
THIS AGREEMENT made this /J'J,---day of __ ~;{ __ t_V ____ , 19~1"h, by and between MICHAELS. CORNELL and ARLIE M. CORNELL, as 
Trustors and Trustees. 
WITNESSETH THAT: 
1. Contemporaneously herewith Trustors and Trustees have entered into a 
Revocable Living Trust known as 
the ''MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL REVOCABLE TRUST dated /l-l-~" I I 
2. This Memorandum of Trust is executed as evidence of the existence of the 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL REVOCABLE TRUST, the terms and 
conditions of which are hereby incorporated herein by this reference. 
3. Said Trust Agreement grants to the Trustee all of the powers contained 
in West's Annotated California Probate Code Sections 16,200 et seq., all of 
which are incorporated herein by this reference. See Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto. 
4. Any person may rely on this Memorandum of Trust as proof of the 
existence of said Trust and is relieved of any obligation to verify that any 
transaction entered into by the Trustee is consistent with the terms and 
conditions of said Trust. 
5. The Co-Successor Trustees are TONIC. JOHNSON and JOHN H. CORNELL. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Trustors and the Trustees have signed this Memorandum 
of Trust the day and year first above written. 
;;a::;7~ 
MICHAELS. CORNELL ARLIE M. CORNELL 
ST ATE OF CALIFORNIA) 
)SS 
COUNTY OF g'Y--"'1 () 
ON II- I _... q C, I BEFORE ME, \\-...,....,.--,< Qk"+-°""' I PERSONALLY APPEARED MICHAEL S. CORNELL and ARLIE M. CORNELL ' PERSONALLY KNOWN TO 
ME OR ----X.-- PROVED TO ME ON THE BASIS OF SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE TO BE THE 
PERSONS 'WHOSE NAMES ARE SUBSCRIBED TO THE WITHIN INSTRUMENT, AND ACKNOWLEDGE 
THAT THEY EXECUTED THE SAME IN THEIR AUTHORIZED CAPACITY, AND THAT BY THEIR 
SIGNATURES ON THE INSTRUMENT THE PERSONS, OR THE ENTITY UPON BEHALF OF WHICH 
THE PERSONS ACTED, EXECUTED THE INSTRUMENT. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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EXHIBIT "A" TO MEMORANDUM OF TRUST 
SUMMARY OF TRUST POWERS 
A) SELL, CONVEY, EXCHANGE, CONVERT, IMPROVE, REPAIR, PARTITION, DIVIDE, 
ALLOT, SUBDIVIDE, CREATE RESTRICTIONS, EASEMENTS, OR OTHER SERVITUDE 
THEREON, OPERA TE AND CONTROL; 
B) LEASE FOR TERMS WITHIN OR BEYOND THE TERM OF ANY TRUST PROVIDED FOR 
IN THIS DECLARATION AND FOR ANY PURPOSE, INCLUDING EXPLORATION FOR AND 
REMOVAL OF GAS, OIL AND OTHER MINERALS; 
C) ENCUMBER OR HYPOTHECATE FOR ANY TRUST PURPOSE BY MORTGAGE, DEED 
OF TRUST, PLEDGE OR OTHERWISE; 
D) CARRY INSURANCE OF SUCH KINDS AND IN SUCH AMOUNTS AT THE EXPENSE OF 
THE TRUSTS PROVIDED FOR IN THIS DECLARATION AS THE TRUSTEE MAY DEEM 
ADVISABLE; 
E) COMMENCE OR DEFEND AT THE EXPENSE OF ANT TRUST PROVIDED FOR IN THIS 
DECLARATION SUCH LITIGATION WITH RESPECT TO ANY SUCH TRUST OR ANY PROPERTY 
OF THE TRUST EST ATE AS TRUSTEE MAY DEEM ADVISABLE. 
F) SO LONG AS THE ORIGINAL TRUSTEE OR TRUSTEES ARE MANAGING THE TRUST, 
THEY MAY INVEST AND REINVEST IN COMMON OR PREFERRED STOCKS, SECURITIES, 
INVESTMENT TRUSTS, BONDS AND OTHER PROPERTY, REAL OR PERSONAL, FOREIGN OR 
DOMESTIC, INCLUDING ANY UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN ANY ONE OR MORE COMMON 
TRUST FUNDS, WHETHER OR NOT SUCH INVESTMENTS BE OF THE CHARACTER 
PERMISSIBLE FOR INVESTMENTS BY FIDUCIARIES UNDER ANY APPLICABLE LAW; 
G) VOTE, BY PROXY OR OTHERWISE, IN SUCH MANNER AS TRUSTEE MAY 
DETERMINE TO BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE TRUST; 
H) PAY ANY ASSESSMENTS OR OTHER CHARGES LEVIED ON ANY STOCK OR OTHER 
SECURITY HELD BY TRUSTEE PURSUANT TO THIS DECLARATION; 
I) EXERCISE OR EXERCISE AS TRUSTEE MAY DEEM BEST ANY SUBSCRIPTION, 
CONVERSION OR OTHER RIGHTS OR OPTIONS; 
J) PARTICIPATE IN ANY PLANS OR PROCEEDINGS FOR THE FORECLOSURE, 
REORGANIZATION, CONSOLIDATION, MERGER OR LIQUIDATION OF ANY CORPORATION 
OR ORGANIZATION THAT HAS ISSUED SECURITIES HELD BY THE TRUSTEE OR WILL ISSUE 
SECURITIES TO BE HELD BY TRUSTEE IN TRUST; 
K) ENFORCE ANY MORTGAGE OR DEED OF TRUST OR PLEDGE BY TRUSTEE IN TRUST; 
L) COMPROMISE, SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION, RELEASE WITH OR WITHOUT 
CONSIDERATION AND OTHERWISE ADJUST ANY CLAIMS; 
M) DISTRIBUTE GIFTS OF UP TO $10,000 PER YEAR PER DONEE OUT OF PRINCIPAL OR 
INTEREST OR IN ANY PROPORTION OF THE TWO THAT THE TRUSTEE, IN HIS SOLE 
DISCRETION, DEEMS ADVISABLE; 
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N) INVEST IN AND GUARANTEE A BUSINESS OR TRUSTEE OF THE TRUST CAPITALIZING ON THE BUSINESS VENTURE; 
0) TAKE ALL SUCH PROCEEDINGS, AND EXERCISE ALL SUCH RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS COULD BE DONE, TAKEN OR EXERCISED BY AN ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE TRUST PROPERTY; 
P) SO LONG AS BOTH OF THE ORIGINAL TRUSTEES ARE SERVING AS TRUSTEES HEREUNDER, EITHER OF THEM SHALL HA VE THE POWER TO BIND THE TRUST IN ANY AND ALL TRANSACTIONS, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO (1) COLLECTING RECEIPTS; (2) PA YING DISBURSEMENTS; (3) SECURING ASSETS; (4) WRITING CHECKS AND MAKING WITHDRAWALS FROM BANK ACCOUNTS; AND (5) PURCHASING, SELLING AND PLEDGING SECURITIES AND OTHER PROPERTY; 
Q) THE TRUSTEE IS EMPOWERED TO BUY, SELL, TRADE AND DEAL IN OPTIONS, PRECIOUS METALS, STOCKS, BONDS AND SECURITIES OF ALL MATURE (INCLUDING 
"SHORT" SALES AND SPECULATIVE OPTION TRANSACTIONS; 
R) HE SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE SAFE DEPOSIT BOX IN TRUSTORS' NAMES, INDIVIDUALLY OR AS TRUSTEES OF THE TRUST, AND REMOVE THE CONTENTS THEREOF; 
S) THE TRUSTEE SHALL HA VE THE POWER TO BORROW MONEY FOR ANY TRUST PURPOSE (INCLUDING FROM THE PROBATE ESTATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PA YING TAXES) ON SUCH TERMS AND CONDITIONS AS THE TRUSTEE MAY DEEM PROPER FROM ANY PERSON, FIRM OR CORPORATION; 
T) THE TRUSTEE IS AUTHORIZED TO LOAN OR ADVANCE TRUSTEE'S OWN FUNDS TO ANY TRUST PROVIDED FOR IN THIS DECLARATION FOR ANY TRUST PURPOSE AND TO CHARGE FOR SUCH LOAN OR ADVANCE TO THE TRUST; 
U) THE TRUSTEE IS AUTHORIZED TO PURCHASE SECURITIES OR OTHER PROPERTY FROM AND TO MAKE LOANS AND ADVANCEMENTS FROM THE PROBATE ESTATE WITH OR WITHOUT SECURITY TO THE EXECUTOR OR OTHER REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF EITHER TRUSTOR; AND 
V) THE TRUSTEE MAY HOLD SECURITIES OR OTHER PROPERTY HELD BY TRUSTEE IN TRUST PURSUANT TO THIS DECLARATION IN TRUSTEE'S NAME AS TRUSTEE UNDER THIS DECLARATION, IN TRUSTEE'S OWN NAME WITHOUT A DESIGNATION SHOWING IT TO BE TRUSTEE UNDER THIS DECLARATION, IN THE NAME OF TRUSTEE'S NOMINEE, OR THE TRUSTEE MAY HOLD SUCH SECURITIES UNREGISTERED IN SUCH CONDITION THAT OWNERSHIP WILL PASS BY DELIVERY; 
W) THE TRUSTEE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE ANY POWER OF ATTORNEY FORM FOR ANY ACCOUNT HELD IN TRUSTORS' NAMES IN ANY BANK; 
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FI~'T AMENDMEN'l' TO 
THE REVOCABLE TRUST O 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE . . CORNELL 
-,. 
~ 
This First Amendment to THE REVOCABLE TRUST OF 
M. CORNELL, dated this 6th day of August, 2009, is made 
Grantor and Surviving Trustee of THE REVOCABLE TRUS 
ARLIE M. CORNELL and accepted and consented to. by MI 
CaAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE 
Michael S. Cornell, as Siirviving 
OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND 
capacity as Surviving Grantor and Surviving Trustee, on this th day of August, 2009. 
By agree.ment with the Trustees dated Novc.mher 1, 1996, Granters, Michael S. Cornell 
and Arlie M. Cornell created and placed into effect ~fHE R OCABLE TRUST Of MICHAELS. 
CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL; Arlie M. Cornell hasp sed leaving Michael S. Cornell as 
Surviving Grantor and Surviving Trustee; and as Sur~iving rantor the said Michael S. Cornell 
desires to amend said trust agreement, and the Surviving Trustee is willing to accept and 
consent to such amendment. 
NOW, THEREFOR£, Surviving Grantor and Surviving rustee agree as follows: 
Article Nine Section 9.01 Trustees SECOND of THE R£ OCABLE TRUST OF MICHAELS. 
CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL shall be amended to read as follows: 
SECOND: At the death or incapacity of the undersign , TONI C. JOHNSON shall act as 
Tru:.tee/Successor Trustee. ln the event that TONI C. JOHNS N is unavailable or unwilling to 
act, then in that event,JOHN HENRY CORNELL shall act as T stee/Successor Trustee. 
AH other terms and provisions of THE REVOCABLE TR ST OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL 
AND ARLIE M. CORNELL shall remain in full force and effect. 
DATED this 61h day of August, 2009. 
FIRST AMENDMt:NT TO TH£ REVOCABLE 'l'KUST OF MlCUAEL S. CORNELL AND A.RUE M. CORNELL l'a8e l of 2 
Surviving 
EXHIBIT_L 
10 39~d S~3l~1S3 1~3~ 3Hl L0££9Lti80C: 
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' .,/ ? /j ......, (/1 '7' . '/ ,/_.,,,.J' , I L21df,.,. 4.;}' J . c.~,~f!ft . 
MICHAE S. CORNELL 
STATE Of IDAHO ) 
)ss. County of Clearwater ) 
On thi, L, 'P-',lay of ~ ,,-tr , ' 009, before me, a notary public in and for the State of Idaho, personally appeai d Michael S. ~ornell, k-nown or identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within · strument as Triistee for THE REVOCABLE TRUST OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M CORNELL, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same as such Trustee for 1'HE REVO · LE TRUST Of MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOf,.\l}fVC hereunto set my hand · d affixed my official seal the day and year in this certi~,qjii:~~; written. 
,,;;,.'It ...... ~':"~~,, ~ /:J/~o't•rti/~~~-'~ } , ,/\I\ .... ?- I .. ..- • ... · '· .. ,: ,\.l.~- '- V V'·· ····"r")-i.i.,-.,.&---·(-: : . ..... : :~= ?"-
·•-. -'.'---"'-........ .:-.=---:. ;, . -.. \C· .·· ·.E /Notary Pu lie man~ for Idaho. \ ~. ;VB\,: ,.• :p ~ Resi~g ~ · e~L-;~-:-...-~, _ ",,.. ~,.;..· • · · •. ,o~ "'' Comnuss1 n Expires: 'L. Lt, · 'Z..0 \ C '1,, .. c of· ' ,,, 111,,,;.H,\''' 
FIRST AMfNDMEN'r TO THE R.£VOCABLE Tl<UST OF MICHA£L S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M CORNELL Page 2 of 2 
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Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Karin Seubert of Jones, 
Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. , and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b), hereby moves this honorable Court for 
an order dismissing the Petition of the petitioner in the above-entitled action. The basis for this 
Motion is that the petitioner is now deceased and died without issue. Based thereon, all net income 
and principal remaining in the Trust Estate vest in Respondent by the express terms of the Revocable 
Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell. 
This Motion is supported by the Affidavit filed herewith. 
DATED this/!J;tzt day of September, 2012. 
' 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
By_~ ~ --~-" _W_~_ct_ 
Karin Seubert 
Attorney for Respondent 
MOTION TO DISMISS -1-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO 
DISMISS was, this~ ay of September, 2012, 
to: 
hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By \<~~ 
Karin Seubert 




JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
Cr1se No. C;.,J I 2- · JJ 7 
f; 1;~d 9/ n 112-- -
at <?:If o'clock _fl __ M 1 
{kr(i'C ~; i) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through 
her attorney of record,. Karin Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. will call up for 
hearing her Motion to Dismiss at the hour of 10:00 a.m. on October 1, 2012, before the 
Honorable Magistrate of the above Court 
DATED this /'IJ;I:: day of September, 2012. 
JONES, BROWER& CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
By~\<_~~~ -----'r+-'¥~.)j,~lte~~ ~ 
Karin Seubert 
Attorney for Respondent 
NOTICE OF HEARING -1-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
HEARING was, this }lit day of September, 2012, 
to: 
hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Ahe1in, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By_~+-----=---V\._.. -~ -
Karin Seubert 
NOTICE OF HEARING -2-
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SEP-27- 2012 12:55 From:AHERIN RICE ANEGON 2087463650 
AHERJN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorney for John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
MOTION TO VACATE RESPONDENT'S 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
COMES NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Ancgon, and moves the Court to 
vacate the hearing set by Respondent on her Motion to Dismiss. 
A telephonic scheduling conference is currently set for that date and time in this matter. 
Counsel for Toni C. Johnson, Karin Seubert, represented to the Court a pre-trial conference was 
requested before any further matters should be scheduled. 
Respondent has filed a motion seeking dismissal. The issue of the Petition for 
Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee of Toni C. Johnson, is still pending. 
Justice is served by the trustee providing a full accounting of the trust. Issues which need 
to be resolved are: 
(1) John H. Cornell has many creditors that are entitled to payment out of his share of 
the trust; 
MOTION TO VACATE HEARING ON 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS --
N:\corncn. John\Plcadings\Motion to V11cute Hearing on Motion to Di!mliss.d11cx ser 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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SEP-27-2012 12:55 From:RHERIN RICE RNEGON 2087463650 To:12084769315 
(2) The Trust of Michael and Arlie Cornell owe Margaret Watkins over $9,000 for a 
loan made by her to Michael Cornell; and 
(3) There is an issue that five acres of the real property is the separate property of 
John H. Cornell. 
A hearing on Petitioner's Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee 
should be set, simultaneously, during the telephonic scheduling conference currently set for 
October 1, 2012. 
The undersigned needs additional time to respond to the Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this d?-6-- day of September, 2012. 
:E;t;;;JN~ 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the ;2 7'-0.: day of September, 2012., I 
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC., 
Attorney at Law 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
MOTION TO VACATE HEARING ON 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS -- 2 
0 U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
~Facsimile 
~e~-~ 
DARREL W. AHERIN 
N:\Corncll. John\Plcadinss\Motion 10 Vucate Mearing on Motion to Dismiss.du~x str 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, ld~ho 
59
SEP-27-2012 12:55 From : RHERIN RICE RNEGON 2087463650 
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, IO 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
TSB# 1 S34 
Attorney for John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
Tn the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFTDA VTT OF 
KARIN SEUBERT 
COMES NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice and Anegon, and hereby moves the 
Court for an order striking Paragraph 2 of the Affidavit of Karin Seubert. 
Paragraph 2 of the Affidavit provides hearsay evidence and is not admissible . 
Oral argument is requested. 
~ DATED this (). 7 :...---day of September, 2012. 
MOTTON TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 
KARIN SEUBERT -- I 
N:\Comc:11, Jo)rn\Plc.~dings\MotiQn tQ Strike Seubert Aniduvi1.docx scr 
AHERTN, RICE & ANEGON 
By JlJLJ o.L 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Aherln, Rice & Anegon 
Attorney~ c1t l..aw 
Lewiston, Idaho 
60
SEP-27-2012 12:56 From:RHERIN RICE ANEGON 2087463650 To:12084769315 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~--1. DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the ;27 day of September, 2012, I 
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC., 
Attorney at Law 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDA VJT OF 
KARIN SEUBERT-- 2 
N :\Camell, John\Pleadings\Motion Lo Striko: So:ubert /\ffidavit.,,;locx ,er 
D U.S. Mail 
D !::Jand Delivery 
~Facsimile 
U Federal Express 
&~H~.~ 
Aherln, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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SECONL' ~ICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE IDAHO 
IN An.o FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWA.1.t,,R r--------.......,.....~ 
In The Matter Of 
Family Trust of 
150 MICIDGAN A VE 
OROFINO, IDAHO 83544 
Case No: CV-201 -






NOTICE OF SUM:MARY JUDGEMENT 
HEARING 




Tuesday, November 27, 2012 
Randall W. Robinson 
Magistrate Courtroom 
01:00 PM 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on October 3rd, 2012. 
DARREL W. AHERIN 
P.O. BOX 698 1212 IDAHO ST. 
LEWISTON ID 83501 -0698 
(208) 746-3650 .... 
KARIN SEUBERT 
P.O. BOX 854 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
Mailed 
(208) 746-0962 ~ Mailed 
Hand Delivered Faxed 
Hand Delivered Faxed 
Dated: October 3rd, 2012 
Carrie Bird 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: 
DOC22cv 7 /96 
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorney for Jol"m. Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
TO: TONI JOHNSON 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM 
OF TONI JOHNSON 
AND TO: KARIN SEUBERT, Attorney for Toni Johnson 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the deposition testimony of TONI JOHNSON will 
be taken on oral examination before an official court reporter and notary public in and for the 
State of Idaho, or some other official authorized by law to administer oaths, at the date, time, and 




October 22, 2012 
10:00 a.m. 
Clearwater County Courthouse 
150 Michigan Avenue 
Orofino, Idaho 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF TONI JOHNSON -- 1 
N:\Comell , John\Pleadings\Notice of Deposition Toni Johnson.docx ser 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 




You are further commanded to bring with you at said time and place the following: 
1) A complete inventory of ALL personal property of Michael S. Cornell and The 
Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell as of the date of death of 
Michael S . Cornell on December 15, 2009; and 
2) Copies of all bank statements of Michael S. Cornell, Arlie M. Cornell and The 
Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell from October 15, 2009 to 
date. 
This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and shall be 
subject to continuance until completed. 
r~h 
DATED this J Y day of October, 2012. 
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
By e<!JeuJ U. ~ 
Darrel W . Aherin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the ·1r7 day of October, 2012, I 
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery 
Attorney at Law 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Keith Evans 
Court Reporter 
380 Clear Creek Road 
Kooskia, ID 83539 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF TONI JOHNSON -- 2 
N:\Comell , John\Pleadings\Notice of Deposition Toni Johnson.docx ser 
D U.S. Mail 
D J-Iand Delivery 
LW Facsirniie 
D Federal Express 
~ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 
D Federal Express 
~ &J ol--
DARREL W. AHERIN 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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10-12-'12 12:09 FROM-JB & C 
Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
2087469553 T-152 P0002/0012 F-463 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
Case No. CV 2012·00277 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TJME 
COMES NOW Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney of record, Karin 
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L,C., and hereby rnoves the Cowt for an order shottening 
the.time in ~bich to have a hear~ng on the M_otionfor Protective Order. 
This Motion is made on the basis that the deposition from which protection is sought is set 
for October 22, 2012. 
DATED this i day of October, 2012. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
By----+--"'-~-..=(g~~~---&~j~1~,.._)':e...t~:/·~ 
Karin Seube1t 
Attorney for Respondent 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME -1-
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10-12-'12 12:10 FROM-JB & C 2087469553 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
co1Tect copy of the foregoing MOTION TO 
SHORTEN TIME was, this \ ;J.... day of October, 
2012, 
/ hand-delivered by providing a 
to: 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
Da11·el W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By r~ &u1t-e,tf 
Karin Seubert 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME -2-
T-152 P0003/0012 F-463 
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Katin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
2087469553 T-152 P0006/0012 F-463 
OCT 12 2012 
C:e, k D,st. Ccurt 
Cle::mvat.'.)r Counr,. Idaho ./ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
Case No. CV 2012~00277 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Ka1in Seube1t of Jones, 
Brower and Calle1y, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 25(a)(l) and 26(c), hereby moves this 
honorable Court for an order protecting Respondent from Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of Toni 
Johnson dated October 3, 2012 and attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
This Motion is made on the basis that said deposition, if allowed to proceed as scheduled, 
would uru-easonably subject Respondent to undue burden and expense, specifically incurring 
attor11ey's fees in prepa1ing for and attending said deposition. As the record of the case reflects, 
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 14, 2012 on the basis that Petitioner John H. 
Comell's claim is extinguished by his death. It is set for summary judgment healing on November 
27, 2012. Counsel for John fl. Cornell has twice confirmed Mr. John H. Cornell's death with this 
CoU1t, thus said fact is not in dispute. Respondent is entitled to a decision on said Motion to Dismiss 
prior to incuning the expense and being subjected to deposition. Protecting Respondent from said 
MOTION FOR PROTECTNE ORDER -1-
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depo~ition until after the Court has ruled on the pending Motion to Dismiss does not prejudice 
Petitioner's claim because if dismissal is not granted, then Petitioner rnay pursue discovery at that 
time. 
Additionally, Rule 25(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows dismissal of an 
action as to a deceased party if no substitution of parties is made within a reasonable time. Herej the 
record of the case reflects that Petitioner's attorney first infonned the Court of Petitioner's death on 
August 21, 2012. No Motion for Substitution of Parties has been filed by a successor or 
representative of the deceased party. It is umeasonable and burdensome to subject Respondent to 
the expense and burden of deposition in the absence of entry of coui1 order allowing substitution of a 
proper party to pursue Petitioner's claim. Further, the authority under which said Notice of 
Deposition Duces Tecum of Toni Johnson was signed is unknown. 
For these reasons, Respondent requests entry of a court order protecting Respondent from 
said Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of Toni Johnson. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this JJ. day of October, 2012. 
JONES; BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
By t~, ~(11~:f-
Karin Seubert 
Attomey for Respondent 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER -2-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER was, this_JJ,.. day of 
October, 2012, 
~ hand-delivered by providing a 
to: 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By ~ &v.oW:J 
arin Seubert 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER -3-
T-152 P0008/0012 F-463 
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.. 
AHERJN, RJCE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston1 ID 83S01-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorney for John Henry Cornell 
2087469553 T-152 P0009/0012 F-463 
JN TIIE DISTRICT COUR1' OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMJL Y TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLTE M. 
CORNELL, 
TO: TONI JOHNSON 
NO. CV2012-00277 
NOTICE OF DEPOSffJON DUCES TECUM 
OF TONI JOHNSON 
AND TO: KA.RJN SEUBERT, Attorney for Toni John.son 
NOTICE TS HEREBY CJVEN that the deposition testimony of TONI JOHNSON will 
be taken on oral examination before an official court reporter and notary public in and for the 
State of Idahos or some other official authorized by law to administer oathst at the date, time, nnd 
place. herein st=t forth: 




Clearwater Couoty Courrhouae 
150 Michigan Avenue 
Orolinu, Idaho 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF TONI JOHNSON-~ I 
N:\C,1tnell. John\Pl~Rdines\Nntlllll nf Depru:ition Tl'lhi Juhn~"n-do'"" ,er 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys &t Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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You are further commanded to bring with you at said time and place the following: 
l) A complete inventory of ALL personal property of Michael S. Comell and The 
Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell as of the date of death of 
Michael S. Comell on December 1 S, 2009; and 
2) · Copies of all bank statements of Michael S. Cornell, Arl~e M. Cornell and The 
.Revocable Family Trust cf Michael S; Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell from October J 5, 2009 Lo 
date. 
This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure and shall be 
subject to continuance un~mpleted. 
DATED this J day of October; 2012. 
AHERIN, RICE & ANEOON 
By~iJ.~ 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERT1F1CA1'E OF SERVICE 
I, DARREL W. AHERTN) hereby certify that on the 3. r? day of October. 2012, I 
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jonest Brower. & Callery 
. Attorney at Law 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O.Box854 
Lewiston, ID 83 SO 1 
Keith Evans 
Court Reponer 
380 CteELT Creek Road 
Kooskia. ID 83S39 
N01'lCE OF DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF TONI JOHNSON -- 2 
N:\Cor®II, Jolm\Plaodi11g.,;\Nuli...i or ~posiilon Toni Johnron.doc:,c m 
D U.S. Mail 
0 Jfond Delivery 
~Facsimile 
D Federal Express 
~U.S.Mail 
O Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 
:;;:;p~-~ 
DAR.REL W. AHERIN 
Aherin,·.Ric-e & Anegofi 
Attotneys: at Law 
Ltl!wiston, ldi!ohD 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
IN THE MATIER OF 







Randall W. Robinson, Presiding Judge 
Courtney Baker: Deputy Clerk 
Other Parties Council: Darrel Aherin 
Other Parties Council: Karin Seubert 
CASE NO. CV2012-277 
COURT MINUTES 
Date: 10/17/2012 Time: 10:23 -10:35 a.m. Tape: CD541-1 




10:23 Honorable Randall W. Robinson, Magistrate Judge, presiding . Parties present in 
the court room: Mr. Aherin, and Ms. Seubert present telephonically. 
10:23 Court addresses the Motion for Protection of Discovery. 
10:24 Ms. Seubert states the Idaho code that needs to substitute someone if a party of 
the case passes away. 
10:24 Court asks Mr. Aherin if there is a person to substitute for the Estate. 
10:25 Mr. Aherin states that that is the problem that they are facing. 
10:26 Ms. Seubert states it is unreasonable to subject her client to discovery at this 
time. 
10:29- M~Anerm state'snis-opinion on requesfing aiscovery. 
10:34 Court states that that is the legal issue, the fiduciary duty. 
10:34 Both attorneys agree that the issue of the case is whether there has been a 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
10:35 Court will grant the order for protective order, but if there are any facts that 
72
survive Mr. Ahern's clients death, the protective order will be terminated. 
10:36 Court is in recess. 
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- :. ---- - , J_j ,· j _q 
t V dJJ~_7_1_ _ _._ 
I 
Ka:rin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
l - ~c~ ~ 1 t0!2 _ 
(_ ,C ' L) ~ .. · l~SI~ ~ 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
('-. . :- ,~rL 1, • Ir ' &()_,_ '/ 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
M1CHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
ORDER OF PROTECTION 
FROM DISCOVERY 
The Court having reviewed Respondent's Motion Protective Order and good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Respondent is hereby protected from the Notice of Deposition Duces 
Tecum of Toni Johnson dated October 3, 2012 until such time as the Court enters a decision on the 
pending Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this JJr;:h day ofOctober, 2012. 
1 
~ 
(k}j lt - ---
ORDER OF PROTECTION 
FROM DISCOVERY 
JlIDGE RANDALL ROBINSON 
~1-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
co1Tect copy of the foregoing ORDER OF 
PROTECTION FROM DISCOVERY was, this_ 
day of October, 2012, 
to: 
hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
Dal1'el W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho St. 
P.O. Box854 
Lewiston) ID 83501 
By __________ _ 
Clerk of Comt 
ORDER OF PROTECTION 
FROM DISCOVERY -2-
T-152 P0012/0012 F-463 
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorneys for John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
COMES NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Anegon, and responds to the 
Respondent's Motion for Protective Order as follows: 
John Cornell began requesting copies of his parents Trust in August of 2010. It was not 
provided until October 29, 2010 when the undersigned requested it from attorney Allison Brandt. 
Despite numerous requests, Toni C. Johnson, as alternate trustee, failed to provide an 
inventory of the property as of the death of Michael S. Cornell on December 15, 2009, the 
second to die of Arlie and Michael Cornell, or a full accounting which has been repeatedly 
requested. She provided random copies of bank statements and only select pages for the bank 
statements immediately following Michael Cornell's death. See Affidavit of Darrel W. Aherin. 
A further issue that will need to be addressed is that John Cornell purchased Lot 34, 
Lakeview First Addition, from the trust for $27,000 in 2002. He paid the road fees and water 
from 2002 until March of 2010. On January 3, 2007, John Cornell conveyed this lot back to the 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER --
N:\Corne 11 , John\Pleadings\Response to Motion for Protective Order.docx ser 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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Michael Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell Family Trust to protect the asset as he was contemplating 
divorce . This lot has now been included as part of the property being sold with the house. 
Toni C. Johnson has breached her fiduciary duty to settle and distribute the trust in 
accordance with the terms of the trust. 
The trust, Section 4.03 provides as follows : 
On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the Trustee 
shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal 
remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the 
following beneficiaries : TONI C. JOHNSON AND JOHN H. CORNELL. 
The assets of the Trust should have been distributed to Toni C. Johnson and John H. 
Cornell within a reasonable time after the death of Michael Cornell, not three years later and 
John Cornell committing suicide. 
Toni C. Johnson has mismanaged The Trust in that she has used a substantial amount of 
the monies available to pay her personal expenses. No money has been distributed to John 
Henry Cornell. See the Affidavit of Darrel W. Aherin with attached undated handwritten partial 
accounting of Toni Johnson showing personal payments from trust funds and a later bank 
statement dated October 7, 2011 showing she was continuing to use trust funds for personal use. 
John Cornell had no money to live on, Toni Johnson refused to provide him with any 
trust money that he was entitled to, John Cornell had to live with his aunt and was supported by 
his aunt. John Cornell owed money to his aunt for providing money to him because Toni 
Johnson refused to distribute the trust assets. Toni Johnson ' s conduct contributed to the death of 
John Cornell. 
The undersigned first asked for an accounting on the trust money on November 5, 2010, 
to the attorney for the trust, Alison Brandt. Other than a few documents delivered by Alison 
Brandt on September 12, 2011, no accounting has been provided. 
DATED this i7~ day of October, 2012. 
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
By &a,J__tJ. ~ 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER -- 2 Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
N:\Comell , John\Pleadings\Response to Motion for Protective Order.docx ser 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
·7~ I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the / day of October, 2012, I 
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following : 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC., 
Attorney at Law 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
D U.S. Mail 
~ . J:Iand Delivery 
iijf' Facsimile 
D Federal Express 
lJcuJ;JaL 
DARREL W. AHERIN 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER -- 3 Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
N:\Corne ll , John\Pleadings\Response to Motion for Protective Order.docx ser 
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorneys for John Hemy Cornell 
tVJ--OJ-J~ a.Tr _ -i. 
ocr 1 s 2012 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
AFFIDAVIT OF DARREL W. AHERIN 
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years and am otherwise competent to make this affidavit. 
This affidavit is made upon personal knowledge setting forth facts I believe to be true. 
2. Attached hereto are true and correct copies of the following documents: 
A. January 8, 2010 Wells Fargo Custom Checking, page 7 of 10; 
B. February 9, 2010 Wells Fargo Custom Checking, page 6 of 9; 
C. March 5, 2010 Wells Fargo statement, pages 2 of 9 and 6of 9; 
D. Toni Johnson undated handwritten partial accounting; and 
E. October 7, 2011 Wells Fargo Checking statement. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DARREL W. AHERIN -- 1 
N:\Comell , John\Pleadings\Affidavit of OW A.docx ser 
i24JJ,).~ 
DARREL W. AHERIN 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this ~ day of October, 2012. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at \,ew \4'u.O )>~Ni 
My commission expires on ?-::7- ::::;;;JJ ---:J.c,1 y 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the ;r- day of October, 2012, I 
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC., 
Attorney at Law 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
AFFIDAVIT OF DARREL W. AHERIN -- 2 
N:\Comell , John\Pleadings\Affidavit of DWAdocx ser 
'fA U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
~ acsimile 746-9553 
D Federal Express 
DARREL w. AHERIN 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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Wells Fargo Custom Checking ® 
Activity summary 
Balance on 12/8 
Deposits/Additions 
Withdrawals/Subtractions 
Balance on 1/8 
Transaction history 
Dale Description 
Beginning balance on 12/8 
12/21 Deposit Made IN A Branch/Store 








Account number']- 1 a t J 
THE MICHAEL S CORNELL AND ARLIE 
MICHAEL S CORNELL TTE 
TONI C JOHNSON TTE 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., California (Member FDIC) 
Questions about your account: 1-800-742-4932 
Worksheet to balance your account and General 
Statement Policies can be found towards the 
end of this statement. 
Deposits/ Withdrawals/ Ending Daily 






Wells Fargo· Custom Checki
Activity summary 
Balance on 1/9 
Deposits/Additions 
Withdrawals/Subtractions 






RNELL AND ARLIE 
MICHAEL S CORNELL TIE 
TONI C JOHNSON TIE 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., California (Member FDIC) 
Questions about your account: 1•800-742-4932 
Worksheet to balance your account and General 
Statement Policies can be found towards the 
end of this statement. 
82
Ill February 6, 2010 - March 5, 2010 Ill Page 2 of 9 
 PMA account 
Percent Balance last Balance this Increase/ Percent 
of total month ($) month ($) decrease ($) change 
18% 6,925.22 8,955.11 2,029.89 29.31% 
81% 39,650.91 39,650.91 0.00 0.00% 
<1% 479.30 479.35 0.05 0.01% 
Total assets $47,055.43 $49,085.37 $2,029.94 4.31% 





Percent balance last balance this Increase/ Percent 
Account (Account Number) of total month ($) month ($) decrease ($) change 
Wells Fargo Credit Card t (5490-9624-9039-9265) N/A 490.09 0.00 (490.09) (100.00)% 
Total liabilltles $490.09 $0.00 ($490.09) (100.00)% 
t Refer to your statement for actual statement dates. 
Available credit 
The informafion below may not be current. Be sure to verify the credit available on your accounts when accessing 
your credit lines 
Account Approved credit line 
Wells Fargo Credit Card (5490-9624-9039-9265) 16,400.00 
Total available credit $16,400.00 
Interest, dividends and other income 
8686 
The information below should not be used for tax planning purposes. 
Account 
PMA • Prime Checking Account (344380183) 
Wells Fargo Money Market Savings•• (6860432969) 
Total interest, dividends and other income 
Credi! used Credit available 
0.00 16,400.00 
$0.00 $16,400.00 






~ TC, 2010 - March 5, 2010 Ill Page 6 of 9 
Wells Fargo Custom Checking ® 
Activity summary 
Balance on 2/6 
Deposits/Additions 
Withdrawals/Subtractions 







MICHAEL S CORNELL TIE 
TONI C JOHNSON TIE 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., California (Member FDIC) . 
Questions about your account: 1-800-742-4932 
Worksheet to balance your account and General 
Statement Policies can be found towards the 
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Complete AdvantL_ a® Checking 
Account number September 9, 2011 - October 7, 2011 111 Page 1 of 5 
MICHAELS CORNELL 
TONI C JOHNSON 
5319 LAKEVIEW RD 
OROFINO ID 83544-6127 
You and Wells Fargo 
- Wells Fargo Bank is consistently rated as "Outstanding" for the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) by federal regulators, the highest rating a financial 
services institution can receive. 
~ IMPORTANT ACCOUNT INFORMATION 
Revised Agreement for Online Banking 
We've updated our Online Access Agreement. 
To see what has changed, please visit wellsfargo.com/onlineupdates. 
Questions? 
Available by phone 24 hours a day, 7 days a week: 
1-800-TO-WELLS (1-800-869-3557) 
TTY: 1-800-877-4833 
En espanol: 1-877-727-2932 TTY: 1-888-355-6052 
:;!;t~ 
"I= iii:, 1-800-288-2288 (6 am to 7 pm PT, M-F) 
Online: wellsfargo.com 
Write: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (114) 
P.O. Box 6995 
Portland, OR 97228-6995 
Account options 
A check mark in the box indicates you have these 
convenient services with your account. Go to 
wel/sfargo.com or call the number above if you have 
questions or if you would like to add new services. 
Online Banking [ZJ Direct Deposit 
Online Bill Pay D Rewards Program 
D 
D 
Online Statements D Auto Transfer/Payment 0 
Mobile Banking D Overdraft Protection [ZJ 
My Spending Report [ZJ Debit Card 
Overdraft Service 0 
lmg=30 
(114) 






Account numb 111 Sl .mber 9, 20'11 - October 7, 2011 111 Page 2 c 
With you when you're shopping for the perfect gift 
Give yourself extra spending security this season. Our Zero Liability protection keeps your 
personal or business Wells Fargo Debit Cards and Credit Cards safe from promptly reported 
unauthorized transactions at no extra cost. Speak with a banker, call us at 1-800-WFB-OPEN 
or visit wellsfargo.com to learn more today. 
Activity summary 
Beginning balance on 9/9 
Deposits/ Additions 
Withdrawals/Subtractions 






Your account is draft Protection: 
a Credit Card 
Interest summary 
Interest paid this statement 
Average collected balance 
Annual percentage yield earned 
Interest earned this statement period 









MICHAEL S CORNELL 
TONIC JOHNSON 
California account terms and conditions apply 
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Transaction history (continued} 
Check Deposits/ Withdrawals/ Ending daily Date Number Description Additions Subtractions balance 
10/6 · 11187 Check 
·• · "-" ,. · "'"" "'' ''"- -· · · · "· ,,_ '""11.65 · · ""1,538.37 f 0/7 ,.. ~,.,.,. . "·" "'"" 11191" Check.. ..• .......,,, .... ,,.. , ...• ,.. '"·"'" ··•·• ,. ......... ,,,, •.. ..... ,, ...• ,,,,. ······"·'"·'n.,, .......... ,,,,..... ·-· .. . .. .,,....... ...,. , ...... 15.78 ···-····· .... .., ... ·""··-·····-··· 
1017 ........ .. ...... • . ... '.~t.~!.E:~!~<:iY~.le!.':1.L.............. ... ... . ............ ,.... ,. .......... .9.:<>.'.:1:... 
. !.!:5.??:~3-Ending balance on 10/7 
1,522.63 Totals $1,871.04 $1,970.87 
The Ending Daily Balance does not reflect any pending withdrawals or holds on deposited funds that may have been outstanding on your account when your transactions posted. If you had insufficient available funds when a transaction posted, fees may have been assessed. 
I\ Converted check: Check converted to an electronic format by your poyee or designated representative. Checks converted to electronic format cannot be returned, copied or imaged. 
Summary of checks written (checks listed are also displayed in the preceding Transaction history) 
Number Date Amount Number Date Amount Number Date Amount 11120 9/22 53.27 11163 9/15 2.85 11175 9/30 39.75 11126" 9/22 52.22 11164 9/19 38.48 11176 9/30 16.84 11135" 9/12 54.87 11165 9/15 49.02 11177 10/4 121.00 11151" 9/12 121.00 11166 9/27 10.60 11178 10/4 76.15 11152 9/12 100.00 11167 9/22 125.63 11179 10/5 73.99 11154" 9/20 113.71 11168 9/21 85.00 11180 10/6 46.25 11155 9/13 141.15 11169 9/22 9.35 11185" 10/5 118.91 11157" 9/9 25.00 11170 9/23 18.98 11186 10/5 75.00 11158 9/9 40.28 11171 9/22 49.70 11187 10/6 11.65 11160* 9/13 16.50 11172 9/27 42.76 11190" 10/6 38.65 11161 9/9 124.59 11173 9/30 5.00 11191 10/7 15.78 11162 9/12 2.85 11174 9/29 50.61 
• Gap in check sequence. 






II Se 1ber 9, 2011 - October 7, 2011 1111 Page 4 of 
Pili IMPORTANT ACCOUNT INFORMATION 
Enjoy safe and secure savings with a Wells Fargo Time Account (CD). You will get a guaranteed rate of return and have the peace of 
mind of knowing your money is FDIC insured up to applicable limits. Talk with your Wells Fargo Banker today. 
Turn off the paper clutter ... If you bank on line, get your statement on line. It's easy to switch to Online Only Statements. Sign on at 
wellsfargo.com/turnoffpaper, select Online Only, or check the box Switch All to Online Only Delivery and click Submit at the bottom of the page. Online statements reduce paper clutter, help protect against identity theft, and they're gentle on the environment. 
96
Sheet Seq = 0015043 
ShAAt onnn.4 nf nnnm; I lllllll llll lllll llllll lllll llll lllll llllll llll lllll lllll lllll lllll lllll 111111111111111111 
97
98
Sheet Seq ~ 0015044 
Sheet 00005 of OOOOfi I lllllll llll lllll llllll lllll llll lllll llllll llll lllll lllll lllll lllll lllll 111111111111111111 
99
Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
- ,... .. v:""' ... ' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Karin Seubert of Jones, 
Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., hereby submits this Memorandum of Law in support of Respondent' s 
Motion to Dismiss dated September 14, 2012. Said Motion is set for hearing on November 27, 2012. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell established the Revocable Family Trust of 
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell on November 1, 1996. See Exhibit A to Affidavit of 
Karin Seubert dated September 14, 2012 (hereinafter "Trust"). Through said trust, Mr. and Mrs. 
Cornell named their two children, Toni C. Johnson and John H. Cornell, as the beneficiaries of 
the trust upon Mr. and Mrs. Cornell ' s deaths. Id. at § 4.03 . On August 6, 2009, Michael S. 
Cornell as surviving grantor and trustee named Toni C. Johnson as sole trustee/successor trustee. 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW -1-
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Id. at Exh. B. 
Arlie M. Cornell died on November 9, 2008 and Michael S. Cornell died on December 
15, 2009. See Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee, ,r 2. 
John H. Cornell died on or around August 20, 2011 leaving no issue. See Affidavit of 
Karin Seubert dated September 14, 2012. 
Respondent Toni C. Johnson seeks dismissal of said action on the basis that John H. 
Cornell's claim was extinguished by his death and that all net income and principal remaining in 
the Trust Estate vest in Respondent by the express terms of the Revocable Family Trust of 
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell. See Trust at§ 4.03(a). 
Petitioner's counsel objects to said dismissal and argues that the claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty survives Petitioner's death and may be pursued by his estate. No substitution of 
parties has been made to date in compliance of Rule 25(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but Petitioner's counsel has represented to the Court that said request for substitution 
will be forthcoming before the hearing on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Summary Judgment Standard 
The parties and the Court have agreed in open court that Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 
shall be treated as a request for summary judgment because it relies upon facts outside of the 
pleading, specifically the death of Petitioner after the filing of this lawsuit. 
Summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The 
party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of proving an absence of a genuine issue 
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of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All facts and 
reasonable inferences will be considered in favor of the non-moving party. Summers v. 
Cambridge Joint School Dist. No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 955, 88 P.3d 772, 774 (2004). 
However, the non-moving party cannot "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that 
party's pleadings, but the party's response ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." Shere v. Pocatello Schoo Dist. No 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489-90, 148 P.3d 
1232, 1235-36 (citing I.R.C.P. 56(c)). As explained below, there are no genuine issues of 
material facts to preclude dismissal being granted in light of John H. Cornell's death. 
B. Respondent is entitled to dismissal as a matter of law. 
Based on the express terms of the trust, all net income and principal remaining in the 
Trust Estate vest in Respondent as the sole surviving beneficiary upon the death of John H. 
Cornell with no surviving issue of John H. Cornell. See Trust at§ 4.03(a). 
The question then becomes whether John Cornell's claims ofbreach of fiduciary duty 
survive his death. The Idaho Supreme Court recently discussed the applicable law relating to 
abatement of a litigant's claim upon his or death in the context of a legal malpractice claim as 
follows: 
The abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative enactment addressing 
the survivability of a claim, the co1r.mon law rules govern. See I.C. § 73-116 
("The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent 
with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all cases not provided for in 
these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this state."); see also 
Evans v. Twin Falls Cnty., 118 Idaho 210, 215, 796 P.2d 87, 92 (1990). Under 
the common law, claims arising out of contracts generally survive the death of the 
claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate. See Helgeson v. Powell, 54 
Idaho 667, 674-79, 34 P.2d 957, 960-61 (1934); Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 
417-18, 184 P. 477,448, 915 P.2d 6, 10 (1996). 
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620-21, 272 P.3d 1247, 1251-52 (2012). 
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It is a settled principle of Idaho law that an action for breach of fiduciary duty sounds in 
tort. See Rockfeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 644 39 P.3d 577, 584 (2001) (citing Property 
Management West Inc. v. Hunt, 126 Idaho 897, 899-900, 894 P.2d 130, 132-33 (1995)). 
Therefore, in the absence of a statute addressing the survivability of the decedent's claim, John 
Cornell's claims of breach of fiduciary duty abated upon his death and must be dismissed. 
The statutory section that governs the survivability of negligence claims is Idaho Code 
Section 5-327(2). Said statute was amended in 2010 with the amendment taking effect on July 1, 
2010, so a two-part analysis is needed to properly consider Mr. Cornell's claim. 
First, in its earlier form in effect prior to July 1, 2010 read as follows: 
Causes of action arising out of injury to the person or property, or death, caused 
by the wrongful act or negligence of another, except actions for slander or libel, 
shall not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer, and each injured person or the 
personal representative of each one meeting death, as above stated, shall have a 
cause of action against the personal representative of the wrongdoer; provided, 
however, the punitive damages or exemplary damages shall not be awarded nor 
penalties adjudged in any such action; provided, however, that the injured person 
shall not recover judgment except upon some competent, satisfactory evidence 
corroborating the testimony of said injured person regarding negligence and 
proximate cause. 
I.C. § 5-327 (through July 1, 2010) (emphasis added). 
Said language makes clear that said survivability applied only after the death of the 
wrongdoer, not the death of the injured party as the subsequent amendment addressed. Because 
the amendment to Idaho Code Section 5-327(2) was not retroactive, so said amendment applied 
only to actions which arose on or after the statute's effective date. See Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620, 
272 P.3d at 1251. Therefore, the statute in its original form applies from the death of Michael S. 
Cornell on December 15, 2009 until July 1, 2010. Applying the facts in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party, John Cornell would be the injured party if his allegations are proven at 
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trial and Toni Johnson is the wrongdoer in this case. Because the alleged "injured party" is the 
decedent as opposed to the "wrongdoer," any claims of John Cornell that may have arisen 
between December 15, 2009 and July 1, 2010 were extinguished by his death and must be 
dismissed. 
For the second part of the analysis, one must consider the amendments to said statute, 
which divided said statute into two subsections, the second of which is applicable here and reads 
in relevant part as follows: 
A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the wrongful 
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person 
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that 
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those 
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii), other out-of-pocket expenses 
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of 
such injured person and as a result of the wrongful act or negligence. 
LC.§ 5-327 (eff. July 1, 2010). 
The tort of breach of fiduciary duty is neither an "action for personal injury" ("personal 
injury" being defined in Idaho Code Section 6-1601(7) as "a physical injury, sickness or death 
suffered by an individual") nor an action for "property damage" as it does not involve tangible 
property that was allegedly damaged as is the common and ordinary meaning of the phrase 
"property damage." As such, this action falls outside of the amended Idaho Code Section 5-
327(2) and the general common law principles govern. In applying the general rule that tort 
actions abate upon the injured party's death, the claims of John Cornell that may have arisen 
between July 1, 2010 and his death on August 20, 2012 were extinguished by his death and must 
be dismissed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondent Toni Johnson respectfully requests that her Motion 
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to Dimiss be granted and that John Cornell ' s Petition be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 31st day of October, 2012. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
By_~--=---- ---=-~ --------"----'-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM 
OF LAW was, this 31st day of October, 2012, 
V hand-delivered by providing a 
to: 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By ~~ 
Karin Seubert 
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorneys for John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW the attorney for the petitioner, Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & 
Anegon, and responds to the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. 
BACKGROUND 
This case heading refers to Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell. They created the 
Revocable Family Trust involved in this case. They are the parents of John Cornell and Toni 
Johnson. The following is a timeline: 
2002 - John Cornell purchased Lot 34, Lakeview First Addition, from his parents 
March 21 , 2005 - Michael and Arlie Cornell quitclaimed their property to the Cornell Trust 
January 3, 2007 - John Cornell quitclaimed Lot 34 to the Cornell Trust 
November 9, 2008 - Arlie Cornell passed away 
August 6, 2009 - Michael Cornell signed the First Amendment to the Cornell Trust 
December 15, 2009 - Michael Cornell passed away 
August 20, 2012 - John Cornell committed suicide 
The parties are designated John Cornell, petitioner, and Toni Johnson, respondent. 
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS -- I 
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In respondent's Memorandum of Law, respondent argues that the petitioner, John 
Cornell's, claim of breach of fiduciary duty abated upon his death and must be dismissed. 
Respondent argues that a breach of fiduciary duty, a claim that sounds in tort, abates upon the 
death of the injured person pursuant to common law principles and that Idaho Code Sections 5-
23 7 (2) and 6-1601 (7) do not create survivability to the petitioner's claims. The respondent's 
argument first fails because the respondent's breach of fiduciary duty began on the date of 
Michael S. Cornell's death, the surviving grantor and trustee of the Michael S. Cornell and Arlie 
M. Cornell Trust, and continues until present. Additionally, the respondent has failed to address 
petitioner's breach of trust claim set forth in the Petition for Supervised Administration and 
Removal of Trustee, hereinafter referred to as the "Petition". A breach of trust claim is a claim 
based on the terms of a trust, and, thus, sounds in contract law rather than tort. 
A. The petitioner's claims of breach of fiduciary duty for failure to manage the monies of The 
Trust and failure to follow the fiduciary requirements of determining and distributing the net 
income and principal of the Trust proceeds pursuant to the terms of Trust survive his death 
on August 20, 2012 since the respondent's alleged wrongful conduct continued until 
petitioner's death. 
The Petition sets forth in paragraphs 7, 9, 10, and 11 the alleged breach of fiduciary duty by 
the respondent for failing to provide an inventory of the trust assets when a reasonable request 
was made by a beneficiary as required by Idaho Code Section 15-7-303 1, using trust assets for 
personal expenses and not managing the assets with the standard observed by a prudent person in 
dealing with another's property as set forth in Idaho Code Section 15-7-302, and failure to 
distribute and follow the terms of the Trust and distribute the net income and principal to the 
petitioner pursuant to the Idaho Code Sections 68-10-103, 68-10-201, and 68-10-202. 
1 
15-7-303. Duty to inform and account to beneficiaries. 
The trustee shall keep the beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed of the trust and its administration. In addition: 
(a) Within thirty (30) days after his acceptance of the trust, the trustee shall inform in writing the current beneficiaries and if possible, one (1) 
or more persons who under section 15-1-403 of this code may represent beneficiaries with future interests, of the court in which the trust is registered and 
of his name and address. 
(b) Upon reasonable request, the trustee shall provide the beneficiary with a copy of the terms of the trust which describe or affect his interest 
and with relevant information about the assets of the trust and the particulars relating to the administration. 
(c) Upon reasonable request, a beneficiary is entitled to a statement of the accounts of the trust annually and on termination of the trust or 
change of the trustee. 
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The various breaches of respondent's fiduciary duty as trustee to the Trust occurred from 
the date of Michael S. Cornell's death on December 15, 2009 and continue. As alleged by the 
petitioner's Petition and the Affidavit of Margaret M. Watkins, the respondent controlled the 
assets of the Trust to her benefit. First, the respondent failed to provide a copy of the Trust 
instrument or provide information to the petitioner as to the assets of the Trust despite the 
petitioner requesting such information from the respondent and the respondent's former counsel, 
Alison Brandt of Orofino, Idaho. The petitioner's letters are attached to the Affidavit of Darrel 
W. Aherin. Petitioner wrote three letters dated August 1, 2010, August 20, 2010, and September 
17, 2010. The only correspondence that the petitioner received from the respondent and her 
former counsel was a letter dated April 26, 2010, filed previously in this case, threatening a 
restraining order against the petitioner. Petitioner's written requests occurred after July 1, 2010. 
Second, the respondent used funds from the Trust to pay for her own personal expenses 
as evidenced by her own ledger, including her own medical expenses, diet program, automobile 
insurance and repair, automobile tires, her cell phone bill, her Dish television subscription, and 
her personal shopping sprees at Target from November 2009 to December 2011. Additionally, 
Wells Fargo bank statements holding the Trust funds, also attached to the Affidavit of Darrel W. 
Aherin, also evidence that the respondent used funds for such personal expenses. Such use of 
funds is improper and in violation ofldaho Code 15-7-302 since the respondent used Trust 
funds, part of which belong to the petitioner as a beneficiary, in a way that is not consistent with 
the standards of a prudent person dealing with another person's property. Idaho Code 15-7-302 
states as follows: 
15-7-302. Trustee's standard of care and performance. 
Except as otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, the trustee 
shall observe the standards in dealing with the trust assets that would be 
observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another, and if the 
trustee has special skills or is named trustee on the basis of representations 
of special skills or expertise, he is under a duty to use those skills. 
Finally, the respondent failed to follow the terms of the Trust and distribute the net 
income and principal to the petitioner pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 68-10-103, 68-10-201, 
and 68-10-202. Those statutes are set forth as follows: 
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68-10-103. Fiduciary duties - General principles. 
(a) In allocating receipts and disbursements to or between principal 
and income, and with respect to any matter within the scope of parts 2 and 
3 of this chapter, a fiduciary: 
(1) Shall administer a trust or estate in accordance with the 
terms of the trust or the will, even if there is a different provision in this 
chapter; 
(2) May administer a trust or estate by the exercise of a 
discretionary power of administration given to the fiduciary by the terms 
of the trust or the will, even if the exercise of the power produces a result 
different from a result required or permitted by this chapter, and no 
inference that the fiduciary has improperly exercised the discretion arises 
from the fact that the fiduciary has made an allocation contrary to a 
provision of this chapter; 
(3) Shall administer a trust or estate in accordance with this 
chapter if the terms of the trust or the will do not contain a different 
provision or do not give the fiduciary a discretionary power of 
administration; and 
(4) Shall add a receipt or charge a disbursement to principal 
to the extent that the terms of the trust and this chapter do not provide a 
rule for allocating the receipt or disbursement to or between principal and 
income. 
(b) In exercising the power to adjust under section 68-10-104( a), 
Idaho Code, or a discretionary power of administration regarding a matter 
within the scope of this chapter, whether granted by the terms of a trust, a 
will, or this chapter, a fiduciary shall administer a trust or estate 
impartially, based on what is fair and reasonable to all of the beneficiaries, 
except to the extent that the terms of the trust or the will clearly manifest 
an intention that the fiduciary shall or may favor one ( 1) or more of the 
beneficiaries. 
A determination in accordance with this chapter is presumed to be 
fair and reasonable to all of the beneficiaries. 
68-10-201. Determination and distribution of net income. 
After a decedent dies, in the case of an estate, or after an income 
interest in a trust ends, the following rules apply: 
(I) A fiduciary of an estate or of a terminating income interest 
shall determine the amount of net income and net principal receipts 
received from property specifically given to a beneficiary under the rules 
in parts 3 through 5 of this chapter which apply to trustees and the rules in 
subsection (5) of this section. The fiduciary shall distribute the net income 
and net principal receipts to the beneficiary who is to receive the specific 
property. 
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(2) A fiduciary shall determine the remaining net income of a 
decedent's estate or a terminating income interest under the rules in parts 3 
through 5 of this chapter which apply to trustees and by: 
(A) Including in net income all income from property used 
to discharge liabilities; 
(B) Paying from income or principal, in the fiduciary's 
discretion, fees of attorneys, accountants and fiduciaries; court costs and 
other expenses of administration; and interest on death taxes, but the 
fiduciary may pay those expenses from income of property passing to a 
trust for which the fiduciary claims an estate tax marital or charitable 
deduction only to the extent that the payment of those expenses from 
income will not cause the reduction or loss of the deduction; and 
(C) Paying from principal all other disbursements made or 
incurred in connection with the settlement of a decedent's estate or the 
winding up of a terminating income interest, including debts, funeral 
expenses, disposition of remains, family allowances, and death taxes and 
related penalties that are apportioned to the estate or terminating income 
interest by the will, the terms of the trust, or applicable law. 
(3) A fiduciary shall distribute to a beneficiary who receives a 
pecuniary amount outright the interest or any other amount provided by 
the will, the terms of the trust, or applicable law from net income 
determined under subsection (2) of this section or from principal to the 
extent that net income is insufficient. If a beneficiary is to receive a 
pecuniary amount outright from a trust after an income interest ends and 
no interest or other amount is provided for by the terms of the trust or 
applicable law, the fiduciary shall distribute the interest or other amount to 
which the beneficiary would be entitled under applicable law if the 
pecuniary amount were required to be paid under a will. 
(4) A fiduciary shall distribute the net income remaining after 
distributions required by subsection (3) of this section in the manner 
described in section 68-10-202, Idaho Code, to all other beneficiaries, 
including a beneficiary who receives a pecuniary amount in trust, even if 
the beneficiary holds an unqualified power to withdraw assets from the 
trust or other presently exercisable general power of appointment over the 
trust. 
(5) A fiduciary may not reduce principal or income receipts from 
property described in subsection ( 1) of this section because of a payment 
described in section 68-10-50 I or 68-10-502, Idaho Code, to the extent 
that the will, the terms of the trust, or applicable law requires the fiduciary 
to make the payment from assets other than the property or to the extent 
that the fiduciary recovers or expects to recover the payment from a third 
party. The net income and principal receipts from the property are 
determined by including all of the amounts the fiduciary receives or pays 
with respect to the property, whether those amounts accrued or became 
due before, on, or after the date of a decedent's death or an income 
interest's terminating event, and by making a reasonable provision for 
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amounts that the fiduciary believes the estate or terminating income 
interest may become obligated to pay after the property is distributed. 
(2001) 
68-10-202. Distribution to residuary and remainder beneficiaries. 
(a) Each beneficiary described in section 68-10-201 ( 4), Idaho 
Code, is entitled to receive a portion of the net income equal to the 
beneficiary's fractional interest in undistributed principal assets, using 
values as of the distribution date. If a fiduciary makes more than one (1) 
distribution of assets to beneficiaries to whom this section applies, each 
beneficiary, including one who does not receive part of the distribution, is 
entitled, as of each distribution date, to the net income the fiduciary has 
received after the date of death or terminating event or earlier distribution 
date but has not distributed as of the current distribution date. 
(b) In determining a beneficiary's share of net income, the 
following rules apply: 
( 1) The beneficiary is entitled to receive a portion of the net 
income equal to the beneficiary's fractional interest in the undistributed 
principal assets immediately before the distribution date, including assets 
that later may be sold to meet principal obligations. 
(2) The beneficiary's fractional interest in the undistributed 
principal assets must be calculated without regard to property specifically 
given to a beneficiary and property required to pay pecuniary amounts not 
in trust. 
(3) The beneficiary's fractional interest in the undistributed 
principal assets must be calculated on the basis of the aggregate value of 
those assets as of the distribution date without reducing the value by any 
unpaid principal obligation. 
( 4) The distribution date for purposes of this section may be 
the date as of which the fiduciary calculates the value of the assets if that 
date is reasonably near the date on which assets are actually distributed. 
( c) If a fiduciary does not distribute all of the collected but 
undistributed net income to each person as of a distribution date, the 
fiduciary shall maintain appropriate records showing the interest of each 
beneficiary in that net income. 
( d) A fiduciary may apply the rules in this section, to the extent 
that the fiduciary considers it appropriate, to net gain or loss realized after 
the date of death or terminating event or earlier distribution date from the 
disposition of a principal asset if this section applies to the income from 
the asset. 
According to Article Four, Section 4.01 of the Trust, "On the death of the Trustor last to die, 
herein called "Surviving Trustor" the principal of the Trust and any accrued or undistributed net 
income from the Trust shall go to the successor Trustee and the Trustee shall apply and distribute 
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the net income and principal of the Trust Estate as set forth herein." Furthermore, Section 4.03 
states, "On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the Trustee shall, as 
soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal remaining in the Trust into two 
(2) equal shares and distribute them to the following beneficiates: TONI C. JOHNSON and 
JOHN H. CORNELL." The respondent, Toni C. Johnson, who was the successor trustee, 
breached her fiduciary duty to abide by the terms of the Trust and distribute the income and 
principal of Trust equally to its beneficiaries after Michael C. Cornell's death. Michael C. 
Cornell passed away on December 15, 2009 and the petitioner and beneficiary of the Trust, John 
H. Cornell, passed away on August 20, 2012. From the date of her father's death to the present, 
the successor trustee respondent has failed to distribute the trust to the petitioner or petitioner's 
estate. Thus, there has been an ongoing breach from July 1, 2010. 
This Response has referred to July 1, 2010 in the above paragraphs because the respondent is 
arguing that the prior language ofldaho Code Section 5- 327, in effect until July 1, 2010, does 
not change the common law rule that tort actions involving breach of fiduciary duty do not 
survive the death of the injured party. Even if petitioner is correct that Section 5-327 in its prior 
form applies to events prior to July 1, 2010, it is clear from the exhibits attached to Affidavit of 
Darrel W. Aherin and previous exhibits filed herein that breaches of Ms. Johnson's fiduciary 
duty continued from July 1, 2010 until the petitioner's death. 
Also, the respondent argues that the current form of Section 5-327 does not apply because 
this case does not involve a property damage case and relies on Section 6-1601 (8)' s definition of 
property damage. Section 6-1601 also provides definitions for economic loss and noneconomic 
loss. Subsection 3 provides, 
"Economic damages" means objectively verifiable monetary loss, including, but not 
limited to, out-of-pocket expenses, loss of earnings, loss of use of property, cost of 
replacement or repair, cost of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment, 
medical expenses, or loss of business or employment opportunities. Idaho Code Section 
6-1601(3). 
Subsection 5, provides, 
"Noneconomic damages" means subjective, nonmonetary losses including, but not 
limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, disability or disfigurement 
incurred by the injured party; emotional distress; loss of society and companionship; loss 
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of consortium; or destruction or impairment of the parent-child relationship. Idaho Code 
Section 6-1601(5). 
The petitioner's damages clearly do not fall under the definition of noneconomic 
damages and it is a stretch to call his injury an economic damage since the petitioner did not 
claim a consequential loss of employment or medical expenses. Rather, the petitioner claimed in 
his Petition that he has suffered a direct loss as result of the destruction of his interest in the Trust 
property by respondent's above-described mismanagement, as well as her failure to distribute to 
him his share. The petitioner is not arguing a loss of earnings, use of his property, cost or repair 
or replacement, loss of wages or medical expenses. The petitioner stated in his Petition that his 
property, held in the Trust, has been depleted, damaged and mismanaged by the respondent. 
This is property damage, and thus, the petitioner's claim of breach of fiduciary duty survives his 
death. 
B. A breach of the trust terms occurred when the First Amendment to the Revocable Trust 
of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell was executed on August 6, 2009 in violation 
of Section 1. 06 of the Trust, when the respondent failed to divide the net income and 
principal remaining in the Trust as required by Section 4.03 of the Trust, and the 
respondent failed to render an accounting as required by Section 8.02 of the Trust. 
In her Memorandum of Law, respondent argues that the petitioner's claims sound in tort. 
However, it is clear from the petitioner's Petition that he claims breach of trust, as well as a 
breach of a fiduciary duty. According to Idaho Law, Cruzen v. Boise City, 58 Idaho 406, 74 P.2d 
1037 (1937), the Supreme Court ofldaho held that a breach of trust is not based upon a statute 
but rather based on the obligation resting on every trustee to fulfill and comply with terms of a 
trust. Id., at 415, 74 P.2d at 1048. The Court continued that a breach of trust is an action upon a 
contractual obligation. Id., at 416, 74 P.2d at 1049. Since a breach of trust sounds in contract, 
then even under common law, a claim of breach of trust would survive the death of the claimant. 
See Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,619,272 P.3d 1247, 1250 (2012). 
In this case, the respondent, Toni C. Johnson, breached the trust in three different ways. 
The respondent breached the Trust when she encouraged Michael C. Cornell to execute the First 
Amendment to the Revocable Trust of Michael C. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell on August 6, 
2009, which changed Article Nine Section 9.01 to state that Toni C. Johnson and John Henry 
Cornell are no longer co-successor trustees. The amendment stated, "At the death or incapacity 
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of the undersigned (Michael C. Cornell) Toni C. Johnson shall act as a Trustee/Successor 
Trustee." Parentheses added. This amendment allowed the respondent to control the assets of 
the Trust and to commit further breaches of the terms of trust set forth below. The amendment 
of the Trust agreement violated Section 1.06 of Article One of the Trust. The trust states "At any 
time during the joint lives of the Trustors, jointly as to community property and individually as 
to his or her own separate property, Trustors may, by duly executed instrument; (a) Amend this 
trust agreement (including his technical provisions) in any manner and/orb) Revoke this trust 
agreement in part or in whole, in which latter event any and all trust properties shall forthwith 
revert to such trustor free of trust." Michael C. Cornell amended said Trust, removing the 
petitioner as a co-trustee in violation of the agreement since Arlie M. Cornell had already passed 
and the language of Section 1.06 clearly states that amendment and ratification can occur only 
during the joint lives of the Trustors. 
In addition to amending the Trust, the respondent failed to divide the trust income and 
principal remaining in the Trust into two equal shares and distribute them to herself and her 
brother, petitioner, John H. Cornell. Said failure is a breach of the trust term in Section 4.03 that 
specifically states that "On the death of the surviving trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the 
Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal remaining in 
the Trust into (2) equal shares and distribute them to the following beneficiaries: Toni C. 
Johnson and John H. Cornell." To date, the respondent has failed to distribute any assets of the 
Trust, has listed the real property of the Trust at an umeasonably high sale price, has used the 
funds for herself and failed to distribute any kind of income to the petitioner and has in fact 
actually demanded the petitioner turn over $3,000.00 to her for a death claim from Michael C. 
Cornell's International Brotherhood of the Electrical Workers Benefit Fund. As stated in the 
affidavit of Margaret M. Watkins, when the respondent discovered that the petitioner received a 
$3,000.00 benefit from the Workers Benefit Fund, she demanded that it be turned over to her. 
The petitioner sent the respondent a check for $2,500.00 and the petitioner kept $500.00 for his 
living expenses. 
Also, the respondent has failed to abide by and has breached the trust terms of Article 
Eight, Section 8.02 regarding periodic accounting. In Section 8.02, "After the deaths of both 
Trustors, the Trustees shall render an accounting from time to time but not less frequently than 
annually after any prior accounting regarding the transactions of any trust created in this 
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS -- 9 
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Response to Motion to Dismiss.docx ser 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
114
instrument." Section 8.02 provides the procedures which a trustee must follow in delivering a 
written accounting to each beneficiary. The petitioner requested in writing an accounting on 
three different occasions as stated earlier in this response. The respondent has only provided an 
incomplete handwritten ledger which indicates the respondent used the Trust for her own 
personal benefit. 
Therefore, there remain genuine issues of material facts which preclude dismissal. This 
case cannot be dismissed upon grounds that John H. Cornell has passed away. Clearly, Section 
5-327 of the Idaho Code permits the petitioner's estate to claim breach of fiduciary duty as 
petitioner's property was damaged due to mismanagement and no statute or common law 
principles prevents the petitioner's estate from pursuing a cause of action for breach of trust, 
which sound in contract rather than tort. Further, it is a settled matter of law that a breach of a 
fiduciary duty is different than an action of breach of trust. See Pikering vs. El Jay Equipment 
Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 512,517, 700 P.2d 134, 139 (App. 1985). Thus, the petitioner's claims of 
breach of trust do not abate upon his death and, at a minimum, should be treated as breach of 
contract, which under the common law principle survives the death of an injured party. 
CONCLUSION 
Toni Johnson is seeking to obtain money for herself when her fiduciary duties required 
her to divide the money between two beneficiaries and distribute it. Toni Johnson is seeking a 
huge financial gain because she intentionally withheld trust distribution to the other beneficiary 
by refusing to distribute the assets for nearly three years. Toni Johnson was living individually 
off the trust. The trust was to be divided one-half to each. John Cornell's estate is entitled to 
one-half of the trust measured as of the date of death of Michael S. Cornell. 
DATED this 13th day of November, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the 13th day of November, 2012, I 
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC., 
Attorney at Law 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorneys for John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARGARET M. WATKINS 
I, MARGARET M. WATKINS, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years and am otherwise competent to make this affidavit. 
This affidavit is made upon personal knowledge setting forth facts I believe to be true. 
2. I am the aunt of John H. Cornell and Toni Johnson. My sister was Arlie M. 
Cornell. 
{ I I 
3. John Cornell lived with me from April through September of 2010 and again from 
December of 2011 until his death on August 20, 2012. 
4. John was the beneficiary under his father's International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers Benefit Fund. He was entitled to payment of $3,000 for the death claim. When Toni 
found out he received this money, she demanded he turn it over to her. He had used $500 for 
living expenses, but sent Toni a check for $2,500. John could really have used that $2,500 to get 
by. As part of John' s records is the letter from the Pension Benefit Fund and the refund check to 
Toni, see attached. 
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5. In April 2010, while John was living with me, he tried getting information from 
Toni about the trusts, requesting copies of the trust documents, etc. Toni refused to talk to him. 
As part of John's records was a letter from the trust attorney, Alison Brandt, stating if he 
continued to try to contact Toni or tried to come on the property, they would get a restraining 
order against him. A poor copy of that letter is attached. 
6. In May of 2010, John Cornell's doctors at Centennial Hills Hospital, Las Vegas, 
Nevada, felt he needed emergency treatment at a rehabilitation and pain control program at 
Mission Hospital in Laguna Beach, California due to his traumatic brain injury. I requested that 
Toni Johnson advance funds to John, which John was entitled to as a beneficiary of the trust, for 
John to receive this treatment and she refused. Due to Toni's refusal to advance any money to 
John, my sister had to put the expenses for this treatment on her credit card. 
7. Both John and Toni told me that their parents had a medical savings account, but 
this was not included as part of the assets of the trust. 
8. The circumstances surrounding John's death can be partially attributed to his 
inability to afford proper medical help he desperately needed. After John's death, I visited with 
Dr. Hopper, John's neuropsychologist, and he told us that John was supposed to see him once a 
week, but only came in approximately once a month. Prior to John's death, he told me he was 
tired of asking me for money for his doctor and other living expenses. 
9. John needed sleep apnea testing, colonoscopy and pain management for his brain 
injuries, previous broken back and neck injuries and several neurological tests. He suffered with 
PTSD. His extremely high blood pressure sent him to the emergency room and urgent care 
several times. We were told he needed to be on high blood pressure medication called 
Propranolol because his high blood pressure was caused by the brain not the heart. 
10. I strongly believe John's death, in part, can be attributed to the extreme stress and 
disturbing situation with his sister and the trust. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 3) day of October, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the t 3-{!; day of /lhv~ , 2012, I 
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC. 
Attorney at Law 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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Doar Mr. Cornell: 
limier Sl:pamte l;lJVC1 a chc,: I~ ·wili ril'.: .scn1 lo you 1.1:. b~1m:li1a;.ll"Y for 
:1,_;.0r'/0.(1\l n::pr~~1:ntiJltl pa~.· 1n1.:r11 n!'!he Llt:Hlh ..:1i1:111 lbr Mk.JN.:l S C'r,rn(.:11. Plan 
1::m.1\ib,i,rns 1)l'tht:' JHF.W Pension fkn,.:!11 l'lllKI rc-w1in: ,tiai tlic µi;n .. ~it:111 payrm:nt:{ 
l'1f' n,·,11h;:1r (\ii nell br: di1>l\llt•tin11e, I lh1· I ll'"if monlh roilmvillg his c1,:a1h. 
LKL 
Cupy tu l[SFW Lt1L",1.tl U11it:m 0011 
l 'laim i;: 2207401 
Linc.:kll K. Le~ 
Tnrnh::t:: 
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorneys for John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
AFFIDAVIT OF DARREL W. AHERIN 
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years and am otherwise competent to make this affidavit. 
This affidavit is made upon personal knowledge setting forth facts I believe to be true. 
2010; 





A copy of John Cornell's letter to Alison Brandt dated August 1, 2010; 
A copy of John Cornell's letter to Alison Brandt dated August 20, 201 O; 
A copy of John Cornell's letter to your affiant dated August 27, 201 O; 
A copy of John Cornell's letter to Alison Brandt dated September 17, 
E. A copy of Wells Fargo Overview of PMA account for the period February 
6, 2010 to March 5, 2010. 
F. A copy of Wells Fargo PMA Checking bank statement for the period 
September 9, 2010 to October 7, 201 O; 
AFFIDAVIT OF DARREL W. AHERIN --
N:\Cornell, John\PleadingslAtlidavit of DW A 11-12-12.docx ser 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
125
G. A copy of Wells Fargo PMA Checking bank statement for the period 
October 8, 2010 to November 5, 2010; 
H. A copy of Wells Fargo Complete Advantage Checking bank statement for 
the period January 8, 2011 to February 7, 2011 ; 
I. A copy of Wells Fargo Complete Advantage Checking bank statement for 
the period May 7, 2011 to June 7, 2011 ; 
J. A copy of Wells Fargo Complete Advantage Checking bank statement for 
the period September 9, 2011 to October 7, 2011; 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAU~ J ~ 
DARREL W.A HERIN 
xJ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this ~ day of November, 2012 . 
~~Q«~ 
Notary Public for 'Idaho 
Residing at ~-e, >J \~ "' O'\\.~ , ~ c\~o 
My commission expires on -a\~~ ~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the /J & day of November, 2012, I 
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC., 
Attorney at Law 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
AFFIDAVIT OF DARREL W. AHERIN -- 2 
N: \Cornell , John\Pleadings\Affidavit of DW A 11-12-12.docx ser 
D JJ.S. Mail 
~ Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 746-9553 
D Federal Express 
A)_~ ,J.~ 
DARREL W.A HERIN 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
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Alison M. Brandt, Esq. 
125 Johnson Avenue 
Kendrick, Idaho 83537 
(208) 476-7212 
Ms. Alison Brandt, 
-WOJ~ Wd9g:eo Ol-LZ-80 paA1aoa~ 
August 20, 2010 
Second Request by mail Registered 
I hrcc I clcphonc Kcqucsts 
No RP.turn Ci:ill - No Respo11se by Mail 
This IP.ttP.r is bP.ing written to you to request a copy of my parent's, Michael and 
Arlie Cornell's Trust. 
The rcclson I nm requesting a copy is because I have not been Informed of the 
details of the estate. My sister Toni Johnson has rnfus~d my reque~ls ror a copy of 
my parent's Trust. My sister refuses to disc.:uss ;,my cfolc1ils or lhe Trust with mP. . I 
hc:1ve nPvPr rnr.P.ivP.d or been given the opportunity to read or review the 
Will/Trust. I have absolutely no details regarding the il!i~cts of the estate. I am 
concerned .:ibout mv personal property which is adjacent to my parent's property. 
How is the property I own being handled? I would appreciate notifici:itiur, i:md 
details of the listing if and when the properties are listf:!d. Hc1s Lh~ pr uperly been 
listed for sale? It is my ur1der~landing by lr.1w thP. details of the estate are to be 
discL1ssed with rm~ b~rure action is tr.1kfm in any way regarding the estate. 
Since I have already waited tor the inform.Jtion nnd it has not been given to me by 
my sister and the letter I sent to you, ilftcr checking with the USPS tracking 
1nformntion regarding the Registered Return Receipt Letter, I was inf ur rm~d Lile 
letter has been sitting In your Post Office Box in Orufi11u, Idaho unc.lairnPd for 
EXHIBIT __ f-'-- __.)...--__ _ 
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-WOJ~ wd9g:eo Ol-lZ-80 pOA!O~O~ 
fiftPen dr1ys. I am hopP.ful you will rP.cP.iVP. this sP.cond RP.gistf!rP.d RP.turn RecP.ipt 
Letter at your Ke11drick, Idaho address and send to me the requested information 
immediately. 
Please contact me if you have any questions or concerns. 
Sincerely, 
John H. Cornell 
7309 Ruslic.: Cre~l Slreel 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89149 
(702) 685 6721 
Please Note: The address and tr:!lephune nurnb(:!r ~ive11 Lu yuu (abl1ve) is my 
Cousin's home. Plec1se ~erid c:111 correspondP.ncP to this ~ddrP.ss. For tt'!lephone 
r:ontact i-nessages please leave your name and number with Robert or Catherine 
Jones and I will return your call. Thank you. 
EXHIBIT D 
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August :zu, :w 
This is my :,ccond attempt to h.:ivc thir, letter l·orwarded to you by your attorney Alison Bran
dt. 
Toni, 
I would like to take a moment to tell you I know you suffer the loss of both of our ptircnts, o
sp(!tially so 
close together. I also sutter trom tho1r loss. I know and feel the pain greatly. I would like to t:.,11
< ,:o you I 
know this rs no·t an option. 1 am sorry you felt thf'-1 need to 1:akP. thP r.1rrlnnc; yn11 h;:ivµ, r;:ilcrn . Sin
e:£) I ;,1rn 
unabla to talk to you in person I am asking you in writing for a copy of t,ur parents Wlll/Truc;.r 
I nPPrl rn 
know wh.:it i~ r,..iyi; arid where I stand. 
Vour brother, 
EXHIBIT __ -4-b~----
Page _ ?) __ of l.\ Pages 
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Pi ck up a im.1r:htm;; ancl card ins hfo, tt1on 
app I y at M11•1. Sho l l 8ave rC,11·d. coin. 
!b1~ I tu~ :-~hr·!l 1 Saver Car·tJ 1:0 mwa 2 
cEmt,;/g;,i 1 on ENE:f':Y' ·1· 1.10 I putch..inc ! 
THANH YOU COM[ AriAJN 
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ZOO RIIP.d 11n11RIIV , R!'I ! ~ 1 11 ! lRIJV·"l .111n1~ mrtsg:so 01-lz-so ~RA!R!'IR~ 
August 1.7, 2010 
Dear Mr. Ahcrin 1 
Tiu~ rulluwing highlights a few of my concerns regarding my porcnt'!i cstiltc. 
There have been t;;P\ll'rril ,111~111pl:') to obtain a copy of mv parent's trust from mv sister Toni C. 
Johnson and my parent's attorney Ms. Alison M. Brandt. On 08/0'J/?010 ,md OR/1.9/2010, I sent 
letters ta Ms. Drandt and to my sister. I sent my letter to Toni in care of Ms. Brandt, by 
R~gbl~1~d rnail with a request for a signed Oeturn Receipt. There h.::is been no response. Upon 
checking with the Postal .5Prvic:f-! I WH:"> i11run11ed that Ms. Brandt had not picked up my first 
letter trom her P.O. ~ox for frftccn days and thP. l(.•nr,r s0.nr to hP.r Kendrick Idaho cJdc.Jr~:,:, wd:, 
also denied. I have tried scvcrul times to contact Ms. ~randt by telephone messages and my 
calls wr•n• rml rt-!lu111~u. My sister has denied me a copy of my parent's Trust ond she rcquc!itcd 
!Vis. Brandt send to me a letter thn>rlH~ning lo pliit:t~ d 11:!~Lraining order on me and stating I was 
not to contact my !iistcr in any way. I hG:i lcttN also stated to only contact Toni throu8h hPr 
dllur ncy Ms. Brandt and Ms. Drandt will not accept my letter:. or telephone calls~?? 
1-rrst, I am very conr.erh,-,,rl .1hour my parent's il!>lle!>. Tllt:y dr i: ,;'IL the house and I would like to 
have o 5crvicc tor my parent's or some type of memorlal. 
Mv (.Onc.erns are the Listing of my parent's property without my input or cons,mt. Please 
review the artrldu-icl i11rrn 111c:1Lion that I found by calling our original Rcol Estotc .::igcnt ;:ind 
sc,irching the internet. I was never informed the propr,,rry w;.rs lbl.~d. 
Mv personal property thilt is adjacent to my parent's property, Lot 37, th~t I p11rr:hr1s~d rrnm 
my rn1.l1!:!r for $27,000.00 in 2002. I have paid rood fees and w~tcr trom 2UUl to March 2.010. I 
put my property Into my f,nhP.r's name whe11 I ,narricd to protect rnv asset and left the 
property in my father's name for tax purposes. 
Tlii::. property has been combined into the listing ot my parent's propNty. I am concerned how I 
wlll be compen'ir1IP.d wli~ri the property is sold. I am concerned the hou:;c b li!;tcd too hish 
EXHIBIT_C~-----
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making it impossible to sell. I believe the value of the property is around 5300,000.00 to 
$350,000.00. I also believe It Is llstGd high so my sister can remain In the house. 
My concern is resardins the handllns or my parent's accounts. 1 am aware of an Annuit.y 
Account, Savings Accounts (Wells rar~o-Orofino), Mcdicc1I Sclving Account, Retirement 
Benefits, possible Dt::c::1Lh Bt::rtl:!l'ib dr1u d Sdf ~ D~µu:)il Bux. A Lhrc:c Thousand Dollar check was 
sent to me by rny Father's IBEW Electrlcal Union ;lftF~r his rlr>,uh. I rnld my sisl<·)r I n~c~ivt-!d lht-! 
check which wa::; intended tor me. She was upset and requested that I imm~diately send to hQr 
the monev for my father's cremation. I sent her $2800.00 instead $3000.00 bccau::;c the other 
$200.00 I used for food. I am on um,mployrm~r,I ,md my wift-! i~ 011 uisdbiliLy from her work due 
to severe leg circulotion issuc5. I hilve tiled tor Ions term disability for sev~re physical and brain 
injuries. My Neurolo~ist and Neuropsychologi::;t ore certain I will be ilWilrded SSD. My sister 
rlPniPn my A11rtl 's r~q11~~1. rur 111ur1l::!y for nw crnergency hospital expenses, medicine, co-pays 
and the plane fare necessary to admit me to Mission Hospital In California 
When my tather died I was told by my sister my father only had $20,000.00. I became? 
suspicious when my father's good friend and nei~hbor told me my father told him at the 
rl f r,r l'rrlt-!fll it lllt-!d iiU:lJLJI I b. 
I here aro it0ms I would like to have of my parnm's and my sister would not dls:cuss with mP rhP 
shi'.lring ot these items. <.:ertam rte ms were promised to me. The items have little value bLlt are 
sentimental. There is a lifetime of items in the house and I would lil<c il few thing!.i. When I 
would rry ;mrl rJisc:11ss l'hf-~ ii.ems m dt:!dll uul cmd organile my sister would go into c;1 crying fit 
telling me she had ttJ havt:::! control and she jusr. r.ould nm dc,r1I wil h ,myl hirrg. I l r ied l.o 
understand .:ind give her time but she w:1s unwillins to cooperate. I was willing to give her 
ulmu:.,l l:!ve1 yll1i11g ant.! even told her the trees on my land could be sold if she needed monetary 
help in the future and she was still unwilling l.o wmk wilt, me. I lit-!c.-:1111e exlrl::!111ely frustrated 
when my sister hod M:;, Br.lndt send to me a letter threat,mmg a Kestraining Order. I was very 
ill and the stress of everything put me into a complete tilil spin. I was ildmittcd into the 
rmPrgr-nc:y Rnom .-:1ruf lnl.er Lr d11:.forrcd to a hospital in California. I remember our last 
telephone convgrsation was extremely emotional due to Ms. Brandt'5 IPT.T.P.r ;.:mrl I "cn~,,mt-!d 
obsct;!nities at my si::;ter over the telephone that I later learn<:!d she:? recorded and played for 
01 her~ Lu hedr. I was very angry to be threatened and I am sorry I became so angered. I do not 
know if a legal Restraining Order has been flied. 
Another concern is my personal home I sham with my wife in Burley. This home WIii iikeiy be 
guirrg ir,lu ru11:!dosure and my wife wants to file Dankruptcy. I am contemplating leaving my 
wife. I am wnrriPrl .-1ho111 ,my rut.we d~:.els being protected from foreclosure, bankruptcy or 
divorce. 
EXHIBIT C __ ..,.__ ___ _ 
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Th;.mk yn11 rm your I irnl:-!, umu~ni d11d expertise regarding the above issues. 
Sincerely, 
John H. Cornell 
Plec:1!>e !>t!llt.l dll c.orrespondence to; 
7375 Rll.._l'ic: l.f'PSI ~lr~~I 
Las Vagas, Nevada 89149 
{702) 453 7749 
EXHIBIT _ __;c::,,.,.-, ____ _ 
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09/17/10 5:30 PM 
Alison M. Drandt, Esq. 
125 Johnson Avenue 
Kendrick, Idaho 83537 
(208) 47fi-7712 
Ms. Alison Brandt, 
SeptemhM 17, 2010 Thiru Allernpt 
August :.w, .2010 Second Attemrr 
Second Request by Hogistered mall 
Thrl'fi TP.lephone Requests 
No Return Call - No R,~~pun.s.e by Mail 
This letter i:; bcins written to you to request a copy or my µ,H l:!trt's, Michael and Arlie Cornell':; 
Trust. 
nu.• ,~r1:-.tm I am requesting a copy is because I hove not be~n informed of the detail-. or I II~ 
estate. My sister Tnni lr1h11!'-.on has refused my reql1ests for a copy at my parenl's Trust. My 
sister refuse::; to di&cuss any details of the Trust with 1111•. I I 1r.1ve never received or been given 
the uµportunity to read or review lhc Tru~t. I h<lve absolutely no dE:!talls reearding I ht-! n!>!>t:b of 
the estatP.. I r1m c:rn1et-!I ned about my personal property which is adjacent to my parent's 
property. How is the property I nwri h~i11g l1d11dled? I would appreciate notific;:ition ;:rnd details 
of the listing it and when the properties ar(' llsrP.d. Has the µr U!Jt!I Ly been listed for sale? 
If so why was I not given the opportunity to discuss or be lnvolvPd willi ll1t: details of a listing? 
Why l1dve I been told I cannot enter my purcnt's property? On what legal basis doP-. TCl11i lidve 
to keep me from my parent's prr.ipt->r I y? The property belongs to both me und my sister. 
I::; it foir that Toni has a place to live and I do not h.-1vr·\ ti pldc1: Lo live? Why .should I incur living 
expenses and she is in complete control ot everything, living off the money In thP rn1-.1 .-ind 
living frpp i11 my pd11:nt's house, which is also my house? 
Why are the detail<; rif my pdr eriL'!> financial information being kept from my revicw·:1 
It is my understanding by law the det;.111, nf rhP FsrntP. an:! tu I.Je ui:ii.:ussed with me before 
action is taken in any way regarding the l:state. 
EXHIBIT __ \:)-'------
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09/ 17 / 10 5:39 PM 
Since I have ;::ilready waited tor the informc1tion ;incl It hils nol t.Jee11 given to me by my sister 
,md lhe letters I sent to you, utter checking with the USPS tracklne inforrn;.il it,11 r 1:=garding the 
Hegr~tcred Return Receipt, I w;.i~ informed the letters had been sitting in your !,Jost Office Bo)( In 
Orofino, Idaho unclaimed for fifteen day,. Th~ ~t-!currd Registered Return Receipt Letter was 
,ri111 t.n your Kendrick, Idaho address ond was returned to me. Please send I c1 mt-! Lhc requested 
information lmmedi;.i1 Ply. 
My :::ittorney Nlr. Aherin In Lewiston, ,~1:1rn1111ended that I send this "third'' letter Regular Mail. I 
told him I would follow hi~ instructions however, Ms. Brandl hr1~ r duscd two registered letter::. 
n11u my telephone calls. My telephone messages included a reque,;:t fnr ;.i n~l urn 1.;c:111. I never 
received a return c.:ill frnm yuu. You requested that all correspondence with my sister go 
throuch you .:ind you wall not answer my correspmuf~11ct-! ur calls. How do you expect thi:; 
.irrangemcnt to work when you will not r~spond to my attempt~ In i:imlr.1Ll you? 
I am in much better health c1L Lhis ·1 irnP. and ready to protect my poG1tion and 
assets regardirie thP Pst;::ite a11d my rights. 
Please conl:tict me it you have any questions or concerns. 
Sincsrcly, 
10h11 H. Cornell 
7325 nustic Crc:;t Street 
Las Vega:;, Ncv.Jda 8~1'19 
(702) 453-77ll8 
Please Note: The .Jddress and telephone number elven 1n y11u (r.11Jovc) is my Aunt's home. 
Plt-!n~t:! ~~nd all correspondence to this addrc55. !=or telephone contact messages please IP;.i\/P 
your n,m,c• ,md r1u111ber with my Aunts and I will return your c::ill. Thank you. 
Please keep information confldemlal. My Au11I'!-. du not want to be involved in these issue:;. This 
is between my sister and me. ·1 hank you. 
EXHIBIT __ \-) ____ _ 
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a February 6, 2010 - March 5, 2010 !Iii Page 2 of 9 
r PMA account 
Percent Balance last Balance this Increase/ Percent 
of total month ($) month ($) decrease ($) change 
18% 6,925.22 8,955.11 2,029.89 29.31% 
81% 39,650.91 39,650.91 0.00 0.00% 
<1% 479.30 479.35 0.05 0.01% 




Account (Accounl Number) 
Wells Fargo Credit Card t (5490-9624-9039-9265) 
Available credit 
Total assets $47,055.43 $49,085.37 $2,029.94 4.31% 
Outstanding Outstanding 
Percent balance last balance this Increase/ Percent 
of total month ($) month ($) decrease ($) change 
NIA 490.09 0.00 (490.09) (100.00)% 
Total liabilities $490.09 $0.00 ($490.09) (100.00)% 
t Refer to your statement for actual statement dates. 
The information below may not be current. Be sure to verify the credit available on your accounls when accessing 
your credit lines. 
Account Approved credit line Credit used Credit available 
Wells Fargo Credit Card (5490-9624-9039,9265) 16.400.00 0.00 16.400.00 
Total available credit $16,400.00 $0.00 $16,400.00 
Interest, dividends and other income 
8686 
The information below should not be used for tax planning purposes. 
Account 
PMA• Prime Checking Account (344 360183) 
Wells Fargo Money Market Savings•• (6860432969) 
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Wells Fargo Custom Checking ® 
Activity summary 
Balance on 2/6 
Deposits/Additions 
Withdrawals/Subtractions 






A=ount numbe~ 150002374 0 
THE MICHAEL S CORNELL AND ARLIE 
MICHAEL S CORNELL TTE 
TONI C JOHNSON TTE 
Wells Fargo Bank, NA, California (Member FDIC) · 
Questions about your account: 1-800-7 42-4932 
Worksheet lo balance your account and General Statement Policies can be found towards the 
end of this statement. 
EXHIBIT __ ~ ----
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9571 
MICHAEL S CORNELL 
TONI C JOHNSON 
5319 LAKEVIEW RD 
OROFINO ID 83544-6127 
® Wells Fargo® PMA Package 
i4 i9 §JRW?51W75 
--If you have questions about this statement or 
your accounts: 
Phone: 1-800-7 42-4932, TTY: i -800-600-4833 
Spanish: 1-877-727-2932, TTY: 1-888-355-6052 
Chinese: 1-800-288-2288 
Online: wellsfargo.com 
Write: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
P.O. Box 6995 
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·Lober 7, 2010 11111 Page 2 of 7 
h 01 
Overview of your PMA account 
Assets 
Percent Balance last Balance this Increase/ Percent of total month (SJ month (SJ decrease (S) change 7% 1,807.38 2,315.26 507.BB 25.10% 93% 34,425.91 32,625.91 (1,800.00) (S .23)% 
< 1% 29.60 29.61 0.0, 0.03% Tot11I 11ssets $36,262.89 $34,970.78 ($1,292.11) (3.56)% 
Total 11sset 11lloc11tion (by 11ccount type) 
0 
Checking: 100% 
Interest, dividends ©lnd other income 
The information below should not be used for tax planning purposes. 
Account Thismanth This year PMA" Prime Checking Account (344380183) 0.06 3.86 Wells Fargo Money Market Savings•• (6860432969) 0.01 0.46 Tot11I interest, dividends 11nd other income $0.07 $4.32 
EXHIBIT __ ..:....( ___ _ 
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 Sep1ember9 · October 7, 201 O m Page 3 of 7 
fjjj liililiiiii.lli &Ii 441199P 
PMA® Prime.Checking Account 
Activity summary 
Balance on 9/9 
Account number: 344380183 
MICHAELS CORNELL 
TONIC JOHNSON Deposits/ Additions 
Withdrawals/Subtractions 





Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, California (Member FDIC) 
Questions about your account: 1-800-7 42-4932 
Worksheet to balance your account and General 
Statement Policies can be found towards the 
end ofthis statement. 
Overdraft protection 
Your account is linked to the following forOverd iaft Protection: 
m Credit c
Interest you've earned 
Interest earned this month 
Average collected balanc;e this month 
Annual percentage yield earned 
Interest paid this year 
Tram.s~dion hist~ry 
Date Description 
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Check 10787 ?!_; .I 
Check 10789 fl 
Check 10788 







Check 10793 ·./ / 
Check 10786~.// Check 10796 .J,; 












Check 10798,./'); ATM Withdrawal -09/23 Mach ID 1079B 210 Michigan Ave 
Orofino ID 9288 0002865 % 
Check 10800 ·1; 
Amerigas Propane Checkpymt 092210 10794 5491082660 A 10794 ». 
Check 1080411 
Check 10792 % Check 10802 





























Check 10806 ·-:£. 
Check 10810¥ 
Check 10805 · / Check 10811 













Dish Network Bill Pymt 100930 10809 *'*"""**"*""3655 A 10809 !/; 
Check C 108121 Check EXHIBIT L 10813 Check 10819 , 
Check ~ \ \) 10807 


























..... Ir Pl'l1i'D'@;3tW;S'llii5:1S!tVC';m;;;sm; t 4i¥¥,t>BiHE/ii/iiF2ii .... F¥1TDi55a~ • -as, :) PMA" PRIME CHECKING ACCOUNT (CONTINUED) 
Deposits/ Withdrawals/ Ending Daily Date Description Check No. Additions Subtractions Balance 10/5 Check 10817 24.29 10/5 Check 10816/ 6.00 2,412.89 10/6 Check 10818 35.58 2,377.31 10/7 Check 10820 62.ll 10/7 Interest Payment 0.06 2,315.26 Ending balance on 10/7 
2,315.26 
Totals $1,800.06 $1,292.18 
Key to symbols: " . Convt:rted check: Paper check i::onver1ed to an electronic format by your payee or designated representative. Converted checks cannot be rerurned, copied or imaged. 
Summary of checks written (checks listed are also displayed in the preceding Transaction history section) 
Number Date $Amount Number Date $Amount Number Date $Amount 10781 9/9 18.77 10796 9/21 33.66 10808 9/30 73.11 10784 * 9/28 83.95 10797 9/21 22.71 10809 10/1 68.99 
10785 9(10 55.00 10798 9/21 21.64 · 10810 9/28 23.36 
10786 9/21 117.13 10799 9/28 43.97 10811 9/29 6.36 
10787 · 9/13 .123.65 10800 9/23 13.07 10812 10/1 29.12 
10788 9/14 17.47 10802 * 9/27 8.64 10813 10/1 3.90 
10789 9/14 31.04 10803 9/28 35.00 10816* 10/5 6.00 
10791 * 9/16 40.19 10804 9/24 12.67 10817 10/5 24.29 
10792 9/24 9.95 10805 9/28 14.32 10818 10/6 35.58 
10793 9/20 17.09 10806 9/28 26.36 10619 10/4 15.16 
10794 9/23 9.54 10807 10/5 26.00 10820 10/7 62.11 
10795 9/20 90.88 
• Gap in check sequence. 
Direct Deposit Advance Important Change in Terms Notice -Additional terms regarding Payment by Mail Set-up fee 
- Effective immediately the following'terms are added. All other repayment terms as communicated in the 
'Important Change in Terms Notice' you received when you opened your consumer checking account or received 
within your consumer checking account statement remain the same. 
Payment by Mail - Refundable Set-up fee. The set-up fee is refundable and will be automatically credited to your 
consumer checking account if your first two (2) payments under the Payment by Mail method are made for the ful I 
amount outstanding on or before the Payment Due Date as indicated on your periodic billing statement. You do not 
need to use the service immediately or for consecutive statement periods to qualify for the refund. In order to be 
eligible for the refund a late fee cannot have been assessed prior to making your first two (2) payments. The refund 
will appear on your checking account statement following the 2nd full payment. 
For complete details about this service, please refer to the Direct Deposit Advance Service Agreement and Product Guide and any addendum or amendment or speak with a banker at the phone number listed above. 
\-EXHIBIT __ _:.. ___ _ 
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ii 
'* 
WelUs Fargo Custom Checking® 
Activity summary · 
Balance on 9/9 
Deposits/ Additions 
Withdrawals/Subtractions 
Balance on 10/7 
Transaction history 
. Date Description 
Beginning balance on 9/9 
10/1 Transfer to DDA #\i%iii!WtAf'iiW>%rit-9 






Get your credit report and heip protect your identity 
Check No. 
Account number: 15000237 40 
THE MICHAELS CORNELL AND ARLIE 
MICHAELS CORNELL TIE 
TONIC JOHNSON TIE 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., California (Member FDIC) 
Questions about your account: 1-800-7 42-4932 
Worksheet to balance your account and General 
Statement Policies can be found towards the 
end of this statement. 
Deposits/ Withdrawals/ Ending Daily 





There's a new way to help manage your credit and protect your identity: Enhanced Identity Theft Protection. 
When you enroll, you'll gain insight into how your everyday financial decisions impact your credit and credit score. 
Then, you can make decisions to help reach your financial goals - whether it's paying off debt, saving more or 
increasing your credit score. Enhanced Identity Theft Protection delivers monthly, triple credit bureau reports and 
scores, online calculators, a credit score tracker, credit score alerts and more. 
Start protecting your credit and identity today by enrolling for just $1 for the first month and only $15.99 monthly 
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-
We1Ds Fargo Money Market Savingssnn 
Activity summary 
Balance on 9/9 
Deposits/Additions 
Withdrawals/Subtractions 
Balance on 10/7 
Interest you've earned 
Interest earned this month 
Average collected balance this month 
Annual percentage yield earned 
Interest paid this year 
Transaction history 
Date Description 
Bcg;nning b'4!~n-ce on 9/9 
10/7 Interest Payment 










Account number: q/i)jl@ilji¢@i,""u)$ 
MICHAELS CORNELL 
TONIC JOHNSON 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Idaho (Member FDIC) 
Questions about your account: 1-800-7 42-493 2 
Worksheet to balance your account and General 
Statement Policies can be found towards the 
end of this statement. 
Deposits/ Withdrawals/ Ending Daily . 
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Complete Advanta_ ~ J) Checking 
Account numbe
 1i1J September 9, 2011 - October 7, 2011 ll'!lJ Page 1 of 5 
MICHAELS CORNELL 
TONI C JOHNSON 
5319 LAKEVIEW RD 
OROFINO ID 83544-6127 
You and Wells Fargo 
- Wells Fargo Bank is consistently rated as "Outstanding" for the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) by federal regulators, the highest rating a financial 
services institution can receive. 
~ IMPORTANT ACCOUNT INFORMATION 
Revised Agreement for Onl ine Banking 
We've updated our Online Access Agreement. 
To see what has changed, please visit wellsfargo.com/onlineupdates. 
Questions? 
Available by phone 24 hours a day, 7 days a week: 
1-800-TO-WELLS (l -800-869-3557) 
ITY: 1-800-877-4833 
En espanol: 1-877-727-2932 ITY: 1-888-355-6052 
~!;E 
"'!= ""' 1-800-288-2288 (6 am to 7 pm PT, M-F) 
Online: wellsfargo.com 
Write: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (114) 
P.O. Box 6995 
Portland, OR 97228-6995 
Account options 
A check mark in the box indicates you have these 
convenient services with your account. Go to 
we/Jsfargo.com or call the number above if you have 
questions or if you would like to add new services. 
Online Banking [Z] Direct Deposit 
Online Bill Pay D Rewards Program 
D 
D 
Online Statements D Auto Transfer/ Payment D 
Mobile Banking D Overdraft Protection [Z] 
My Spending Report [Z] Debit Card 
Overdraft Service D 
-
-
EXHIBIT _ __:3:::::,_ __ _ 
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~ St .r. r 9, 20 ·11 - October 7, 2011 !iii Page 2 c 
With you when you're shopping for the perfect gift 
Give yourself extra spending security this season. Our Zero Liability protection keeps your 
personal or business Wells Fargo Debit Cards and Credit Cards safe from promptly reported 
unauthorized transactions at no extra cost. Speak with a banker, call us at 1-800-WFB-OPEN 
or visit wellsfargo.com to learn more today. 
Activity summary 
Beginning balance on 9/9 
Deposits/Additions 
Withdrawals/Subtractions 






Your account is linked to the following for Overdraft Protection: 
·Ill Credit Card 
Interest summary 
Interest paid this statement 
Average collected balance 
Annual percentage yield earned 
Interest earned this statement period 










California account terms ond conditions apply 
For Direct Deposit and Automatic Payments use 
Routing Number (RTN): 121042882 
Check Deposits/ Withdrawals/ Ending daily 
Date Number Descriplion Additions Subtractions balance 
9/9 11161 Check 124.59 
9/9 11158 Check .... ·· ... _......... 40.28 ...... ······ · ..... , ·· · 
9/9 . .. jffs7 ·check '"''" ...... ,..... ... ...... ,,., ..... _,_,,,_,. ... . . . .. 25:00 ,.,. -·· 'i;.is:2:s9 
9/12 . 11151 Check . .. . -·--·-·---.. ,, ........ - - -- . "'" - . - - 121.00 - ·---- ..... 
~~H • :··········.··· ··.·  :~··~·~r ~:f eec~a.FcLiCheckPyint\ff$2··················.······.····:··· ·.···············.·:·········· ··· :·····.·.··::··············· ······ ························ ··.····· ···· ·· ······.········ . . ... ............. ,,. ~ ~4:~~ '"'"''" .,, ...... ,,,,,, "'"' 
g/12 fl162 Check ............. ... .. ... -· fas ... · 1,153.87 
9fit ... · ........ :_11_1s5 ·_<thecl< __ "_ ·. ·. ···-<·- ....... ·"--···· · · __ · ............ ____ .... ·· ........ _ ... ,. ,w, .. --·-·· _, ........... ,, ... ··1..i1.15 _____ : ·· ,w···· ···-
9/13 11160 Check 16.50 996.22 9hs · ······ iiiiis ttieck ······························ ··· ········· ·· ··· ························· 49:02 · 
9h5 ... , ........ ·11163 « check - ... . .... ... _,. . ., ...... , ........... ,, .... ,w... ..... ·.- .• , ......... ,, ..... , ............ --...................................... , ........ ,.... ... . . ............ .. .... . ... ... ·.···· 2.85....... ......., .... w-944.3s 
9/19 ll.1.?~ .. ,c~~ck ::. ::::: ... , ........ .. · .. .. ::•:::•:::= : :::::=:: ...  ::~••::•: :=.:~::.:.:., ..... . ?.~;,,4~ .............. :29?:8J. 
9/20 11154 Check 113.71 792.16 9/21 . .. . ... 11168 check . . . . .. . .. ..... ...... ... - ... - .................... "',, ...................................... - .......................... .,......................... ......................... . . .. ........................... 'i\s':Ci6 .................. _:ioii 6, 
?hi :: Aiiiiii iMgefsarikctie:Skp~y3itifri922iifiiiooooi4963is : :. : ij s:ii3 : ::.. .: : 
9/22 11120 Check 53.27 9/22 11·126 Check· ...... ... .,..... . .............. ., ............................ ,............... ... ., .. . . . ., ..... s .. ij';i' . ..., .... ., .. . 
9/22 .. ..... 1·1 ·i71"' ·chec1<""'"'""" ......... ,. ................. ..... .. ....... . .,,. .,, ... - ., ..... .- ............ "........ ..... ....................... . . .. 49.70 .... ...... ................ ., "·"'"""•"" , 
9ii2 ., ......... ...... 11169 ·· Check ···· ·· · .... ,. ,. ..................... , ................ ,, ... ,,,,.. .. ............ .,,,,,-... -·,······ ........... ,,,,..,"_,... .. ,. ............. ,.,. ........ , ................................ , ..... , ............ ,,............ 9 .35 · ... , ""·"'4fi5:99 
EXHIBIT ___ T ___ _ 
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Transaction historry (continued) 
Check Deposits/ Withdrawals! Ending daily Date Number Descriptian Additions Subtractions balance 9/26 ___ ",-·, _________ Tele-Transfer Fr Savirrgm xxxx8663 Reference# Tfe58H9Yjn ___ ,,. ___ ,._,__ 100.00 , .. ,,, _______ ,,,,, __ ,,_____ 49R(H 9/27 · I\ 11172 Frontier 13 Arc Bill Pymt 110926 11172 42.76 0000000301251003906656 
. 9/27 _,,,,,,,,,,_,, _ _ "11166 Ameri~s ~~e Ch~¥mt 09261.1 11166 5491082660 __ ,,_,____ ,,_,,, ____ , :~-/ _____ ,,,._. __ 10.60 ._.,,,,. · · • 44-4.65 :~~~ ___ ,, _______ ,, __ ,,,,,,, ~~=~~r~~~f;urc~:~i~mo;::~~~:~~~~Wi~ti~:~D - - · ___ ,,_,,,, 1,500.00 )1 ________ :0.48 . ,,,., .,.__ 1,941:T 7 
434256xxxxxx9288 271140012375516 ?McC=5211 90 9/29 _ ,. '"11174 Check • ., •. ,. .. ........... , .......... ··-···--· -··---- · ...... , •. ., ..... ., . . . ................ ·- ······ so:iff 1;s~JO:s6 9/30 ·---·---·-·- 11175 • Check _____ ,, _ __ ,, ______ ,,, ____ ,,.,,,,,, ____ _,_,,_, __ ,,. _____ ,.,,,,_,,,,,.,----------------39.75 ·----,- ---9/30 _,, _____ 11176 . Check 
- · ----------------,, 16.84 .,, .. ,,,._,, _______ ._ 
9/30 · 11173 Check 
· 
· 
· · 5.00 1,828.97 10/4 ·--·-··-·-· 11177- Check -·-·-·--,, 
-------·--···----··--·---------------------- 121.00--·--·---.. ,,,, _ _  _ ioJ.;r --· · .... ·" TiYis ··cfieck · ,, .,,. ·· ·· ... .... · ---- · ········ · i6:1s ·· ·-· · ... 1,631.82 
10/5 ··---------·-.... Tele-Transfer Fr Savingsxxxxxx8663 Referenc~ #~tr),92R · _,_ 271.00 -----·--·-·---10/5 11185 Check 118.91 
· 
10/5 11186 Check · ------.. ··-··"·-··---------·------ .. --·----··----,.--,,.,-.----·--·"·"""'-""'·'"'"""-"·"'"'"""'75,00 ""'"'"· ·---·-,,,,-
10/S _,,, .............. - " l 11.79_ Di.sh Network Bill Py1'Tlt 11.1004 1 .. 1179 ********"***3655···--····--··· ·---· ..... . . · .. . . ..... ,.-............ ,. __ . '""' .- ...... 73_.99 __ . .,, ...... ,,, 1,634.92 10/6 11180 Check 46.25 10/6 11190 Chi,ck 
-----------· 38.65 ---- · ---·· 10/6 11187 Check 11.65 1,538.37 10/7 --- 11191 Check ·-·----·--·----------
· ----15.78·-·--·· · 
1.0/7 .................. ,.. ···-·-- • ······-·. Interest.Payment ... ... _ ........ ........... -~:.::: ..... - ~:..... . ... % · -·--
__ .,,,,, • .,, . ...... ......... .• 9:.2'.! ........................... .,, .• ,, ......... ,, .•.... ""---"T,522'.63 Ending balance on 10/7 1,522.63 
Totals $1,871.04 $1,970.87 
The Ending Daily Balance does not reflect any pending withdrawals or holds on deposited funds that may have been outstanding an your account when your transactions posted. If you had insufficient available funds when a transaction posted, fees may have been assessed. 
" Converted check: Check converted to an electronic farmat by your payee or designated representative. Checks converted ta e/ectranic farmat cannot be returned, copied or imaged. 
Summary of checks written (checks listed are also displayed in the preceding Transaction history) 
Number Date Amount Number Date Amount Number Date Amount 11120 9/22 53.27 11163 9/15 2.85 11175 9/30 39.75 11126 * 9/22 52.22 11164 9/19 38.48 11176 9/30 16.84 11135 * 9/12 54.87 11165 9/15 49.02 11177 10/4 121.00 11151 * 9/12 121.00 11166 9/27 10.60 11178 10/4 76.15 11152 9/12 100.00 11167 9/22 125.63 11179 10/5 73.99 11154 * 9/20 113.71 11168 9/21 85.00 11180 10/6 46.25 11155 9/13 141.15 11169 9/22 9.35 11185 * 10/5 118.91 11157 * 9/9 25.00 11170 9/23 18.98 11186 10/5 75.00 11158 9/9 40.28 11171 9/22 49.70 11187 10/6 11.65 11160* 9/13 16.50 11172 9/27 42.76 11190 * 10/6 38.65 11161 9/9 124.59 11173 9/30 5.00 11191 10/7 15.78 11162 9/12 2.85 11174 9/29 50.61 
* Gap in check sequence. 
-
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~ IMPORTANT ACCOUNT INFORMATION 
Enjoy safe and secure savings with a Wells Fargo Time Account (CD). You will get a guaranteed rate of return and have the peace of 
mind of knowing your money is FDIC insured up to applicable limits. Talk with your Wells Fargo Banker today. 
Turn off the paper clutter ... If you bank online, get your statement online. It's easy to switch to Online Only Statements. Sign on at 
wellsfargo.com/turnoffpaper, select Online Only, or check the box Switch All to Online Only Delivery and click Submit at the bottom of 
the page. Online statements reduce paper clutter, help protect against identity theft, and they're gentle on the environment. 
EXHIBIT ___ ~=------













Available by phone 24 hours a day, 7 days a week: 
1-800-TO-WELLS (1-800-869-3557) 
TTY: 1-800-877-4833 5319 LAKEVIEW RD 
OROFINO ID 83544-6127 En espaflol: 1-877-727-2932 TTY: 1-888-355-6052 
~;Ji ~ iio 1-800-288-2288 (8 am to 7 pm PT, M-F) 
You arid Wells Fargo 
Thank you for being a Wells Fargo customer. We appreciate your business and 
understand that you are entrusting us with your banking needs. Let us assist you 
in finding the right accounts and services to help you reach your financial goals. 
Please visit us on line at wellsfargo.com, call us at the number at the top of your 
statement, or visit any Wells Fargo store - we'd love to hear from youl 
Online: wellsfargo.com 
Write: Wells Fargo Bank,.N.A. (114) 
P.O. Box 6995 
Portland, OR 97228-6995 
Account options 
A check mark in the box indicates you hove these 
convenient services with your account. Go to· 
wellsfargo.com or call the number above if you have 
questions or if you would like to add new services. 
Online Banking [Z] Direct Deposit 
Online Bill Pay D Overdraft Protection 




Mobile Banking D Auto Transfer/Payment 0 
My Spending Report [Z] 
IMPORTANT ACCOUNT INFORMATION 
Shared ATM Deposits 
Effective July 28, 2011, we will no longer accept deposits made at non-Wells Fargo STAR and Instant Cash Shared Network ATMs. To 
make an ATM deposit, please visit one of our 12,000 Wells Fargo or Wachovia a Wells Fargo company, ATMs. 
n With you when you're protecting the things you value most 
8 
Protecting the things that matter most in your life is easier with Wells Fargo Insurance. 
We can help you find the type of coverage that fits your needs. And, with competitive 
quotes from the multiple companies we represent, you'll get a pi;ice that's right for you. 
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Beginning balance on 5/7 
Deposits/Additions 
Withdrawals/Subtractions · 
Ending balance on 6/7 
Overdraft Protection 





Your account is linked to the following for Overdraft Protection: 
Iii Credit Card
Interest summary 
Interest paid this statement $0.06 




Annual percentage yield ealned 
Interest earned this statement period 








5/13 ······ .. 
5/13 
s/16 . · 
5/18 




· i 1037 Check ······· 
.. ... ..... 11036 ·'check 
11035 Check . . "" "' ,_,, .• " ''"'"""'" . , . 
.. Clieck Crd Purchasebsjj iiNorttiwest Drug& Gift Orofino ID . 
434256xxxxxx9288 131140012404209 ?McC=5912 90 
···· iio4i check · 
. i 1043· Check . 
i 1044 '"check 
. 11045 ·check ···. 
? 11046 -)a/9.ei sa:nrc~ec1<p_axfr;i,59stfil§46§¢§oJ4?~3fa .,...... .. .. · 
11047 Check 
s119 ·· 1103s oieck ·· 
sh<) "" ' '' . . iio49 "'check 
5/23 . . chec1<erd Purchase 05J2ci Hayes Foods & 1-iardw 6rofino 115 . 
5i23 . 




:S12:s ···· · 
5h6 ·· ··· ·· 
s12r,-··· 
s/27 ···· ·· 
434256xxxxxx9288 142140012909126 ?M,cC=54 ll 90 
. . i1iisl ciieck . . ..... . .. . 
11050 Cl1eck ... 
11052•n•,Check ' h ,•,Nn'"· '·'•'•"" ''"''• .. h A• 
· 1 i o,is check · · ·· 
i io4:f' check 
· ·· ······ ii 033 check ·· ·· · 
·· ·1 io1is Check .. 
11 007 · check' .. 












.... I\ 1 ios3 .. Froriiiei-' i3Afc Biii Pymt iios2:i ii0s3 . 
0000000301251003906656. 
" ; 1054 bish Network Eiii1 · rymr ii 06cff i fo54 **"''"''"''36ss ·· ··· ·· 
· i iiis8 ciieck ·· ·· ····· ···· ···· · ···· ·· · ····· ·· ······· ··· ··· ··· · ·, 




California account terms and conditions apply 
For Direct Deposit and Automatic Payments use 
Routing Number (RTN): 121042882 
Deposits/ 
Additions 




.. 17.86 . 
.. ... 9~60 
9.35 
7 .. 06 
17, 18 
.. 30.02 · . . 
2f27 










53,80 ···· · 
49.57 
52.22 
·· ····' 4957 
52.22 
............ . .... ,,. • • .,.. ..... ,~ 
039.8:f 














. ... i ,061.83 
.. .. \044.56 
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Transaction history (continued) 
Check 
Deposits/ Withdrawals/ Date Number Description Additions Subtractions 
Ending daily 
balance 6/3 11 060 Check 
50.24 6/j" "" • ""'' ·-::~~if9§(:~~~~k• HOW"""''°'""""'""'"'"""'°'"'"""""°""°''"""'"'''"'"'"""'''"' •••d .. •• . . • .,m ..... •• • 23.58 . 1/40,?1. 
~>~· ··· ............ ·- 11 ~~; ... 2~:~~ .....  --- .,....... -.. ,., ......... ,, _,,,,_,,_ -···-·--·-·-··-·· .. -· .. ,., ....... . .. .. .... .... ..... ... _ .. ,, ... ,,~~=-~::~~Hr-: .... -·· ..... )~6-§z.?2 61i·· · i\ iio63. kineciai'cucheckryirit'iio63. · iocioo 6/i ·· .. · ··• ················ ········ ············· ·····inieiesti'aYment············ ··· ... ...... ................. ..... ....... ·· ······· :······ ·· ···· ······· ····· ···· ·· ······················· ···· ············ : ························· ··o:oi5····· ··•••: ·:••~··········-•· ·•······· ··············•···· •••·· :··~····; '46Q:o~ Ending balance on 617 
1,460.05 Totals $1,500.06 $1,779.28 
The Ending Daily Balance does not reflect any pending withdrawals or holds on deposited funds that may have been outstanding on your account when your transactions posted. If you had insufficient available funds when a transaction posted, fees may have been assessed. 
I\ Converted check: Check converted to an electronic format by your payee or designated representative. Checks converted to electronic format cannot be returned, copied or imaged. 
Summary of checks written (checks listed are also displayed in the preceding Transaction history) 
Number Date Amount Number Date Amount Number Date Amount 11007 5/26 49.57 11041 5/11 17.18 11052 5/24 21.33 11016 * 5/26 52.22 11042 5/25 53.80 11053 5/31 42.53 11023 * 5/27 . 39.83 11043 5/13 30.02 11054 6/2 73.99 11029* 5/27 52.22 11044 5/13 21 .27 11056 * 5/27 38.24 11033* 5/25 49.57 11045 5./16 121.00 11057 6/3 75.00 11035 • 5/10 9.35 11046 5/18 119.81 11058 6/2 7.90 11036 5/10 9.60 11047 5/18 75.00 11060 • 6/3 50.24 11037 5/10 17.86 11048 5/25 53.80 11061 6/3 23.58 11038 5/19 149.47 11049 5/19 46.62 11062 6/6 73.11 11039 5/31 80.03 11050 5/24 40.00 11063 6/7 100.00 
11040 5/10 53.20 11051 5/23 8.80 11065 * 6/7 107.61 
• Gap in check sequence. 
~IMPORTANT ACCOUNT INFORMATION 
Save time with Online Bill Pay 
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Worksheet to. balance your .account 
Follow the steps below to reconcile your stat.ement balance with your 
account register balance. Be sure that your register shows any interest 
paid into your account and any service charges, automatic payments or 
ATM transactions withdrawn from your account during this statement 
period. 
[Kl Enter the ending balance on this statement. ~$ _____ _ 
(fil List outstanding deposits and other 
credits to your account that do not appear on 
this statement. Enter the total in the column · 
to the right. 
Description Amount 
T.;tal $ 
[I] Add[Kj and @] to calculate the subtotal. 
[Q] List outstanding checks, withdrawals, and 
other debits to your account that do not appear 
on this statement. Enter the total in the column 
to the right. 
----:--··---~---------, 
Number/Description Amount 
+ s; L· · -r 
_¥·~~· __ ]_ ..
- ---~-.---:- ~ 
i · _:.::~_L_·_ t:..-
,· .1 ·. . I ..._.....-· 
~ ·----------+---~~~--:--1 
~~---- -----·- .. ;~;- .-~!-·~·:~.~-, 
















~ - $ \ -l..---------'--------~ Total $ 
IT] Subtract [Q] from[fl to calculate the 
adjusted ending balance. This amount should be 
the same as the current balance shown in y·our 
register. 
= .. $ ______ _ 
General statement policies for Wells Fargo Bank 
Ill To dispute or report inaccuracies in information we have furnished to a 
Consumer Reporting Agency about your accounts. You have the right to 
dispute the accuracy of information that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. has 
furnished to a consumer reporting agency by writing to us at Wells Furgo 
... -Servicing, P.O. Box 14415, Des Moines, IA 50306-3415. Please describe the 
specific information that is inaccurate or in dispute and the basis for the 
dispute along with supporting documentation. If you believe the 
information furnished is the result of identity theft, please provide us with 
an identity theft report. 
Iii In case of errors or questions about your electronic transfers, 
telephone us at the number printed on the front of this statement or write 
us at Wells Fargo Bank, P.O. Box 6995, Portland, OR 97228-6995 as soon as 
you can, if you think your statement or receipt is wrong or if you need more 
information about a transfer on the statement or receipt. We must hear 
from you no later than 60 days after we sent you the FIRST statement on 
which the error or problem appeared. 
1. Tell us your name and account number (if any). 
2. Describe the error or the transfer you are unsure about, and explain a!; 
clearly as you can why you believe it is an error or why you need more 
information. 
3. Tell us the dollar amount of the suspected error. 
We will investigate your complaint and will correct any error promptly. If 
we take more than 10 business days to do this, we will credit your account 
for the amount you think is in error, so that you will have the use of the 
money during the time It takes us to complete our investigation. 
a In case of errors or questions about your Direct Deposit Advance• 
service 
If you think your bill is wrong, or if you need more information about a 
transaction on your bill, write us at Wells Fargo Bank, P. 0. Box 6995, 
Portland, OR 97228-6995 as soon as pos·sible. We must hear from you no 
later than 60 days after we sent you the first bill on which the error or 
· problem appeared: You can telephone us, but doing so will not preserve 
your rights. 
In your letter, give us the following information: 
1. Your name and account number 
2. The dollar amount of the suspected error 
3. Describe the error and explain, if you can, why you believe there is an 
error. If you need more information, describe the item you are unsure 
about. 
You do not have to pay any amount in question while we are investigating, 
but you are still obligated to pay the parts of your bill that are not in 
question. While we investigate your question, we cannot report you as 
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(114) 1- 2 
10661 
MICHAEL S CORNELL 
TONI C JOHNSON 
5319 LAKEVIEW RD 
OROFINO ID 83544-6127 
ctober 8, 20 1 0 .mvember 5, 201013 Page 1 of9 
® Wells Fargo® PMA Package 
If you have questions about this statement or 
your accounts: 
Phone: 1-800-742-4932, TTY: 1-800-600-4833 
Spanish: 1-877-727-2932, TTY: 1-888-355-6052 
Chinese: 1-800-288-2288 
Online: wellsfargo.com 
Write: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
P.O. Box 6995 
Portland, OR 97228-6995 · 
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Overview of your PMA account 
Assets 
Percent Balance last Balance this 
of total month (SJ month (SJ 
6% 2,315.26 1,938.20 
94% 32,625.91 30,825.91 
<1% 29.61 29.61 
Total assets $34,970.78 $32,793.72 
Total asset allocation (by account type) 
0 
Checking: 100% 
Interest., dividends and other income 
The information below should not be used for tax planning purposes. 
Account 
PMA0 Prime Checking Account
-Wells Fargo Money Market Sav
Total interest, dividends and other income 
10662 
lncreasei Percent 
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:, OVERVIEW OF YOUR PMA ACCOUNT (CONTINUED) 
Upcoming changes to your Wells Fargo PMA Package and Brokerage Account Benefits 
On January 1, 2011, Wells Fargo Investments, LLC brokerage accounts will be tramforred to our affiliat ed 
broker-dealer, Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC. The following is a summary of changes to the PMA Package Brokerage 
Account Benefits described in the Wells Fargo Consumer Account Fee and Information Schedule: 
All references to Wells Fargo Investments, LLC are replaced with Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC. Financial Consultants are 
now called Financial Advisors. WellsTrade and Full Service Brokerage Account Maintenance Fees and IRA Custodial 
Fees are now described as Annual Account Fees. Annual Account Fees also includes any other annual fees described 
in your Wells Fargo Advisors Brokerage Account fee schedule. 
WellsTrade Brokerage Accounts 
WellsTrade accounts link.ed to a PMA Package: 100 commission-free online trades per year ($8.95 per trade 
thereafter, starting on January 18, 2011 ). Annual Account Fees will be waived for WellsTrade accounts linked to a 
PMA Package as of June 30 of each year. 
· 
Full Service Brokerage Accounts 
For qualifying brokerage accounts linked to a PMA Package on or after January 1, 2011 , Annual Account Fees will be 
waived with a PMA qualifying balance of $250,000 or more as of June 30 of each year. (Certain brokerage accounts 
are not eligible for this fee waiver.) 
For brokerage accounts .. linked to a PMA Package prior to January 1, 2011, Annual Account Fees c1re wa ived fqr 
non-IRA brokerage accounts that remain linked to a PMA Package as of June 30 of each year, with no qualify ing PMA 
balance ($100,000 or more qualifying PMA balance required for Brokerage IRAs, excluding Education Savings 
Accounts). 
Certain brokerage accounts are not eligible to be linked to a PMA Package and their balances will not count toward 
the qualifying PMA relationship and they will not receive PMA benefits. Please contact your Financial Advisor or 
Investment Professional to see if your brokerage account can be linked to your Wells Fargo PMA Package. 
INVESTMENT PRODUCTS: 
-ARE NOT INSURED BY THE FDIC OR ANY OTHER FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY 
-ARE NOT DEPOSITS OF OR GUARANTEED BY THE BANK OR ANY BANK AFFILIATE 
-MAY LOSE VALUE 
Investment products and services, including WellsTrade accounts are offered through Wells Fargo Investments, LLC (member SIPC), a registered broker dealer and non-bank affiliate of Wells Fargo & Company. 
Please see an important message on the last page of your statement that describes how Wells Fargo posts 
transactions to your account. 
EXHIBIT G 
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PMA ® Prime Checking Account 
Activity summary 
Balance on 10/8 
Deposits/ Additions 
Withdrawals/Subtractions 






Your account Is erdraft Protection: 
Iii Credit car
Interest you've earned 
Interest earned this month 
Average collected. balance this month 
Annual percentage yield earned 
Interest paid this year 
Transaction history 
Date Description 






10/12 ATM Withdrawal-10/12 Mach ID 10798 210 Michigan Ave 
Orofino ID 9288 0003969 
10/12 Check Crd Purchase 10/09 Frontier Foo.ds Orofino ID 





















10/26 ATM Withdrawal - 10/26 Mach ID 10798 210 Michigan Ave 
Orofino ID 9288 0004816 





10/29 Transfer From ODA~ 
11/2 Check ) 
1112 Check EXHIBIT_.!....~.:.'-------1112 Check 
10664 Page __ L\_...._ of ___,..,......_ Pages 
Accountnumber: 344380183 
MICHAEL S CORNELL 
TONI C JOHNSON 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., California (Member FDIC) 
Questions about your account: 1-800-742-4932 
Worksheet to balance your account and General 
Statement Policies can be found towards the 
end of this statement. 
Deposits! 
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:, PMA® PRIME CHECKING ACCOUNT (CONTINUED) 
Deposits/ Withdrawals/ Ending Daily 
Date Description Check No. dditions Subtractions Balance 
11/3 Dish Network Bill Pymt 101102 1 1110845 · 68.99 
11/3 Check 10847,-- 5.45 2,043.07 
11/4 Check 10852~ 23.83 
11/4 Check 10342v 8.00 2,011.24 
11/5 Check 10850 73.11 
11/5 Interest Payment 0.07 1,938.20 
Ending balance on 11/S 1,938.20 
Totals $1,800.07 $2,177.13 
Key to symbols: II Converted check: Paper check converted to an electronic format by your payee or designated representative. 
. Converted checks cannot be returned, copied or imaged. 
Summary of checks written (checks listed are also displayed in the preceding Transaction history section) 
Number Date $Amount Number Date $Amount Number Date $Amount 
--- ·- ·----10782 10/19 42.47 10827 10/13 26.51 10838 10/27 75.00 
10790 * 10/19 41.41 10828 10/18 328.13 10840 • 10/26 39.62 
10801 * 10/19 41.41 10829 10/13 6.34 10841 10/26 23.61 
10814 * 10/20 37.18 10830 10/14 i·'.· J.U6 c,.J.0842, . .'· Y 11/4 8.00 
10815 10/8 120.00 10831 10/20 41.94 10844 • 11/2 120.00 
10821 * 10/20 41.41 10832 10/19 45.00 10845 11/3 68,99 
10822 10/20 109.40 10833 10/18 8.80 10847 • 11/3 5.45 
10823 10/25 80.78 10834 10/19 30.08 10848 11/2 89.75 
10824 10/25 135.00 10835 10/19 29.15 10849 11/2 28.25 
10825 10/12 128.24 10836 10/26 46.26 10850 11/5 73.11 
10826 10/13 40.88 10837 10/20 108.06 10852 * 11 /4 23.83 
• Gap in check sequence. 
Track seasonal spending online 
Get your seasonal spending, bills, budget, and savings under control with My Spending Report with Budget Watch, 
and other free online tools from Wells Fargo Online. 
Save time, spend wisely and save more by using Account Alerts, My Spending Report with Budget Watch and My 
Savings Plan, and Mobile and Text Banking*. You can also download an App for your mobile device at wf.com 
(optimized for your mobile device). 
Sign up or sign on today! Visit wellsfargo.com, wellsfargo.com/biz, or wf.com for more details. 
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Wells Fargo Custom Checking® 
Activity summary 
Balance on 10/8 
Deposits/ Additions 
Withdrawals/Subtractions 
Balance on 11 /5 
Transaction history 
Date Description 
Beginning balance on 10/8 .· 
10/29 · Transfer to DD~l1it£\li!'P:t:'t/i\;'/;~ 









THE MICHAELS CORNELL AND ARLIE 
MICHAELS CORNELL TTE 
TONIC JOHNSON TTE 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., California (Member FDIC) 
Questions about your account: 1-800-742-4932 
Worksheet to balance your account and General 
Statement Policies can be found towards the 
end of this statement. 
Deposits/ Withdrawals( Ending Daily 
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Balance on 10/8 
Deposits/Additions 
Withdrawals/Subtractions 
Balance on 11/5 
Interest you've earned 
Interest paid on 11 /5 
10667 
Average collected balance this month 
Annual percentage yield earned 
Interest paid this year 
rMA acc ctober 8, 2r · "'- .,ovember 5,201 O 1111 Page 7 of9 












Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Idaho (Member FDIC) 
Questions about your account: 1-800-7 4 2-4932 
Worksheet to balance your account and General 
Statement Policies can be found towards the 
end of this statement. 
-
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Worksheet to balance your checking account 
1. Go through your check register and mark each check {this includes 
cancelled, converted and substitute checks that may appear on your 
statement), withd,ti;!WiJ,!~.f.l}!\.Jransqc:tion, payment, deposit or other credit 
listed in the "Transaction history" section of your statement. Be sure your 
register shows any interest or dividends paid into your account and any 
service charges, automatic payments or transfers withdrawn from your 
account during this statement period. 
2. Using the chart below, list any outstanding, converted or substitute 
checks, as well as any ATM withdrawals, payments or any other 
withdrawals {including any from previous months) which are listed in your 
register but are not shown on your statement. 
3. Balance your account by filling in the spaces below. 
@ ENTER 
~ The "ending balance" 
shown on your statement 
@ADD 
ill] Any deposits listed in 
your register or transfers into 
your account which are not 
shown on your statement 
l§>(ALCULATESUBTOTAL 
(Add parts [Al and~) 
@SUBTRACT 
@] Total of outstanding 
checks and withdrawals from 
the chart at right 
@CALCULATE 
ENDING BALANCE 
(Part [fil + Part~ - Part@]) 
This amount should be the 
same as the current balance 














Check number Amount 






~ Total $ 
General statement policies for Wells Fargo Bank 
l!Jll To dispute or report 
inaccuracies in information we 
have furnished to a Consumer 
Reporting Agency 11bout your 
accounts. You have the right to 
dispute the accuracy of 
information that Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A. has furnished to a consumer 
reporting agency by writing to us 
at Wells Fargo Servicing, P .0. Box 
14415, Des Moines, IA 
50306-3415, Please describe the 
specific information that is 
inaccurate or in dispute and the 
basis for the dispute along with 
supporting documentation. If you 
believe the information furnished 
is the result of identity theft, 
please provide us with an identity 
theft report. 
!ill Checking account information. After 
balancing your checking account, please report 
any differences to us as soon as possible but no 
later than within 30 d11ys. Special provisions, 
including a reporting period of up to 60 days, 
apply if the difference involves an electronic funds 
transfer. These provisions are explained below. 
!llJ In case of errors or questions about your 
electronic transfers, telephone us at the number 
printed on the front of this statement or write us at 
Wells Fargo Bank, 735 West Wisconsin Avenue, 
Milwaukee, WI 53201 -2057 as soon as you can, if 
you think your statement or receipt is wrong or if 
you need more information about a transfer on 
the statement or receipt. We must hear from you 
no later than 60 days after we sent you the FIRST 
statement on which the error or problem 
appeared. 
1, Tell us your name and account number ,(if any). 
2. Describe the error or the transfer you are 
unsure about, and explain as clearly as you can 
why you believe it Is an error or why you need 
more information. 
3. Tell us the dollar amount of the suspected 
error. 
We will investigate your complaint and will 
correct any error promptly. If we take more than 
10 business days to do this, we will credit your 
account for the amount you think is in error, so 
that you will have the use of the money during the 
time It takes us to complete our investigation. 
Ii Deposit and loan products, including 
PMA Package, offered by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
C Member FDIC. EXHIBIT _ __,,-- :2"------©2007 Wells Fargo Bank, NA All rights reserved. L:> of \Q Pages Page 
10668 
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This message will clarify the way Wells Fargo posts transactions to your account and assesses Overdraft and Returned Item fees as of November 29, 2010. 
••• 
Wells Fargo posts transactions during our nightly processing each business day. Generally, we first post depos its or incoming transfers received before the deposit cut-off time that day. We then post your withdrawals (such as ATM, debit card or check transactions) that have been received for payment from your account. We pay some categories (or types) of transactions, such as debit card transactions, before other types of transactions, such as checks. If there are multiple transactions within a category, the order in which the transactions are posted will vary depending on the type of transaction. 
For example, effective November 29, 2010, we will pay the most common types of transactions in the following order: 
-ATM and debit card transactions - transactions will be sorted by the date the transaction was conducted. If a merchant does not seek pre-authorization from the bank at the time of the transaction, we will use the date the transaction is received for payment from your account. If there are multiple transactions on a date, those transactions will be sorted by time (where that information is available to our posting systems); the remaining transactions on that date will be 
. sorted and paid from lowest to highest dollar amount. 
-Account transfers, teller cashed checks and teller cash withdrawals - If there are multiple transactions, the transactions will be sorted and paid from highest to lowest dollar amount. · 
- Checks, Bill Pay and automatic payments (also known as ACH) - If there are multiple transactions, the transactions will be sorted and paid from highest to lowest dollar amount. 
If you do not have sufficient available funds to cover a transaction, we will take one or more of the following actions: transfer available funds from any linked Overdraft Protection account(s); pay the transaction, creating an overdraft in your account; or return the transaction unpaid due to insufficient funds . Applicable Overdraft and Returned Item fees 
will post to your account the morning following our nightly processing. 
In determining whether you have sufficient funds to cover a transaction, we will consider all transactions that have posted to your account, any holds that may be in place on deposits you have made, and pending transactions (such as pending debit card purchases or ATM withdrawals) that the bank has authorized but that have not yet posted to your account. Overdraft and/or Returned Item fees will ordinarily be assessed on posted transactions that exceed your available balance. (Overdraft fees will not apply to ATM and one-time debit card transactions that post against insufficient funds, unless you have enrolled in our Debit Card Overdraft Service.) 
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Account number-lhu January l, Jl 1 - February 7, 2011 Ill Page 1 of 4 
I - ~ -- JI f- () ;t ~· 7- f f 
MICHA~L S CORNELL 
TONIC JOHNSON 
5319 LAKEVIEW RD 
OROFINO ID 83544-6127 
You and Wells Fargo 
At Wells Fargo, we are committed to doing what's right for our customers based 
on their changing needs. That's why we periodically meet with our customers to 
ensure they have the right accounts and. services for their financial needs. Visit a 
banker today and request a financial review. 
Questions? 
Available by phone 24 hours a day, 7 days a week: 
1-800-TO-WELLS {1-soo-869-3557) 
ITT: 1-800-877-4833 
Enespafiol: 1-877-727-2932 ITT: 1-888-355-6052 
1;£~ 
"t=-~o 1-800-288-2288 (8 am to 7 pm PT, M-F) 
Online: wellsfargo.com 
Write: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (114) 
P.O. Box 6995 
Portland, OR 97228-6995 
Account options 
A check mark in the box indicates you have the5e 
convenient services with your account. Ga to 
wellsfargo.com or call the number above if you have 
questians or if you would like to add new services. 
Online Banking 0 Direct Deposit 
Online.Bill Pay D Overdraft Protection 




Mobile Banking D Auto Transfer/Payment 0 
My Spending Report 0 
0 With you when you want help balancing spending with saving With a Wells Fargo Cash Back'" Credit Card, you can automatically apply your cash back earnings toward an eligible Wells Fargo checking, st1i:ng!lfy>ei.'t onal loan, or home equity account. To learn more, call 1-800-WFB-OPEN, talk with us, or visit wellsfargo.com today. 
Activity summary 
Beginning balance on 1/8 
Deposits/Additiom 
Withdrawals/Subtractions 










California account terms and conditions apply 
For Direct beposit and Automatic Payments use 
Routing Number (RTN): 121042882 
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Januar :011 - February 7, 2·011 m Page 2 of 4 
Overdraft Protection 
Your account i~ ft Protection: 
1"11 Credit Card 
lnterestsurnrnary 
Interest paid this statement 
Average collected balance 
Annual percentage yield earned 
Interest earned this statement period 
Interest paic.i this year 









i . J,~-.-:,_n~:!0-.·.·.·.:-:e-_. ~-. . ·~~ 
. .f$1 .. l'i!' 
$1,595.07 $1,634.73 
Tl,e Ending Daily Balance does not rer1ect any pending withdrawals or holds on depasited funds that may have been outstanding on your ac::cunt when your 
transactions posted. If you had insufticient availablefunds when a transaction posted, fees may have been assessPd. 
11 Converted check: Check converted to an electronic format by your payee or designated representative. Checks converted to electronic format cannot be 
returned, copied or imaged. 
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Summary of checks written (checks listed are also displayed in the preceding Transaction history) 
Number Date Amount Number Date Amount Number Date Amount 10922 2/7 49.57 10935 1/14 22.07 10945 
10926 • 1/11 100.00 10936 1/13 1.90 10946 
10927 1/20 199.61 10937 1/19 188.57 10947 
10929 * 1/18 135.00 10938 2/4 3.72 10948 
10930 1/18 89.00 10940* 1/20 38.36 10949 
10931 1/11 80.10 10941 1/24 121.00 10950 
10932 1/12 75.00 10942 1/26 43.34 10951 
10933 1/13 7.90 10943 2/7 48.43 10953 * 
10934 2/7 37.18 10944 1/28 19.43 
• Gap in check sequence. 
Read the latest updates about the integration efforts under way between Wells Fargo and Wachovia. Visit 
wellsfargo.com/wachovia/news. 









Online Statements are convenient, secure and better for the environment than paper statements. If you bank on line, get your 
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Account numbe~ Janua 2011 - February 7, 2011 11 Page 4 of 4 
Worksheet to balance your account 
Follow the steps below to reconcile your statement balance with your 
account register balance. Be sure that your register shows any interest paid into your account and any service charges, automatic payments or ATM trJn.sactions withdrawn from your account during this statement period. 
[Kl Enter the ending balance on this statement. $,} / . 1-j' 
[ill List outstanding deposits and other 
credits to your account that do not .;ppear on 
this statement. Enter the total in the coiumn 
to the right. 
Description A_m_o_u~ 
l----------+-·L5 .'LC.t2-~~/~ 1--------1-==-·-~ 
Total $ 
[I) Add~ and~ to calculate the subtotal. 
@] List outsttinding checks, withdrilwtils,_ tind 
other debits to your account that do not appear 
on this statement. Enter the tottil In the column 
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General statement policies for Wells Fargo Bank 
Ill To dispute or report inaccuracies in information we have furnished to a Consumer Reporting Agency about your accounts. You have the right to dispute the accuracy of information that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. has furnished to a consumer reporting agency by writing to us at Wells Fargo Servicing, P.O. Box 14415, Des Moines, IA 50306-3415. Please describ~ the 
specific information that is inaccurate or in dispute and the basis for the dispute along with supporting documentation. If you believe the 
information fumished is the result of identity theft, please provide us with 
an identity theft report. 
1:11 In case of errors or questions about your electronic transfers, 
telephone us at the number printed on the front of this statement-or write 
us at Wells Fargo Bank, P.O. Box 6995, Portland, OR 9722B-6995 as soon as you can, if you think your st;;tement or receipt is wrong or if you need more information about a transfer on the statement or receipt. We must hear from you no later than 60 days after we sent you the FIRST statement on 
which the error or problem appeared. 
1. Tell us your name and account number (if any). 
2. Describe the error or the transfer you are unsure about, and explain as 
clearly as you can why you believe it is an error or why you need more information. 
· 
3. Tell us the dollar amount of the suspected error. 
We will investigate your complaint and will correct any error promptly. If 
we take more than 10 business days tc do this, we will credit your account for the amount you think is in error, so that you will have the use of the 
money during the time it takes us to complete our investigalion. 
II In case of errors or questions 11bout your Direct Deposit Advance• 
service 
If you think your bill is wrong, or if you need more information about a 
transaction on your bill, write us at Wells Fargo Bank, P. 0. Box 6995, Portland, OR 9722B-6995 as soon as possible. We must hear from you no later than 60 days after we sent you the first bill on which the error or problem appeared. You can telephone us, but doing so will not preserve your rights. 
In your letter, give us the following information: 
1. Your name and account number 
2. lhe dollar amount of the suspected error 
3. Describe the error and explain, if you can, why you believe there is an 
error. If you need more information, describe the item you are unsure 
about. 
You do not have to pay any amount in question while we are investigating, but you are still obligated to pay the parts of your bill that are not in question. While we investigate your question, we cannot report you as delinquent or take any action to collect the amount you queslion. 
I 
,-i ; (,/ l 1 
Total $ ~ 
[I] Subtract [Q] fromW to calculate the 
adjusted ending balance. This aniount should be 
the same as the current balance shown in your 
register. 
- $ 
} / .. . . · ... ·.·.-~ - :_., f ·.··' / / ·-~?,;"'"/ 
<ci2010Wells Fargo gank, NA All rights reserved. ~ Member FDIC. UNt'liA 
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JONES, BROWER & CAU.ERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
2087469553 T-232 P0002/0011 F-684 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF IN"' 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DIS:MISS \_ 
COMES NOW Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney of record, Karin 
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., hereby submits this Respondent's Reply Brief in 
Support of Motion-to Dismiss. Said Motion. is set for hearing on November 27, 2012. 
Respondent's Memorandum of Law dated October 31, 2012 summarized the procedural and 
factual background of the case and the applicable law. This Reply Brief will not restate said 
background and argument. Instead, this Reply Brief is limited in scope to the points raised by 
Petitioner in his Brief dated November 13, 2012. 
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I. ARGUMENT 
In his Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated November 13, 2012 
(hereinafter "Response"), Petitioner argues that his claims for breach of fiduciary duty survive 
his death, and that Petitioner additionally has separate claims for breach of trust, which survive 
his death under contract theory. 
A. Petitioner~s claim for breach of fiduciary duty does not survive his death. 
The parties agree that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty arises in tort. See generally 
Memorandum of Lmv; Response. Specifically, ''a claim for a breach of a fiduciary duty is a 
negligence action in which the duty to act is created by the relationship between the parties." 
Jones v. Kootenai County Title Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 607,614,873 P.2d 861, 868 (Idaho 1994). In 
the absence of statutory authority addressing the survivability of a claim, claims arising out of 
tort abate upon a claimant's death. See Bishop -v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620-21, 272 P.3d 1247, 
1251 ~52 (2012). 
As discussed in Respondent's initial brief, Idaho Code Section 5-327 governs the 
survivability of Petitioner's breach of fiduciary duty claims. As further discussed in said 
briefing, Petitioner's claim as it relates to acts from prior to July 1, 2010 do not survive his death 
because the prior language of said statute provide for the survivability of claims only after the 
death of the wrongdoer, not the death of the injured party. 
Said statute was amended effective July 1, 2010 to allow fo:r: the survivability of tort 
claims after the death of the injured party in limited instances. The parties disagree on whether 
one such limited instance is found here. Petitioner contends that Respondent's alleged breach is 
ongoing from July 1, 2010 and that because his alleged damages are neither noneconomic and 
economic damages, said damages should be deemed to be property damage for purposes of Idaho 
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Code Section 5-327(2). See Response at 7-8. 
However, parsing of whether the alleged damages are property damage or not is 
unnecessary because of the express limitation of recoverable damages :in such actions: medical 
expenses actually incurred, other out-of-pocket expenses actually incurred, and loss of earnings 
actually suffered, prior to the death of such injured person and as a result of the wrongful act or 
negligence. I.e. § 5-327(2). Petitioner concedes that ''[t)he petitioner is not arguing ... loss of 
wages or medical expenses." Response at 8 (emphasis added). Instead, petitioner describes the 
damages sought as follows: "he has suffered a direct loss as result of the destruction of bis 
interest in the Trust property." Id. ( emphasis added). 
Based on Petitioner's admissions, the only question that remains is whether said alleged 
damages for "direct loss as result of the destruction of his interest in the Trust" falls with:ln the 
scope of recoverable damages for "out-of-pock.et expenses actually incurred." Response at 8; LC. 
§ 5-327(2). It clearly does not because under Petitioner's theory of the case, he was allegedly 
denied disbursement of his share of the Trust proceeds, so by definition had no ''out-of-pocket 
expenses actually incurred." 
The only allegations which could possibly constitute an out-of-pocket expense relate to 
$3j000.00 of death benefits received by Petitioner under Michael Cornell's International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Benefit Fund. See Affidavit of Margaret M. Watkins at 'Il 4. 
Ms. Watkins alleges that Respondent "demanded" that Petitioner turn said funds over to 
Respondent and he ultimately turned over $2,500.00 after spending $500.00 on his own living 
expenses. 1 Id. 
' Respondent notes that the dates of the subject letter and remittance of $2,500.00 from Petitioner to Respondent are 
in January and February 2010, respectively, both of which are prior to the statutory amendment to Idaho Code 
Section 5-327 discussed above. 
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There is no dispute that Petitioner was the named beneficiary of said death benefits, not 
the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell. Id. at<[ 4, attached letter 
dated January 21, 2010. What Petitioner chose to do with said funds, even if he later regretted it, 
does not change their character: said funds were Petitioner's property, not property of the 
Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arile M. Cornell. Because said funds were 
not a Trust asset, then Respondent's alleged demands or actions related to said death benefit 
cannot be considered a breach of hex fiduciary duty as trustee, even if they had occurred after July 
1, 2010. Said death benefit simply has no relation to the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. 
Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell, or this proceeding. 
No other factual allegations have been made to support the conclusion that Petitioner 
suffered actual "out-of-pocket expenses" as a result of Respondent's actions after July 1, 2010. 
Instead, the facts alleged indicate that Petitioner would have applied said funds to medical and 
living expenses if said funds had been available, but did not obtain said services due to lack of 
available funds. See Affidavit of Margaret M. Watkins at fl 6, 8, and 9. There are no allegations 
before the Court that Petitioner suffered actual "out-of-pocket" damages from Respondent's 
alleged breach of her fiduciary duty as trustee or any other damages that are recoverable after his 
death. 
As discussed above, "a claim for a breach of a fiduciary duty is a negligence action[.]" 
Jones v. Kootenai County Title Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 607,614,873 P.2d 861, 868 (Idaho 1994). It 
is well established under Idaho law that a "cause in negligence includes proof of: (1) a duty, 
recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a 
breach of duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting 
injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage." West v. Sanke, 132 Idaho 133, 142, 968 P.2d 228, 237 
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(1998) (citing Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 489, 903 P.2d 73, 78 (1995); Black Canyon 
Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171; 175-76, 804 P.2d 900, 
904-05 (1991); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617,619,619 P.2d 135, 135 (1980)). · 
Petitioner's response to a request for summary judgment "must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Shere v. Pocatello School Dist. No. 25, 143 Idaho 
486, 489-90, 48 P.3d 1232, 1235-36 (citing I.R.C.P. 56(c)). For the reasons discussed above, 
Petitioner's response does not show that there is a genuine issue for trial because there are no 
alleged facts to support the conclusion that Petitioner suffered actual loss or damage of actual 
"out-of-pocket" expenses as a result of Respondent's actions as trustee prior to his death. 
Because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Respondent is entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw, summary judgment must be granted. I.R.C.P 56(c). 
B. Petitioner's claims for breach of trust should be dismissed. 
Petitioner contends that in addition to Respondent's alleged breach of fiduciary duty as 
trustee, Respondent has a claim for breach of trust arising in contract. 
Respondent relies upon Cruzen v. Boise City, 58 Idaho 406, 74 P.2d 1037 (1937), to 
support his argument that a breach of trust arises in contract. Respondent disagrees with 
Petitioner's analysis of Cruzen, which Respondent contends is limited in scope as opposed to 
establishing a general principle that a claim for breach of trust arises in contract. Further, the 
Cruzen decision is distinguishable from the facts at hand. Said case involved a dispute over 
liability a municipal corporation owes to bondholders for a deficiency in the collection of 
assessments due to embezzlement by the city clerk of the levied special assessments. Id. at 408, 
74 P.2d at 1039. The Cruzen Court held that the subject bonds constituted an enforceable 
contract between the city and its bondholders and was not time barred. Id. at415-417, 74 P.2d at 
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1046-48 (declining to consider whether statute concerning safekeeping of money by a county or 
the statute of limitations for breach of contract was implicated). 
The relationship be.tween a bondholder and municipal corporation issuing bonds clearly 
conforms with the general :requirements of an enforceable contract: offer, acceptance, meeting of 
the minds, and consideration. Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 838 P.2d 293 (1992); Haener v. 
Adam Co. Highway Dist..; 108 Idaho 170; 697 P.2d 1184 (1985); Gyurkey v. Bahler, 103 Idaho 
663; 651 P.2d 928 (1982); Vance v. Connell) 96 Idaho 417,529 P.2d 1289 (1974). 
No such contractual relationship between the successor trustee and beneficiary of a trust 
ex:ists. Just because a written document (the Trust Agreement) is implicated, this does not 
establish a contractual relation between Petitioner and Respondent nor a potential claim by 
Petitioner against Respondent grounded in contract. 
Instead, a review of applicable case law finds no Idaho decision directly addressing 
whether a claim for breach of trust arises in tort, contract or equity. The Washington Court of 
Appeals addressed this question in Foster v. Gilliam, 165 Wn.App. 33, 268 P.3d 945 (Wash. 
App. Div. 1 2011), in the context of a dispute concerning a revocable living trust as follows: 
This cas.e arises from probate. A probate court is a court of equity. The Trust and 
Estate Dispute Resolution Act gives broad authority to the courts to administer 
and settle all estate and trust matters. . .. We have reasoned that claims for 
breach of trust are equitable in nature. This is in accord with the general 
recognition that a trust beneficiary's remedies are equitable in origin and depend 
upon the application of equitable principles. 
165 Wn.App. at 39-40, 40-41, 268 P.3d at 951-52, 952-53 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
Being equitable in nature, a claim for breach of trust is neither grounded in tort nor in 
contract. As such, Petitioner's claims of breach of trust should not be treated as non-abated 
breach of contract claims as Petitioner contends, but instead as claims in equity that do abate 
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upon Petitioner's death. 
Even if Petitioner is correct that a claim for breach of trust survives his death under 
contract law principles, it is further appropriate for the Court to consider whether Petitioner's 
alleged breach of trust claims are appropriately characterized as such. Petitioner describes 
Respondent's alleged three breaches of trust as follows: 
1. "Encouraging" the surviving grantor during his lifetime to amend the 
terms of the Trust (see Response at 8w9); 
2. Failing to divide the trust income and principal remaining in the Trust to 
the two equal shares during Petitioner's lifetime (see Response at 9); and 
3. Failing to provide a periodic accounting (see Response at 9-10). 
This Memorandum will briefly discuss each in tum. 
First, as to the alleged "encouragement" by Respondent to surviving grantor Michael 
Cornell to amend the terms of the Trust, said alleged acts are not supported by an affidavit and, 
even if they were, are beyond the scope of Petitioner's Petition and this litigation. See Petition 
for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee dated July 9, 2012. Said alleged acts 
occurred on or around August 6, 2009, prior to Michael Cornell's death and prior to authority as 
successor trustee vesting in Respondent. See Affidavit of Karin Seubert dated September 14, 
2012 at <JI 4, Exh. B.; Response at 8-9. Said alleged acts have no relevance to Respondent's 
alleged action or inaction as trustee as she had no autlio£ity as trustee at that time. Instead, if the 
· Amendment was invalid as being executed after Arlie Cornell's death as Petitioner implies, then 
Petitioner would have £emained co-trustee and had authority to act under the original terms of the 
Trust. See Affidavit of Karin Seubert dated September 14, 2012 at Exh. A. Petitioner failed to 
assert said authority during his lifetime and this issue is moot in light of his death. More 
importantly for consideration of summary judgment, said allegations are not probative to whether 
supervision of the Trust ore removal of Respondent as Trustee is appropriate, faus do not 
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preclude summary judgment. 
Second, as for Respondenf s alleged failure to divide the trust income and principal 
between the two beneficiaries during Petitioner's lifetime; Petitioner makes no distinction how 
said alleged acts constitute "breach of trust" when the same actions or inactions are also alleged 
to be a breach of Respondent's fiduciary duty as trustee. See Response at 7 ("The respondent, 
Toni C. Johnson, who was the successor trustee, b:reached her fiduciary duty to abide by the 
terms of the Trust and distribute the income and principal of Trust equally to its beneficiaries 
after Michael C. Cornell's death.") and at 9 ("the respondent failed to divide the trust income and 
principal remaining in the Trust into two equal shares and distribute them to herself and her 
brother, petitioner, John H. Cornell. Said failure is a breach of the trust term in Section 4.03") 
(emphasis added in both quotations). 
The Idaho Courts have looked to the Restatement (2nd) of Torts in analyzing actions for 
breach of trust as follows: 
If the trustee commits a breach of trust, he is chargeable with any profit which 
would have accrued to the trust estate if he had not committed such breach of 
trust. On the other hand, if the trustee commits a breach of trust and if a loss is 
incurred, the trustee may not be chargeable with the amount of the loss if it would 
have occurred in the absence of a breach of trust. 
A trustee is guilty of a breach of trust if he knowingly pays more than he should 
have paid for an item. and he is chargeable with the difference between what he 
paid and the market value of the item 
Pickering v. El Jay Equipment Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 512,517, 518, 700 P.2d 134, 139, 140 (App. 
1985) {citing Restatement (2d) of Trusts § 205 comments e, i and f (1959)). This analysis 
reflects the application of breach of trust in terms of the management or potential 
mismanagement of trust assets, not the alleged violation of a duty as Petitioner argues has 
occurred here. As such, said alleged actions or inactions do not constitute a breach of trust, but 
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instead are appropriately characterized as a breach of fiduciary duty alone. 
Thrrd, as for the alleged lack of periodic accounting, said claim is also duplicative of one 
of Petitioner's claim for breach of fiduciary duty and is more appropriately characterized only as 
such. The presence or lack of periodic accounting does not impact the profits or principal of the 
trust assets as the principles from Picketing, infra, assume. Instead, said alleged lack of 
accounting relates to a trustee's fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries, so when violated, constitute a 
breach of fiduciary duty alone. As discussed above, said claim arises in tort and does not survive 
Petitioner's death. 
For these reasons, Petitioner's claims for breach of trust are either outside the scope of 
this litigation or more properly considered to be claims for breach of fiduciary duty, which do not 
survive Petitioner's death. See infra. Respondent is therefore entitled to sununary judgment as a 
matter of law. 
C. No substitution of parties has occurred. 
Last, Rule 25(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows dismissal of an action as 
to a deceased party if no substitution of parties is made within a reasonable time. Here, the 
record of the case reflects that Petitioner's first informed the Court of Petitioner's death on 
August 21, 2012. Nearly three months have passed since said date of death. No Motion for 
Substitution of Parties has been filed by a successor or representative of the deceased party as of 
the date of this Reply Brief. The hearing on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is now seven days 
away, so there is insufficient time for notice to be given in advance of a hearing on any 
subsequently filed Motion for Substitution of Parties. 
For this additional reason, it is appropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of 
Respondent and to dismiss Petitioner's action in its entirety. 
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TI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondent Toni Johnson respectfully requests ·that her Motion 
to Dimiss be granted and that John Cornell's Petition be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this .;lb day of November, 2012. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
By____,._tJ___.l{~A..L::'.v:l~· .__..____.&-<~~~~±~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISMISS was, this~ day of November, 2012, 
hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or ~ transmitted via facsimile 
to: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
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FOOTAGE: 
1: 18 Honorable Randall W. Robinson, Magistrate Judge, presiding. Parties present in 
the court room: Mr. Aherin , and Ms. Seubert. 
1: 19 Court advices that he has read both briefs. 
1: 19 Ms. Seubert gives a brief history of the case. 
1 :24 Ms Seubert addresses the legal theories that are before the court, the alleged 
breach of trust. 
1 :30 Ms. Seubert states that Summary Judgment is warranted, because there are no 
claims that survive John Cornell's death, therefore, the claim should be 
dismissed. 
1 :30 Court _~t9tes that the Idaho Code is notbroad ~nough for this matter. 
-------- ------- --
1 :33 Mr. Aherin argues that John was denied any information about the trust. 
1 :45 Mr. Aherin continues to argue his points. 
1 :48 Court addresses checks written by Ms. Seubert's client. 
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) RE: RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
) DISMISS 
__________ ) 
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This case was instituted to protect John Cornell's interests in property held in trust by the 
trustee of the The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell. In his 
petition, John Cornell set forth facts showing that the trustee, Toni Johnson, was (1) acting 
without proper authority as trustee, (2) abusing and diminishing the trust res, and (3) attempting 
to diminish or extinguish his property interests. John Cornell died before his rights in the 
property could be adjudicated and his demand for distribution could be granted. Toni Johnson 
seeks dismissal of this action on the grounds that (A) the Estate of John H. Cornell failed to 
timely substitute into this action pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 25; and (B) John 
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Cornell's causes of action did not survive his death. In regard to her Rule 25 arguments, Johnson 
failed to raise Rule 25 as a grounds for dismissal in her motion, instead attempting to incorporate 
it as a ground for dismissal through argument in her Reply Brief. It must be recognized that the 
Estate holds a strong interest in protecting the property rights of the deceased by being 
substituted into this action upon resolution of the dispute regarding the proper personal 
representative. 
In regard to the survival of the causes of action pled in this case, both common law and 
statutory law support a finding that causes of action regarding property rights survive the death of 
the claimant. Further, Johnson premises her arguments upon the assumption that there exists no 
genuine issue as to her entitlement of the entirety of the trust res. Johnson's entitlement to the 
trust res is an issue that requires briefing and, almost assuredly, discovery into whether she 
engaged in inequitable conduct while acting in a fiduciary capacity for the decedent 
Johnson's motion should be denied. 
II. FACTS & PROCEDURE 
John Henry Cornell ("John") instituted this action on July 11, 2012. John petitioned the 
Court to, among other things, remove Toni C. Johnson as trustee of The Revocable Family Trust 
of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell ("the Trust") and order that the trust be subject to 
supervised administration. John's petition seeks relief based upon claims that (1) Johnson's 
service as sole trustee of the Trust conflicts with the terms of the Trust,,, 5-6; (2) Johnson failed 
to provide an inventory of the assets of the Trust, as required by law, , 7; (3) Johnson failed to 
distribute the Trust res in accordance with the terms of the Trust,,, 8-9, 11; and (4) Johnson has 
misused assets of the Trust,,, 9-10. 
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John died on August 20, 2012. John is survived by his spouse, Kareen Cornell 
("Kareen"). He is also survived by his sister, Johnson, and his aunt, Margaret Watkins. It is 
believed by all parties involved in this matter that John died without issue. 
On September 14, Johnson filed her motion to dismiss this case. Johnson argued for 
dismissal on the ground that the issue of survivability is governed by the common law. Johnson 
argues that John's claims sound in tort and, therefore, do not survive his death under the common 
law. Johnson premised this argument upon the assumption that she is entitled to the entirety of 
the Trust res. Johnson assumes, without argument, that the Trust res did not vest in the 
beneficiaries until after John's death-at which time it vested in Johnson. 
On November 13, Watkins filed a Petition for Formal Probate of the Estate of John C. 
Cornell ("the Estate"), by and through attorney Darrel Aherin. Watkins sought appointment as 
Personal Representative of the Estate based upon her position as a creditor of the Estate. She 
also proffered a document purported to be John's will. 
On November 15, Watkins was appointed temporary personal representative in the Estate 
case. That same day, a memorandum in opposition to Johnson's motion to dismiss was filed by 
Mr. Aherin. Mr. Aherin appears to have filed on behalf of the Estate. No substitution, however, 
has been made. In the memorandum, Mr. Aherin argues that (1) the issue of survivability is 
governed by statutory law, not common law-at least as to a number of claims; and (2) the 
claims of the petition sound in contract, which claims survive death at common law. 
On November 20, Johnson filed a reply brief. In addition to arguing the points raised in 
Mr. Aherin' s response brief, Johnson asked the Court to grant her motion to dismiss pursuant to 
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(l). Johnson's reply brief marks the first time she raised 
Rule 25(a)(l) as grounds for dismissal. 
On November 27, Kareen filed an objection to Watkin's petition in the Estate case. On 
December 19, Kareen filed (1) a petition for formal adjudication of intestacy and formal 
appointment of Kareen as personal representative; (2) a memorandum in support of her petition, 
setting forth the invalidity of Watkin's purported will; and (3) a motion asking the Court to 
restrain Watkins from taking any action on behalf of the Estate until such time as the Court could 
rule on Kareen's petition. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Court should deny Johnson's request for dismissal pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 25(a)(l) and allow the Estate to substitute into the action for John. 
It has long been the law in Idaho that an action cannot be continued in the name of a 
deceased, on behalf of his heirs, without substitution of the deceased's representative or 
successor in interest. See Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co., 47 Idaho 306,274 P. 800 (1929). Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(l) sets forth the process for substitution of the deceased party's 
representative. Johnson seeks dismissal of this action based upon the argument that John's 
representative has failed to substitute into the action in a timely manner; a ground Johnson raises 
for the first time in her reply brief. However, the failure to effect substitution has not been the 
result of unnecessary delay or disinterest, but rather the result of a dispute as to the proper 
representative of the deceased. Therefore, the Court should deny Johnson's request for dismissal 
and should grant the anticipated motion for substitution of the Estate. 
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Motions seeking a court order must set forth the grounds of the motion with particularity. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 7(b)(l); see also Idaho Mercantile Co. v. Kalanquin, 7 Idaho 295, 62 P. 925 
(1900) (applying the requirement of particularity to motions for nonsuit). Johnson's motion set 
forth a single ground for her motion: that John's claims were rendered moot because the Trust 
res vested entirely in her at the time of John's death and all other claims of the petition abated 
upon death. A claim of mootness and abatement rests upon different dispositive facts than a 
claim of failure to timely substitute. Therefore, the Court should not consider failure to timely 
substitute as a ground for dismissal. 
Even if the Court does consider Johnson's Rule 25( a)(l) argument, it fails on its merits. 
Dismissal for failure to timely substitute is left to the discretion of the Court. See Idaho R. Civ. 
P. 25(a)(l) (using the permissive may rather than the compulsory must). In determining whether 
a party ought to be nonsuited for delay, the Court should consider the length of delay, the 
prejudice caused by the delay, and the reason for delay. See Gerstner v. Washington Water 
Power Co., 122 Idaho 673, 677, 837 P.2d 799, 803 (1992) (analogous case law on motions to 
dismiss based upon lack of prosecution). First, this case has been delayed approximately three 
months. Three months is a relatively short delay when compared to the rate of prosecution in the 
average civil action. Second, Johnson has not made any showing of actual prejudice caused by 
the delay. 
Third, the justification for delay provides even stronger support for excusing the delay. 
Watkins is currently the only person entitled to represent the Estate. However, Kareen has 
opposed Watkins' appointment based upon her priority to act as personal representative as John's 
surviving spouse, Idaho Code§ 15-3-203, and the patent inadequacy of the Will which Watkins' 
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has proffered. Further, Kareen has requested that the Court restrain Watkins from taking any 
action on behalf of the Estate. Thus, the decedent's interests are represented by a temporary 
personal representative with an inferior and dubious claim to appointment, and a surviving 
spouse who has not been appointed to act on behalf of the Estate. Thus, the Court should first 
resolve who is the rightful personal representative and then entertain a motion for substitution. 
The propriety of this course of action is further supported by the uncertainty as to the preclusive 
effect any judgment entered before resolution of the Estate dispute would have on Kareen or the 
Estate. 
Therefore, Kareen asks this Court to deny Johnson's request for dismissal pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(l) as not properly before the Court. In the alternative, 
Kareen asks the Court deny the request on its merits, finding the delay excusable. Finally, 
Kareen asks the Court to entertain a motion for substitution from the rightful personal 
representative of the Estate, once that dispute has been resolved. 
B. The causes of action pied in the petition survive the death of John under both the 
common law and Idaho Code § 5-327(2). 
The causes of action pled in the petition survive the death of John under both the 
common law and Idaho Code § 5-327(2) because they are actions regarding an interest in 
property. In the petition, John sought compensation for the diminution and attempted extinction 
of his interest in the Trust res. The petition alleges that Johnson engaged in misfeasance and 
malfeasance that caused injury to the real and personal property of the Trust. At its core, the 
action seeks to (1) obtain reimbursement of the Trust for all diminishment resulting from 
wrongful acts and (2) compel distribution of the Trust res. 
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property rights and order proper distribution of the subject property survive the death of the 
claimant under both the common law and the relevant statutory provisions. 
Johnson premises her argument regarding the survivability of this action upon the 
assumption that the entirety of the Trust res has vested in her. This conclusion is neither 
conceded by Kareen nor is it clear under the law. Several legal issues must be fully briefed and 
presented before the Court, including (1) whether distribution can serve as the proper event for 
vesting; (2) if so, whether the law presumes vesting within a reasonable period of time regardless 
of actual distribution; (3) whether the terms of vesting in the Trust violate the common law or 
statutory rule against perpetuities as to both Johnson's and John's interest; and ( 4) whether 
Johnson's conduct resulted in her holding that portion of the Trust res due to John in a 
constructive trust for the benefit of John and his heirs. The lack of briefing on these issues call 
into question Johnson's assumed premise. 
Many of the equitable theories under which John's heirs might recover give rise to 
genuine issues of material fact. Those theories are often dependent upon the establishment of 
improper conduct; a triable issue of fact. Because triable issues of material fact remain, the 
motion to dismiss should be denied. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). For example, constructive trusts 
arise where "one party obtains the legal title to property, not only by fraud or by violation of 
confidence of fiduciary relations, but in any other unconscientious manner." Hanger v. Hess, 49 
Idaho 325, 328, 288 P. 160, 161 (1930). The result of such conduct is that the Court, ruling in 
equity, "impress[es] a constructive trust on the property in favor of the one who is in good 
conscience entitled to it, and who is considered in equity as the beneficial owner." Id. Specific 
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facts that may give rise to the creation of a constructive trust were set forth in the Affidavit of 
Margaret M. Watkins, filed with the Court on November 15, 2012. 
The common law governs the issue of survivability of an action upon death of the injured 
party in all actions where the injured party's cause of action arose prior to July 1, 2010. See 
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619 (2012). Johnson's argument on survival under the 
common law relies upon the analysis in Bishop. The Bishop Court set forth the general rule 
regarding survival of claims at common law: "Under the common law, claims arising out of 
contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate." 
Id. This case, however, does not fall under that general rule. The cause of action before the 
Bishop Court sounded in "pure tort" as it was for attorney malpractice. The cause of action did 
not involve a claim to property held in trust by another. 
While the Bishop Court identified the general rule, the common law is more nuanced in 
cases involving property. In such cases, the survival of an action depends upon the nature of the 
interest affected. 
At common law survivable actions are those in which the wrong complained of 
affects primarily property and property rights, and in which any injury to the 
person is incidental, while nonsurvivable actions are those in which the injury 
complained of is to the person and any effect on property or property rights is 
incidental. ... 
. . . The general rule is that, in addition to the causes of action arising out of 
contract recognized at common law, causes of action arising from torts to real and 
personal property survive and pass to the personal representative of the decedent, 
while purely personal torts do not survive in the absence of statutory provision. 
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 51. "All causes of action arising from torts to 
real or personal property, by which its value is diminished, as well as actions based on contract, 
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are generally assignable and survive and pass to the executor or administrator." 1 Am. Jur. 2d 
Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 56. Thus, in cases where the injured party alleged an injury 
to his property-such as the existence or amount of his interest in a trust-the claim survives. 
See Henshaw v. Miller, 58 U.S. 212 (1854) (cause for taking of chattels survives). See also, 
Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 105, 15 P.3d 816, 818 (2000) (holding that issues regarding 
property survive). 
The survivability of this action is further supported by the fact that it arises pursuant to a 
remedial statute and that it is equitable in nature. The petition seeks recovery based upon a 
trustee's breach. A cause of action which is founded under Idaho Code§§ 15-7-101 through 15-
7-601. "A cause of action that is founded on a remedial statute ... survives the death of the party 
possessing the cause of action." 1 Arn. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 59. Further, 
the causes of action pled here are equitable in nature-as noted by Johnson in her Reply Brief 
The principle that a cause of action expires with the death or disability of a party 
generally does not apply to suits in equity; equitable remedies exist to the same 
extent in favor of and against executors and administrators as they do against the 
decedent, as long as the court can continue to grant effective relief in spite of the 
death. One of the main reasons for this stance for suits in equity is that such suits 
primarily pertain to property rights. 
1 Arn. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 60 (footnotes omitted). Thus, under the 
common law, the causes of action pled in this case survive John's death. 
Idaho Code § 5-327(2) governs the issue of survivability of an action upon death of the 
injured party in all actions where the injured party's cause of action arose after July 1, 2010. 
While the causes of action in this case survive John's death under the common law (as set forth 
above), the Idaho legislature made survival explicit in its enactment of section 5-327(2): 
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A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the wrongful 
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person 
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that 
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those 
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii) other out-of-pocket expenses 
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of 
such injured person and as a result of the wrongful act or negligence. Such action 
shall be commenced or, if already commenced at the time of the death of the 
injured person, shall be thereafter prosecuted by the personal representative of the 
estate of the deceased person or, if there be no personal representative appointed, 
then by those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of the 
deceased person according to the provisions of section 5-311(2)(a), Idaho Code. 
The facts pled in the petition give rise to an action against Johnson for the damage caused by her 
improper conduct. The alleged damage is diminution of the Trust res; a diminution in the value 
of the property interest John held in the Trust res. Johnson claims this action falls outside the 
scope of the term "property damage" because (1) the action "does not involve tangible property 
that was allegedly damaged [in] the common and ordinary meaning of the phrase," and (2) the 
action does not seek the limited damages available to a surviving action. 
(1) Johnson does not provide a definition for the "common and ordinary meaning" of 
the term "property damage." One is left to assume that Johnson proposes that the term be 
confined to causes of action arising out of facts where the wrongdoer caused damage to tangible 
property through the application of physical force. No foundation exists for such a distinction in 
law. While the statute discusses the survivability of "causes of action", Johnson proposes an 
interpretation that would condition survivability based upon facts within the cause of action. For 
example, a trespass to chattels cause of action would survive where the trespass was in the form 
of physical contact, but not where the trespass took the form of barring the owner's access to the 
property. 
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(2) Johnson attempts to limit recovery on all actions surviving pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 5-327(2) to those grounds set forth in the second sentence of the subsection. Johnson's 
interpretation fails to account for the limited applicability of the second sentence. Subsection (2) 
governs the survivability of causes of action for personal injury or property damage. The second 
sentence of the subsection limits recovery where the suit seeks damages for injury to a deceased 
person. Statutory provisions are to be interpreted in accord with common sense and reason. 
Smith v. Dep't of Employment, 100 Idaho 520, 522, 602 P.2d 18, 20 (1979). Interpreting Idaho 
Code § 5-327(2) in a manner that limits recovery in property damage causes of action to the 
grounds set forth in the second sentence conflicts both with common sense and reason. 
Both the common law and Idaho Code § 5-327 support a ruling that the causes of action 
set forth in this case survive the death of John. If the deceased held a property interest at the time 
of death, that interest falls into the estate, where it is later distributed to the beneficiaries. The 
alleged wrongdoer does not get to convert the deceased's property to her own simply because the 
deceased did not survive to the point of judgment. Kareen asks this Court to reject Johnson's 
proposed interpretations would result in an unjust and inequitable conclusion. 
C. Granting Johnson's motion to dismiss would not be in the interest of justice because 
it would only result in duplicative litigation. 
In the event that the Court granted Johnson's motion to dismiss, Kareen could file a 
petition for a judicial proceeding declaring the Estate's rights or legal relations to the Trust 
pursuant to the Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act, Idaho Code§§ 15-8-101 through 
15-8-305. The conduct alleged in the petition is the same as that which would be set forth in a 
MEMORANDUM RE: RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS - 11 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
209
TEDRA action instituted by Kareen or the Estate. No proper purpose is served by requiring 
repetitive filing, causing additional costs and fees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Kareen asks this Court to deny Johnson's motion to dismiss. 
DATED this 17th day of January, 2013. 
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D Federal Express 
D U.S. Mail 
.J Hand Deiivery 
:~ f'acsimile 
CJ Federal Express 
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DARREL W. AHERIN 
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Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CAllERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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In the Mauer of: ) 
) 
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Case No. CV 2012~00277 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN REPLY 
TO BRIEF OF SURVIVING SPOUSE 
COMES NOW Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney of record, Karin 
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.LC., hereby submits this Respondent's Brief in Reply to 
Brief of Su1Viving Spouse. Respondent's subject Motion to Dismiss is set for further hearing on 
February 6, 2013. 
Respondent's Memorandum of Law dated October 31, 2012 sununarized the procedur~l and 
factual background of the case and the applicable law. This Reply Brief will not restate said 
background and argument. Instead, this Reply Brief is limited in scope to the points raised by the 
Memorandum re: Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated January 17, 2013 and filed by Kareen 
Cornell (hereinafter ''Mrs. Cornell"), surviving spouse of John H. Cornell, by and through counsel. 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO SURVIVING SPOUSE 
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I. ARGUMENT 
In her Memorandum dated January 17, 2013 (hereinafter "Memorandum"), Mrs. Cornell 
contends that dismissal of this action is not proper pursuant to Rule 25(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, that the causes of action in this case survive the death of John H. Cornell. , 
and that judicial economy precludes dismissal. This Brief will address each in turn. 
A. Dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 25(a)(l) is appropriate. 
In her Memorandum, Mrs. Cornell argues that Respondent's request for dismissal 
pursuant to Rule 25(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is not properly before the Court 
because it was not cited to in the Motion to Dismiss, but instead was not raised until 
Respondent's Reply Brief As the record of the case reflects, the subject Motion to Dismiss is 
dated September 17, 2012 "within one month of Mr. John Cornell's death. Said Motion was 
original set for hearing on October 1, 2012; then continued to November 27, 2012; then further 
continued to January 8, 2013, which took place; and then subsequently re-opened and re-set for 
February 8, 2013 to allow further opportunity to Mrs. Cornell to be heard. As of the February 8, 
2013 hearing, Mr. John Cornell, the Petitioner in this action, will have been deceased for nearly 
six months (the six month anniversary of his death being only 12 days later). 
When the Motfon to Dismiss was prepared on September 17, 2012, a reasonable time 
frame had not yet passed after the death of Mr. John H. Cornell where it would have been 
appropriate to include Rule 25(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure as a potential grounds 
for dismissal. Respondent could not have foreseen the long and contentious path that this 
litigation has taken since that time. 
During the nearly six month period since Mr. Cornell's death, no Motion for Substitution 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO SURVIVING SPOUSE 
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has been filed by either the temporary personal representative, or by Mrs. Cornell. Rule 25(a){l) 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[i]f substitution is not made within a 
reasonable time, the action may be dismissed as to the deceased party." More than a reasonable 
time has passed; and thus dismissal as to Mr. Cornell is appropriate and well within the 
discretion of the Court. 
B. The causes of action in this proceeding do not survive Mr. John Cornelrs death. 
Mrs. Cornell asserts in her Memorandum that "the causes of action pled in the petition 
survive the death of John under both common law and Idaho Code§ 5~327(2) because they are 
!!9!ions regarding an interest in property." Memorandum at 6 (emphasis added). Mrs. Cornell 
does not state her assessment of the legal basis for said claims other than potential, undefined 
"equitable theories." Id. As the previously submitted briefing discussed at length. this is an 
action for breach of fiduciary duty action arising out of Respondent's alleged misconduct as 
trustee of the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell after the deaths 
of Michael and Arlie Cornell. See Respondent's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
dated Nov. 20, 2012. Temporary Personal Representative of the estate of John H. Cornell, 
Margaret Watkins, has submitted briefing and argument in support of her position that the 
alleged facts also support an action for breach of trust arising in contract, but for reasons 
previously briefed and argued, the alleged facts fail to support a claim for breach of trust. 
A claim fot breach of fiduciary duty sounds in tort. See Jones v. Kootenai County Title 
Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 6071 614, 873 P.2d 861, 868 (Idaho 1994) ("a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty is a negligence action in which the duty to act is created by the relationship between the 
parties.") 
BRIEF JN RESPONSE TO SURVIVJNG SPOUSE 
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The Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning the context of similar analysis of a legal 
malpractice claim is informative here: 
As this Court previously recognized, legal malpractice actions are an amalgam of 
tort and contract theories. The tort basis of legal malpractice actions flows for the 
elements of legal malpractice: (a) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; 
(b) the existence of a duty on the party of the lawyer; (c) failure to perform the 
duty; and ( d) the negligence of the lawyer must have been a proximate cause of 
the damage to the client. The scope of an attorney• s contractual duty to a client is 
defined by the purposes for which the attorney is retained. Breach of an attorney's 
duty is negligence in tort. The contract basis of legal malpractice actions is the 
failure to perform obligations specified in the written contract. Thus, under the 
abatement rule, breach of duty is an action in tort, not contract; that is, unless an 
attomey foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a specific outcome in 
the litigation or p1·ovides for a higher standard of care in the contract, he is held to 
the standard of care expected of an attorney. Breach of that duty is a tort. 
. . . [T]he contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are 
defined by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attorney and client 
want to provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by express language 
in the contract. Here, the standard of care in the contract is essentially the same as 
in any attorney-client relationship. Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated 
upon [the client's] death. 
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620j 272 P.3d 1247, 1251 (2012) (citations omitted). 
Similar to the attorney-client relationship at issue in Bishop, the contours of the duties 
owed by a trustee to trust beneficiaries are defined by the Uniform Probate Code and Principal 
and Income Act. Here, the trust documents contain no greater requirements than are set forth in 
said statutes. Therefore) the analysis of Idaho Code Section 5-327(2), and the common law rule 
of abatement prior to its amendment, applies. Based thereon, Mr. Cornell's claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty brought as a trust beneficiary against the trustee Respondent are abated upon his 
death for the reasons previously briefed. 
Mrs. Cornell asserts that these claims are equitable in nature, thus do not abate, however 
cites only to treatises that contradict Idaho law to support said assertion. Memorandum at 8-9. 
BRJEF lN RESPONSE TO SURVIVJNG SPOUSE 
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As discussed above and at length in prior briefing. the general rule under Idaho law is that claims 
arising in pure tort abate upon the death of the claimant. Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616. 620-
21. 272 P.3d 1247, 1251-52 (2012). Despite the well-established nature of that principle, which 
l\.1rs. Cornell herself acknowledges, Mrs. Cornell proposes that this Court reject the clear 
principle established in Bishop v. Owens and instead draw a distinction between personal torts 
and property torts that has no basis in Idaho law. Memorandum at 8. She cites to no case law or 
statutory authority in support of this distinction, but instead relies upon a treatise, 1 Am.Jur.2d 
Abatement, Survival and Revival, without further authority or relation to Idaho law. Id. 
Mrs. Cornell does cite to the Idaho decision of Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 15 .3d 
816 (2000), however, said case was a divorce action where the husband died during the pendency 
of an appeal after entry of an interlocutory divorce. There, the surviving wife sought to 
''posthumously reunite the parties based on a procedural flaw in the motion for summary 
judgment." Id. at 107, 15 P.3d at 820. The Barnes decision stands for the limited principle that 
where a divorced spouse dies prior to resolution of the division of community property and debts, 
the resolution of said division of property survives. Id. Said principle has no application to the 
Court's determination of whether a breach of fiduciary duty claim survives the allegedly injured 
party's death. 
Mrs. Cornell further argues that this Court should adopt a broader definition of "property 
damage" in interpreting Idaho Code Section 5~327(2) than that proposed by Respondent. 
Memorandum at 10. Respondent disagrees with such expanded definition, however, as discussed 
at length in prior briefing, it is unnecessary for the Court to base its decision on the definition of 
''property damage" as even if the Court were to adopt Mrs. Cornell's definition> there remains no 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO SURVNING SPOUSE 
-5-
217
02-01-'13 16:33 FROM-JB & C 2087469553 T-312 P0007/0008 F-960 
question _that the damages sought in this action are not recoverable under Idaho Code Section 5-
327(2): those permissible being expressly limited to medical expenses actually incurred, other 
out-of-pocket expenses actually incurred, and loss of earnings actually suffered. No such 
damages are plead or sought here. Mrs. Cornell has not asserted any faces to preclude dismissal. 
Mrs. Cornell correctly notes that that Idaho law requires that statutory provisions be 
interpreted in ac~ord with common sense and reason. Memorandum at 11 (citing Smith v. Dep't 
of Employment, 100 Idaho 520, 522, 602 P.2d 18, 20 (1980)). However, in this instancej 
interpretation of Idaho Code Section 5J327(2) in accordance with common sense and reason 
requires abatement of Mr. Camell' s claims upon his death and dismissal of this action. 
For these reasons, Mr. Comell 's claims abated upon his death and should be dismissed. 
C. The causes of action in this proceeding do not survive Mr. John Cornell~s death. 
Mrs. Cornell raises her potential right to file a lawsuit under the Trust and Estate Dispute 
Resolution Act, Idaho Code § 15-8'"' 101 et seq., as further grounds to oppose dismissal of this 
lawsuit on a basis of judicial economy. Memorandum at 11. Said argument is entirely 
speculative in nature, inappropriately seeks to expand the scope of this proceeding> and should be 
disregarded by the Court. The Court has gone to great lengths to ensure that Mrs. Cornell have 
the opportunity to participate and be heard. She has done so. She has ample opportunity to raise 
questions relating to the interpretation of the Trust in other proceedings. Said issues are not 
properly before the Court. 
Instead, this is an action for breach of fiduciary duty. The only question before the Court 
is whether said action survives the death of Mr. John Cornell. As discussed above and in prior 
briefing, based upon Idaho law, it does not and dismissal is required. 
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II. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondent Toni Johnson respectfully requests that her Motion 
to Dimiss be granted and that John Cornell's Petition be dismissed· with prejudice. 
DATED this 1st day of February, 2013. 
JONES, BROWER & CAllERY, P.L.L.C. 
By ~-r' &:tJW 
Karin Seubert 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISMISS was, this 1st day of February, 2013, 
transmitted via facsimile to: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C. 
1219 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By {~ &112>-Rrt 
Karin Seubert 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
COURT MINUTES 
CV-2012-0000277 
The Matter of Michael S Cornell 
Hearing type: Motion to Dismiss 
CV2012-0000439 
The Matter of the Estate of John Henry Cornell, Deceased 
Hearing type: Court Trial 
Hearing date: 02/06/2013 
Time: 2:09-3:09 
Judge: Randall W. Robinson 
Courtroom: 001 
Court reporter: None 
Minutes Clerk: Jodie 
Tape Number: CD551-1 
2:09 The Honorable Randall W. Robinson presiding. Present in Court: 
Ted Creason, Karin Seubert, Darrel Aherin 
2:10 Mr. Aherin - Motion for Mediation 
Court asks which case will be first. 
2:11 Discussion addressing Briefs 
2:28 Discussion continues addressing the Trust and Estate 
2:32 Mr. Aherin - addresses the Trust Document; Terms of 
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2:35 Discussion continues Terms of the Trust and subject of Personal Representative 
2:52 Mr. Creason inquires time for a Personal Representative 
2:55 Ms. Seubert who is the surviving spouse? 
2:56 Mr. Aherin not prepared to go into the issue of Personal Representative 
2:58 Court suggests addressing Personal Representative another day 
2:59 Mr. Creason will submit an Order for Personal Representative 
3:04 Court grants Motion to Dismiss CV2012-277 
Will allow Personal Representative to file claim within 20 days 
Will provide a written decision 
3:05 Discussion addressing Mediation? Clarifying who all the Parties are going 
forward? 
CV2012-439 - to Continue 
3:09 Recess 
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell 
~\JJ(;/J·.J.17 )j;-11/ 
j ,·1-:3 .1 -~; 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) NOTICE OF SERVICE 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST 
OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND 
ARLIE M. CORNELL. ) 
______ ____ ) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 33 and 
34 that on the 22nd day of March, 2013, the Petitioner, Kareen Cornell, by and through her 
attorney of record, Theodore O. Creason, served by messenger one ( 1) copy of Petitioner, 
Personal Representative of the Estate Of John Cornell, Kareen Cornell ' s First Set of 
Interrogatories and First Set of Requests For Production and Requests For Admission 
Propounded To Respondent, Karin Seubert, attorney for Respondent, Toni C. Johnson. 
DATED this r;/0 day ofFebruary, 2013. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE PURSUANT TO 
I.R.C.P. 33 AND 34 - 1 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
/ , J,,. J_ [ t c:f ~ d<-----
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Attorney for Petitioner, Kareen Cornell 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drnwer 835, Lewiston ID 83501 
(208)743-1516; Fax(208)746-2231 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
,;, '( 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~-day of February, 2013, a copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE OF SERVICE PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 33 AND 34 was served by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC 
1304 Idaho Street 
P. 0. Box 854 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
FIRST-CLASS MAIL 
--




NOTICE OF SERVICE PURSUANT TO 
I.R.C.P. 33 AND 34 - 2 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston ID 83501 
(208)743-1516; Fax(208)746-2231 
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Theodore 0 . Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183 
CVd~tJ·~1, j.:tfL/ 
~·[_~8 1 3 2013 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION 
) OF TONI C. JOHNSON 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. ) 
____ _ _ ____ ) 
TO: RESPONDENT, TONI C. JOHNSON, TRUSTEE OF THE REVOCABLE 
FAMILY TRUST OF MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL, 
AND TO KARIN SEUBERT, HER ATTORNEY 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney for Kareen Cornell, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of John C. Cornell, will take the testimony, upon oral examination, 
of Toni C. Johnson before K&K Reporting, certified shorthand reporters of the State ofldaho, or 
in the case of their inability to act or be present, before some other person authorized to 
administer oaths, on Wednesday, March 22, 2013, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. of that day and 
thereafter from day to day as the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at the offices of 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, 1219 Idaho Street, Lewiston, Idaho 83501. 
This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION 
OF TONI C. JOHNSON - 1 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516 ; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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DATED this ,z't- ay ofFebruary, 2013. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
Theodore 0. Cteason, ISB # 1563 
Attorneys for Kareen Cornell, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ( Z:-day of February, 2013, a copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF TONI C. JOHNSON was served by the method 
indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Keith and Kristi Evans 
Certified Court Reporters 
P. 0. Box 574 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
1212 Idaho Street 
P . 0 . Drawer 698 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION 
OF TONI C. JOHNSON - 2 
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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Theodore 0 . Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183 
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CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF 
) PARTY (I.R.C.P. 25(a)(l)) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 




COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry 
Cornell, by and through her attorney of record, Theodore 0. Creason of Creason, Moore, Dokken 
& Geidl, PLLC, and hereby moves this Court to approve substitution of the Estate of John Henry 
Cornell for John Henry Cornell. The Estate brings this motion pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 25(a)(l) and the order of this Court, dated February 6, 2013. 
7"1 DATED this 1,l - day ofFebruary, 2013 . 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY - 1 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this taay of February, 2013, I filed the foregoing 
MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY with the Clerk of the Court, and provided a paper 
copy to the following persons: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
1212 Idaho Street 
P. 0. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0. Creason,ISB #1563 
MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY - 2 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
Of Estate of Jolm Hemy Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 ) 
~ NOTICE OF HEARING 
) 
) 
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned will call on for hearing Petitioner's Motion 
for Substitution of Party (I.R.C.P. 25(a)(l)) on Tuesday, February 26, 2012, at 11:00 a.m., or as 
soon thereafter as counsel may be heard in the courtroom at the Clearwater County Comihouse, 
Orofino, Idaho. 
DATED this 121h day of February, 2013. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
I / . I J I ,· / 
t;::; /u ;"/c.'l.L i-L {., C,,/ rae /-'" " ----
Theodore 0 . Creason, ISB # 1563 
Attorney for Petitioner Kareen Cornell 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston ID 83501 
(208)743-1516; Fax(208)746-2231 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this lih day of February. 2013, a copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: PETITIONER' S MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY 
(I.R.C.P. 25 (a)(l)) was served by the method indicated below and addressed to the following : 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLP 
1304 Idaho Street 
P. 0. Box 854 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
1212 Idaho Street 
P. 0. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL 
Case No. CV 2012-277 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
On September 14, 2012, Karin Seubert representing Toni C. Johnson ("Toni") 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition of John H. Cornell ("John") based upon abatement 
of John's claims following John's death. Darrell Aherin appeared on behalf of the 
deceased John Cornell. The parties have provided affidavits and briefs on the issue of 
abatement. Oral argument was originally set for November 27, 2012, but continued to 
January 8, 2012. Karin Seubert and Darrel Aherin submitted written memoranda and 
on January 8, 2013 presented oral argument. 
After the hearing, Theodore Creason representing the widow of the deceased 
John Cornell, Kareen Cornell ("Kareen"), was permitted to file a memorandum and 
participate in another hearing. Kareen filed her Memorandum on January 18, 2013. On 
February 1, 2013, Toni filed a reply memorandum. Another hearing was conducted on 
MEMORANDUM OPINION-1 
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February 6, 2013 on the Motion to Dismiss with Karin Seubert, Darrel Aherin, and 
Theodore Creason present and providing oral argument. The Motion, affidavits of the 
parties, the parties' memoranda, the oral argument of the parties and the file have been 
carefully considered. 
I. Statement of Facts 
On November 1, 1996, Michael Cornell and Arlie Cornell, husband and wife, and 
parents to Toni and John, created a revocable family trust. The Trust provides "On the 
death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the Trustee shall, as soon 
as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal remaining in the Trust into 
two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the following beneficiaries: Toni C. Johnson 
and John H. Cornell." Trust§ 4.03. 
On November 9, 2008, Arlie Cornell passed away. On August 6, 2009, Michael 
Cornell signed the First Amendment of the Cornell Trust which named Toni as sole 
trustee/successor trustee instead of Toni and John jointly serving in that capacity as 
provided for in the original Trust. On December 15, 2009, Michael Cornell, the last 
Trustor, passed away. 
John was experiencing serious health and financial problems at the time his 
father passed away. John failed to obtain necessary medical care because of his lack 
of finances. John contacted his sister, Toni, regarding the status of the Trust following 
his father's death, but his sister refused to speak to him. John wrote several letters and 
made several phone calls to the attorney for the estate requesting information as to the 
status of the trust without a response from the attorney. In his third letter to the attorney 
dated September 17, 2010, John wrote, "Is it fair that Toni has a place to live and I do 
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not have a place to live. Why should I incur living expenses and she is in complete 
control of everything, living off the money in the trust and living free in my parent's 
house which is also my house?" 
In the nearly two (2) years from the last truster's death through John's death, 
Toni failed to distribute any part of the trust to John even while she lived rent free in the 
home that is included in the trust and apparently paid all her living expenses from trust 
funds. Toni has not distributed any of the funds from the trust other than for her own 
use. 
John received $3000 as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy on his father's 
life. Upon Toni's demand that he turn the money over to her, he sent a check for $2500 
to Toni and retained $500 for living expenses. 
On July 11, 2012 John filed a Petition for supervised administration and removal 
of trustee. The Petition alleges that Toni as trustee has "breached her fiduciary duty to 
settle and distribute The Trust in accordance with the terms of the Trust." Petition at§ 
11. The Petition also alleges that Toni mismanaged the estate by Toni paying her own 
personal expenses and paying the expenses associated with the real property on which 
she resided while failing to pay John his one-half share of the estate. Petition at § 10. 
Finally, the Petition alleges Toni failed to provide an inventory of the assets in the Trust. 
Petition at § 7. 
On August 20, 2012, John committed suicide. In the case of death of one of the 
beneficiaries, the Trust provides at 4.03(a), 
If any child, for whom a share of the Trust Estate has been set aside, 
should die prior to the above distribution, then the Trustee shall distribute 
all of such deceased child's share of the Trust Estate to his or her 
surviving issue in equal shares . . . If there is no surviving issue,, then all 
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of the deceased child's share of the Trust Estate shall be added to the 
shares set aside for the benefit of the Trustors' other living child .... " 
John's wife, Kareen Cornell, survives him. However, John left no issue. Thus, 
the Trust Estate, in the absence of any distribution prior to John's death, will go in its 
entirety to Toni. Toni seeks to dismiss John's Petition on the basis that John's claims of 
mismanagement, breach of trust, and breach of fiduciary duty are abated by John's 
death. 
11. Legal Analysis 
A. Standard. 
Affidavits have been filed and considered. In considering matters outside the 
pleadings on a motion to dismiss, such motion must be treated as a motion for summary 
judgment. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Hellickson v Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 276, 769 P.2d 150, 153 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment has been often 
repeated by the appellate courts. 
All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving 
party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are 
to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 
Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876,878 (1991). Summary judgment is 
appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991). 
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 529, 887 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1994). 
With respect to the abatement issue presented by Toni's Motion to Dismiss, there 
is no genuine issue of any material fact with respect to John's claims. I find it 
appropriate to consider Toni's motion for summary judgment. Toni's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment raises two issues: (1) Do John's claims survive his death under 
the common law? (2) If not, has the Idaho legislature abrogated the common law and 
provided for the survivability of John's claims? 
B. John's claims do not survive his death under common law. 
The Supreme Court recently considered in Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 272 
P.3d 1247 (2012) when the claims of deceased individuals are abated or terminated. 
The abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative enactment 
addressing the survivability of a claim, the common law rules govern. See 
I.C. § 73-116 ("The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant 
to, or inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all 
cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all 
courts of this state."); see also Evans v. Twin Falls Cnty., 118 Idaho 210, 
215, 796 P.2d 87, 92 (1990). Under the common law, claims arising out of 
contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding 
in pure tort abate. See Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 674-79, 34 P.2d 
957, 960-61 (1934); Kloepferv. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 417-18, 184 P. 477, 
477 (1919). 
Id. at 619-620. 
Thus, in order for John's claims to survive his death, his claims must 
sound in contract, and not in tort. The Bishop decision is instructive as to how to 
analyze whether a case sounds in contract or tort for purposes of abatement of 
the claim. The Bishop case involved a legal malpractice claim. Although the 
malpractice claim arose out of a contractual claim to perform legal services, the 
Supreme Court held the claim to sound in tort for purposes of abatement. 
As this Court previously recognized, "[l)egal malpractice actions are an 
amalgam of tort and contract theories." See Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 
702, 706, 652 P.2d 650, 654 (1982). The tort basis of legal malpractice 
actions flows from the elements of legal malpractice: "(a) the existence of 
an attorney-client relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part of the 
lawyer; (c) failure to perform the duty; and (d) the negligence.of the lawyer 
must have been a proximate cause of the damage to the client. ... " Id. 
(quoting Sherry v. Diercks, 29 Wash.App. 433, 437, 628 P.2d 1336, 1338 
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(1981)). "The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined 
by the purposes for which the attorney is retained." Johnson, 103 Idaho at 
704, 652 P.2d at 652; Fuller, 119 Idaho at 425, 807 P.2d at 643 (holding 
that the tort of legal malpractice is also a breach of the attorney-client 
relationship). Breach of an attorney's duty in negligence is a tort. See 
Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136, 90 P.3d 884, 886 (2004); 
Johnson, 103 Idaho at 704, 706-07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55. The 
contract basis of legal malpractice actions is the failure to perform 
obligations directly specified in the written contract. See Johnson, 103 
Idaho at 704, 706-07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55 (holding that a breach of 
contract claim would arise if the attorney did not do what he promised to 
do in the contract, e.g., failing to draw up a contract of sale). Thus, under 
the abatement rule, breach of duty is an action in tort, not contract; that is, 
unless an attorney foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a 
specific outcome in the litigation or provides for a higher standard of care 
in the contract, he is held to the standard of care expected of an attorney. 
Breach of that duty is a tort. 
Id. at 620. 
The Idaho Supreme Court's analysis of whether legal malpractice claims 
are abated is very clearly applicable to this case. This case is a mixed tort and 
contract case. This case also involves torts arising from a contractual 
agreement. A tort basis for John's claims against Toni exists just as they were 
found to exist with respect to the legal malpractice claim in Bishop: (a) The 
existence of a fiduciary relationship is established by Toni being appointed as 
and acting as a trustee (b) the existence of a duty on the part of Toni, the 
trustee; (c) the alleged failure to meet that duty; (d) the failure of Toni to perform 
her duty was the proximate cause of John not receiving his share of the trust 
during his lifetime. 
John relies on the directive of Trust§ 4.03 that the trust be divided as soon as 
reasonably possible to argue that he states a contract claim which cannot be abated. 
The Supreme Court in Bishop considered a similar claim. The deceased client's estate 
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argued that the attorney-client relationship provided by contract that the attorney 
provide services and therefore exempted the claims of the estate from abatement. The 
Court held that 
the contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are 
defined by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attorney and 
client want to provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by 
express language in the contract. Here, the standard of care in the 
contract is essentially the same as in any attorney-client relationship. 
Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated upon Patricia Shelton's death. 
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,620,272 P.3d 1247, 1251 (2012). 
Similarly, in this case, the contours of the duties owed by the trustee to the 
beneficiary are defined by sources outside the contract: Chapter 7 of the Uniform 
Probate Act, Idaho Code§ 15-7-101 et seq., and the Uniform Principal and Trust Act at 
Idaho Code§ 68-10-101 et seq. As exhaustively described in John's Memorandum at 
2-6, Toni has allegedly violated her fiduciary duties as defined by Idaho Code§§ 15-7-
302, 15-7-703, 68-10-103, 68-10-201 and 68-10-202. Violation of these fiduciary duties 
arising under statute is a tort. 
The Trust provision upon which John relies that the assets be distributed as 
reasonably soon as possible is essentially the same as any trust fiduciary relationship 
governed by the Idaho Code. Idaho Code§ 15-7-301 provides, "Except as specifically 
provided, the general duty of the trustee to administer a trust expeditiously for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries is not altered by this code." (emphasis added). Thus, John's 
claim abates since a tort arising under Idaho Code§ 15-7-301 covers John's claim 
John also relies upon § 8.02 of the Trust which requires periodic accountings. 
This provision virtually replicates Idaho Code § 15-7-303(a) except that the statute 
requires that Toni provide notice to John of the trust within thirty (30) days of her 
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acceptance of her status as trustee, while the trust has no such provision. Again, the 
Trust provision imposes no greater duty than that which the Idaho statutes already 
impose upon trustees. Therefore, as in Bishop, John's claim sounds in tort and abates 
upon his death under the common law. 
John relies upon Cruzen v. Boise City, 58 Idaho 406, 74 P.2d 1037 (1937) to 
argue that "a breach of trust is not based upon a statute but rather upon a contractual 
obligation resting on every trustee to fulfill and comply with terms of a trust." Response 
to Motion to Dismiss at 8. Toni counters that "'a claim for a breach of a fiduciary duty is 
a negligence action[.]' Jones v, Kootenai County Title Ins. Co., 1 125 Idaho 607, 614, 
873 P.2d 861, 868 (Idaho 1994)." Reply Brief at 4. Both parties ignore the specific 
facts of the case they cite that prevent the principles the parties draw from being 
universally applied. 
In Cruzen, while there were statutes governing the procedural ability of the 
Plaintiff to sue the city, there was no state law imposing a duty upon the City to pay the 
Plaintiff bondholder. Unlike Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,620,272 P.3d 1247, 1251 
(2012), therefore, there was no mixed question of tort and contract. In Cruzen, the only 
duties imposed upon the city were contractual. 
In Jones, cited by Toni, the Supreme Court clearly limited its holding: "the 
breach of an assumed duty claim sounds in tort." Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin & 
Matthews, Chartered, 125 Idaho 607, 612, 873 P.2d 861, 866 (1994). Jones does not 
hold that all fiduciary breaches are to be treated as torts. This case does not involve an 
assumed duty. 
1 While Kootenai County Title Ins. Co. is the first identified defendant, the title of the 
case is actually Jones v. Runft,. Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, Chartered. 
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However, Jones does support finding that this case involves a tort and not a 
contract action for purposes of abatement. The Court observed, "'A contract may ... 
create a state of things which furnishes the occasion for a tort. If the relation of the 
plaintiff and the defendants is such that a duty to take due care arises therefrom 
irrespective of contract and the defendant is negligent, then the action is one of tort.' 
Jones, 125 Idaho at 612, 873 at 866. As stated above, the duties John asserts Toni 
breaches arise irrespective of contract. The duties are grounded in state law regardless 
of what the contract states. 
Finally, John argues that Toni breached the Trust "when she encouraged Michael 
C. Cornell to execute the First Amendment to the Revocable Trust of Michael C. Cornell 
and Arlie M. Cornell on August 6, 2009, which changed Article Nine Section 9.01 to 
state that Toni C. Johnson and John Henry Cornell are no longer co-successor 
trustees." Response to Motion at 8. There are several problems with John's argument. 
First, there are no specific facts supporting the allegation that Toni encouraged the 
Amendment. Even if there were such facts, John does not argue nor provide any 
specific facts demonstrating undue influence or Michael Cornell's incapacity to be 
present when Michael Cornell made the change. Mere encouragement does not 
provide a basis for rescinding the amendment. 
Second, even if Toni could somehow be held responsible for the amendment to 
the trust, no facts are present showing that the change made by Michael Cornell was 
the proximate cause for the damages John alleges he suffered because of Toni's 
wrongful acts. Review of the checks submitted by John discloses that Toni was a joint 
signatory to the checking account and did not write checks in the capacity of a trustee. 
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John does not point to any specific action taken by Toni with regards to the 
property that she could not have accomplished even if John had remained a cotrustee. 
The Amendment of the Trust by itself did not cause the harm for which John seeks 
relief. John has failed to show a single instance in which Toni acted in her capacity as a 
Trustee, as opposed to her individual capacity as a joint account holder, to John's 
detriment. 
Third, the Amendment took place on August 6, 2009, prior to the amendment of 
Idaho Code § 6-327 permitting the survival of wrongful actions as John alleges here. 
Therefore, John's claim cannot survive his death. 
Fourth, the Uniform Principal and Income Act incorporates the provisions of the 
trust as part of the fiduciary duties of the Trustee. Idaho Code§ 68-10-103(a)((1) states 
that a fiduciary as part of the fiduciary duties "shall administer a trust or estate in 
accordance with the terms of the trust or the will, even if there is a different provision in 
this chapter." Thus, by rendering any violation of the trust a violation of a fiduciary duty 
imposed by statute, the legislature within the meaning of Bishop created a tort of any 
violation of the Trust and thus abatable upon death. 
Finally, if John's argument is correct that the trust forbade the amendment of the 
trust, the Amendment was then ineffective. John could have exercised his powers of a 
cotrustee and not suffered any harm that he alleges occurred. 
John's claims abate under common law. The alleged wrongful acts of Toni are 
all breaches of fiduciary duties under state law that for purposes of abatement are in the 
nature of torts. In the absence of any state law supplanting the common law, John's 
claims are abated and must be dismissed. 
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John argues that such fine parsing of the law is inconsistent with the equities of 
this case that cry for action against Toni's wrongdoing in failing to distribute to John 
during his lifetime his one-half share of the trust. This court cannot ignore the 
legislature or the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretations, regardless of the perceived 
injustice. Nor is it even clear that the Trustors would have desired the result urged by 
John. The Trustors could have provided in the trust for John's heirs as John now seeks 
as relief, but chose not to, instead limiting distribution of the trust solely to the issue of 
the deceased. 
Kareen relies upon Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 15 P.3d 816 (2000) to 
argue that any action regarding property survives abatement. The Supreme Court in 
Barnes held that once a divorce is granted, the associated issues of property and debt 
distribution survive the parties. Unlike the later Bishop decision, Barnes does not 
involve a mixed question of tort and contract. 
Kareen also relies upon Am Jur cites for the principles that any tort to property 
survives the death of a party and an action pursuant to a remedial statute, as in this 
case, survives the death of the party. Memorandum Re: Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss at 9. While Kareen correctly sets forth these principles, she provides no 
explanation as to how they are consistent with Bishop. The Supreme Court in Bishop 
did not distinguish torts done to persons or to property in determining whether the action 
survived the death of the party. Nor did the Supreme Court analyze whether the rules 
of professional conduct are remedial in nature for purposes of surviving the party's 
death. Therefore, Kareen's argument is rejected. 
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Kareen argues that Toni's Motion to Dismiss is premised upon the entirety of the 
trust vesting in her. Kareen makes four (4) arguments not made by John which she 
asserts undermines Toni's premise and which therefore must be considered before 
summary judgment can be considered. Memorandum Re: Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss at 7. Kareen argues that these additional issues must be briefed and 
considered including "(1) whether distribution can serve as the proper event for vesting; 
(2) if so, whether the law presumes vesting within a reasonable period of time 
regardless of actual distribution; (3) whether the terms of vesting in the Trust violate the 
common law or statutory rule against perpetuities as to both Johnson's and John's 
interest; and (4) whether Johnson's conduct resulted in her holding that portion of the 
Trust res due to John in a constructive trust for the benefit of John and his heirs." Id. 
First, the merits of who takes from the trust are irrelevant to whether John's 
claims survive his death. Kareen fails to point to how the issue is relevant to 
consideration of Toni's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Second, the issues are not articulated in John's Petition and therefore cannot be 
considered. Nowhere in John's Petition does he challenge the trust on the basis that 
the trust is ineffective under either common law, the rule of perpetuities or its provision 
for vesting upon distribution. Nor is there any challenge to the trust based upon a 
presumption under the law that presumes vesting within a reasonable period of time 
regardless of distribution. 
Third, Kareen states that the arguments require further legal briefing, but then 
provides no legal argument to support her theories. Kareen's arguments cannot 
therefore be considered. 
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Fourth, Kareen argues that the issue of a constructive trust requires 
establishment of improper conduct which is a triable issue of fact. However, Kareen 
points to no additional facts to those already provided in the Affidavit of Margaret 
Wilkins which Kareen relies upon to argue her right to a constructive trust. 
Memorandum Re: Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 9. In addition, under the Bishop 
analysis, the arguments regarding a constructive trust speak to wrongdoing, a tort, and 
one that is already subsumed under the Uniform Probate Act and the Uniform Principal 
and Trust Act. The constructive trust argument is indistinguishable from John's 
arguments regarding Toni's breaches of fiduciary duties. 
Kareen in her Memorandum and orally at the hearing requested an opportunity to 
present her arguments if she is appointed personal representative of John's estate. 
Kareen was appointed personal representative of John's estate on February 6, 2013, 
the same date as the final argument in this case on the Motion to Dismiss. Kareen shall 
be given twenty (20) days to substitute for John and present issues free of the pleadings 
filed by John's attorney during John's lifetime. 
B. The Idaho state legislature has not abrogated the common law and provided 
for the survivability of John's claims. 
On July 1, 2010, the legislature abrogated the common law regarding abatement 
of certain civil actions while limiting relief in the form of damages that can be obtained. 
Idaho Code§ 5-237(2) provides: 
A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by 
the wrongful act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of 
the injured person from causes not related to the wrongful act or 
negligence. Provided however, that the damages that may be recovered in 
such action are expressly limited to those for: (i) medical expenses 
actually incurred, (ii) other out-of-pocket expenses actually incurred, and 
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(iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of such injured 
person and as a result of the wrongful act or negligence. Such action shall 
be commenced or, if already commenced at the time of the death of the 
injured person, shall be thereafter prosecuted by the personal 
representative of the estate of the deceased person or, if there be no 
personal representative appointed, then by those persons who would be 
entitled to succeed to the property of the deceased person according to 
the provisions of section 5-311 (2)(a), Idaho Code. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that Idaho Code § 5-327 cannot be 
applied retroactively: Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho at 1052. Thus, the issue presents 
itself as to whether Idaho Code § 5-327 permits consideration of John's claims after July 
1, 2010, the effective date of the statute. 
John makes several claims that are abated since they do not present any claim 
for damages. These include the allegations of the alleged "breach of fiduciary duty by 
the respondent [Toni] for failing to provide an inventory of the trust assets when a 
reasonable request was made by a beneficiary as required by Idaho Code Section 15-7-
303." Response to Motion to Dismiss at 2; the alleged breach of the trust when Toni 
allegedly encouraged Michael C. Cornell to change the trust on August 6, 20092. 
Response to Motion to Dismiss at 8-9 ; and the failure to provide accountings. 
Response to Motion to Dismiss at 9-10. 
Idaho Code§ 5-327(2) broadly allows for "a cause of action for "personal injury 
or property damage caused by the wrongful act ... " Toni argues that the tort of breach 
of fiduciary duty in this case is not a personal injury action nor involving property 
damage and therefore not subject to Idaho Code§ 5-327. Toni relies on the limited 
definition of property damage given at Idaho Code§ 6-1601 (8) which defines property 
2 As this alleged wrongdoing by Toni took place in 2009, prior to the adoption of Idaho 
Code§ 5-327(2) in 2010, John's claim rising in tort would be abated under the common 
law in any event. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION-14 
243
damage as "loss in value or in use of real or personal property where such loss arises 
from physical damage or destruction of the property." 
I find the circumstances of this case to constitute property damage within the 
meaning of Idaho Code§ 5-327(2). The damages alleged in this case arise from 
property being made unavailable by being retained by Toni and by Toni's expenditures 
on her personal needs instead of being distributed to John as required under the trust. 
The unavailability of the funds has resulted in loss of use of the property within the 
meaning of Idaho Code§ 6-1601. 
In any event, the definition of property damage at Idaho Code§ 6-1601 is too 
restrictive. While Idaho Code§ 6-1601 limits property damage to losses that arise from 
physical damage or destruction of property, Idaho Code § 5-327(2) refers to property 
damage caused by a wrongful act. Certainly, the misappropriation of funds resulting in 
deprival of property to which John is entitled constitutes damage to his right to property 
caused by a wrongful act. 
It is not enough to find that Idaho Code 5-327(2) abrogates the common law with 
regards to John's tort claims against Toni. John's action may only proceed if the relief 
sought is one of the three types of damages specifically listed at Idaho Code§ 5-327(2). 
John does not seek lost wages or medical expenses which are two of the three types of 
damages which can be obtained. Thus, the issue is joined as to whether Toni's alleged 
misappropriation of the trust by using the trust proceeds on herself and Toni's failure to 




John argues that the term, "out of pocket expenses actually incurred", 
encompasses the value of John's share of the trust that was not distributed to him and 
the amounts that Toni misappropriated for herself. Thus, John argues "out of pocket 
expenses" should be defined as including property wrongfully taken and withheld as 
allegedly occurred in this case. 
However, the Idaho state legislature has already indicated in the Crime Victims 
Compensation Act that the definition of out of pocket expenses excludes property 
wrongfully taken. 
Under I.C. § 19-5304(2), the trial court may order restitution for any 
economic loss that the victim actually suffers. The statute gives a broad 
definition of economic loss: 
"Economic loss" includes, but is not limited to, the value of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-of-
pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from the 
criminal conduct, but does not include less tangible damage such as pain 
and suffering, wrongful death, or emotional distress. 
I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 379, 93 P.3d 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Idaho Code§ 19-5304(1)(a)(ii) separately identifies "direct out of pocket losses 
or expenses such as medical expenses" and "the value of property taken, destroyed, 
broken or otherwise harmed." John seeks compensation for the value of property taken 
from him by Toni's wrongful acts in failing to give John his share of the estate and 
misappropriating property of John for her own benefit. The state legislature knew how 
to express language that would cover John's type of losses. Instead, the state 
legislature chose not to do so at Idaho Code § 5-327(2) by limiting damages to direct 
out of pocket expenses and not adding property taken as a form of damages that is not 
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abated. John did not incur any out of pocket expenses within the meaning of the statute 
and so his claims are abated. 
The Crime Victim's Compensation Act is also significant for its broad definition of 
the type of expenses that can be reimbursed under the Act. The Act provides that the 
definition of economic loss reimbursable "includes, but is not limited to" a broad list of 
forms of loss. Idaho Code§ 19-5304(1). Thus, the Idaho Court of Appeals in Olpin, in 
light of the broad purposes and liberal definitions underlying the Victims Compensation 
Act, had no problem in analogizing to "lost wages" to find that the costs associated with 
employees researching the losses incurred by the business and the cost of testifying in 
court to be reimbursable economic costs. 
In contrast, Idaho Code§ 5-327(2) by its express limitation does not permit 
analogizing or stretching the definitions to cover costs that do not come within the strict 
definitions. Damages are "expressly limited" to three types of damages. 
The damages John seeks- recovery of property wrongfully withheld from him- do 
not meet the definition of out of pocket expenses. Therefore, Idaho Code§ 5-327(2) 
does not overrule the common law abatement of John's causes of action. 
John makes no claim against Toni and the administration of the estate of their 
parents that survives his death under the common law or under Idaho Code§ 5-327. 
Under the terms of the trust, John's heirs have no claim against the estate as he left no 
surviving issue. Trust§ 4.03(a). 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and there 
being no material facts in dispute, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Toni C. Johnson of the 
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Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee, converted into a Motion 
for Summary Judgment by the filing of Affidavits, shall be granted and the Petition for 
Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee will be dismissed as John's claims 
set forth in his Petition do not survive his death under common law, state law or the 
trust. Kareen, as the newly personal representative of John's estate, shall be given 
twenty (20) days to file claims on behalf of the estate in the above entitled case. 
Dated this ]z'lday of February, 2013. 
~~L 
Randall W Robinson, Magistrate 
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P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
CARRIE BIRD 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN A.L~ FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWAi'ER 
In The Matter Of 
Michael S. Cornell, eta!. 
150 MICIDGAN AVE FfB 9 ') 2013 






Case No: CV-2012-0000277 
NOTICE OF HEARING 




Tuesday, February 26, 2013 
Randall W. Robinson 
Magistrate Courtroom 
11:00AM 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on February 22nd, 2013. 
DARREL W. AHERIN 
P.O. BOX 698 1212 IDAHO ST. 
LEWISTON ID 83501-0698 
KARIN SEUBERT 
P.O. BOX 854 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
THEODORE 0. CREASON 
P.O. DRAWER 835 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
Dated: 
By: 
February 22nd, 2013 
Carrie Bird --
Clerk Of Tliebistrift Co~rt 
~
-!~· !rtl r'i ~ 
z t ~·A il £AM d£Jl · 
, eputy Clerk , _; 
--1 r 
< 
DOC22cv 7 /96 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
COURT MINUTES 
CV-2012-0000277 
The Matter of Michael S Cornell 
CV2012-0000439 
The Matter of the Estate of John Henry Cornell 
Hearing type: Motion for Consolidation 
Hearing date: 02/26/2013 
Time: 11:12 am 
Judge: Randall W. Robinson 
Courtroom: 001 
Court reporter: None 
Minutes Clerk: Jodie 
Tape Number: CD552-1 
11:12 The Honorable Randall W. Robinson presiding. Present in Court: 
Ted Creason, Sam Creason; Karin Seubert; Telephonically- Darrel Aherin 
11:13 Court addressing Mr Aherin's concerns 
11:14 Mr Aherin objects John Cornell not a resident of Idaho; was living in Nevada 
11:15 Mr Creason -John was living in Nevada for several months due to health & 
finance issues 
Clarifies domicile vs residing 
11:17 Legal issue is Domicile? Personal Representative? Or Will? 
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11:19 Mr Aherin - discussion about jurisdiction of this Will/Trust being property is in 
Clearwater County 
11:21 Court - regarding the issue of Appointing Personal Representative 
Mr Creason had offered to have client appear in person but did not request for 
today's attendance 
11:22 Court Trust/Estate located here in Idaho - Court does have jurisdiction 
11:24 Court clarifying jurisdiction and Amending his Order 
11:25 Ms Seubert - discussion and clear record to confirm that ALL parties agree that 
John Cornell was domiciled in Idaho at time of death 
11:27 Court- jurisdiction? 
11:30 Mr Creason clarifies Domicile issue - IDAHO and verified Petition 
11:31 Mr Aherin Probate property because Court has jurisdiction being the land is in 
Clearwater County 
11:32 Ms Seubert - clarifies this is a TRUST Issue! 
11:32 Parties in agreement 
11:35 Discussion continues regarding Jurisdiction and the Trust 
11:44 Court - will sign Order? 
11:51 Mr Creason - New allegations 
11:52 Ms Seubert has new pleadings that will file today, 02/26/13 
11:53 Mr Creason requests time to explain merits of this case 
11:54 All Parties - discussion 
12:00 Ms Seubert asks to have issues resolved now or at a later time? 
12:01 Court - wants more time to review all the information 
12:03 Date set for next hearing: March 13, 2013 at 3:00 PM 
12:04 Recess 
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Personal Representative 
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell 
c._ v .J O 1 ~ • ;217 
F[~:3 '.) ·· 20B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION 




COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, Petitioner in this matter and Personal Representative of 
the Estate of John Henry Cornell, by and through her attorney of record, Theodore 0. Creason of 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, and hereby moves this Court to order consolidation of 
this action with Case No. CV 2012-439, In the Matter of The Estate of John H Cornell pursuant 
to the Court's powers under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a). 
Petitioner brings this motion upon the grounds that consolidation would expedite the 
Court's business and further the interests of the litigants. See Branam v. Smith Frozen Foods of 
Idaho, Inc. , 83 Idaho 502, 509, 365 P.2d 958, 961 (1961) . 
MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION - 1 Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516 ; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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DATED this 26th day of February, 2013. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
HvL•U.VJLv 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Personal Representative 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of February, 2013, I filed the foregoing 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION AND COURT ORDERED DISTRIBUTION with the 
Clerk of the Court, and hand-delivered a paper copy to the following persons: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
1212 Idaho Street 
P. 0. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION -2 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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t Vc:20 Id· ,;n1 
Ff:8 2 lD 2013 
Theodore 0 . Creason, ISB #1563 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
C 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorney for Kareen Cornell, Surviving 
Spouse Of John Hemy Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
) 
In the Matter of: ) CV 2012-277 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 












_ __________ _ _ ___ ) 
PETITION BY KAREEN CORNELL AS 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
ESTATE OF JOHN HENRY CORNELL AND 
AS SURVIVING SPOUSE OF JOHN HENRY 
CORNELL, DECEASED BENEFICIARY OF 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL FOR SUPERVISED 
ADMINISTRATION AND COURT 
ORDERED DISTRIBUTION 
COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, in her capacity as personal representative of the estate of 
the Estate of John Hemy Cornell and as surviving spouse of John Hemy Cornell (hereinafter 
"Petitioner") by and through her attorney of record, Theodore O. Creason of Creason, Moore, 
Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, and hereby alleges as follows: 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION 
AND COURT ORDERED DISTRIBUTION OF TRUST - 1 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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I. PARTIES 
1.1. Petitioner brings this action on behalf of the Estate of John Hemy Cornell 
(hereinafter "Estate"). The Estate has been admitted into formal probate before this Court in 
Case No. CV 2012-439. 
1.2. The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell 
(hereafter "the Trust") was formed and has been administered in the State of Idaho. The acting 
successor trustee of the Trust is Toni Johnson (nee Cornell). 
II. JURISDICTION & VENUE 
2.1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter and the parties thereto pursuant to the 
Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act, Idaho Code§§ 15-8-101 through 15-8-305. 
2.2. This Court is the proper venue for administration of the Trust pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 15-7-202. 
2.3. This case was instituted on July 11, 2012. Since that time, the Trust has not 
asserted lack of personal jurisdiction or requested a change of venue. 
III. FACTS 
3.1. Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell created the Trust on November 1, 1996, 
a copy of the Trust document is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
3.2. John Cornell was a beneficiary of the Trust. 
3 .3. As a beneficiary of the Trust, John Cornell held an equitable property interest in 
the property of the Trust. 
3.4. Arlie M. Cornell died on November 9, 2008. 
3.5. On August 6, 2009, Michael S. Cornell amended the terms of the Trust from 
having John Cornell and Toni Johnson serve as co-trustees of the Trust upon his death, to 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION AND 
COURT ORDERED DISTRIBUTION OF TRUST - 2 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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designating Toni Johnson as the sole successor trustee upon his death, a copy of the amendment 
is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
3.6. Michael S. Cornell died on December 15, 2009. 
3.7. Toni Johnson (hereinafter, "Successor Trustee") has been servmg as sole 
successor trustee since the death of Michael S. Cornell. 
3.8. On or about January 3, 2007, John Henry Cornell deposited by quitclaim, separate 
property into the Trust in the form of Lot 34, Lakeview First Addition, real property adjacent to 
real property owned by his parents, Michael S. and Arlie M. Cornell, into the Revocable Family 
Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell. 
3.9. John Cornell instituted this action on July 11, 2012 by filing a Petition for 
Supervised Administration and Removal of Successor Trustee. 
3.10. John Cornell died on August 20, 2012. 
3.11. On February 15, 2013, this Court dismissed all claims raised by John Cornell, 
personally, and granted the Estate twenty (20) days in which to raise the claims of the Estate in 
this matter. 
3.12. Under the terms of the Trust, the Trust assets were to be distributed equally to 
John Cornell and Toni Johnson upon the death of Michael S. and Arlie M. Cornell. 
3.13. Successor Trustee has not made reasonable efforts to distribute the Trust in a 
timely manner, in contravention of her fiduciary duties and statutory duties under Idaho Code 
§§ 15-7-301, 15-7-302 & 15-7-305. 
3.14. Despite demands, Successor Trustee has not provided records or any accounting 
of her management of the Trust, in contravention of her fiduciary duties and statutory duties 
under Idaho Code§§ 15-7-302 & 15-7-303. 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION AND 
COURT ORDERED DISTRIBUTION OF TRUST- 3 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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3.15. Successor Trustee has not created an inventory of the assets in the Trust at any 
time during her service as Successor Trustee of the Trust, in contravention of her fiduciary duties 
and statutory duties under Idaho Code§§ 15-7-302 & 15-7-303. 
3 .16. Successor Trustee has not kept John Cornell or Petitioner reasonably informed of 
the status of the Trust, in contravention of her fiduciary duties and statutory duties under Idaho 
Code§§ 15-7-302 & 15-7-303. 
3.17. Successor Trustee has mismanaged the Trust through negligent and inequitable 
conduct, in contravention of her fiduciary duties and statutory duties under Idaho Code § § 15-7-
301 & 15-7-302. 
3.18. Successor Trustee has resided and otherwise occupied and used the real property 
belonging to the Trust without accounting to the Trust or paying rent during her tenancy at the 
property, in contravention of her contractual, fiduciary and statutory duties and under Idaho 
Code§§ 15-7-301 & 15-7-302. 
3.19. Successor Trustee has used assets of the Trust to pay personal expenses, in 
contravention of her contractual, fiduciary, and statutory duties under Idaho Code§§ 15-7-301 & 
15-7-302. 
3.20. As a result of losses suffered from the Successor Trustee's inequitable conduct, 
the Trust holds a creditor's claim against Successor Trustee. 
3.21. As a result of losses suffered from the Successor Trustee's inequitable conduct, 
Petitioner holds a creditor's claim against Successor Trustee and the Trust. 
3.21. Successor Trustee converted assets of the Trust into personal assets. 
3.22. As a result of Successor Trustee's conversion, the Trust holds a creditor's claim 
against Successor Trustee until such time as restitution is made. 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION AND 
COURT ORDERED DISTRIBUTION OF TRUST - 4 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
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3 .23. As a result of Successor Trustee's inequitable conduct, Successor Trustee holds 
assets, personally in constructive trust, for the Estate and/or the Trust. 
IV. LIABILITY 
4.1. Petitioner realleges paragraphs 1-3 above. 
4.2. Upon accepting and undertaking her duties as successor trustee, Successor 
Trustee became party to a third-party beneficiary contract charged with the responsibility of 
carrying out the terms of the Trust in an equitable, reasonable and timely manner for the 
benefit of the third-party beneficiaries named and in compliance with the laws of the State of 
Idaho. 
4.3. Upon accepting her duties as successor trustee, Successor Trustee agreed and 
undertook to hold assets in Trust for the benefit of the true owner(s). Successor Trustee's 
actions constitute breaches of Successor Trustee's fiduciary duties (1) of loyalty toward all 
beneficiaries; (2) to act in good faith while administering the Trust; (3) to keep clear and 
accurate accounts and adequate records of transactions; ( 4) to keep beneficiaries informed of 
all material facts that might affect their rights under the Trust; (5) to provide beneficiaries an 
accounting of the Trust; ( 6) to not engage in self-dealing; (7) to properly care for assets of the 
Trust, including its financial records, and (8) to conform administration to the terms of the 
Trust. 
4.4. The Trust is entitled to damages pursuant to an action in claim and delivery 
under the common law action for conversion and equitable actions of detinue or replevin. 
4.5. Successor Trustee's actions constitute inequitable conduct giving rise to a 
constructive trust for all assets (a) obtained by Successor Trustee, personally, through the 
inequitable conduct; or (b) diminished from another's interest by the Successor Trustee. 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION AND 
COURT ORDERED DISTRIBUTION OF TRUST - 5 
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4.6. The Trust, on behalf of the beneficiaries, is entitled to damages pursuant to an 
action for unjust emichment. 
4.7. The Trust, on behalf of the beneficiaries, is entitled to an accounting and to 
enforce the contractual provisions of the Trust instrument in favor of the beneficiaries. 
4.8. The Trust is entitled to relief pursuant to all other causes of action in law or 
equity supported by the facts as set forth herein. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests that: 
1. Successor Trustee be ordered to file an inventory of Trust assets and accounting 
of management of those assets during her tenure as successor trustee of the Trust. 
2. Successor Trustee be ordered to make restitution to the Trust for damages 
caused by Successor Trustee's wrongful conduct. 
3. Upon approval of the inventory and accounting by the Court, Successor Trustee 
be ordered to file a proposed distribution of the Trust assets. 
4. Upon approval of the proposed distribution by the Court, Successor Trustee be 
ordered to distribute the property by a time certain, as set forth by the Court. 
5. The Court order legal fees and costs incurred by Petitioner be paid by Toni C. 
Johnson, personally, or from Toni C. Johnson's share of The Trust assets. 
6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED this 26th day of February, 2013. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
Theodore 0. Cr;ason, ISB #1563 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Kareen Cornell 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION AND 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of February, 2013, I filed the foregoing 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION AND COURT ORDERED 
DISTRIBUTION with the Clerk of the Court, and hand-delivered a paper copy to the 
following persons: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
1212 Idaho Street 
P. 0. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION AND 
COURT ORDERED DISTRIBUTION OF TRUST - 7 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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MEMORANDUM OF TRUST 
TRIS AGREEMENT made this {J'rday of J{tfi/ , 19'7'f,, by and hetween MICHAELS. CORNELL and ARLIE M. CORNELL, as Trustors and Trustees. 
WITNESSETH THAT: 
l. Contemporaneously herewith Trustors and Trustees have entered into a Revocable Living Trust known as 
the "MICHA.EL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M, CORNELL REVOCABLE TRUST dated )l-/-<;0 11 
2. This Memorandum of Trust is executed as evidence of the existence of the MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL REVOCABLE TRUST, the terms and conditions of which are hereby incorporated herein by this reference. 
3. Said Trust Agreement grants to the Trustee all of the powers contained in West's Annotated California Probate Code Sections 16,200 et seq., all of 
. which are incorporated herein by this reference. See Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
4. Any person may rely on· this Memorandum of Trust as proof of the existence of said Trust and·is relieved of any obligation to verify that any transaction entered into by the Trustee is . consistent with the terms and conditions of said Trust. 
5. The Co-Successor Trustees are TONIC. JOHNSON and JOBN H. CORNELL. 
IN WITNESS_ WHEREOF, the Trustors·anct the Trustees have signed this Memorandum of Trust the day and year first above written. 
;;z;::;7~ 
MICHAELS. CORNELL ARLIE M. CORNELL 
STATE OF CALIFO:RNlA) 
)SS 
COUNTY OF Q'..,-"'1 ,f'.) 
ON If- I - q G, I BEFORE ME, \\v-.d, (lbo::c'\-+-°"::) , PERSONALLY APPEARED MICHAEL S. CORNELL and ARLIE M. CORNELL PERSONALLY KNOWN TO ME OR __:;i_ PROVED TO ME ON THE BASIS OF SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE TO BE THE PERSONS <'WHOSE NAMES ARE SUBSCRIBED TO TEE WITHIN INSTRUMENT, AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY EXECUTED THE SAME IN THEIR AUTHORIZED CAPACITY, AND THAT BY THEIR SIGNATURES ON THE INSTRUMENT THE PERSONS, OR THE ENTITY UPON BEHALF OF WHICH THE PERSONS ACTED, EXECU'I'ED THE INSTRUMENT. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Hurd Thorilton 
Ccr.i;:-i. t;: c-:-.::: - • 1 r 
"7.il-=No,1.m r-ueu::. c::--;.: :-.,.,)) 
ORAt,c~ cou::,·f Q 
Comm. Exp. Jan. 2.J, 2000 _. 
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EXHIBIT "A" TO MEMORANDUM OF TRUST 
SUMMARY OF TRUST POWERS 
A) SELL, CONVEY, EXCHANGE, CONVERT, IMPROVE, REPAIR, PARTITION, DJVIDE, 
ALLOT, SUBDIVIDE, CREATE RESTRICTIONS, EASEM:ENTS, OR OTHER SERVITUDE 
THEREON, OPERATE AND CONTROL; 
B) LEASE FOR TERMS WITHIN OR BEYOND THE TERM OF ANY TRUST PROVIDED FOR 
IN THIS DECLARATION AND FOR ANY PURPOSE, INCLUDING EXPLORATION FOR AND 
REMOVAL OF GAS, OIL AND OTHER MINERALS; 
C) ENCUMBER OR HYPOTHECATE FOR ANY TRUST PURPOSE BY MORTGAGE, DEED 
OF TRUST, PLEDGE OR OTHERWISE; 
D) CARRY INSURANCE OF SUCH KINDS AND IN SUCH AMOUNTS AT THE EXPENSE OF 
THE TRUSTS PROVIDED FOR IN THIS DECLARATION AS THE TRUSTEE MAY DEEM 
ADVISABLE; 
E) COMMENCE OR DEFEND AT THE EXPENSE OF ANT TRUST PROVIDED FOR IN THIS 
DECLARATION SUCH LITIGATION WITH RESPECT TO ANY SUCH TRUST OR ANY PROPERTY 
OF THE TRUST ESTATE AS TRUSTEE MAY DEEM ADVISABLE. 
F) SO LONG AS. THE ORJGINAL TRUSTEE OR TRUSTEES ARE MANAGING THE TRUST, 
THEY MAY INVEST AND REINVEST IN COMMON OR PREFERRED STOCKS, SECURITIES, 
INVESTMENT TRUSTS, BONDS AND OIBER PROPERTY, REAL OR PERSONAL, FOREIGN OR 
DOMESTIC,. INCLUDING ANY UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN ANY ONE OR MORE COMMON 
TRUST FUNDS, WHETHER OR NOT SUCH INVESTMENTS BE OF THE CHARACTER 
PERMISSIBLE FOR INVESTMENTS BY FIDUCIARIES UNDER ANY APPLICABLE LAW; 
G) VOTJ1_ :SY PROXY OR .OTHERWISE, IN SUCH MANNER AS TRUSTEE MAY 
DETERMINE TO BE IN TifE BEST INTERESTS OF THE TRUST; 
H) PAY ANY ASSESSMENTS OR OTHER CHARGES LEVIED ON ANY STOCK OR OTHER 
SECURlTY HELD BY TRUSTEE PURSUANT TO THlS DECLARATION; 
I) EXERCISE OR EXERCISE AS TRUSTEE MAY DEEM BEST ANY SUBSCRIPTION, 
CONVERSION OR OTB.EK KlGHT::i UK UYnuN;:;; 
J) PARTJCIPATE IN ANY PLANS OR PROCEEDINGS FOR 1HE FORECLOSURE, 
REORGANIZATION, CONSOLIDATION, MERGER OR LIQUIDATION OF ANY CORPORATION 
OR ORGANIZATION THAT HAS ISSUED SECURITIES HELD BY THE TRUSTEE OR WILL ISSUE 
SECURITIES TO BE HELD BY TRUSTEE IN TRUST; 
K) ENFORCE ANY MORTGAGE OR DEED OF TRUST OR PLEDGE BY TRUSTEE IN TRUST; 
L) COMPROMISE, SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION, RELEASE WITH OR WITHOUT 
CONSJDERA TION AND OTHER WISE ADJUST ANY CLAIMS; 
,/ 
M) DISTRIBUTE GIFTS OF UP TO $10,000 PER YEAR PER DONEE OUT OF PRINCIPAL OR 
INTEREST OR IN ANY PROPORTION OF THE TWO TI-MT THE TRUSTEE, IN HlS SOLE 
DJSCRETION, DEEMS ADVISABLE; 
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N) INVEST IN AND · GUARANTEE A BUSINESS. OR TRUSTEE OF THE TRUST 
CAPITALIZING ON THE BUSINESS VENTURE; 
0) TAKE ALL SUCH PRGeEEDINGS; AND EXERCISE ALL SUCH RJGHTS AND 
PRJVILEGES AS COULD BEDONE, TAKEN OR EXERCISED BY AN ABSOLUTE O\VNER OF THE 
TRUST PROPERTY; 
P) SO LONG AS BOTH OF THE ORJGINAL TRUSTEES ARE SERVING AS TRUSTEES 
HEREUNDER, EITHER OF THEM SHALL HA VE THE POWER TO BIND THE TRUST IN ANY AND 
ALL TRANSACTIONS, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO (1) COLLECTING RECEIPTS; (2) 
PAYING DlSBURSEMENTS; (3) SECURlNG ASSETS; (4) WRJTING CHECKS AND MAKING 
WJTHDRA WALS FROM BANK ACCOUNTS; AND (5) PURCHASING, SELLING AND PLEDGING 
SECURITIES AND OTHER PROPERTY; 
Q) THE TRUSTEE IS EMPOWERED TO BUY, SELL, TRADE AND DEAL IN OPTlONS, 
PRECIOUS METALS, STOCKS, BONDS AND SECURITIES OF ALL MATURE (INCLUDING 
"SHORT' SALES AND SPECULATIVE OPTION TRANSACTIONS; 
R) HE SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE SAFE DEPOSIT BOX 
IN TRUSTORS' NAMES, INDIVIDUALLY OR AS TRUSTEES OF THE TRUST, AND REMOVE THE 
CONTENTS THEREOF; 
S) THE TRUSTEE SHALL HA VE TI:IE POWER TO BORROW MONEY FOR ANY TRUST 
PURPOSE (INCLUDING FROM Tiffi PROBATE ESTATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PAYING TAXES) 
ON SUCH TERMS AND CONDITIONS AS THE TRUSTEE MAY DEEM PROPER FROM ANY 
PERSON, FIRM OR CORPORATION; 
T) THE TRUSTEE IS AUTHORIZED TO LOAN OR ADVANCE TRUSTEE'S OWN FUNDS TO 
ANY TRUST PROVIDED FOR IN THIS DECLARATION FOR ANY TRUST PURPOSE AND TO 
CHARGE FOR SUCH LOAN OR ADVANCE TO THE TRUST; 
U) THE TRUSTEE IS. AUTHORIZED TO PURCHASE SECURITIES OR OTHER PROPERTY 
FROM AND TO MAKE LOANS AND. AfJV AN CEMENTS FROM TIIE PRO BA TE ESTA TE WITH OR 
WITifOUT SECURITY TO THE EXECUTOR OR OTHER REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF - . I • 
EITHER TRUSTOR; AND . · ; 
V) THE TRUSTEE MAY HOLD SECURITIES OR OTHER PROPERTY HELD BY TRUSTEE IN 
TRUST PURSUANT TO THIS DECLARATION IN TRUSTEE'S NAME AS TRUSTEE UNDER THIS 
. ' DECLA_R.JI.T!ON, IN TRUSTEE'S O\VN N./'Jvffi V-!IlliOUT A. DESIGNATION SHOVvTI,,;G IT TO BE 
TRUSTEE UNDER THIS DECLARATION, IN THE NAME OF TRUSTEE'S NOMINEE, OR THE 
TRUSTEE MAY HOLD SUCH SECURITIES UNREGISTERED IN SUCH CONDITION TBA T 
OWNERSHIP WILL PASS BY DELIVERY; ' 
W) THE TRUSTEE HAS THE AUTHORJTY TO EXECUTE ANY POWER OF ATTORNEY 
FORM FOR ANY ACCOUNT HELD IN 1RUSTORS' NAMES IN ANY BANK; 
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FIRST AMENDMENf TO 
THE REVOCABLE TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL 
Exhibit 
This First Amendment to THE REVOCABLE TRUST OF MJCHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE 
M. CORNELL, dated this 6th day of August, 2009, is made by Michael S. Cornell, as Surviving 
Grantor and Surviving Trustee of THE REVOCABLE TRUST OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND 
ARLIE M. CORNELL and acce1-1ted and consented to by tvgCHAEL S. CORNELL, acting in his 
capacity as Surviving Grantor and Surviving Trustee, on this 6th day of August, 2009. 
By agreement with the Trustees dated November 1, 1996, Grantors, Michael S. Cornell 
and Arlie M. Cornell created and placed into effect THE REVOCABLE_TR1JST.OF. MICHAELS . 
.. ···---~:· .. ,. '·-~· ·--·-··· . ----- .. -·. --·--·-· .. ··- __ :,.. - +.----· -·- ----· -- . . ·- ----···· . . . ·---·· ., 
CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL; Arlie M. Cornell has passed leaving Michael S. Cornell as 
Surviving Grantor and Surviving Trustee; and as Surviving Grantor the said Michael S. Cornell 
desires to amenq said trust agreement, and the Surviving Trustee is willing to accept and 
consent to such amendment. 
NOW, THEREFORE, Surviving Grantor and Surviving Trustee·agree as follows: 
.. _, ... 
l-\rticle Nine Section 9.01 Trustees SECOND of THE REVOCABLE TRUST OF MJCHAEL S. 
CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL shall be amended to read as follows: 
SECOND: At the death or incapacity of the undersigned, TONIC. JOHNSON shall act as 
Trustee/Successor Trustee. In the event that TONIC. JOHNSON is unavailable or unwilling to 
act, then in that event,JOHN HENRY CORNELL shall act as Trustee/Successor Trustee. 
All other terms and provisions of THE REVOCABLE TRUST OF MICHAELS. CORNELL 
AND ARLIE M. CORNELL shall remain in full force and 'effect. 
DATED this 6th day of August, 2009. 
FIRST AMEND.lviENT TO THE REVOCABLE TRUST OF 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Clearwater ) 
On this C_;·\J" day of >AL1;=\;-.'):t , 2009, before me, a notary public in.and 
for the State of Idaho, personally appea'.-red Michael S. Cornell, a single person, known or 
identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within insfrument, and 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same . 
. ,,\\.\l_lOU,,. 
IN WI~'NE~S WH~~; ~-~ .. !f~ff,y9-~to set my ,,hand and affixed my official seal the 
day and year m this cerh~~O'~(~~V.~{en. · l\ . . ; 
_ -..J , ~ _ .. . .· . . r--1. l i/\ r\~ \ L · 
- <e • . . - . ·• ·•,:. ._:: \J__ \ A..Jl-,-c''-X " . l2 --z._,.~" = • • . _,;,.,. ,-.--. .-; ::<=< • = 2 .. --~ • I -' •• L=;:.:- I ., ,., 
-:;_ • . · - a<..\G./6 ~ No~ry Publi~_:1 a11d for Idaho. 
-:;,.. · •. PU :· · .·)' :J:: ........ Res1dmg at: 0 rtr( ...... ,,,.-..,-~ ... _ 
..... ..-.,/?~,-;' • ;._,f'· ~~ ~ .. " Commission E:iqJfres: 2. 2 C.r · l. .c \ c, 
./,1 i::; ~- ·:,\ 
ACCEPTED this (;'~d:;!~~ii'~~~1-Q111-5-1 , 2009 .. {) 
STATE Of IDAHO ) 
)ss~ 
MICHAEL s. CORNELL 
Surviving Trustee 
County of Clearwater ) . 
I 'tl" (: . 
On this lC day of ~~ \.J-.--o--+- , 2009, before me, a notary public 
in and for the State of Idaho, personalfy appea d Michael S. Cornell, known or identified to 
me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within insfrument as Trustee for THE 
REVOCABLE TRUST OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL, and acknowledzed to 
me that he executed the same as such Trustee for TrIE REVOCABLE TRUST OF MICHAEL S. 
CORNELL AND ARLIE Ivi. CORNELL. 
IN ~S WH~~qf,!\Bfle hereu:1to set my hand and affixed my official seal the 
day and year rn this certi~~r,IJ~~e written. 
,, 0 •. •·.· ... . :.of~ /,- ·\ j $:·~oiARv··.~,.i;:S _ I r , f\f\ ~7_ l~ 
:: !C(": . ~- ·. · = 9-~ \.Uy-·~ \ '- <!) l-+~"- <'' . ·-~ · · . ~·"- :, · ·= .>Now.ry Public in and for Idaho. 
-:;,. ·• PUB\.\O / O ~ Residin<:r at: /C:.H,l'J-~, ·,,-c, ~ ·($\ ~.. ,·· .-!W • .;t- ~ 0 l_ - ~ 
,...., ~~- · · • · :O~ 0 Commission Expires: -l ·1 , , · ·1 0 \ C\ 
// ·1, (:; Of' \ .. ,, L <(' 
,,,, fJ ,ii'\\"''\.. 
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Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewjston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
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·-; r.(l 3) I / I 3 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
COMES NOW Karin Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., on behalf of the 
Respondent Toni Johnson, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 15-8-208 and Rule 54(d), 54(e)(l) 
and 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, submit the following items of costs to which 
the Court may order to be awarded to Respondent Toni Johnson as follows: 
Costs (filing fee) $66.00 
Reasonable attorney fees to be 
fixed by the Court as set out in 
the Affidavit for Attorney Fees 
filed herewith (specifically does 
not include costs related to 
probate of Estate of John Cornell 
or filings by Estate/Kareen Cornell 
after dismissal of original 
petition). 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 




03-01-'13 12:14 FROM-JB & C 2087469553 T-355 P0003/0010 F-085 
DATED this 1st day of March, 2013. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
KARIN SEUBERT being first duly sworn and on oath, deposes and says: 
That she is the attorney for Respondent Toni Johnson and as such is well informed as to 
the costs, disbursements and attorney fees of Toni Johnson; that to the best of her knowledge and 
belief, the items in the Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees are correct and that the said 
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in said action and are being claimed in compliance 
with Rule 54(d) and 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 1st day of March, 2013. 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE. ) 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 1st day of March, 2013. 
(SEAL) 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES was, this 1st day of March, 
2013. 
/ hand-delivered by providing a 
to: 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
transmitted via e-mail 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin; Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St, 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
1219 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By_____.~-'-'---~~--
KARIN SEUBERT 
.MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 
3 
T-355 P0004/0010 F-085 
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Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
2087469553 T-355 P0005/0010 F-085 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Nez Perce ) 
) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATIORNEY FEES 
KARIN SEUBERT, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That I am an attorney duly admitted to practice law before the Courts of the State of 
Idaho. The finn of Jones, Brower and Callery has been retained by Toni Johnson to defend 
against the Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee dated July 11, 2012. I 
am well informed as to the costs, disbursements and attorney fees of Toni Johnson in defending 
against said Petition; that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the items in Exhibits A and B 
to this Affidavit are correct and that the said disbursements have been necessarily incurred in this 
action and are being claimed in compliance with Rule 54(d) and 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. I make this Affidavit on behalf of Toni Johnson and in support of the 
AFFIDA VlT IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 1 
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Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and, in particular; in support of a request for costs in 
the sum of $66.00 and for attorney's fees in the sum of $6,422.50, for a total of Six Thousand 
Four Hundred Eighty Eight and 50/100 Dollars ($6,488.50). 
To date either I have performed the following professional services in connection with 
said Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee dated July 11, 2012: 
See Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
That the attorney time of the office for Karin Seubert was charged at the rate of $150,00 
per hour. Said rate is within the rates prevailing in the Second Judicial District for the State of 
Idaho. 
In my opinion, based upon the appropriate factors to be considered by the Court, 
confirmation of $6;488.50 to Toni Johnson for costs and attorney fees necessarily expended in 
the good faith defense of this action is reasonable. 
Said figure specifically excludes amounts incurred for the probate of the estate of John 
Henry Cornell, deceased, or in defending against the Petition by Kareen Cornell as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of John Remy Cornell and as Surviving Spouse of John Henry 
Cornell, Deceased Beneficiary of the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie 
M. Cornell for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution filed February 26, 
2013 and related filings and discovery filed prior to and since the filing of said second Petition. 
Additionally, to date, this firm has advanced the following costs for a filing fee in 
connection with the defense of the Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of 
Trustee dated July 11, 2012: 
s·ee Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
In my opinion, based on the appropriate factors to be considered by the Cou11, an award 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 2 
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of Sixty Six Dollars ($66.00) to Toni Johnson for costs necessarily expended in the good faith 
defense of this action is reasonable. 
DATED this 1st day of March, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P .L.L.C. 
By_~P==--~c~~~-
K.ARlNSEUBERT 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES was, this 1st day of March, 2013, hand-
delivered by providing a copy to Valley Messenger 
Service addressed to: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
1219 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By~~------'.~=------
KARIN SEUBERT 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 3 
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EXHIBIT A: Attorney Fees 
Service Provided 
Initial consultation. 
Reviewed pleadings and trust documents. 




Reviewed correspondence. Research. Telephone 1.00 
conferences with client and Aherin. 
Multiple telephone conferences re: John Cornell's 2.15 
death. Letter to Aherin, Attended telephonic 
motion hearing. 
Telephone conference with client. 
Telephone conference with client. 
Research. Prepared Motion to Dismiss and notice. 






Telephone conference with client. Confirming 0.50 
letter. 
Attended telephonic status conference. Telephone 0.50 
conference with client. 
Reviewed deposition notice. Telephone conference 0.25 
with Aherin. 
Research. Prepared Motion for Protective Order 1.50 
and related documents; correspondence. 
Telephone conference with client. 
Telephone conferences with Aherin and Court. 
Telephone conference with client. · 






Telephone conference with client. Confirming 0.75 
letter. 
Telephone conference with Ted Creason. 
Research. Prepared Memorandum of Law. 
Reviewed response brief and affidavits. Research. 
Research. Started reply brief. 






Telephone conference with client. No charge 
Traveled to/from Orofino. Attended hearing on 3.00 
Motion to Dismiss, which was continued. 
Telephone conference with Creason's office. No charge. 
Correspondence. 
Telephone conference with Creason. Reviewed 1.00 
file. 
Telephone conference with Creason. 
Telephone conference with Creason. 
0.25 
0.25 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS AND A TIORNEY FEES 
T-355 P0008/0010 F-085 
Fee 









































Telephone conference with client. 





Travel to/from Orofino. Attended hearing on 4.00 
Motion to Dismiss. 
Telephone conferences with Aherin and Creason. 
Conference call with Court, Aherin and Creason. 
Telephone conference with client., 
Reviewed Creason memoranduni. Research. 
Letter to client. Research. 
Research. Prepared reply brief. 
Prepared for second hearing on Motion to Dismiss. 
Travel to/from Orofino. Attended second hearing 
on Motion to Dismiss. 
Reviewed Judgment and Memorandum Decision. 
Prepared Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
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EXHIBIT B: Costs 
Cost Incurred Amount 
Filing Fee $66.00 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
T-355 P0010/0010 F-085 
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Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
0 4 2013 
Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Karin Seubert of Jones, 
Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), hereby moves this honorable Court 
for an order dismissing the Petition by Kareen Cornell as Personal Representative of the Estate of 
John Henry Cornell and as Surviving Spouse of John Henry Cornell, Deceased Beneficiary of the 
Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell for Supervised Administration 
and Court Ordered Distribution filed February 26, 2013 in the above-entitled action. 
This Motion is made on the basis that Petitioner Kareen Cornell, as personal representative 
of the Estate of John Henry Cornell, deceased, has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. Respondent reserves the right to submit supplemental briefing and authority in support of 
her Motion in advance of the hearing on this Motion in accordance with I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3). 
MOTION TO DISMISS -1-
;J-Ji;A 
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DATED this 1st day of March, 2013 . 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
By t~~L 
Karin Seubert 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO 
DISMISS was, this 1st day of March, 2013, 
~ hand-delivered by providing a 
to: 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore O. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
1219 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By ~~ 
Karin Seubert 
MOTION TO DISMISS -2-
Attorney for Respondent 
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Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
'_I ' '; 
1 2013 ,J1f!rt ~ l .,_r 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney of record, Karin Seubert of Jones, 
Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(c), hereby moves this honorable Court for 
an order protecting Respondent from Notice of Taking Deposition of Toni C. Johnson dated 
February 12, 2013, attached hereto as Exhibit A, and Petition, Personal Representative of the Estate 
of John Cornell, Kareen Cornell's First Set of Interrogatories and First Set of Requests for 
Production and Requests for Admission Propounded to Respondent dated February 12, 2013 
attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
This Motion is made on the basis that said discovery unreasonably subjects Respondent to 
undue burden and expense, specifically incurring attorney's fees in preparing for and attending said 
deposition and responding to said discovery, where it remains in dispute whether Petitioner Kareen 
Cornell has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Petition by Kareen Cornell as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell and as Surviving Spouse of John Henry 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER -1-
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Cornell, deceased beneficiary of the Revocable Family Trust of Michael C. Cornell and Arlie M 
Cornell for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution ("Second Petition") is 
largely duplicative of the Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee ("First 
Petition") filed by John Henry Cornell, which this Court has dismissed and concluded that such 
claims did not survive the death of John Henry Cornell. 
As the record of the case reflects, this is not new territory in this action. The current posture 
of the case is the same as was previously before the Court in October 2012, when this Court entered 
its Order of Protection from Discovery on October 17, 2012 protecting Respondent from discovery 
then sought by attorney Darrel Aherin representing (then deceased) John Henry Cornell. 
To that end, although the Court had made an oral ruling in open court on February 5, 2013, 
the written Judgment for Dismissal and Memorandum Opinion were not entered until February 15, 
2013 - after the subject deposition had been propounded. This Court's Order of Protection from 
Discovery dated October 17, 2012 remains by its terms in effect until the decision itself was entered. 
While said Order specifically references the Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of Toni Johnson 
dated October 3, 2012, the clear intent of said Order was to suspend discovery until it was 
determined whether any claims had survived the death of John Henry Cornell. Therefore, the 
premature nature of the discovery now at issue violated the intent of this Court's Order of Protection 
from Discovery dated October 17, 2012. 
Additionally, the discovery at issue was propounded before now Petitioner Kareen Cornell 
had even filed her Second Petition on February 26, 2013. At that time, no pleadings of any party 
were pending before the Court in this action. As such, Petitioner Kareen Cornell had no authority to 
propound discovery as discovery may only be obtained regarding "any matter, not privileged, which 
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." While Respondent acknowledges 
that depositions may be taken by an expected adverse party, the requirements ofl.R.C.P. 27 were not 
complied with in this instance. 
For these reasons, Respondent requests entry of a court order protecting Respondent from 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER -2-
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discovery, specifically including the Notice and Requests attached hereto, until such time as the 
Court enters a decision on the pending Motion to Dismiss dated March 1, 2013 . 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 1st day of March, 2013. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
By--+-~~~~~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER was, this 1st day of March, 
2013, 
/ hand-delivered by providing a 
to: 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
1219 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By~~ 
Karin Seubert 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER -3-
Karin Seubert 
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell BROWER 2. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION 





TO: RESPONDENT, TONI C. JOHNSON, TRUSTEE OF THE REVOCABLE 
FAMILY TRUST OF MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL, 
AND TO KARIN SEUBERT, HER ATTORNEY 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney for Kareen Cornell, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of John C. Cornell, will take the testimony, upon oral examination, 
of Toni C. Johnson before K&K Reporting, certified shorthand reporters of the State ofldaho, or 
in the case of their inability to act or be present, before some other person authorized to 
administer oaths, on Wednesday, lv1arch~22, 2013, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. of that day and 
thereafter from day to day as the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at the offices of 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, 1219 Idaho Street, Lewiston, Idaho 83501. 
This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION 
OF TONI C. JOHNSON - 1 
Creason, Moore, Do 
P.O. Drawer 835, 1o11»:,L1L\lll,1'1;1-J. 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (20 
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DATED this ,z'1.!fiay of February, 2013. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB # 1563 
Attorneys for Kareen Cornell, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this (C'day of February, 2013, a copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF TONI C. JOHNSON was served by the method 
indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Keith and Kristi Evans 
Certified Court Reporters 
P. 0. Box 574 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
1212 Idaho Street 
P. 0. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION 
OF TONIC. JOHNSON - 2 
'\ 
/ ~: ,, .,,--,l 
.~G~-~ /; / .. i/ ,, . ..,/ 
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) PETITIONER, PERSONAL 
) REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE 
) OF JOHN CORNELL, KAREEN 
) CORNELL'S FIRST SET OF 
) INTERROGATORIES AND FIRST SET 
.) OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
) AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
) PROPOUNDED TO RESPONDENT 
---------
-------) 
TO: RESPONDENT, TONI C. JOHNSON, TRUSTEE OF THE REVOCABLE 
FAMILY TRUST OF MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL, 
AND TO KARIN SEUBERT, HER ATTORNEY 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that petitioner Kareen Cornell, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell, requires respondent to answer the following 
Interrogatories, within thirty (30) days from the date of service herein, pursuant to Rule 33 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure; that said Interrogatories shall be answered separately and fully 
under oath in writing and said answers shall contain the composite knowledge which is available 
to respondent personally or through her attorney, agents, officers, directors, employees, insurers, 
PETITIONER'S FIRST SET OF 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 1 
Creason, Moore, D.oli.ken &:Geitll, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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or accountants; that said Interrogatories shall be deemed to be continuing, and if respondent or 
her attorney discovers additional information as to the matter inquired of in these Interrogatories 
between the time the answers are made and the time of trial, supplemental answers should be 
made informing petitioner Kareen Cornell and her attorney as to the newly discovered 
information prior to trial. 
Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Kareen Cornell, as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell, requires that respondent produce 
and/or permit the authorized representatives of said petitioner to inspect and copy the documents 
and things requested herein on March 29, 2012, at 2:00 p.m., at the offices of Creason, Moore, 
Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, 1219 Idaho Street, Lewiston, Idaho 83501, or at such other time and 
place convenient to counsel for the petitioner prior thereto. 
Petitioner Kareen Cornell, as Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry 
Cornell, requires that respondent respond to the following Requests for Admission, within thirty 
(30) days from the date of service herein, pursuant to Rule 36 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
I. GENERALPROCEDURES 
1. You are requested to produce all documents in your possession, custody, or 
control that are described below. In so doing, please furnish documents that are in the possession 
of your employees, attorneys, insurers, accountants, or agents, or that are otherwise subject to 
your custody or control. All documents that respond, in whole or in part, to any portion of the 
production requests set forth below shall be produced in their entirety, INCLUDING ALL 
ATTACHMENTS AND ENCLOSURES. 
2. When identifying a document, specifically state separately the following for each: 
(a) The type of document (e.g., letter, interoffice memo, etc.); 
(b) Information sufficient to identify the document, including its date, the name of the 
addressee(s), the name of the signor(s), the title or heading of the document and the number of 
pages; 
( c) The identity of the person or persons to whom copies were sent; 
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( d) The present or last known location of the original of the document or, if that is 
unavailable, the most legible copy; and 
( e) If any document was, but is no longer in your possession, custody or control, state 
what disposition was made of it and the reason for such disposition. 
3. When identifying a person, furnish information separately for each individual 
sufficient to identify and locate the person, including, to the extent that the information is 
available, the full name and present or last known address of the person, together with the person 
or entity by whom said person is employed or with whom he or she is affiliated and his or her 
position therein. 
4. IF YOU CONTEND THAT ANY OF THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT BY THIS 
REQUEST ARE PRIVILEGED OR OTHERWISE PROTECTED FROM PRODUCTION IN 
WHOLE OR IN PART OR IF YOU OTHERWISE OBJECT TO ANY OF THESE REQUESTS, 
STATE SEPARATELY FOR EACH SUCH DOCUMENT THE REASONS FOR EACH 
OBJECTION OR NON-PRODUCTION AND IDENTIFY EACH DOCUMENT WITHHELD 
FROM PRODUCTION BY ITS AUTHOR, DATE, RECIPIENT OR RECIPIENTS, ALL 
INDIVIDUALS WHO RECEIVED COPIES OF THE DOCUMENT AND THE GENERAL 
SUBJECT MATTER. 
5. If you object to any part of a request for production, produce all documents 
responding to the request to which you do not object and, as to each part to which you do object, 
set forth the basis for the objection and the documents being withheld pursuant thereto. 
6. You must respond under oath to these discovery requests within thirty (30) days 
of the date on which they were served. 
7. THESE REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION ARE CONTINUING. IN THE 
EVENT YOU DISCOVER FURTHER INFORMATION OR DOCUMENTATION THAT 
ALTERS, MODIFIES, DELETES OR AUGMENTS THE ANSWERS GIVEN NOW OR ANY 
TIME HEREAFTER, YOU ARE TO PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION BY 
SUPPLEMENT AL ANSWERS AND/OR PRODUCTION OF SUCH DOCUMENTS. 
II. DEFINITIONS 
For purposes of these discovery requests, the following terms shall have the meanings set 
forth: 
1. AND or OR mean AND/OR, with the singular form being deemed to include the 
plural and vice versa. 
2. DOCUMENT or DOCUMENTS is used in the broadest possible sense and 
means, writings of every kind or character pertaining to the designated subject matter, including, 
without limitation, the original and any copy or draft, regardless of origin or location, of any 
book, pamphlet, periodical, letter, memorandum, diary, file, note, calendar, newspaper, 
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magazine, statement, bill, invoice, order, policy, telegram, correspondence, summary, receipt, 
opinion, investigation statement or report, schedule, manual, financing statement, audit, tax 
return, articles of incorporation, bylaws, stock book, minute book, agreement, contract, deed, 
security agreement, mortgage, deed of trust, title or other insurance policy, report, record, study, 
handwritten note, map, drawing, working paper, chart, paper, index, tape, microfilm, data sheet, 
data processing card, computer printout, computer program, check, bank statement, passbook, or 
any other written, typed, printed, photocopied, dittoed, mimeographed, telecopied, faxed, 
recorded, transcribed, punched, taped, filmed, photographic or graphic matter, however 
produced. DOCUMENT or DOCUMENTS includes the file and folder tabs associated with 
each document as above-described, all correspondence transmitting such documents or 
explaining or commenting on the contents thereof, and all working or supporting papers. 
3. IDENTIFY, IDENTITY or IDENTIFICATION means (a) when used with 
reference to a natural person, to state his or her full name, present home address, present business 
address, present home and business telephone numbers, and present or last known position 
and/or business affiliation; (b) when used with reference to an entity, such as a partnership ( either 
general or limited), joint venture, trust corporation, to state the full legal name of such entity, 
each trade name under which such entity does business, the entity's telephone number and the 
identity of the chief operating officer, manager, trustee or other principal representative or 
managing agent or agents; and ( c) when used with reference to documents, state specifically (i) 
the type of document involved (e.g., letter, interoffice memorandum, etc.), the date it was 
prepared, the preparer, all distributees, its title or the heading and the number of pages; and (ii) 
the identity of the custodian or other person last known to have possession of the document 
together with the present or last known location of the document. 
4. PERSON or PERSONS refers to any natural person or any entity other than a 
natural person including, but not limited to, any business entity whether a sole proprietorship, 
corporation, partnership, limited partnership, association, joint venture, co-venture, and any other 
legally recognized entity of any description whatever, as well as all divisions, departments, 
affiliates, subsidiaries, or other subunits of the foregoing entities. 
5. RELATING TO or RELATE TO means pertinent, relevant, or material to, 
evidencing, having a bearing on, concerning, affecting, discussing, dealing with considering or 
otherwise relating in any manner whatsoever to the subject matter of the inquiry. 
6. STATEMENT refers to any oral, written, stenographic, electronic or recorded 
declaration of any kind or description. 
7. DEFENDANTS refers to the defendants Rob Vance and Becky Vance, either 
collectively or individually, unless otherwise specifically indicated. 
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III. INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
& REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Set forth the following as to all assets held by the Trust 
during the time which you have served as a Trustee (whether joint or sole), including, but not 
limited to, assets which have since been consumed or transferred during administration and 
assets which have been generated or acquired during administration. 
(a) Description of asset; 
(b) Location of asset; 
( c) Estimated fair market value of asset; and 
( d) Any and all administrative action taken with regard to asset. 
ANSWER: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Set forth all actions taken by you to distribute the assets of 
the Trust during the time which you have served as a Trustee (whether joint or sole) of the Trust. 
ANSWER: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Please produce copies of all financial 
accountings of the Trust, whether created before or during the time which you have served as a 
Trustee. 
RESPONSE: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Please produce a copy of a current financial 
accounting of the Trust. 
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RESPONSE: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Set forth all facts regarding the manner in which the the 
accountings produced in response to Requests for Production Nos. 2 & 3 were generated. 
ANSWER: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Set forth the name and contact information for any and all 
persons assisting with the accountings produced in Response to Requests for Production Nos. 
2&3 and those persons assisting with the creation or review of information upon which those 
accountings were based. 
ANSWER: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: With respect to those assets which have since been 
consumed or transferred during administration and assets which have been generated or acquired 
during administration, please set forth the following: 
(a) The date the asset was consumed, transferred, generated or acquired; 
(b) Name, address and telephone nun1ber of the person to whom the property was 
transferred or sold, or from whom property was acquired; 
( c) The sales price or consideration for the asset; and 
(d) Name, address and telephone number of any persons with personal knowledge 
regarding the facts set forth in your answers to (a)-(d). 
ANSWER: 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please produce a copy of all written 
documents evidencing the sale or transfer of the property referred to in the preceding 
interrogatory. 
RESPONSE: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Please produce a copy of all correspondence 
between you and the decedent, John Henry Cornell, including correspondence through which you 
advised him of the state of Trust assets and your administration of the Trust. 
RESPONSE: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Do you intend 'to rely on any statement, whether oral or 
written, given by Maragaret Watkins or Kareen Cornell, or any of their representatives or agents 
to support any of your claims or defenses? If your answer is in the affirmative, please state: 
(a) The name, address and telephone number of the person making the statement; 
(b) The date and place the statement was made; 
( c) The name, address and telephone number of the person to whom the statement 
was made; 
( d) The name, address and telephone number of each person who was present when 
the statement was made; 
( e) If the statement was oral, please briefly describe the content of the statement. 
ANSWER: 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Please produce any and all statements 
referred to in the preceding interrogatory, whether in written or electronic format. 
RESPONSE: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Do you intend to rely on statement, whether oral or 
written, given by the decedent, John Henry Cornell, or any of the decedent's representatives or 
agents to support any of your claims or defenses? If your answer is in the affirmative, please 
state: 
(a) The name, address and telephone number of the person making the statement; 
(b) The date and place the statement was made; 
( c) The name, address and telephone number of the person to whom the statement 
was made; 
(d) The name, address and telephone number of each person who was present when 
the statement was made; 
( e) If the statement was oral, please briefly describe the content of the statement. 
ANSWER: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: Please produce any and all statements 
referred to in the preceding interrogatory, whether in written or electronic format. 
RESPONSE: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: If you, your attorney, or any other person, firm, or 
corporation acting on your behalf consulted with or engaged any experts you intend to call at trial 
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in connection with this litigation, please fully identify each such expert. For each such expert, 
state the following: 
(a) Set forth in full and complete detail the nature of his/her education and training, 
including the name and address of each school or university where (s)he received special 
education or training in the field in which (s)he is expected to testify, the date (s)he attended each 
institution, and the degree or certifications received from each institution; 
(b) If any expert tested, analyzed, or examined any physical evidence relating to this 
litigation, state the dates on which such test, analysis, or examination was conducted and 
identify, all persons who assisted or were present; 
( c) Set forth in full and complete detail the substance of the facts, conclusions, and 
opinions to which each expert is expected to testify; 
( d) Identify each person who has present custody of each item tested, analyzed, or 
examined by each such expert; 
( e) Identify each document reporting or setting forth the objective findings, opinions, 
or conclusions of each expert; and 
(f) Describe in detail all facts and opinions underlying your expert's opinion(s). 
ANSWER: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: Please produce a copy of the documents 
referred to in subsection ( e) of the preceding interrogatory. 
RESPONSE: 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please identify all exhibits you intend to offer in evidence 
at the time of trial. 
ANSWER: 
· INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Identify all witnesses who you intend to or may call as 
witnesses to testify in support of your claims or defenses in this action, and specify the substance 
of the subject matter of the testimony as it is expected to be given by each witness. 
ANSWER: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please identify by name, address, telephone number, 
employer and job title each person who was consulted or who assisted in the answering of these 
discovery requests, or who furnished information which was used in answering them. 
ANSWER: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify each and every person by name, address and 
telephone number who has any knowledge or purports to have any knowledge of the facts of this 
case and a brief description of the knowledge held by each person, if known. 
ANSWER: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: Please produce copies of all records not 
produced in response to one of the foregoing requests that are in your possession, custody or 
control regarding administration of the Trust. 
RESPONSE: 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Admit that John Henry Cornell transferred real 
property into the Trust. 
RESPONSE: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Set forth all facts upon which you base any claim of 
legal interest in the real property discussed in Request for Admission No. 1. 
ANSWER: 
DATED thisf-ZY.~ay of February, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ( l t_day of February, 2013,· a copy of the foregoing 
PETITIONER, KAREEN CORNELL'S, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE 
OF JOHN CORNELL, FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND FIRST SET OF 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION PROPOUNDED TO 
RESPONDENT was served by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
13 04 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through 
her attorney of record, Karin Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. will call up for 
hearing her Motion for Protective Order dated March 1, 2013 at the hour of 3 :00 p.m. on March 
13, 2013, before the Honorable Magistrate of the above Court. 
DATED this 1st day of March, 2013. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Karin Seubert 
Attorney for Respondent 
NOTICE OF HEARING -1-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
HEARING was, this 1st day of March, 2013, 
/ hand-delivered by providing a 
to: 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore O. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
1219 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By K~~ 
Karin Seubert 
NOTICE OF HEARING -2-
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MAR-11-2013 17 :12 From:AHERIN RlL~ ANEGON 2087463650 To: 1<... 184769315 
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewistoni ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorneys for John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND WDICIAL DISTRlCl' 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUSl OP 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
OBJECTION TO I-IEARYNG 
COMES NOW Margaret Watkins, by and through her attorney, Darrel W. Aherin, of 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon, and objects to the Court hearing the Respondent Toni C. Johnson's 
Motion for Protective Order on March 13, 2013 . 
l.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A) provides that the Notice of Hearing shall be filed and served 
so the parties receive the Noi-ice of Hearing and Motion no later than fourteen (14) days before 
the hearing. 
On March 1, 2013, a Motion for Protective Order and Notice of Hearing for March 13, 
2013, was received by the undersigned. Clearly fourteen days notice was not provided. Serving 
the Notice on March 1, 2013 , means the earliest a hearing could have been noticed for hearing is 
March 15, 2013. 
Because the proper procedure regarding notice was not provided the hearing cannot be 
called on for hearing on March 13, 2013. 
OBJECTION TO HEARING -- 1 
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DATED this /J~ay of March, 2013. 
:~J.~ 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Atlomcy for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1, Darrel W. Aherin, hereby certify that on the //-f'>- day of March, 2013, l caused to be 
served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to the 
following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC. 
Attorney at Law 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
Attorney at Law 
1219Idaho 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
OBJECTION TO HEARING -- 2 
N :\Cornell, fohn\Plc11dings\Objllctiot1 to Nolice of Heuring.docx •CCW 
D U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
~acsimile 746-9553 
D Federal Express 
[l U.S. Mail 
0 !:land Delivery 
[Ij"""_Facsimile 746-2231 
0 Federal Express 
ByWJ.~ 
Darrel W. Aherin 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
IN THE MATIER OF 







Randall W. Robinson, Presiding Judge 
Courtney Baker: Deputy Clerk 
Plaintiff's Council: 
Defendant's Council: 
Date: 03/13/2013 Time: 3:05 - a.m. Tape: CD554-1 
Subject of proceeding: Eviction Hearing 




3:05 Honorable Randall W. Robinson, Magistrate Judge, presiding. Parties present in 
the court room: Mr. Aherin, Mr. Creason, and Ms. Seubert present telephonically. 
3:05 Court addresses Mr. Aherin's objection to the motion for protective order hearing 
3:06 Mr. Aherin states his objection. 
3:06 Ms. Seubert addresses Mr. Aherin's objection to the hearing . 
3:07 Court explains that it deems appropriate to move the hearing date up. 
3:08 Mr. Aherin asks about the deposition scheduled, on March 22, 2013. 
3: 10 The Court states that it would be appropriate for Mr. Aherin to file a notice of 
appearance. 
3: 11 The court addresses the Protective order. 
3: 11 Ms. Seubert addresses the Protective order. 
3: 16 Mr. Creason addresses the Protective order. 
3:27 The Court questions on why they would need discovery at this point. 
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3:28 Parties explain why they want discovery. 
3:32 Court addresses the matter at hand. 
3:37 Parties address the trust. 
3:45 The Court addresses concerns. 
3:50 Court will allow discovery. 
3:51 Ms. Seubert discusses briefing dates. 
3:52 Mr. Creason discusses briefing dates. 
3:56 Written discovery is to be completed by April 15, 2013; Deposition is to be 
completed by April 22, 2013; Motion to dismiss hearing June 4, 2013 
4:01 Court is in recess. 
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AHERTN, RJCE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, lD 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorney for Margaret Watkins 
fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLlE M. 
CORNELL, 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED BY TONI C. 
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST 
COME~ NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Anegon, on behalf of Margaret 
Watkins and moves the Court pursuant to l.R.C.P. 54(d)(6) for an order disallowing the costs and 
attorney fees sought in the Memoi::andum of Costs and Attorney Fees filed by Toni C. Johnson 
and Affidavit in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees as follows: 
Under the terms of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. 
Cornell, dated November 1, 1996, hereinafter 'The Trust," Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. 
Cornell, or the survivor between them, were Co-Trustees. The Trust further provided that upon 
the death or incapacity of the last survivor of the initial trustees, Toni C. Johnson and John H. 
Cornell would act as successor trustees. This could not be modified after Arlie M. Cornell died. 
After the death of Arlie M. Camell, Michael S. Cornell illegally modified The Trust to 
appoint Tonl C. Johnson as sole successor trustee upon his death or incapacity, and John H. 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED BY TONIC. 
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST -- 1 
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Motion to Disallow Costs and Mtomcy Fees.docx ,er 
Aherln, Rice & Anegon 
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Cornell as trustee in the event Toni C. Johnson could not act. Section 1.06 of The Trust provides 
that amendments to The Trust could be made "during the joint lives of the Trustors" (emphasis 
added). 
Toni C. Johnson has been serving as sole successor trustee since the death of Michael S. 
Cornell on December 15, 2009 in violation of the trust. 
No inventory of the assets in The Trust at the time of the death of Michael S. Cornell has 
been provided. 
The Trust, Section 4.03 provides as follows: 
On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the Trustee 
shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal 
remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute thern to the 
following beneficiaries: TONl C. JOHNSON AND JOHN H. CORNELL. 
Toni C. Johnson is asking this court to continue rewarding her for intentionally breaching 
the trust because the trust terminated on December 15, 2009. Toni C. Johnson should pay the 
attorney foes personally because had she distributed the assets timely, the claimed attorney fees 
and costs would not have been incurred. 
The main asset of The Trust is the house and Teal property. Toni C. Johnson has been 
residing in the house since Michael S. Cornell's death on December 15 2009. The property 
remains in the name of The Trust and was not distributed to the two beneficiaries "as soon as 
reasonably possible". Toni C. Johnson has paid no rent during her tenancy of the premises. 
Toni C. Johnson has mismanaged the Trust in that she has used a substantial amount of 
the monies available to pay both expenses of maintaining the real property, where she has 
resided for three years.and to pay her personal expenses. No money was distributed to John 
Henry Cornell. 
Toni C. Johnson has breached her fiduciary duty to settle and distribute the Trust in 
accordance with the terms of the Trust. The actions and mismanagement of The Revocable 
Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell by Toni C. Johnson are the sole cause 
of this action. 
The Trust should not be responsible for Toni C. Johnson's attorney foes or costs. 
Oral argument is requested. 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED BY TONI C. 
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST -- 2 
N:\Comdl. John\Pleadings\Motion to Ois11llow Costs und Auomey F'ees.docx scr 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys .it Law 
LtitWiston, Idaho 
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DATED this / 4 "t- day of March, 2013. 
AHERJN, RICE & ANEGON 
By /;J@J). 0-~ 
Darrel w. Aherin-· 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the / t.f fj.. day of March, 2013, I 
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC., 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED SY TONIC. 
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST -- 3 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Deli very 
~acsimile 746-9553 
0 Federal Express 
0 U.S. Mail 
D !;land Delivery 
~Facsimile 746"2231 
DARREl,., W. AHERIN 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
N:\Cornell. John\Plcading~\Motion to Oisullow Costs and /\!Tomey Fc~5.docx scr 
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Theodore 0 . Creason, ISB #1563 
~amtLcl r. Cre,-L-;on r~m #8183 
CREASON, MOOKE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
17. 1 9 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743- l S 16 
Facsimile : (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Personal Reprcsentati ve 
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell 
IN THI:<: UISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND .JUOICJAL DISTlUCT 
Ol~ THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY 'l'RUST OF 
MICHAELS . CORNELL AND ARLIE M . 
CORNELL. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS ANO 
) ATTORNl£Y FEES (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) 
) 
) 
COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry 
Cornell , by and through h<.:r all<.m1ey 01· record, Theodore 0 . Crca:,on or Creason, Moore, Dokken 
& Ccidl. PLLC, and hereby moves this Court to disallow all or parl of the costs and attorney fees 
set forth in Toni Johnson's Memorandum or Costs and Attorney Fees. Ms. Cornell basis Lhis 
motion upon the authorities and arguments set faith in the Memorandum in Support filed 
herewith. 
DATED Lhi:; l.'.ilh <luy oCMarch, 2013 . 
CR.sf.SON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GElDL, PLLC 
f dti.,,,,L.- tJ a~·=·:....-&.:....L....._'.1 _ 
~-l;oJore 0. Creason, lSB # 1563 
Attorneys for Petitioner/ Personal Representative 
MOTION TO UlSALLOW COSTS ANO ATTORNEY 
FBF.S (I.R.C l'. 5J(d)(6)) - I 
C rc:t,ou, Moore, lloldccn & Gei<ll, l'LLC 
l'.0. 0nawcr 835, l.,·.wi,tm, , ID 83501 
(ZON) 743-1516; l•'i,,: (211!1) 7-4<i-22JI 
il·'JJ p.3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of March, 2013, I filed the foregoing 
MOTION TO DlSALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES (LR.C.P. 54(d)(6)) with th~ 
Clerk of the Court (via facsimile to (208) 476-9315), and also delivered a copy via facsimile to 
tbe following person~ at the fax numbers designated below: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin_ Ric1:: & /\.ncgon 
1212 Idaho Street 
P. 0. Drnwer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
h1x: 208-746-3650 
MOTION TO l>lSAl,LOW COSTS ANO ATTORNEY 
FEES (I.R.C.l'. 54(d)(6)) - 2 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
l,ewiston, ID 83501 
Fax: 208-746-9553 
Cr~i1so11, l\1uorc, l)okkc1l & Gddl, Pl.LC 
P.O. l)r·:iwc1·83s, Lc,,iston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-151(;; l'ax; (:208) 746-n31 
p.4 
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Sauwcl T. Cn;,·1::;v11 ISR /.1-8183 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GElDL. PLLC 
121 9 Idaho S lred 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
T~k:µhum::: (208) 743- l 516 
Facsimile: (208) 7 46-223 l 
ALtorney:,, 1<.ir PetiLioncr/Personal Representative 
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell 
c2ou1 746-2231 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STAT~ OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Mauer oC: 
TIIE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICIIAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M 
CORNELL. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) 
) RE: MOTION TO DISALLOW 
) COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
) (l.RC.P. 54(d)(6)) 
____ ) 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENl' 
Kareen Cornell, Personal Representative of the Estate or John Henry Cornell (hereinafter, 
''Estate") objects to Jolmson's memorandum or costs and attorney fees on the grounds that the 
foes should not be awarded. Toni Johnson brings her claim for attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 15-8-208. Section 15-8-208 provides Lhat the court "may, in its discretion, order costs, 
in.duding n~u:,onnblc utton1cy':, fees .. .. " The Court should disn.llow Johnson'() motion for Ceef; 
becaw,e (1) Johnson foiled lo identify the source from which she is seeking an ,-1w;i.rd of fees; 
(2) an award cannot be granted against the Estate, as it is not a party to the action; (3) an award 
IVIElYIORANlJUM. lN SUI'PORT RE: MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
(I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) - I 
Cn\ltson, f"1o<Jt'l': 1 Dokl,;c,n & Ci!llll, PLLC 
l'.O. Ul'aw,•r 835, tewi.mrn, II) 835111 
(!08) 7J3-l516; F,,,c (20!!) 7J6,2231 
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shOLlld not be granted against John Cornell, as doing so would be inequitable; and ( 4) an award 
should not be granted against the properly of the Trust until such time as Johnson has apprised 
the Court or the stale of the Trust. 
ANALYSIS 
l. Procedurnl Requirements 
A party's clain1 for attorney fees is to be "processed in the same manner as costs and 
included in the mernorandurn of cost::-; provided, however, the claim for attorney fees as costs 
shall be supported by an affidavit of the attorney stating the basis and method of computation of 
the attorney foes clnimcd." Idaho R. Civ. P_ 54(c)(5)_ A proper 1T1Cm()rnn<lun:i. of coc1t::i "rnay not 
be filed laler llmn fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment." ldaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(5)_ "Any 
party may o~ject to the claimed costs of another party ... by filing and serving on adverse parties 
a motion to disallow part or all of such costs within fouttcen ( 14) days of service of the 
men10randun1 of cost." Idaho R Civ. P. 54(d)(6). Johnson served the memorandum of costs 
upon Cornell on Maeoh l, 2013. Thci-eforc, il'thc EHtute it., deemed u pu.rty, then the Estate has 
through F rid<LY, March l 5, 2013 to file its motion to disallow the claimed costs and fees. 
II. Substantive Standards 
Filing Fee: Johnson seeks recovery or the initial appearance filing fee of $66.00. This is 
a cost that is awarded to the prevailing party "by right", subject to the Court's discretion to 
disallow the co~L See IRCP 54(J)(1)(C). Limitation \vould be particularly appropriate here 
where the Court is considering, continuing the action and, therefore, Joh11so11 will not be assessed 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT RR: MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
(Ln._c_p_ 54(d)(6)) - 2 
C'rcu~on~ 1'1.ourc, ))old~cn & Cci.tll, 'rLLC 
l'_O_ llmwcr ll3S, I .ewistun, Ill ll:lSill 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
p.6 
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an addilional inilial appearance filing fee. She may seek recovery of such a foe shoul<l she 
prevail in lhe anticipated litigation. 
Attorney F ccs: Johnson rai::;cs Idaho Code § 15-8-208 as the statutory grounds upon 
whi1,:h ohe claims auorney fees_ Section 15-8-208 places determinations rc;:g<1-rding an award of 
fees within the sound discretion of the district court. The Courl may award reasonable attorney 
fees (a) from a party to the proceedings; (b) from the assets of the trust; or (c) from any non-
probate asset that is the subject of the proceeding. Johm,011 has failed to set forth the source from 
which she seeks an award of fees. Johnson's failure to identify the requested source of the fees 
h,:i.-; Jcprivc<l the purtie;:'; agaim,l. whom the fees may be awarded of their right to due procc:,::,_ Si;:,;: 
Farber v. lfowe!I, 111 ldaho 132,136,721 P.2d 731,735 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that Rule 54 
satisfies the requirements of due process becau::;e it provides the relevant party notice and an 
opportunity to be heard). The Court should nol 1;xerci::;e ils discretion in awai-ding foes where 
Johnson has fr1.iled to provide clear notice to the party against whom she seeks a recovery. 
](lhn:·Hm should not be awtH·ded fees frnm the Estate. The Court had not recognized the 
Estate as a party to this proceeding due, in paii, to Johnson's opposilion of the Estate's 
intervention. Theret'ore, the Estate was not a party to the proceeding. Nor is t.he fatale holding 
property of the Trusl (Jr non-probate assets that arc the subject of the proceeding. Thus, the Court 
should not award Johnson foes from the Estate. 
Joh1rno11 ,;houl<l not be awarded foes fi.·om Jolu1 Cornell. Johnson sought and received a 
dismissal of Cornell's petition on the grounds that because Corne I I is deceased (]) there exists no 
standing to bring claims in his name, and (2) the claims in the petition abated upon his death. In 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT RE: MO'flON TO 
DISALLOW COSTS ANO ATTORNEY FEES 
(I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) - 3 
C1·e;l.son, Moo,·(' 1 J)okk~n .. \:. <.,:~i<,11, Pl.t.(: 
1'.0. D1·11wc1· S35, Lewiston, Ill 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fnx: (20S) 746-2231 
p.7 
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determining wbether lo award fees against a party under section 15-8-208, Lhe courts consider 
whether an award would be equitable. Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixso11 Irrevocable 
Trust, 147 Idaho 117,133,206 P.3d 481,497 (2009). An award againl:lt John Cornell would be 
incquiti:tble for the two rcui:1ons. 
1. Jolmson did not prevail on whether John Cornell could establish the prirna facie 
elements of ihe causes of action pied. Rather, Johnson prevailed on the issue of abaternent of 
those causes of action upon the unfortunate and unft)n-~seen demise or John CornclL In fact, 
Johnson has sought to avoid disclosure regarding her administration of the Trust-facts which 
would support the cause,; of uction by mcan::i of motions for prolcdivc orders. Vv'hik thusi.; 
motions may not be improper, the unwillingness to disclose facts which would either suppo1t or 
refute the petition renders an award against John Cornell for bringing those actions inequitable. 
2. An award ol' attorney's fees against John Con1ell would most likely result in a 
claim against the Estate. The Estate has requested approval to proceed in this mailer, which 
Johnson has opposed. The Court should not effectively gn:int an award against the Estate when~ 
the Estate has not, despite its objections, bcer1 recognized as a party to the action. 
Finally, Johnson should not be awarded foes from assets of the Trust, at least until such 
time as Johnson apprises the Comt of the status of the Trust. This Court holds "full and ample 
autllority" to administer and settle the Trust and all trust matters. Idaho Code § 15-8-I02(1) . 
.lnhn Cornell asked this Court to intervene ba"ed upon allegations that Jolrn.son ha:., n,i::ima11agcd 
the Trust. Johnson has not yet apprised the Collrt or any other interesled party of the stale of the 
Trust assels. An award to Johnson out of the Trust assets for foes incurred by .loh11son in 
MlcMORANlJUM IN SUPPORT H.E: MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
(I.H..C.P. :'i4(d)(6)) - 4 
·Crc.a.•mn,, !\'loon.~, Dol(kc.n & Gci1.ll, PLl ,C 
P.O. l)1•aw~1· S35, Lcwislnn, m 8350 l 
(208) 743-1516; Fax; (208) 746-nJJ 
p.8 
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defendant against allegatior1s of misni.anagernenl, where Johnson has made no showing that those 
allegations were false, would re::;i..tlt in an inequily, 
CONCLUSION 
Johnson asks this Court to order a discretionary award of fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ l 5-8-208. The Court should decline to grant Johnson's request on the following grounds: 
( 1) Johnson failed to identify the source from which she is seeking an award or lees; 
(2) an award cannot be granted again::;t the Estate, as it is not a party to the action; 
(3) a11 av,•u.r<l should not be granted against John Co .. 11cll, as doing :so would be 
inequitable; and 
(4) an award 8hould not be granted against the property of the Trust until such time as 
Johnson has apptised the Court of the state of the Trust. 
DATED this 15th day of March, 2013. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
11 I) ' /.~.-~) ~; 
.. Ld~±-~c c£.1,.::-l---c~;;,~·¢'"c'.-Z,.~----
Theodore 0. Creason> lSB # I 563 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Personal Representative 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT RE; MOTlON TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
(I.R.C.P. S4(ll)(6)) - 5 
Cn.~!u;on, M-00•·1.~, Ookke.n .,,14 GcidJ, Pl..LC 
P.O. ))rawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; 11,,x: (208) 746-2231 
p.8 
310
Mar 15 13 10:37a Crea5on, Moore, ~ Dokken (201:lJ 746 2231 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of March, 2013, I filed the foregoing 
MEMOI-lANDllM IN SUPPORT RE: MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES (l.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) with the Clerk of the Court (via facsimile to (208) 476-
9315), and also dcli,1c1-cd a copy via fac~imilc to the following persons at the fax 11umber::; 
designated below: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Ancgon 
1212 Idaho Street 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Id11ho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
P. 0. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Fax: 208~746-3650 /) ;~" 208-746-9553 
(-:!l0L~~--£~'u.Z'.:,d-/~~--
l hcodon: 0. Creason, !SR-# I 563 
Ml.SMORANDlJM IN SUPPORT RE; MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
(I.R.C.P. S4(d)(6)) - 6 
Cre:1,011, Moo•·<, Dokken & Geidl, l'LLC 
P.O. ll,·,i,vc~ 835, Lcwis!Oll, II) S3501 
(208) 743-IS16; liax: (Z08) 746-2231 
p. 10 
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB # 1563 
San1ud T. Crca,~on ISR ff8183 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GElDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
l' .0. Drawer 835 
Lewiston> [0 8350l 
'l'clephone: (208) 741-1 'i 16 
Facsirnile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
Ol'Eslale of John Henry Corneil 
IN THI!: DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND .JUDlCIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE 01<' lOAHO, IN A.ND l<'OR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the IVlatLer or: 
THS REVOCABL12 FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
Case No. CV 20 12-00277 
NOTlCE OF HEARlNG RF:: MOTION 
TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) 
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned will call on for hearing Mntinn 1n ni~,,llow 
Costs and Attorney Fees (1.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) on Wednesday, April l 0., 2013, at 9:00 a.m., 
telephonically. Counsel for each party should call (208) 476-8998 to co1mect with the Judge and 
attend the Hearing. If counsel inler1ds lo attend in person, the hearing will be heard in the 
eourlroom at the Clearwater County Courthouse, Orofino, Idaho. 
DATED this 15111 day orMan.:h, 2013. 
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS ANO ATTORNEY fEES 
(I.R.C.P_ 54(<.1)(6)) - l 
CRE\SON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GElDL, PLLC 
h~}:J/,~  c;;z#?&~----
lore 0. Crcaso11, ISB # 1563 
Attorney for Petitioner Kareen Cornell 
c,·,,ason, Muoi·~, Dukkca & <~cidl, Pl,LC 
1>.0. n,·:1wc,· 835, L~wi,lou, II) S351ll 
(20S) 743-15H,; l':i~, (208) 746-2231 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of March, 2013, I filed the foregoing 
NOTICE OF HEAlUNG RE; MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) with the Clerk of the Court (via facsimile to (208) 476-9315), and also 
delivered n copy via fa1.•.:.imi.k to the following persons at the fax nurnbern designated bdow: 
Darrel W. Ahcrin 
Ahcrin, Rice & Ancgon 
l 212 Idaho Street 
P. 0. Drawer 698 
I ,ewiston, 11) 83501 
h1x: 208-746-3650 
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
(I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) - 2 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Cu.llery, P.LL.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 8.54 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Fax: 208-746-9553 
~/h,,4"6 .::)c.0d<¢.,-/,;.c: L 
~,,{~~re 0. Creason, lSB # 1563 
Crc:m.rn, Moor~, Dokken & C;1:i11l, l'LLC 
I),(), Ornw~r 835, Uwistun, ll) S3S(II 
(20l!l 743-151{i; Filx: (208) "146-223 I 
p.12 
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Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183 
FILED 
C. V_,r"',4r,J..1.4c.:....!!!....!-L-....!..!~'!11f""'-1 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Personal Representative 
Of the Estate of John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING 
) DEPOSITION OF TONI C. JOHNSON 
) 
_ _ ________ ) 
TO: RESPONDENT, TONI C. JOHNSON, TRUSTEE OF THE REVOCABLE 
FAMILY TRUST OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORNELL, 
AND TO KARIN SEUBERT, HER ATTORNEY 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney for Kareen Cornell, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of John C. Cornell, will take the testimony, upon oral examination, 
of Toni C. Jolrnson before Keith Evans of IC&K Rep0rting, certified shorthai1d reporters of the 
State of Idaho, or in the case of their inability to act or be present, before some other person 
authorized to administer oaths, on Monday, April 22, 2013, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. of that day 
and thereafter from day to day until the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at the offices 
of Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, 1219 Idaho Street, Lewiston, Idaho 83501. 
This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING 
DEPOSITION OF TONI C. JOHNSON - 1 
Creasoa, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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DATED this /r'fa_y of March, 2013. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
u~a~~-
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB # 1563 
Attorneys for Kareen Cornell, Petitioner/Personal 
Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this.;<O~ay of March, 2013 , a copy of the foregoing 
AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF TONIC. JOHNSON was served by hand 
delivering a paper copy to each named individual at the addresses indicated below: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
1212 Idaho Street 
P. 0. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING 
DEPOSITION OF TONI C. JOHNSON - 2 
~eO~~~ 
ii;od~so;, ISB #1563 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 -0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorney for Margaret Watkins 
'c,t\-[' 1 · J ~ ~~ 3 Ol 
Mt11.( 9 ri 1013 
Clerk Dist. Court 
Clearwater Coun , Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Category L(2) 
Fee $61.00 
TO: TONI C. JOHNSON, KAREEN CORNELL AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Margaret Watkins appeals to the District Court from the Magistrate's Judgment 
for Dismissal granting Toni C. Johnson's Motion for Summary Judgment entered in the above-
entitled case on February 15, 2013, Honorable Randall W. Robinson presiding. 
2. Margaret Watkins, an interested person, has a right to appeal because she was 
appointed temporary personal representative and defended Toni Johnson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Estate has a right to appeal to the District Judge Division of the District Court in 
the County of Clearwater the Judgment described in Paragraph 1 pursuant to Section 17-201(7) 
of the Idaho Code. 
3. The appeal is taken upon matters of both law and fact. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 1 
N:\Cornell ,John\Pleadings\Notice of Appeal.docx ser 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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4. The proceedings of the hearings were recorded or reported by the method of 
electronic recordings and are in the possession of the Clearwater County Clerk located in 
Orofino, Idaho. No record of the proceedings are being requested. 
5. The statement of issues on appeal that Margaret Watkins intends to assert are as 
follows: 
(a) Does a breach of the contractual provisions of a trust by a trustee equate to 
a personal injury tort which would allow the trustee/beneficiary to personally 
benefit from the death of the other beneficiary. 
(b) Should the beneficiary/trustee personally benefit from the intentional 
breach of a trust contract by the beneficiary/trustee. 
(c) Is a breach of the fiduciary duties by a beneficiary/trustee to be rewarded 
by claiming the breach sounds in tort so the beneficiary that dies after being 
intentionally denied his distribution of assets under a contract by the 
beneficiary/trustee forfeits his assets to the trustee who breached her contractual 
duty to distribute the assets as soon as possible. 
(d) Did the court incorrectly apply Idaho Code§ 5-327 by not holding the 
property damage claim did not abate. 
( e) Does equity allow the intentional breach of a trust contract by the 
beneficiary/trustee to be rewarded to the detriment of the beneficiary. 
6. The above list of issues is not exhaustive and Margaret Watkins may assert other 
issues on appeal thereafter discovered by Margaret Watkins. 
7. That this Notice of Appeal is not intended to stay or delay other discovery 
proceedings or petitions that have been filed by Kareen Cornell. 
DATED this 2- S'~ day of March, 2013 . 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 2 
N :\Cornell , J o hn\ Pleadin1,-s\Notice o r Appeal.docx se r 
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
By ~[) ~ 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Attorney for Margaret Watkins 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the 2.S ~ ay of March, 2013, I 
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC. 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore O. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 3 
N :\ Cornell, J ohn\Pleadings\Nolice of Appeal.docx ser 
lW'U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 
D Federal Express 
inJ.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 
D Federal Express 
&a{,,,}_ {,J_ ~ 
DARREL W. AHERIN 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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I, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Clerk's 
Transmittal of Court File and Certificate of Appeal To District Court was hand-
delivered, faxed or mailed, postage pre-paid, on the d nd..... day of April,2013 to: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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/ FiLED--~~/~ _fJJ_3 __ AT 
BY /~~ •~OFINO. ll•ArlO 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNY OF CLEARWATER 
) 
IN THE MATTER OF: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE ) 
M.CORNELL. ) 
Notice of Appeal was filed March 26, 2013. 
A transcript of proceedings is not necessary. 
CASE NO. CV 2012-277 
ORDER FOR BRIEFING 
Margaret Watkins shall submit a brief in support of her appeal no later than May 13, 
2013. 
All other interested parties shall file any responsive briefs no later than 28 days after 
service of Ms. Watkins' brief. 
Ms. Watkins shall file any reply brief no later than 21 days after service of any 
responsive briefs. 
Failure to comply with this briefing schedule by the appellant may result in the dismissal 
of the appeal. 
So ORDERED this 4th day of April, 2013. /0=~<?/r Michael J. Gffin 
District Judge 
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Darrel Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
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Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorney for John Henry Cornell 
Cfcarv~ ,' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
STIPULATION RESCHEDULING 
HEARING 
COME NOW the parties to the above-referenced case, by and through their respective 
counsel of record, and hereby stipulate and agree that the hearing currently scheduled for April 
10, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. on the Personal Represcntati ve' s Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney 
Fees is rescheduled to Wednesday, April 17, 2013 at 9:30 a.m. telcphonically. Counsel for each 
party should cal I (208) 4 76-8998 to connect with the Judge and attend the hearing. lf counsel 
intends to attend in person, the hearing will be heard in the courtroom at the Clearwater County 
Courthouse, Orofino, Ida~ 
DATED this _J__ day of April, 2013. 
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
By~ a,y,J J. ~ 
' Darrel W. Aherin 
Attorney for Margaret Watkins 
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(208J 7'46-2231 
To:7452231 
Apr OS 13 09:31a Creason, Moore, & Dokken 
A~R~08-~13 17:23 From:AHERIN RICE AHEGON 2087463650 
DA TED this {vi:} day of April, 20 l l 
DATED this __ day of April, 2013. 
STIPULATION RESCHEDULING HEARING -- 2 
JIJ:\C!Offl~IJ_ Joh~\fl'l~edinp\S1i.,ul,,r;(H1 l11!~..C:"'i!.Jt.dl11,S Plr:wir1t:,,rJvi,:;• ~i;y 
elf N, MOOR£, DOKKEN & GEIDL 
~J'tkt~ua_ 
Theodo~ 0. Cn:.mm. Attomey for 
Personal Repreunt11ti v¢ 
JONES, HKOWER & CALLERY 
By~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Karin Seubert, A Horney for 
Tun.i C. JohJ'!Sol') 
p.3 
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DATED this-~ day of April, 201l. 
DATED this '{ da)' Qf April, 2013. 
STIPULATION 'fl."£SCHEDUL1NG HEARJNG - 2 
N:\O:lmell, Jllhn\Pl~adi,..g,\."irip11h1tir.il't ReKl'4duH11s Mevin11.~ m 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & Of:l'DL 
BY-------------Theodore O. Crea.son, Attorney for 
Personal Representative 
JONES, BROWM. & CALLERY 
s,l:~~ 
Karin Seubert, Attorney for 
Toni C. Johnson 
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JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Karin Seubert (ISB No. 7813) 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-3591 
~v:)..o,c9.·JT7 
Al 1R 1 6 2013 
Attorneys for Respondent, TONI C. JOHNSON 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
CASE NO. CV 2012-00277 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
I, KARIN SEUBERT, attorney for Respondent Toni Johnson, pursuant to I.R.C.P., Rule 
33(a)(5), certify that on the 15th day of April, 2013, the original and one copy (without attachments) of 
Respondent's Answers to Kareen Cornell's First Set of Interrogatories and First Set of Requests for 
Production and Requests for Admission were hand-delivered to Theodore 0. Creason, Creason, Moore, 
Dokken & Geidl, 1219 Idaho Street, Lewiston, ID 83501 -and- one copy ( with attachments) was hand-
delivered to Darrel W. Aherin, Aherin, Rice & Anegon, 1212 Idaho Street, Lewiston, ID 83501. 
DATED this 15th day of April, 2013. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
(QutA- &ui}eck 
Karin Seubert 
NOTICE OF SERVICE -1-
ti . Ljtf 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that true and correct 
copies of the foregoing NOTICE OF SERVICE 
were this Ir-day of April, 2013, hand-delivered 
to: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore O. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
1219 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By 
NOTICE OF SERVICE -2-
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Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston; ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
2087469553 T-465 P0002/0018 F-360 
MAY 07 2013 
Clerk Dist. C urt 
-- Clearwater County, Idaho t\-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO~ IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
) 
Case No. CV 2012~00277 
AlVIENDEDNOTICEOFHEARlNG 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through 
her attorney of record, Karin Seubert of Jones. Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. will call up for 
hearing her Motion to Dismiss dated March 1, 2013 at the hour of 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday, June 4, 
2013, before the Honorable Magistrate of the above Court. 
DATEDthis 7 dayofMay,2013. 
JONES, BROWER& CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
By t~~ 
Karin Seubert 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
co1Tect copy of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE 
OF HEARJNG was, this_:]_ day of May, 2013, 
to: 
hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
Dauel W. Aherin 
Aberin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C. 
1219 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By~~ 
Karin Seubert 
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING -2-
T-465 P0003/0018 F-360 
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JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
2087469553 T-465 P0004/0018 F-360 
MAY O 7 2013 
Clerk Dist. C urt 
Clearwater Count , Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tiffi SECOND JUDICIAL D1STR1CT OF THE 
STAIB OF IDAHO, IN" A,1'-.1:D FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
TIIB REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. } 
CORNELL. ) 
) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
MEMORANDITh'I OF LA ,v IN 
SUPPORT OF SECOND MOTION 
TO DIS.MISS 
Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attomey of record, Karin Seubert of Jones, 
Brower and Callery; P.L.L.C-, hereby submi.ts this Memorandum of Law in support ofRe&TJOnde.nfs 
Motion to Dismiss dated March 1, 2013. Said Motion is set for hearing on June 4, 2013. 
I. FACTS MID PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Background 
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell established the Revocable Family Trust of 
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell on November 1, 1996. Petition for Supervised 
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution of Trust at ,r,I 3.1, 3.4, Exh. A (said Exhibit 
hereinafter referred to as ' 1Trust"). Through said Trust, :t\.1r. and Mrs. Cornell named thefr two 
children, Toni C. Johnson aud John H. Cornell, as the beneficiaries of the trust upon Mr. and 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW -1-
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1.frs. Cornell's deaths. Id. at § 4.03 of Exh. A. O:n August 6. 2009, Michael S. Cornell as 
surviving gran:tor and trustee named Toni C. Johnson as sole trustee/successor trustee. Id_ at 
Exh.B . 
. Arlie M. Cornell died on November 9, 2008 and Michael S. Co.mell died on December 
15, 2009. Id. at W 3.4, 3.6. 
Litigation r:onr:erning r:nmell Revor.ahle Living Trust 
On July 11, 2012, John H. Cornell filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and 
Removal ofTrnstee, which originally initiated this proceeding. [d_ at 1f1j 2.3, 3.9. 
John H. Cornell died on or around August 20; 2011 leaving no issue. Id. at if 3.10. 
Respondent Toni C. Johnson filed a .Afation to Dismiss on September 17, 2012 seeking to 
dismiss the Petition for Supef'Vised Administration and Removal of Trostee on the basis that the 
claims of John H. Cornell were extinguished by his death. 
Briefing in support of and in opposition to dismissal was submitted by lv:t:s. Seubert for 
Respondent and 1'Ir. .A.herin for John Henry Cornell (and presumably for Margaret Watkins who 
as of November 15, 2012 served as temporary personal representative of the Estate of John 
Henry Cornell). Memorandum of Law filed November 1, 2012; Response to Respondent·'s 
Motion to Dismiss filed November 15, 2012; Respondent's Rt.ply Brief in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss filed November 20, 2012. Said Motion was first called for hearing on November 27, 
2012, at which time it was continued to allow participation by Kareen Cornell. 
Said Motion was called for hearing for a second time on January 8, 2013, at which time 
Ms. Seubert on behalf of the Respondent and Mr. Aherin on behalf of John Henry Cornell ( and 
presuniably Margaret Watkins who at that tinte served as temporary personal representative of 
the Estate of John Henry Comell) presented oral argument. Mr. Creason did not partic.ipate at 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW -2-
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that hearing on Kareen Cornell's behalf due to what was later <liscovered to be a 
misunderstanding. 
Subsequent briefing in support of and in opposition to dismissal was submitted by Ms. 
Seubert for Respondent and Mr. Creason for ¥..areen Cornell. .A1emorandum re: Respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss filed January 18, 2013; Respondent's Brief in Reply to Brief of Surviving 
Spouse filed February 4, 2013. 
Said Motion. was called for hearing for a third time on February 6, 2013, at which Ms. 
Seubert for Respondent; Mr. Aherin for John Henry Cornell (and at that time Margaret Watkins 
as temporary personal representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell), and Jvf...r. Creason for 
Kareen Cornell presented oral argument. 
After considering the above-referenced briefing and oral argument presented, this Court 
issued an oral ruling in open court on Februaiy 12, 2013 dismissing the Petition for Superv·ised 
Administration and Removal of Trustee and granted the Estate twenty days in which to raise any 
claims of the Estate. A vVritten opinion and judgment followed. Id. at ,r 3.11; Menwrandum 
Opinion and Judgment for Dismissal entered February 15, 2013. 
Margaret Watkins, as a self-identified "interested person," has filed an appeal of said 
Memorandum Opinion and Judgment for Dismissal, which remains pending before the District 
Court. 
On February 26, 2013, Kareen Cornell as then personal representi;itive of the Estate of 
John H. Com ell and as his surviving spouse, filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and 
Court Ordered Distribution. 
On March 4, 2013, Respondent filed a .A1otion to Dismiss. This :Memorandum of Law is 
submitted in support of said Motion to Dismiss. 
l'vIEMORANDUM OF LAW -3-
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Estate of John H Cornell, deceased 
John H. Cornell died on or around August 20, 2011 leaving no issue. Id. at if 3.10, 
Ou November 15, 2012, in the probate action concerning the Estate of John H. Cornell, 
deceased, Margaret Watkins was appointed as Tempora..1)' Personal Representative of the Estate 
of John H. Comeli, deceased. See Order of Appointment of Temporary Personal Representative, 
Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-00439. 
On February 12, 2013, in the probate action concerning the Estate of John R Cornell, 
deceased, Kareen Camell was appointed as personal representative of the Estate of John R 
Cornell, deceased, thereby tenriinating the prior temporary appointment of Margaret Watkins. 
See Order Appointing .Personal Representative, Letters of Testamentary~ Clearwater County 
Case No. CV 2012-00439. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Summary Judgment Standard 
The pa_rties and the Court have agreed in open court that Respondent's 1\.1otion to Dismiss 
shall be treated as a request for summary judgment on the expectation that the Estate of John H. 
Cornell, deceased, will submit information obtained through discovery in opposition to the 
Motion to Dismiss. 
Sun-unary judgment roust be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, 3I,1,d admissions on 
file. together with the affidavits; if any; show that there is no genuine issue as. to any materi.al 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a :matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The 
party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of proving an absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact. See Celotex, Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All facts and 
reasonable inferences will be considered in favor of the non-moving party. Summers v. 
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Cambridge Joint School Dist. No. 432,, 139 Idaho 953" 955,, 88 P.3d 772, 774 (2004). 
However, the non-moving pa:rt-y cannot "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that 
party's pleadings, but the party's response ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial/) Shere v. Pocatello Schoo Dist .No 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489-90. 148 P.3d 
1232, 1235-36 (citing I.R.C.P. S6(c)). As explained below, there are no genuine issues of 
material facts to preclude dismissal being granted in light of John H. Coroen • s death_ 
B. Respondent is entitled to dis»Jissal as a matter oflaw. 
As the brief summary above reflects; the procedux:al history of this trust dispute has been 
highly unusual resulting in th.e current stati.,1.s of a second lawsuit filed within the original 
proceeding and the first lawsuit subject to a pending appeal. As such, it does not lend itself to 
straightfo:r:ward analysis- It is Respondent's analysis that the now pending Petition is a 
continuation of the original proceeding~ rather than a new and sepBJ.-ate lawsuit. Based on this 
analysis, this Memorandum of Law will not address the doctrine of res judicata, which includes 
the two legal concepts of issue preclusion and claim :reclusion., because said c.oncepts require 
separate proceedings> which is not present here. See Berk.,hire Investments, L.L.C. v. Taylor, 
153 Idaho 73, 278 P.3d 943 (2012). To the extent that the Estate argues that its Petition should 
be viewed as a separate proceedi...'1g ·mthin this single case, Respondent reserves the right to 
respond more fully to any such arguments in her reply brief. 
Further, this Memorandum of Law addresses only the claims r3rised by the Estate of John 
H. Cornell, not any individual claims of Kareen Cornell as surviving spouse, because a review of 
the Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution finds no claim 
individual to Mrs. Cornell a..11.d distinct from her capacity of personal representative of the Estate 
of John H. Cornell aud heir of said Estate. 
lVIEMORAl\IDUM OF LAW 
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The Estate asserts causes of action for constructive trust (see ,r 4.5 of Petition for 
Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution of Trust); for breach of contract (see 
"i\4il 4.2 and 4.7 of Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution of 
Trust); for breach of fiduciary duty (see ,r 4.3 of Petition for Supervised Administration and . 
Court Ordered .Distribution of Trust); for conversion (see 1 4.4 of Petition for Supervised 
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution of Trust); and for unjust enrichment {see if 4.6 of 
Petition for Supervised Administration and Ct>urt Ordered Distribution of Trust). This 
Memorandum will first discuss the application of law of the case doctrine to this proceeding, and 
then each alleged action. 
1. The Memorandum Opinion is binding upon the Estate. subject to the outcome of the appeal. 
In its Memorandum Opinion entered February 15, 2010, this Court determined that the 
claims of breach of fiduciary duty and constnictive tri.ist that were filed by John H. Cornell 
during his lifetime and pursued by his attorney after his death were abated by his death under the 
common law., and are not within the scope of express limits of Idaho Code § 5-327(2). See 
Memorandum Opinion at 10 ("John's claims abate under comm.on law. The alleged WTongful 
acts of Toni are all breaches of fiduciary duties under state law that for purposes of abatement 
are in the nature of torts. In the absence of any state law supplanting the common law, John.'s 
claims are abated and must be dismissed.); at 13 ("The constructive trust argument is 
indistinguishable from John's arguments regardi.n.g Toni's breaches of fiduciary duties."); at 17 
("The damages John seeks - recovery of property wrongfully withheld from him - do not meet 
the definition of out of pocket expenses. Therefore, Idaho Code§ 5-327(2) does not overrule the 
common law abatement of John's causes of action."). 
This decision is binding upon the Estate, who is not entitled to a second bite at the 
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proverbial apple because Kareen Cornell, the surviving wife of John H. Cornell,. has succeeded 
!vfargaret V{atkins, the decedent's aunt, as personal representative. 
This Court specifically provided that "Kareen shall be given twenty days to substitute for 
John and present issues free of the pleadings filed by John's attorney during John's lifetime." 
Jvfemoranduin Opinion at 13. 
The litigation of the first Petition centered upon Respondent's alleged breach of fiduciary 
duty as trustee. See id. The only "newly'' pled fact contained within the second Petition for 
Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution o/Trust is that "on. or about January 
3, 2007, John Henry Com.ell deposited by quitclaim, separate propeli'J into the Trost in the fou:n 
of Lot 34, Lakeview First Addition, real property adjacent to real property owned by his parents, 
Michael S. and Arlie M. Cornell, into the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and 
Arlie M. Cornell." See Petition.for Supert1ised Administration and Court Orde7ed Distribution 
of Trust at ,i 3.8. This allegation is irrelevant to the causes of action pled or to the Motion to 
Dismiss. Furt.her, said act pre-dates llte Grantors' deaths and Respondent's authority as trustee 
and no relation has been shovm to how it relates to the alleged misconduct of Respondent since 
the death of Michael Cornell. 
Absent said A1emorandum Opinion being overturned on appeal, t.1.e Estate is precluded 
from re-litigating the issues previously addressed by this Court uuder the law of the case 
doctri__ne. The Iclaho Supreme Court discm,sed the law of the case doctrine in a very recent 
decision stating as follows: 
This Court adheres to the °'law of the case" doctrine, which we have articulated as 
follows: 
The doctrine of "law of the case'; is well established i:n Idaho aud provides that 
upon an appeal. the Supreme Court in deciding a cas.e presented states in its 
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opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision; such pronouncement 
becomes the law of the c.ase and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent 
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal. The "law of the 
case;' doctrh'"l.e also prevents consideration on a subseq11ent appeal of alleged 
errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal. 
Park.vest Homes, L.L.C. v. Barns.on, I.S.C. No. 38919 (April 18, 2013) (quoting Swan.son v. 
Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973. 976 (2000); Taylor v. Maile; 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 
P.3d 12821 1286 (2009)). Further, "where the district court acts in an appellate capacity, and 
appeal to the Supreme Court is subsequently dismissed by stipulation, the rulings of the district 
court became the final rulings in the case, not subject to attack in this appeal, and which stated 
the law of the case that the w..agistrate - and even. this appellate court - must follow in this 
appeal." Swanson v. Swanson> 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P3d 973. 976 (2000) (quoting Wu.if! v. 
Peralta, 123 Idaho 567, 568, 850 P.2d 216, 217 (Ct.App. 1993). Further, to the extent a litigant 
fails to avail herself from appealing a trial court's rnlin.g, tb.e "law of the case'' doctrine precludes 
the litigant from re-opening the issue at a later time. Jd_ at 516-17, 5 P.3d at 978~ 79. 
Here. Margaret Watkins had filed an appeal of the Memora..11.dum Opinion. Said appeal 
remains pending before the District Court. No stay has been sought to preclude the presiding 
magistrate from ruling on the Motion to Dismiss now before the Court. Subject to the outcome 
of the appeal, the A1emorandum Opinion remains the law of the case and is binding upon the 
Estate under the ··1aw of the case" doctrfue. 
Respondent anticipates that it is the Estate's position t.h.at it is not bound by the Court's 
earlier ruling because neither the Estate nor Kareen Cornell were a party to said action. Said 
argument is flawed because all authority of the Estate, of Margaret Watkins acting previously as 
temporary personal representative, or of Kare.en Comell now acting as personal representative 
was derived from John H. Cornell. At all times since his death, the Estate of Jobn H. Cornell has 
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been the only legitimate pa_rty adverse to Respondent in this proceeding. 
Here, John H. Cornell filed an action for breach of fiduciary duty. Upon his death, the 
Estate of John H. Cornell becam.e the successor to John H. Cornell. Upon his death, his former 
attorney continued to defend the decedenes interest in this litigation aud opened a probate action 
through which Margaret Watkins was. initially appointed as temporary personal representative. 
The acts of Margaret Watkins as temporary personal representative relate back in. time to John. H. 
Cornell's date of death. See LC. § 15-3-701. A review of the Idaho Probate Code finds no 
reference to the tem1 "temporary personal representative/' The only reasonable reading and 
application of Title 15; Chapt& 3, Idaho Code is. that a "temporary personal representative," 
when acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons, possesses full authority to act on 
behalf of the estate within the authorized parameters of Idaho Code Section 15-3-715, and that 
any such acts taken in good faith are binding upon the Estate. Application of said principles'to 
this proceeding requires the confirmation of all actions taken by Margaret \Vatkins, including 
those of the decedent's attorney, now Ms. Watkins' attorney, as binding upon the Estate of John 
H. Cornell, deceased. This includes such acts being binding upon the Estate and its current 
personal representative Kareen Cornell. 
For these reasons, any effort by Kfu"'een Cornell acting as personal representative or of the 
Estate generally to claim that they were not parties to the earlier action are misplaced and should 
be disregarded by the Cou1t. The law does not provide for a second bite at the proverbial apple. 
Instead, the Court's consideration of the Motion to Dismiss should center on whether the 
Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution of Trust raises facts or 
issnes of law not previously addressed by this Court that were not abated by the death of John H. 
Cornell. For the reasons discussed below, no such facts or issues have been raised and the 
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Motion to Dismiss should be granted. 
2. The facts alleg¢ in the subject Petition do not support a cause of action for constructive trust 
The Estate alleges that "[a]s a result of [Respondent]'s inequitable conduct, [Respondent] 
holds assets, personally in constructive trust, for the Estate and/or the Trust .... [RespondentYs 
actions constitute inequitable conduct giving rise to a constructive trust for all assets (a) obtained 
by [Respondent}, personally, through the inequitable conduct; or (b) diminished from another's 
interest by the [Respondent.]" Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered 
Distribution of Trust at ml 3.23 and 4.5. 
"A cot"l..structive trust arises where legal title to property has. been obtained through. actual 
fraud, misrepresentations, concealments. taking advantage of one's necessities, or under 
circumstances otherwise rendering it unconscionable for the holder of legal title to retain 
beneficial interest iu the property." Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 168, 722 P.2d 474,477 (1986) 
(citing Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 559, 167 P. 481 (1917)). A "constructive trust arises from 
the legal title holder's wrongful actions and not from any intent to create a trust" Snider v. 
Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 289 P.3d 43 (2012) (citing Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 599, 608, 167 
P. 481,483 (1917)). 
Here, the doctrine of constructive trust is inapplicable because there are no facts alleged 
that Respondent has obtained legal title to Trust property. Instead, it is undisputed that the 
Cornell Revocable Living Trust remains the title holder of the relevant real property situated in 
Clearwater County. not Respondent personally. As such, Mrs. Cornell's claim for constructive 
trust must be dismissed. 
Further; as discussed above, this Court has previously determined that the "constructive 
trust argument is indistinguishable from John's arguments regarding Toni's breaches of fiduciary 
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duties," which were abated by John H. Cornell's death. Said determination is binding upon the 
Estate subject to the outcome of the pending appeal. 
For these reasons and the reasons previously briefed and incorporated by reference 
herein, the Estate's .claim for c-onstructive trust should be dismissed subject to the outcome of the 
pending appeal. 
3. The Estate's claim of breach of contract is actually a breach of fiducianr claim, that abates. 
The Estate seeks damages for breach of contract, under a straight breach of contract 
theory and under a third party beneficiary theory. See Petition for Supervised Administration 
and Court Ordered Distribution at i,r 4.2 and 4.7. 
This Court has previously determined that ''the duties John asserts Toni breaches arise 
irrespective of contract. The duties are grounded in state law regardless of what the contract 
states. . . . The alleged wrongful acts of Toni are all breaches of fiduciary dutieS under state law 
that for purposes of abatement are in the nature of torts .... John makes no claim against Toni 
and the administration of the estate of their parents that survives his. death under the common law 
orunderldaho Code§ 5-327." Memorandum Opinion at 9, 10, 17. 
As discussed above, this detennination is binding upon the Estate subject to the outcome 
of the pending appeal. 
For these reasons and the reasons previously briefed and incorporated by reference 
herein, the Estate's claims for breach of contract were extinguished upon the death of John H. 
Comell and should be dismissed subject to the outcome of the pending appeal. 
4. The Estate's claim for breach of fiduciary duty is abated by Joh:n)s death. 
The Estate alleges that Respondent is liable for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. See 
Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution at 1f 4.3. 
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This Court has previously determined that such claims were extinguished by the death of 
John H. Cornell. See Memorandum Opinion at 17. Specifically, this Couit ruled that the 
damages John sought, and that the Estate now seeks - recovery of property wrongfully withheld 
from him - are outside the scope of Idaho Code§ 5-327 - thus are not recoverable after John's 
death. Id. As discussed above, this determination is binding upon the Estate subject to the 
outcome of the pending appeal. 
For these reasons and the reasons previously briefed and incorporated by reference 
herein, the Estate's claims for breach of :fiduciary duty were extinguished upon the death of John 
H. Cornell and should be dismissed subject to the outcome of the pending appeal. 
5. The Estate~s claim of conversion is abated by John's death. 
The Estate alleges that Respondent is liable for alleged conversion. See Petition for 
Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution at 1f 4.4. 
Under Idaho law, conversion is an intentional tort claim. See Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, 
Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 77,910 P.2d 744, 749 (1996). 
This Court has previously determined that all tort claim were extinguished by the death 
of John H. Cornell. See Memorandum Opinion at 17. Specifically, this Court ruled that the 
damages John sought, and that the Estate now seeks - recovery of propei:ty w-rongfully ,vithheld 
from him - are outside the scope of Idaho Code § 5-327 - thus are not recoverable after Job.n's 
death. Id. As discussed above. this determination is binding upon the Estate subject to the 
outcome of the pending appeal. 
For these reasons and the reasons previously briefed and incorporated by reference 
herein, the Estate's claim for conversion was extinguished upon the death of John H. Cornell and 
should be dismissed subject to the outcome of the pending appeal. 
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6. The Estate's claim of unjust emichment is a breach of fiduciarv duty claitR that abates. 
The Estate seeks damages under a theory of unjust enrichment. See Petition for 
Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution at ,i 4.6. 
"Unjust enrichment, as a fictional promise or obligation implied by law, allows recovery 
where the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff that would be inequitable for the 
defendant to retain without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit." Great Plains 
Equipment; Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 123 Idaho 754, 767; 979 P.2d 627, 640 (1999) 
(citing Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743. 518 P.2d 
1012, 1205 (1974). Unjust enrichment claims involve claims based on an implicit promise to 
pay. Id .• 979 P.2d at 640. 
The Courti s prior analysis of the alleged breach of contract claim is instructive: "the 
duties John asserts Toni breaches arise i1Tespective of contract. The duties are grounded in state 
law regardless of what the contract states. ·... The alleged wrongful acts of Toni are all breaches 
of fiduciary duties under state law that for purposes of abatement are in the nature of torts .... 
John makes no claim against Toni and the administration of the estate of their parents that 
survives his death under the comm.on law or under Idaho Code § 5-327.'' Memorandum Opinion 
at 9; 10, 17. 
The alleged breaches are for b;reacb of fidudazy duty. The Estate does not allege that 
John H. Cornell conveyed a benefit during his lifetime to Respondent that would support a 
recoverable claim under the theory of unjust enrichment. Instead, the Estate alleges that 
Respondent withheld benefits under the Trust from John H. Cornell, which supports a claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty, which is not recoverable after John H. Cornell's death. 
For these reasons and the reasons previously briefed and incorporated by reference 
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herein. the Est.ate• s claims for breach of contract were extinguished upon the death of John. H. 
Camell and should be dismissed subject to the outcome of the pending appeal. 
7. General creditor's claim must be supported by Idaho law. 
The Estate alleges that "as a result oflosses suffered from the [Respondent}1s inequitable 
conduct~ the Trust holds a creditor's claim against [Respondent]!' Petition for Supervised 
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution at ,r 3.20. 
The term "creditor's claim" is most commonly used in the context of a probate action. 
See generally Title 15, Ch. 3, Idaho Code. All creditor's claim must be recoverable under Idaho 
law to be valid. 
For the reasons discussed above; the various claims pursued by the Estate were abated by 
the death of John H. Cornell. See supra. The Petition for Supervised Administration and Court 
Ordered Distribution fails to allege any new issues or fact& to support a valid claim against 
Respondent or the Trost The wo:r:ds of the Court's earlier ruling remain applicable: the Estate 
"makes no claim against Toni and the administration of the estate of their parents that survives 
[John's] death under common law or under Idaho Code § 5-327. Under the terms of the trust, 
John's heirs have no claim against the estate as he left no surviving issue.'' Memorandum 
Opinion at 1 7. 
ID. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondent Toni Johnson respectfully requests that her Motio.n 
to Dismiss be granted and that the Court dismiss the Petition for Supervised Administration and 
Court Ordered Distribution with prejudice subject to the outcome of the pending appeal. 
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DATED this 7th day of May, 2013. 
JONES, BRO\VER & CALLERY) P.L.LC. 
By 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRJCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M .. 
CORNELL) 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
BRfEF TN SUPPORT OF APPEAL 
COMES NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Anegon, on behalf of Margaret 
Watkins, and provides this Brief in Support of Appeal. 
BACKGROUND 
This appeal is made by one of the beneficiaries of the trust, John Cornell. Margaret 
Watkin:;, John Cornell's aunt, was appointed Temporary Personal Representative and presented 
John Cornell's claim. After submitting his claim as a beneficiary of the trust, John Cornell died 
on August 20, 2012 (committed suicide) while residing with his aunt, Margaret Watkins. 
John Cornell and Toni Johnson are the children of Michael S . Cornell and Arlie M. 
Comell. Michael and Arlie Cornell created a family trust. The beneficiaries of the trust) after 
the deaths of the parents, were John Cornell and Toni Johnson. On December 1 S, 2009, Michael 
Cornell died. Arlie Cornell died on November 9, 2008. Margaret Watkins and Arlie Cornell 
were sisters. 
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Toni Johnson was nominated as the sole alternate trustee at the death of Michael Cornell 
on August 6, 2009, by an improper change made to the trust after Arlie Cornell died. 
The trust provides "On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and 
the Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal remaining 
in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the following beneficiaries: Toni C. 
Johnson and John H. Cornell." Memorandum Opinion, p. 2; Trust§ 4.03. 
There is no factual dispute that Toni Johnson has intentionally not divided the trust assets 
since Toni Johnson and John Cornell's father, Michael Cornell, died on December 15, 2009, as 
required by the trust. The trust dearly says "On the death of the surviving Trustor [Michael 
Camell], the Trust shall terminate . __ ,, 
In the Memorandum Opinion filed February 15, 2013, on page 3, Judge Robinson stated: 
In the nearly two (2) years from the last trustor's death through John's death, Toni 
failed to distribute any part of the trust to John even while she lived rent free in 
the home that is included in the trust and apparently paid an her living expenses 
from trust funds. Toni has not distributed any of the fonds from the trust other 
than for her own use. 
Memorandum Opinion, p. 3. 
Judge Robinson's factual statement makes it clear that Toni Johnson breached the 
contract. Judge Robinson has mistakenly applied the wrong legal standard to the current facts. 
Looking at page 9 of the Memorandum Opinion will illustrate Judge Robinson is wrong that this 
case is decided on"- .. state law regardless of what the contract states." The language of the 
contract controls, not state law. The language in the contract said the trust terminated on 
Michael Cornell's death and as soon as reasonably possible, distribution of the assets in two 
equal shares was to be made. Had the contract said the trust continued at the discretion of the 
trustee, Toni Johnson, and said the trustee had the right to decide when assets were distributed, 
John Cornell would have had no breach of contract claim. The duties of the trustee are not 
grounded in state law regardless of what the contract states. The requirements of what the 
trustee was required to do in this case is controlled by the contract. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
This case involves a trust. The written agreement - contract - made it very clear, " ... the 
Trust shall terminate and the Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income 
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and principal remaining jn the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the 
following beneficiaries: Toni C. Johnson and Jolm H. Cornell." Trust§ 4.03. 
The case involved a breach of contract. The contract was breached by Toni Johnson. 
The Court ruled the case sounded in tort so the claim abated. The citation on page 5 in 
the Memorandum Opinion refers to a quote saying" ... those sounding in 12ure tort abate" 
(emphasis added). The Court did not follow the law because this case does not sound in pure 
tort. 
Judge Robinson discussed both statutory law and the common law. It appears the 
comparison between Bfahop v. Owens, 152 ldaho 616,272 P_ 3d 1247 (2012) and this case was 
relied upon. The use of the cited case was misplaced. In Bishop a contract was signed between 
plaintiff and defendant. The defendant was providing legal services. The Idaho Supreme Court 
held the standards for performance were the same in the contract as the defendant's professional 
standards so the case was deemed a tort case. The trust created by contract in this case had very 
specific terms that are not found in any Idaho law. The terms are specific to the contract. John 
Cornell alleged these specific contract requirements were breached. The tort damages claimed in 
Bishop were claims for malpractice. The contract damages sought by John Cornell were the 
specific contract amounts that were his under the written terms of the contract. lf the rule of law 
for tort damages is applied to this case, the contract amounts that belonged to John Cornell will 
go to the person who intentionally did not timely disburse the assets lo John Cornell and if 
abatment is applied the person who breached the contract will get money that was not hers_ 
Application of common law to this case was misplaced by Judge Robinson because this case is 
not a pure tort case. The contract is what provides the specific division of the trust property. 
The contract requirements were not followed so it is a breach of contract, NOT a pure tort claim. 
The case is a contract case. A written trust that had specific contractual requirements is a 
contract. The contract was breached. This is not a pure tort case. The contract/trust was 
intentionally breached, and the Court's ruling rewards Toni Johnson for intentional breach of the 
contract. The Court confirmed these facts as set out above. The Court mixed the duties under 
Idaho statutes for a probate and trust and improperly held the claim of John Cornell abated upon 
his death because the case was a pure tort case. Claims arising out of a contract generally 
survive the death of the claimant. 
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From a review of the Memorandum Opinion, Judge Robinson has concluded Idaho law 
has evolved to a point where a breach of contract/trust is a tort and the claimant's claim abates if 
the claimant dies. Where is equity? Judge Robinson's Opinion says a Court is not to consider 
equity and fairness. Judge Robinson says if the damaged party dies, the breach of contract claim 
becomes a pure tort claim because of the fiduciary duty of the trustee and abates, and the 
perpetrator of the breach of the contract is rewarded because the perpetrator had some fiduciary 
duties. This case is not a "pure tort case." The case law involving claims for personal injury do 
not apply to this case. Cases involving legal malpractice are founded in tort. A fee agreement 
may be involved in a legal malpractice ca..<;e, but the legal duties of a lawyer are based on the 
standards applied by law to the lawyer. The trust/contract is not a fee agreement in this case. 
The trust had contractual provisions unique to that contract. The specific contract provisions 
were breached. That is a breach of contract, not a tort. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Magislmte Court should be reversed. John Cornell's claim for breach 
of contract did not abate on his death. The party breaching the contract cannot be rewarded for 
intentionally breaching the contract. The contract language determined what was to be done. To 
hold otherwise violates Idaho law. 
DATED this 13th day of May, 2013. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TliE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF JDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
ln the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMlLY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) MOTTON FOR ORDER SHORTENING 
) TIME FOR HEARING 
) 
) 
--- -------- ---- -- ) 
COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, Petitioner in this matter and Personal Representative of 
the Estate of John Henry Cornell, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Theodore 0. Creason of 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, and hereby moves this Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3), for an order shortening the time for a hearing on the Motion for Stay 
and to set a hearing to be held on the motion frn· Friday, May 17, 2013 at 2:30 p.m., to be 
conducted by teleph(me conference initiated by movant's counsel. Movant has filed a Petition 
11nder Tdaho's Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (ldaho Code §§ 15-8-101 et s<tq.) in 
'--/0 1 , !J,, [. ,< I 
un• I. ~_l_r _, J!JJ_ 
district court seeking consolidation of this matter with Case No. CV 2012-439 (Jn rhe Maller <<f 
the Estate l~l John 1 leniy Cornell) and the appeal of Margaret Watkins in this case, cunently 
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pending before the district cou1i. This request is made on the grounds that responsive bticfing to 
the Trustee's motion to dismiss is due on or before May 21, 2013. Pursuit of such briefing will 
cause unnecessary increase in expense of litigation should the district court assume jurisdiction 
of the case p11rs11;mt to the TEDRA petition. 
Counsel for the Trustee has stipulated to shortening the time for the hearing. C()unsel for 
all parties arc available for a telephone conforence on Friday, May 17, 2013 at 2:30 p.111. 
DATED thi~ 1511, day of May, 2013. 
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COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, Petitioner in this matter and Personal Representative of 
the Estate of John Hcmy Cornell, by and through her attorney of record, Theodore 0. Creason of 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, and hereby moves this Court for an Order ::itnying this 
proceeding. Movant has filed a Petition under Idaho ' s Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act 
(Idaho Code §§ 15-8-101 et seq.) in district court seeking consolidalion of this matter with Case 
No. CV 20 l 2-439 (In the Matter q{t.he t'srate <~{John Hemy Cornell) and the appeal of Margaret 
Watkii1s in this case, cunently pending before the cfo,tJict court. Movant. requests this C()urt stay 
this proceeding until such time as the district court either assumes jurisdiction over the case 
under the TEDRA petition or denies the petition for consolidation. 
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DA TED this 15th day of May, 2013. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GElDL, PLLC 
Theodore 0. Creason, lSB #1563 Attorneys for Personal Representative 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I 5rn day of May, 2013, 1 filed the foregoing MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDING with the Clerk of the Court, and hand-delivered a paper copy to the following persons: 
Kari11 Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P. LL.C. 1304 Ida.ho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 8350 l 
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JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
2087469553 T-483 P0002/0022 F-403 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE SECOND JUDICIAL DIS1RICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNEl.J..,. ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO 
STAY PROCEEDINGS 
CO~S NOW Respondent Toni Johnson. by and through her attorney of record, Karin 
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., and objects to the Motion to Stay Proceedings 
dated May 15, 2013 and filed by Petitioner Kareen Cornell, Personal Representative of the Estate of 
John H. Cornell, deceased. Said Motion to Stay Proceedings is set for hearing on Friday, May 17, 
2013 at 2:30 p.m. 
Movant Kareen Cornell states the basis of her Motion as follows: 
Movant has filed a Petition under Idaho's Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (Idaho Code§§ 15-8-101 et seq. in district court seeking consolidation of this matter 
with Case No. CV 2012-439 (In the Matter of the Estate of John Henry Cornell) and 
the appeal of Margaret Watkins in this case, currently pending before the district 
court. Movant :requests this Court stay this proceeding until such time as the district 
court either assumes jurisdiction over the case under the TEDRA petition or denies 
the petition for consolidation. 
Motion to Stay Proceedings at 1. For the Court's convenience, a copy of the referenced "new" 
Petition is attached hereto as Exhibit A ( exhibits A and B are omitted in the interest of judicial 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
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economy as they are identical to Exhibits A and B to the Petition filed by Kareen Cornell on 
February 26, 2013 and already on file in this proceeding). 
Movant' s request is puzzling as her Petition filed in this action filed on February 26, 2013 is 
also brought under the Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act, Idaho Code§§ 15-15-8-101 
through 15-8-305. See Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution 
filed Febmary 26, 2013 at 'J[ 2.1. Further, a review .of the two Petitions filed by Mrs. Cornell reflects 
that they are nearly identical through paragraphs 3.8 and 3.10 respectively (the paragraph 
referencing the death of John Cornell on August 20, 2012). Tue Petition in the ''new" district court 
TEDRA action proceeds from that point to set forth the procedural history of this case and the 
probate of John H. Cornell, deceased (Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-439). Toe Petition 
previously filed by Mrs. Cornell in this action proceed from that point to set forth her allegations of 
Respondent's misconduct in the administration of the Revocable Family Trust of :Michael S. 
Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell and also sets forth the procedural history of this case through the date 
of said Petition. The "new" TEDRA action appears at this juncture to be a clear violation of the 
doctrine of claim preclusion, which protects litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same 
party or its privy. See Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. #401; 147 Idaho 277, 288, 207 
P.3d 1008, 1019 (2009) (citing Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613,617 
(2007). 
Further, Mrs. Cornell's "new" IBDRA action seeks the consolidation of this action with the 
probate action into the "new" TEDRA action. Respondent is aware of no good :reason to further 
complicate this matter by what she considers to be a fourth action (the first being the action 
originally filed by John Cornell during his lifetime and now on appeal to district court; the second 
being the probate of John Cornell's estate; the third being the Petition filed by Mrs. Cornell in this 
action on February 26, 2013 and the subject of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss that is set for 
heming on June 4, 2013; and the fourth being the "new" TEDRA action). Even jf the judicial 
economy alone were good cause for some degree of consolidatio~ Mrs. Cornell has not withdrawn 
her Motion for Consolidation filed in this action on February 26, 2013, which seeks the 
consolidation of this action with the probate action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 42(a) on the gr01.mds that 
"consolidation would expedite the Court's business and further the interests of the litigants." 
Motion for Consolidation at 1 (citing Branom v. Smith Frozen Foods of Idaho, Inc., 83 Idaho 502, 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
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509, 365 P.d 985, 961 (1961)). Mrs. Cornell has never set said Motion for Consolidation for 
hearing or otherwise pursued it, and her Motion to Stay Proceedings gives no good cause why she 
now instead seeks to consolidate this action into the "new'' TEDRA case and why the district court 
should now assmne jurisdiction where the Honorable Randall W. Robinson of the magistrate's 
division has already presided over this matter, and the probate of John H. Cornell, deceased, for 
many months, has issued multiple substantive opinions, and is familiar with the case. 
Respondent is opposed to the consolidation of this Trust action into a probate action, or 
both into the "new'' 1EDRA action, except for the limited purpose of resolving common questions 
of law or fact, such as the essential question now pending before this Court through Respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss set for hearing on June 4, 2013: do the claims of John Cornell or his Estate 
related to the admm.istration of the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. 
Cornell survive his death'? This Court has already addresses that question once through its 
Memorandum Opinion and Judgment for Dismissal entered on February 15, 2013. This Court 
expressly gave Mrs. Comell 20 days from its February 2012 decision to file a Petition asserting any 
additional claims, which it has done. No good cause has been shown why this proceeding should 
be stayed due to her filing of a duplicative lawsuit in district court. 
Mrs. Cornell's Motion to Stay Proceedings did not reference what authority her request 
relies upon,. so Respondent can only make the following assumptions as to he.r true intent: 
If Mrs. Cornell's true intent was to consolidate matters, then the proper remedy would have 
been to pursue her previously filed Motion for Consolidation pursuant to I.R.C.P. 42(a). No good 
cause for consolidation has been shown, however, because this proceeding concerns administration 
of the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell, and specifically whether 
John Cornell's death e~tinguishes any potential claim he or his Estate may have related to said 
Trust. In comparison, the probate action concerning the Estate of John Cornell concerns the 
determiuation of whether the will on file with the Court is valid; the determination of his heirs and 
creditors, inventory of his estate (which would include any interest that his Estate :rnay have in the 
above Trust, but also any other assets or encumbrances of the Estate), and distribution of said assets 
accordingly. The only potential common question of law or fact is whether the Estate has any valid 
(meaning not extinguished by Mr. Cornell's death) claim in the Trust, which is the subject of the 
June 4, 2013 hearing. In detennining whether consolidation is appropriate, it is important to note 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
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that I.R.C.P. 42(a) specifically authorizes the court to make such orders concerning proceedings as 
"may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." A stay in this proceeding would not avoid delay, 
instead it would compound the l9ug sought resolution of this matter. Further, while the timing of 
the Motion to Stay Proceedings is such that, if granted, Mrs. Cornell would avoid the cost of 
preparing her response brief to the pending Motion to Dismiss, which is due on May 21. 2013. 
However, the Court should also consider the unnecessary costs to Respondent: Respondent has now 
borne the cost of active and continuous litigation over the issue of whether her brother's clai.ms 
survive his death since August 2012. She has previously presented to the Court a Memorandum of 
Costs and Attorney Fees indicating that her costs and attorney fees related to the "first" action alone 
totaled $6?_488.50 as of March 1, 2013. She has additionally borne the cost of participating in the 
., 
probate 'action, pursuing a Motion to Dismiss concerning Mrs. Cornell's Petition in this action 
(including preparation of tbe supportive brief filed on May 7, 2013), :responding to formal discovery 
and appearing for her deposition, and defending the appeal filed by Margaret Watkins despite 
Margaret Watkins's appointment as temporary personal representative having been terminated 
before the decision under appeal had been issued. LR.C.P. l(a) establishes that the civil rules are to 
"be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of evecy action and 
proceeding." For these reasons, if Mrs. Cornell's true intent with her Motion to Stay Proceedings 
and .. new" TEDRA action were to consolidate matters, the resultant delay and procedural 
complication is contrary to the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of this proceeding, and 
should be denied. 
If lVfrs. Cornell's true intent was to make additional allegations that were not included. in her 
first Petition, then the proper remedy would have been to seek leave of this Court to amend her 
Petition pursuant to l.R.C.P. 15(a). However, because the "new" 1EDRA petition merely restates 
the procedural history of this case and the probate case, :no good cause for amendment or for further 
delay to allow amendment has been sho~ particularly where this Court has allowed discovery to 
proceed over Respondent's objections; which discovery has since included responses to 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents, and Respondent's deposition. 
If Mrs. Com.ell's true intent was to transfer this matter from the magistrate division of 
district cou.rt to district court, then the property remedy would have been to request a transfer 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 8(a)(2). However, it is well settled under Idaho law that "proceedings in the 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
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probate of wills and administration of estates of decedents. minors and incompetents" be assigned 
to magistrate court. LC. § 1-2208. The probate of John H. Cornell, deceased (Clearwater County 
Case No. CV 2012-439) clearly falls within these categories. The only reasonable conclusion that 
can be drawn from a review of the Tmst and Estate Dispute and Resolution Act, which grants the 
power and authority to administer and settle "(a) all matters concerning the estates and assets of 
incapacitated, missing, and deceased persons, includmg matters involving nonprobate assets and 
powers of attorney, .in accordance with this chapter; and (b) all trusts and trust mattersLr is that 
actions brought under TEDRA also fall within the "administration of estates" tha.t are categorically 
assigned to the ma.gistrate;s division. For these reasons, no good ca.use for transfer of this 
proceeding to district court has been shown. 
If Mrs. Cornell's true intent was to seek a stay pursuant to LR.C.P. 83(i) due to the pending 
appeal filed and pursued by Margaret Watkins; it would be :inappropriate to grant such a stay to 
:Mrs. Cornell where she did not file a cross appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(g) within the time 
allowed to either join in or supplement Margaret Watkins' appeal. Because Mrs. Cornell, as 
personal representative, took no such action during the .time allowed, no good cause has been 
shown why this Court should not proceed to determine whether to dismiss Mrs. Comell's Petition 
filed February 26, 2013. The clear language of this Court in its Judgment for Dismissal was that 
''Kareen Cornell, the personal representative for John Cornell's estate shall be given twenty days to 
set forth in the above entitled action the claims of the estate[,] in its corresponding Memorandum 
Order that .. Kareen shall be given twenty days to substitute for John and present issues free of the 
pleadings filed by John's attorney during John's lifetime." The only reasonable reading of said 
statements is that ::Mrs. Cornell was granted express authority to present issues not addressed by the 
Court in said ruling. For the reasons discussed in further detail in Respondent's Memorandum of 
Law in Suppon of Second Motion to Dismiss, Mrs. Cornell has failed to present a claim that does 
not fall within the Court's earlier ruling and survives the death of John H. Cornell. Jf :Mrs. Cornell 
disputes this, then she has the opportunity to submit briefing in opposition to the pending Motion to 
Dismiss on or before May 21, 2013. 
If Mrs. Cornell's true intent was to relitigate the issues previously determined through this 
Court's Memorandum Opinion and Judgment for Dismissal, then the appropriate remedy would 
have been for Mrs. Cornell, as personal representative, to file a notice of appeal or notice of cross 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
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appeal under I.R.C.P. 83 within the time allowed. The relevant time period, which is jurisdictional, 
has now ·expired and the record reflects Mrs. Cornell has elected not to file an appeal. Mrs. Cornell 
and the Estate can certainly participate in the appeal filed by Margaret Watkins, but will also be 
bound by the decision of the district court, just as it is cunently bound by the prior decision of this 
court pending the outcome of said appeal. It is Respondent's position, as will be further elaborated 
upon in Respondent's response brief in the appeal, that this Courf s decision should be affirmed as 
being supported by Idaho law, and also because appellant Margaret Watkins lacks standing to 
appeal the Judgment for Dismissal. It is the district court's role to consider the appeal. That does 
not deprive this Court from authority to determine whether Mrs. Cornell's opinion of February 26, 
2013 should be dismissed or not. 
For these reasons, Respondent Toni Johnson respectfully requests that this Court deny :Mrs. 
Cornell's Motion to Stay Proceedings. 
DATED this 17th day of May, 2013. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
By 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO 
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS was, this 
17th day of May, 2013, transmitted via facsimile 
to: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore O. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
1219 Idaho St. 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
6i ·. (ili.utL ~ 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 
~6-
~~ Karin Seubert 
Atto;mey for Respondent 
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183 
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CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
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Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE ESTATE OF JOHN H. CORNELL, 
and 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 




) Case No. CV 
) 
) AlvffiNDED :PETITION 
) · FOR CONSOLIDATION AND 
) ADiv.QNISIRATION OFTHEESTAIB OF 
) JOHN" H. CORNELL AND THE 
) REVOCABLE FA.MIL X 1RUST OF 




) LC.§§ 15~8-101 through 15-8-305 
COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, in her capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate 
of J obn H. Cornell (hereinafter "Petitioner") by and through b.er attor:ney of record, Theodore O. 
Creason of Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl) PLLC, and hereby alleges as follows: 
I. PARTIES 
1.1. Petitioner is the personal representative of the Estate of John H. Cornell and 
surviving spouse of John Henry Cornell and a resident of Minidoka County, Idaho. 
TEDRAPETITION- 1 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & ~r;ll, l'LLC 
1;'.0. Drll.wer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-:2231 
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1.2. The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell 
(hereafter ''the Trust") was formed and has been administered in the State of Idaho; an action. 
regarding the proper administration of the Trust is before the magistrate division of the District 
Court of Clearwater County, Case No. CV 2012-277 (hereinafter, "the Trust Case"). 
1.3. A Petition for Formal Probate of the Estate of John H. Cornell (hereafter "'the 
Estate") is before the magistrate division of the District Court of Clearwater County; Case No. 
CV 2012-439 (hereinafter, "the Estate Case"). 
II. JURISDICTION 
2.1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter and the parties thereto pursuant to the 
Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act, Idaho Code §§ 15-8-101 through 15-8-305. 
2.2. This Court is the proper venue for administration of the Estate pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 15-3-201. 
2.3. This Court is the proper venue for administration of the Trust pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 15-7-202. 
III. FACTS 
3.1. Michael S. Cornell and Adie M. Cornell created the Trust on November 1; 1996, 
a copy of the Trust document is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
3.2. John H. Cornell held an interest in the Trust upon the death of Michael S. Cornell 
and Arlie M. Cornell. 
3.3. John H. Cornell his sole and separate real property into the Trost in the fonn of 
Quit Claim Deed on or about January 3, 2007. 
3.4. Arlie M. Cornell died on November 9, 2008. 
TEDRA PETITION - 2 
Crci1$(1.1)1 Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PtLC 
l>.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 8:3501 
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3.5. On August 6, 2009, Michael S. Cornell amended the terms of the Trust from 
ha-v-ing Joho H. Cornell and Toni C. Cornell serve as co-trustees of the Trust upon his death, to 
designating Toni C. Camell as the sole trustee upon his death, a copy of the amendment is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
3.6. Michael S. Cornell died on December 15, 2009. 
3.7. John Henry Cornell instituted the Trust Case on July 11, 2012 by filing a. Petition 
for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee. 
3.8. John Henry Cornell died on August 20, 2012. 
3.9. Petitioner is the surviving spouse of John Henry Cornell. 
3.10. Margaret Watkins, John Henry Cornell's aunt, instituted the Estate Case by filing 
a Petition for Formal Probate of the Estate on November 13, 2012. 
3 .11. In her petition, Watkins sought appointment as Personal Representative of the 
Estate. Watkins offered a document for probate she alleges is the will of John H. Cornell. 
Petitioner challenges the validity and authenticity of the document offered by Watkins. 
Petitioner alleges John H. Cornell died intestate. 
3.12. On September 17, 2012, Toni C. Johnson, in her capacity as trustee of the Trust, 
filed a motion to dismiss the Trust action on the grounds that because John Henry Cornell died 
before distribution of the Trust, the entirety of the TIU.St res vested in Toni C. JohnsoIL 
3.13. Petitioner filed an objection to the Watkins' petition on November 27, 2012, on 
the grounds that Petitioner held priority to serve as personal representative in formal testacy or 
administrator in intestacy. 
TEDRA. PETITION - 3 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, FlLC 
P.O. ;Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(20S) 743-1516; Fu: (208) 746-2231 
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3.14. On February 12, 2013, the magistrate court appointed Petitioner to serve as 
Personal Representative in the Estate Case. 
3.15. On February 15, 2013, the magistrate court issued a memorandum opinion 
dismissing John Comell;s claims in the Trust Case on the grounds that the causes of action did 
not survive his death. The court e:xpressly provided Petitioner twenty (20) days in which to file 
claims on behalf of the Estate in that case. 
3.16. Pursuant to the February 15 order, Petitioner filed a petition in the Trust Case on 
February 26, 2013. 
3.17. Watkins filed an appeal of the Court's February 15 Order on April 2, 2013. 
Watkins' appeal is currently pending before this Court. 
3.18. Cornell filed a motion to dismiss Petitioner's petition on May 7; 2013. · 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Wherefore,. Petitioner prays as follows: 
1. That the Court consolidate the Trust Case and the Estate Case mth this TEDRA 
action pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-3-202(3). 
2. That the Court remove Tooi C. Johnson as Trustee of'the Trust. 
3. Tbat the Court appoint Petitioner, in her capacity as Personal Representative of 
the Estate> as Trustee of the Trust. 
4. That the Court order the Trust be subject to supervised administration. 
5. That Petitioner be awarded reasonable attorneys fees for those fees personally 
incurred in pursuit of this action. 
TEDJ.U PETTI10N - 4 
Cr!:llSOn, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawtr
0
835, Lewiston, ID 3J50l 
(208) 743-1516; Fu:: (:208) 746'2231 
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6. That petitioner be awarded such other and further relief as the Court may deem 
just and equitable. 
DATED this 16th day of May, 2013. 
T:EDRA PE'fffiON ~ 5 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC. 
heodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & G~idJ, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, IO 83S0l 
(208) 74J-.1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of May, 2013, I filed the foregoing 
PETITION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND AD1\1INISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN 
H. CORNELL AND Tiffi RECOV ABLE F AlvfIL Y TRUST OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND 
ARLIE M. CORNELL with the Clerk of the Court, and provided a paper copy to the following 
persons: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
1212 Idaho Street 
P. 0. Drawer 698 
Levviston. ID 83501 
(via Valley Messenger) 
TEDRA l'ETITION - 6 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.LC. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box. 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(via Valley Messenger) 
Cm1so1,1, Mix,,c, DoJ<l<.i,n & Geidl, PLLG· · 
P.O. l'.l,a.wer 83S, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) _743-1516; Fu: (20S) 746<Z231 
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Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD 
COMES NOW Appellee Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney of record, Karin 
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., and moves this Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(q) and 
I.AR. 30, hereby moves this honorable Court for an order augmenting the clerk's record to add the 
following documents from the collateral matter In the Matter of the Estate of John H Cornell, 
deceased, Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-00439: 
l. Order of Appointment of Temporary Personal Representative entered November 15, 
2012 (certified copy attached hereto as Exhibit A); 
2. Order Appointing Personal Representative entered February 12, 2013 (certified copy 
attached hereto as Exhibit B); and 
3. Registry of Action as of May 7, 2013 (copy attached hereto as Exhibit C). 
The specific grounds for the request are that said documents are necessary in order to allow 
the District Court to be fully advised when detennining whether Appellant Margaret Watkins has 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD 
-1-
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standing to pursue her appeal. 
DATEDthis [] dayofMay,2013. 
JONES, BRO"\VER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
By----1"-'t~~-=---s.,.~~~-
K.arin Seubert 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY tbat a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD was, this fl day of May, 
2013, 
hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
./ by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
to: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore O. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C. 
1219 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By~~~ 
Karin Seubert 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD -2-
Attorney for Respondent 
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON · 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
. (208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
/ 
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IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND nJDICIAL DISTRJCT 
OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
IN TIIB MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
JOHN HENRY CORNELL, 
Deceased. -




.; ........ !,. 
Upon consideration of the Petition for Appointment of Temporary Personal 
Representative for the Estate of Jolm Henry Cornell, deceased, filed by Darrel W. Aherin, 
attorney for petitioner, Margaret Watkins, and the Court being fully apprised of the matter, the 
Court finds: 
L The petitioner, Margaret Watkins, is qu.a.Jified to be appointed temporary personal 
representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell; 
2. That venue is proper; 
3. That the best interest of the Estate of John Henry Cornell will be served by the 
appointment of Margaret Watkins as temporary personal representative; 
THEREFORE, Margaret Watkins is hereby appointed temporary personal representative 
of the Estate of John Henry Cornell ·pending the hearing on the Petition for Formal Probate of 
Will and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative~ or sixty (60) days, whichever occurs 
last. 
ORDER OF APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE -- 1 
N:\Comell, Es1'1~ of John 1-1\Ple~dings\Order of Temporary App-0intment.doex -ser 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
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DATED this i.{J, day ofNovember, 2012. 
STATE OF IDAl-10 
County of Ci,;,arwa·:sr 
I h,;ir,:;,by c.::-::1:iy ,h.:it ,he foregoing i5> a furl, true 
ar.d ¢')!i'ect c-)~y d fln instium2nt as the same 
now refr'.air:<a on file '3.nci cf raco,cl :n my office. Wm\1~ hand and official seal hereto 13: 
this~dayoLf\'") ~ A.D. 20 . CAR.FliE BIRO, CLERK OF HE DISTRICT COURT O AUOlTOR &; RECORDER 
By Dep • 
ORDER OF APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE -- 2 
N:\Cornell, Estate of John H\l'leadings\Ordet of Temporary Appointment.docx -ser 
u~~ 
JUDGE 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorrieys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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,.:., ,\1' 
Theodore 0. Creason/ISB #1563 -
Samuel T. Creason, ISB #8183 _ 
. CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL; PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P .0, Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
_Facsimile: (208) 746u223 l 
Attorney for Surviving Spouse 
Of Jolm Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TBE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDABO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
IN THE MA TIER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
JOHN HENRY CORNELL, 
Deceased. 
I, 
Case No. CV 2012-439 
· ORDER APPOINTMENTING 
·. PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
The petitioner Kareen Cornell for an adjudication of intestacy and determination 
of heirs having come before the Court, the Colllt makes the following findings: 
1. John Cornell died on August 20, 2012, at the age of 47 years. At the time 
of his death, the decedent was domicHed in Minidoka County, State of· 
Idaho. 
0:RDER APPOINTMENTI:NT 
PERSONAL REPRESENT A UVE ·~ 1 Creason, Moor~ Dokl..en & Geidl, PLLC 




05-17-' 13 10: 36 FROM-JB L, ,..; 2087469553 T-483 P0019/0022 F-403 
. ( 
2. No adjudication has been made of whether Decedent died intestate. No 
Will has been admitted to probate. 
3 The decedent was survived by the following persons: 
Kareen Cornell 
Address 
P. 0. Box361 
Heyburn, Idaho 83336 
Relationship 
Spouse 
4. · Movant' s Petition sets forth her priority as · surviving spouse to 
appointment as personal representative.of the Estate. 
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER REQUESTS that the Court issue an order 
appointing Kareen Cornell Personal Representative of the Estate of John Cornell and 
terminating the appointment of acting temporary personal representative, Margaret 
Watkins. 
DATED tbisZ·-Z. day of February, 2013. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ORDER APPOrnThIBNTrnT 
P'.ERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 2 Creason, Moore, Dokken & Qejdl, l'LLC 
P.O. Drawer S35, Lewiston ID 83501 
(208)743-1516; Fax(208)146-2231 
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Time: 11 :57 AM 
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. Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County 
ROA Report 
case: CV-2012-0000439 current Judge: Randall W. Robinson 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of John Henry Cornell Deceased 













































New Case Filed - Formal Estate Randall W. Robinson 
Filing: A5 - Petition for formal probate Paid by: Randall W. Robinson 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon Receipt number. 0003570 
Dated: 11/13/2012 Amount $96.00 (Cashiers 
Check) For: Watkins, Margaret (other party) 
Other party: Watkins, Margaret Appearance Randall W. Robinson 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Randall W. Robinson 
Appointment of Personal Representative (Idaho 
Code 15-3-402) 
Affidavit of Attesting Witness of Margaret Watkins Randall W. Robinson 
,. 
Affidavit of Attesting Witness of Lillian D Beckman Randall W. Robinson 
Acceptance Of Appointment - Margaret Watkins Randall W .. Robinson 
Petition for Appointment of Temporary Personal Randalt W. Robinson 
Representative 
}:\cceptance Of Appointment as Temporary Randall W. Robinson 
Person.al Representative 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The.Same Randall W. Robinson 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: · 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon Receipt number: 0003571 
Dated: 11/13/2012 Amount: $4.00 (Cashiers 
Check) 
Notice of Petition and Hearing (IC 15-1-401) Randall W. Robinson 
Hearing Scheduled (Formal Probate~Appt of Randall W. Robinson · 
Personal Representative 11/27/2012 12:30 PM) 
Order of Appointment of Temporary Persoanl Randall W. Robinson 
Representative 
Temporary Letter - Temporary appointment of Randall W. Robinson 
Margaret Watkins as Temporary Personal Rep 
Corrected Notice of Petition and Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
Filing: J1 Lr Probate, Demand for notice Paid by: Randall W. Robinson 
Karin Seubert Receipt number: 0003701 Dated: 
11/27/2012 Amount $9.00 (Cashiers Check) For. 
Watkins, Margaret (other party) 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Randall W. Robinson · 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Creason 
Moore Dokken & Geidl, PLLC Receipt number: 
. 0003702 Dated: 11/27/2012 Amount $66.00 
(Cashiers Check) For: Cornell, John Henry 
(subject) 
Demand For Notice Randall W. Robinson 
Notlce of Appearance - Theodore O Creason Randall W. Robinson 
Objection to Petition for Formal Probate of wm Randall W. Robinson 
and Formal Appointment of Personal 
Representative 
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ROA Report 
Case: CV-2012-0000439 Current Judge: Randall W Robinson 
111 The Matter Of The Estate Of John Henry Cornell Deceased 

































KBROWNING Hearing result for Formal Probate-Appt of 
Personal Representative scheduled on 
11/27/2012 12:30 PM: Continued 
Randall W. Robinson 
KBROWNING Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
12/26/2012 08:30 AM) 
Randall W. Robinson 
KBROWNING Other party: Cornell, Toni Appearance Karin 
Seubert 
Randall W. Robinson 
KBROWNING Other party: Cornell, Kareen Appearance 
Theodore 0. Creason 


















Notice Of Hearing Randall W. Robinson 
Court Minutes Randall W. Robinson 
Petition for Formal Adjudication of Intestacy and Randall W. Robinson 
Formal Appointment of Personal Representative 
Motion for Order Restraining Acting' Personal Randall W. Robinson 
Representative (IC15-3-401) 
Memorandum in Support Re: Petition for Formal Randall W. Robinson 
Adjudication of Intestacy and Formal Appointment 
of Personal Repr~sentati"'.e 
Hearing result for Status Conference schedu[ed Randall W. Robinson 
on 12/26/2012 08:30 AM:. Hearing Held- Off 
Record 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 02/06/2013 Randall W. Robinson 02:00 PM - 5:00 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing for Court Trial 
Amended Temporary Letters 
Motion To.Mediate· 
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 
02/06/2013 02:00 PM: Hearing Held - issue to 
be addressed at another hearing 
Order Appointing Personal Representative 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall w. Ropinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Letters of Administration Randall W. Robinson 
Objection to Proposed Order Appointing Personal Randafl W. Robinson · 
Representative 
Hearing Scheduled (Objection 02/26/2013 11:00 Randall W. Robinson 
AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing result for Objection scheduled on 
02/26/2013 11:00 AM: Hearing Held 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
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Second Judicial DiStrict Court - Clearwater County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2012-0000439 Current Judge: Randall W. Robinson 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of John Henry Cornell Deceased 













Hearing type: Objection 
Hearing date: 2126/2013 
Time: 11 :12 am 
courtroom: 
Court reporter: None 





Darrel Aherin - telephonically 
Letters Of Testamentary 
Probate Notice To Creditors 
T-483 P0022/0022 F-403 
User. JJENSEN 
Judge 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson · 
Randatl W. Robinson 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THt 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
COURT MINUTES 
CV-2012-0000277 
The Matter of Michael S Cornell 
Hearing type: Motion to Stay Proceedings 
Hearing type: Motion Hearing 
Hearing date: 05/17/2013 
Time : 2:35 PM - 2:57 PM, 4:00 PM - 4:14 PM 
Judge: Randall W. Robinson 
Courtroom: 001 
Court reporter: None 
Minutes Clerk: Jodie 
Tape Number: CD563-1 
The Honorable Randall W. Robinson presiding. 
Present in Court: 
Samuel Creason, Karin Seubert, 
2:35 Court - introduces all present. Explains Request for today's hearing, Motion for Stay of 
Proceedings; Appeal - does not feel that Mr. Aherin has the S4B Certification needed 
to Appeal. 
2:37 Mr. Creason - explains reason to proceed with the TEDRA for Judge Griffin to review 
2:38 Court- explains the Idaho State Rule 1-2208 which provides the Magistrate to handle 
Estate Matters. 
2:42 Mr. Creason - hopes to resolve all in one court with one Judge 
376
2:43 Court- explains reason for leaving this case in Magistrate Court Idaho State Rule 1-
2208 (2) 
2:45 Ms. Seubert - Respectfully disagrees with Mr. (reason's reason for moving this case to 
District Court. This is a classic case always assigned to Magistrate Court. 
Time for Appeal is passed 
Should consider taking care of all issues that have not been dealt with 
Feels her client deserves some answers 
Has filed an Objections Brief 
2:48 Mr. Creason - does not have Brief in front of him 
Requesting a Break to review the Brief that was faxed to his office this morning 
Concerns about proper procedures for continuing 
2:50 Court - Clarifies issues 
2:51 Colloquy between Court and Counsel regarding clarifying the issues, Personal 
Representative and Appeal 
2:56 Court - Recess for Mr. Creason to review paperwork, will resume at 4:00 PM today 
4:00 Court - Resumes 
Mr. Creason -Apologizes for the Delay and gives reasons for: 
TEDRA is to Consolidate 
Appeal is in District Court 
Address the Estate/Trust? Dismissal? 
If Consolidated : 
Grant Petition to Consolidate by District? 
Stay in Magistrate Court- issues from Claims before John Cornell's death 
New issues have come up and go to Appeal? 
4:05 Colloquy between Court and Counsel regarding issues brought up by Mr. Creason 
4:11 Court - Denies Motion for the Stay 
4:13 Ms. Seubert - confirms schedule for June 4, 2013 
3:00 PM with Hearing with District Court 
4:00 PM Motion to Dismiss with Judge Robinson 
4:14 Recess 
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Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
2087469553 T-489 P0002/0003 F-409 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 1HE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAivllLY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that KARIN R. SEUBERT of the firm of JONES, 
BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C., attorney ofrecord for the Appellee, Toni Johnson, gives notice 
that she will call on for hearing the undersigned's Motion to Augment Record, the 4th day of June, 
2013, at the hour of 3:00 p.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard in the Courtroom of the 
District Court at Clearwater County Courthouse, Orofino, Idaho, Honorable Michael Griffin 
presiding. 
DATED this 17 day ofMay, 2013. 
NOTICE OF HEARING ' ' -1-
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Byd::~~ 
' KARIN R. S.USERT 
Attorney for Toni Johnson r 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document was, 
this__ti day of May, 2013, 
hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or ~ transmitted via facsimile 
to: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Gei~l, P.L.L.C. 
1219 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By~~~ 
' Karin Seubert 
NOTICE OF HEARING -2-
T-489 P0003/0003 F-409 
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L MAY 2 0 2013 _ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
) 
IN THE MATTER OF ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY ) 
TRUST OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL ) 





CASE NO. CV 2012-277 
ORDER 
Oral argument was heard on May 17, 2013 on the Motion of Kareen 
Cornell to Stay Proceeding with Samuel Creason representing Kareen Cornell, 
Petitioner and Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell, and 
Karin Seubert representing the Respondent, Toni Johnson. After considering the 
Motion, the oral argument, and the file, 
Karreen Cornell's Motion to Stay the Proceedings IS HEREBY DENIED on 
the basis that this Court has original jurisdiction of the action to the exclusion of 
any other actions that have subsequently been filed to the above entitled action 
and for such additional reasons as set forth on the record. 
Dated this 7&1.. day of May, 2013. 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct cofil' of the foregoing Order was 
mailed, postage pre-paid, or delivered on the c2.0 day of May, 2013, to: 
Samuel Creaon 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Box 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC 
P.O. Box 854 





Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183 
C.'/o20lc1 · ;J..,f . i~.*rt) 
MAY 2 2 2013 
(' 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 





STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF THEODORE 0. 
) CREASON CERTIFYING A PORTION 
) OF THE DEPOSITION OF TONI C. 
) JOHNSON AND EXHIBITS OF APRIL 
) 22, 2013 
THEODORE 0. CREASON, comes now, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and 
says: 
1. That he is the attorney of record for for Kareen Cornell, suriving spouse and 
Personal Representative of the Estate of John H. Cornell. 
2. That on the 2211d day of April, 2013, Affiant took the deposition under oath of 
Toni C. Johnson. 
AFFIDAVIT OF THEODORE 0. CREASON CERTIFYING A 
PORTION OF THE DEPOSITION OF TONI C. JOHNSON AND 
EXHIBITS OF APRIL 22, 2013 - 1 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
382
3. That Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E attached hereto are portions of testimony and 
exhibits to said deposition. 
4. These portions of the deposition transcript and exhibits are provided to the Court 
in support of the Memorandum in Opposition Re: Motion to Dismiss filed 
herewith. 
~o~~ 
heodore 0 . Creason, ISB#l563 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2/'!f.ay, May, 2013. 
CLAIRE A. BOYER 
Notarv Public 
State of Idaho 
(SEAL) 
Notary Public in and for sai tate, 
residing at or employed in Lewiston. 
My Commission Expires: (, /10/17 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of May, 2013, I filed the foregoing 
AFFIDAVIT CERTIFYING A PORTION OF THE DEPOSITION OF TONI C. 
JOHNSON AND EXHIBITS OF APRIL 22, 2013, with the Clerk of the Court, and delivered 
via first claim mail to the following person: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Toeodore 0 . Creason, ISB #1563 
AFFIDAVIT OF THEODORE 0. CREASON CERTIFYING A 
PORTION OF THE DEPOSITION OF TONI C. JOHNSON AND 
EXHIBITS OF APRIL 22, 2013 - 2 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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Q. Sure. 
A. I haven't seen this before. 
Q. When did you first become aware that you were 
a Trustee of the Revocable Trust of Michael S . Cornell 
5 and Arlie M. Cornell? 
A. I can 't recall right now. 
Q. Were your parents both living at the time 
8 that you became aware of that fact? 
9 A. I can't recall. 
10 Q. Were you present - - this document - - let's 
11 back up just a bit . This document, Exhibit No. 6, 
12 indicates that it was executed on the 6th of August, 





Q. Okay, and at that time you were living with 
17 your father, correct? 
18 A. Yes. I was caregiving for him . He was 
19 dying. 
20 Q. Okay, and this document apparently was 
21 notarized by Alison M. Brandt, am I right? 
22 A. Apparently so. 
23 Q. And it purports to make a change to t he 
24 Revocable Trust. Do you understand that to be true? 
25 A. Yes, sir. 
K & K REPORTING (208) 74 3- 1380 
kkreport@wildbl ue.net 
65 
1 is Exhibit No . 7. 
A. Okay . 
Q. Have you ever seen that document before? I 
apologize to you, too, because it looks like they 
5 stapled it together with No. 8. 
6 A. Thank you. No problem . I appreciat e that. 
7 I have not seen this document before. 
Q. Okay. Do you know who Hurd Thornton is? 
9 A. I've never heard of that person . 
10 Q. All right. I'm going to show you -- before 
11 we leave that topic were you aware back in 1996 that 
12 you and your brother John were named as the 




A. I did not. I did not read it. 
Q. Did you know that you were named as a 
17 Co-Trustee with your brother John? 
18 A. Well, I was under the impression that I was 
19 in charge of everythi ng. Something got changed 
20 somewhere along the line, and I don't know anything 





Q. Okay. I've handed you No. 8 there. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Have you seen that document before? 
A. have not. 
K & K REPORTING (208)743-1380 
kkreport@wildblue .net 
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Q. Okay. Were you involved in any discussions 
2 about making a change in the Revocable Trust --
A. (Shakes head negatively. 
Q. -- at that time? 
A. No, sir. 
6 Q. When did you first become aware that you were 
7 the Successor Trustee and not Co-Trustee of the Trust? 
A. I don't recall the date. All I know is my 
9 brother drove my dad down to Alison Brandt, and they 
10 came back with a paper somewhat similar to this and 
11 showed it to me. That's when I knew, but I don't 
12 recall the date. 
13 Q. That's when you knew what? 





Q. Did you discuss that with John? 
A. Not especially . 
Q. When you say not especially, I ' m not sure 
19 what you mean. 
20 A. I'm trying to be fair here. 
21 Q. I just want you to tell me -- answer the 
22 question. You let somebody else worry about the 
23 fairness. 
24 A. Okay. I don't recall. 
25 Q. Okay, you can give that to her, please. This 
1 
K & K REPORTING ( 208) 7 43-1380 
kkrepor t@wildblue.net 
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Q. Has anybody discussed with you, other than 
2 Alison Brandt, what your duties and powers as Trustee, 
3 Co- Trustee, or Successor Trustee for the Cornell 
Revocable Trust would be? 
5 A. I can't recall at this time . 
6 Q. Other than Ms. Seubert . 
7 A. Nobody -- well - - I don't recall. 







A. Absolutely not, sir . 
Q. Did you terminate her services? 
A. I did, sir. 
Q. When did you terminate her services? 
A. I don't recall, but I did send her a 
15 certified letter, return receipt, that I would no 
16 longer need her. Shortly this was after sometime 
17 let me rephrase that , please. She kept mucking things 
18 up with my brother's attorney, and at some point I 













Was this after your father had died? 
Yes, sir. 
And who was your brother's attorney at that 
Mr. Aherin. 
And then I'm going to hand you Exhibit 
K & K REPORTING (208)743-1380 
kkreport@wildblue . ne t 








Q. A little earlier in the deposition, Ms. 
Johnson, you referred to some list that was made out 
that had something to do with items of property in the 
Trust. Is this the list you were referring to? 
A. Yes, sir, it is. 
Q. Okay. Whose handwriting is that? 
A. In parts it's mine, in parts it is my 
brother's. 
10 Q. And when you say parts of it are your 
11 brother's you are talking about John? 
12 A. Yes, that is correct. 
13 Q. Okay. Tell me, if you would, please, which 
14 entrees are his and which are yours. 
15 A. Okay, to make this extremely clear, I wrote 
16 down on the top items John wants and No. 1 was table 
17 with basically antique gold claws. Then he initialed 
18 it. That's what he wanted. The second was a matching 
19 desk, and he initialed that's what he wanted. There 
20 was one China closet that belonged to the Trust and one 
21 that belonged to me. I recall that now. He wanted 
22 that when the house sold. And then the next item it 
23 says -- my brother wrote this: If bar stoles, 
24 s-t-o-1-e-s -- something LA sisters. I'm sorry. I 
25 can't read the writing. 
K & K REPORTING (208)743-1380 
kkreport@wildblue.net 
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did he leave them with you or what? 
2 A. No, sir. I had come home -- or I can't 
3 exactly recall all the circumstances, but we had done 
the list because we were trying to figure out who 
5 wanted what and at that time I came back later and he 
6 made a little adjustment, and I didn't say anything. 
7 Q. Did he take certain items with him at that 
8 time? 
9 A. I don't remember exactly the date, but he 
10 took an entire car full of stuff with him. 
11 Q. Was this at or about the time that you 
12 contend that he injured you? 
13 A. Yes, sir. 
14 Q. So the last time you saw John was somewhere 
15 near 2/22/2010; is that right? 
16 A. Roughly. 
17 Q. Okay. Showing you now Exhibit No. 10. Do 
18 you recognize Exhibit No. 10? 





Q. And who wrote that out? 
A. I did. 
Q. What is that supposed to be? 
A. In other words Alison Brandt told me to write 
24 down how much the house was for sale at that time. She 
25 asked what accounts do you have. I said, trust 







Q. Plays, okay. 
A. Plays, spotting scope. John initialed it, 
then I initialed it. Okay. Then Toni to retain 
shotguns. wrote that. And I wrote, John requested a 
multitude of electronic equipment; i.e, meters, etc, 
and then he scratched something out. A lot of 
7 equipment and tools, one camping lantern. Underneath 
8 my brother wrote: Most there are a set of two. Other 
stuff unusable by my sister. Prior we initialed that, 
10 but he hadn't written that down at that point. 
11 Q. So, is that your handwriting, the last line, 
12 says hope chest to John? 
13 A. Yes, sir, it is. 
14 Q. Okay. Now, there is a date at the top. It 







A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was that the date that this list was written? 
A. Yes, sir, between he and I. 
Q. And who has the original of this list? 
A. Ms. Seubert does. 
Q. Okay. You seem to indicate that some entrees 
22 or cross-outs or something were made after the time 
23 that the list was made. Who made changes to it? 
24 A. My brother, John Cornell. 
25 Q. And did he send those changes back to you or 
K & K REPORTING (208) 743-1380 
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1 account, checking account, credit union, savings, that 
2 was in the Wells Fargo. And then I described 
3 everything that was in the Trust to the best of my 
4 knowledge on these sheets of paper here. 
5 Q. So, was that a true and accurate inventory of 
6 property that you considered to be in the Trust? 
7 A. The very best of my knowledge. 
8 Q. On the second to last page at the very bottom 






Q. What was promised to Margaret Watkins? 
A. She asked me at one point, you know, you 
14 asked me if I wanted something, and she says, yes, 





Q. Have you done that? 
A. No, sir. It is still at the house. 
Q. There's also just above that an entry that I 
20 can't quite understand. It says something about 
21 antique typewriter John took home. It belonged to 
22 Marlene aunt? 
23 A. Correct. 
24 
25 
Q. When did this typewriter get taken home? 
A. I believe he did that when we did the 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. Now you have in front of you the dark 
3 red spiral binder. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is that? 
A. This is accounting for J anuary 2012 and April 
of 2012 I began spending all my own money on Trust and 
8 my related expenses. And I just kept copies of all of 
9 it, and like I said, I would like to make sure that as 
10 of 4/12 I was paying for everything. This is basically 
11 it, and then again when I was still using Trust funds 
12 put that information back. Anything with a dot on it 
13 meant it was Trust related. 
14 Q. I see. Now, when you say you spent your own 
15 money, I gather you mean on maintaining the Trust 
16 property; is that right? 
17 A. Yes, sir . 
18 Q. When you say your own money are you talking 
19 about the $10,000 your mother give you? 
20 
21 
A. Yes, sir . 
Q. Okay. Was there any other assets of your own 
22 that you used? 
23 A. Yes, sir . I've sold some of my own 
2 4 belongings . 
25 Q. And what was that? 
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1 Trust expenses, and at that time I hadn't written 
2 anything down on the back of the paper as I have with 
3 the other ones to document other funds I had spent . 
5 
6 
Q. I see. 
A. It's right here, this one right here 
(indicating.) 
MR . CREASON: Have this marked as Deposition 
8 Exhibit 17 . 
(Deposition Exhibit No. 17 
10 was then marked for identification.) 
11 MR . CREASON: Inside Deposition 17 there is also 
12 some loose pieces of -- looks like perhaps an HVAC 
13 invoice , just some mail and some invoices along with 
14 some notes. What we' 11 do is have that -- I think what 
15 we' 11 do is ask the Reporter to make a precise 
16 duplicate so that you can have your original records 
17 back. 
18 A. Thank you. 
19 MR. CREASON : And all of us can have a copy that 
20 doesn't interrupt your bookkeeping, okay? 
21 A. Thank you very much. 
22 MR. CREASON: Do you have any objections , Darrel , 
23 or, Karin, to having us just have the Reporter take 
24 care of the copying of this because there is a lot of 
25 blank pages in these spiral notebooks. I don't see the 
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A. Okay. r sold' some handguns. I sold a 
2 shotgun. I've sold some of my own jewelry. 
3 Q. Do you have records of that? 
A. I believe I have records of the jewelry, but 
5 it doesn't say what ' s sold or not. It just gives the 
items that I gave to them. It is called t he Diamond 
Shop, and for a percentage they take a percentage and 
8 then when they sell your jewelry they give you the 
money. 
10 Q. I see.. Okay. I will ask any more about the 




Q. But we will have this one marked as 
14 Deposition Exhibit No . 16. 
15 (Deposition Exhibit No . 16 
16 was then marked for identification.) 
17 Q. (By Mr . Creason) We have the dark green 
18 spiral binder next . What is that? 
19 A. Okay . There is a lot of personal information 
20 in here and -- okay, let me see . Dad died in December 
21 so 
Q. Of 2009, correct? 22 
23 A. Yes. So, basically the only thing that would 
24 be of interest, I believe, to you, sir, and, Mr. 
25 Aherin, is this is in-part some of mine and some of the 
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1 sense of having those recopied; is that all right with 
2 everybody? 
3 MS. SEUBERT: That's fine . 
MR. AHERIN: (Nods head affirmatively.) 
5 Q. (By Mr. Creason) Are any of those active 
6 records, Ms . Johnson? In other words , do you make 
daily entrees on either of these, 14, 15 , 16, or 17? 
A. I can't recall right now at this time exactly 
the date that I stopped recording, but I do have 
10 information. In other words, I have recorded 
11 everything to the best of my knowledge up until like 
12 4/2012, and then the rest of the information that was 
13 in there, I believe. 
14 Q. Okay. We' 11 have them returned to you as 
15 quickly as possible, then. 
16 A. Thank you. 
17 Q. And you have in front of you, then , also some 
18 manila folders. 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. One of which I think has already been marked 
21 as Deposition Exhibit No. 13 and t hen what are the 
22 other manila folders that you have? 
23 A. Okay. Please excuse me for a moment. The 
2 4 wrong papers inside. That was the exhibit that you 
25 spoke of. The other exhibit -- excuse me. This was a 
K & K REPORTING (208)743-1380 






cas'iier's check made to Idaho State Tax Commission for 
my father. It was a cashier's check from Lewis Clark 
3 Credit Union, and that's in that folder. 
Q. Going to have to ask you just a few questions 
5 because now I think I'm beginning to understand your 
6 filing system a little bit. 
A. Okay, certainly. 
Q. And it might help us keep things straight. 
9 On what has been marked as Deposition Exhibit No. 13, 
10 the folder, that is, the manila folder, says at the top 
11 of it: Accounting for 2009 and 10; is that ac_curill.1 
-·-···----12 A. _!:~., ... Jiir. 
13 
14 A. I did, sir. 











A. IIP, it's not. 
Q. I see. Were there others of these 
spreadshe~ts that have been lost, destrQYed, or 
_.., . .,..,.,,,_ ... ~-~~~-- -
someplace else? 
-x:··"No, sir. 
-Q. Okay. Why is it not complete? 
A. Because I was under extreme duress to ~-!: 
that~~us.t..at that ti.mil I lost both-my 
pare~~s.l:-Jiig_ the best I could at that tinJ.e. 
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meeting with her. 
Q. Okay. Now, just so we are clear on this. 
3 A. Uh-huh (affirmative.) 
4 Q. Your communications with Ms. Seubert are not 
5 in here, correct? 
A. Ms. Seubert's information is not in there. 
Q. All right. 
8 MR. CREASON: Have this marked as 19. 
(Deposition Exhibit No. 19 
10 was then marked for identification.) 
11 Q. (By Mr. Creason) In Exhibit 19, Ms. Johnson, 
12 there appears to be a couple of invoices from Clements, 
13 Brown, McNichols with respect to the matter· of Cornell, 
14 and it seems to reference the Trust. To your knowledge 
15 were all of the services by Clements, Brown & McNichols 
16 that were provided to you provided in connection with 
17 your duties as Trustee? 
18 A. Yes, sir. 
19 Q. All right, and the next folder is what? 
20 A. Okay. Please excuse me. This is me 
21 documenting information in regards to Alison Brandt. 
22 This is a copy of some of the monies that I put into 
23 for the Trust and myself, and then there is an envelope 
24 from Ms. Alison Brandt. Then here are a rough draft of 
25 you owe part of the accounting of the furniture and the 
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Q. Okay, and did you do these records at or 
2 about the time that the entry was -- in other words, 
3 did you make these entrees on a monthly basis or daily 
4 basis or what, on the spreadsheets? 
5 A. On this one I don't recall. 
Q. Did you make the entries on these 
7 spreadsheets at or near the time that the event 
8 recorded occurred? 
A. I'm not sure what you mean by the event 
10 occurred. 
11 Q. Well, did you make these spreadsheets or have 














A. Yes, sir. 
(Deposition Exhibit No. 18 
was marked for identification.) 
MR. CREASON: And the next one, which is going to 
be marked as Deposition Exhibit No. 18 is -- I'm going 
to ask that the Reporter copy the folder label, as well 
as the document inside. The document inside is simply 
an Idaho State Tax Commission check stub. 
Q. (By Mr. Creason) Now, what's the next one we 
have, Ms. Johnson? 
A. Okay, this will be some of my attorney's fees 
starting with 2010, and I don't have all of 
Ms. Seubert's billing with me. This was from prior to 
K & K REPORTING (208) 743-1380 
kkreport@wildblue.net 
54 
1 likes of that. 
2 Q. When did you prepare those records? 
3 A. This here, roughly 2010. This letter that I 
4 wrote about Ms. Brandt is 3/29/11. 
5 MR. CREASON: Okay, and that folder will be 
6 Deposition Exhibit No. 20. 
7 (Deposition Exhibit No. 20 
8 was then marked for identification.) 
9 Q. (By Mr. Creason) And the next folder? 
10 A. Okay. It is money I deposited into the 
11 checking, Wells Fargo checking. I believe it might be 
12 some of the same information as far as money I 
13 deposited, and it is on a little card. 
14 MR. CREASON: Okay. We' 11 ask Exhibit No. 21 be 
15 marked. 
16 (Deposition Exhibit No. 21 
17 was then marked for identification.) 
18 Q. (By Mr. Creason) And on that folder, 
19 Ms. Johnson, you say money I deposited. What do you 
2 0 mean by that? 
21 A. Okay. In other words, from myself, out of my 
22 funds into the regular checking account to pay for some 
23 Trust items and for myself as well. 
24 Q. Okay. Was this part of the $10,000 that your 
25 mother had given you? 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. Where did these monies come from? 
A. Okay. The 73.70 I'm no\. sure. 1400 I'm not 
sure. My ~ did have a death benefit fund that was 
supposed to have been paid to me. My brother said, no 
problem. It was sent to him. His wife kept 500 of it, 
and I got the other part. I don't remember how much 
"~---------that was. So, that's the best I can tell you on that. 
~ Why did you believe the death bene~ 
r, --------· supposed to_~.::.._to you? -· 
A: Because my dad said so, and, of course, when 
he was H~ ne had problems doil}g_c;_<etl.fil.!L..jJJ.ing~ and he_ 
said I~§.kg_~_t..§i_~~~n~~~~_!~~~t 
it, dad~J,..~.=...il....d.i..!m..'..Lm.at)cer to me one way or_!~e 
at.her. --Bllt-m~t.he:r:...agr.e.ruj to send me part _':!_~ 
mane~ 
Q. All right, and you have another folder there? 
A. Yes, sir. And I don't know why I brought 
this one. It says December 31st, 2009, Lewis and Clark 
Credit Union and there is one statement that says Lewis 
21 Clark Credit Union and on it I wrote, taxes and house 
22 insurance paid from this account. There is also a 
23 receipt, and I don't recall what that is about, from 
24 Lewis and Clark Credit Union. 
25 MR. CREASON: Have this marked as Deposition 
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MR. CREASON: Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Creason) Exhibit No. 22 is just a 
3 couple of, looks like, a receipt from Lewis Clark 
Credit Union and a notice of an annual meeting of the 
5 Lewis Clark Credit Union, but it does indicate that 
6 there it is at least partially a statement from Lewis 
7 Clark Credit Union. I did not see on the inventory of 
8 assets Lewis Clark Credit Union account, Ms. Johnson. 
Do you recall -- oh, I see. Is this the -- I see it 
now, 27057 - yes, okay. Did you close 27 -- no, it 
still has $8. 76 in it; is that correct? 




13 Q. To your knowledge, Ms. Johnson, were there 
14 any other financial institutions in which your dad had 
15 accounts at the time of his death other than the Wells 
16 Fargo accounts and the Lewis Clark Credit Union 
17 account? 
18 A. Not at all, to my knowledge. 
19 Q. And other than the life insurance or the 
20 death benefits that were at least referenced --
21 
22 
A. Part of it. 
Q. in Exhibit No. 21, were there other life 
23 insurance or death benefits payable to your dad's 
24 beneficiaries or named beneficiary at the time of his 
25 death? 



















Exhibit No. 21 -- 22, I'm sorry. 
(Deposition Exhibit No. 22 
was then marked for identification.) 
MR. CREASON: Thank you. 
MS. SEUBERT: Do you mind if I just confer with 
Toni for just a minute. 
MR. CREASON: All right. 
MS. SEUBERT: I would just like to mention that 
as we are going through the records there was some of 
Ms. Johnson's records that my office has that I used in 
preparing her response to discovery. All the bank 
statements were provided but didn't take the time to go 
through and make copies of all the various invoices in 
the folders that were made. I can have someone from my 
office bring that over if you would like to go through 
that as part of this deposition. 
MR. CREASON: You know, I don't know that that is 
necessary at this point. Rather than take the time to 
explain every invoice and so on, I think that if you 
just provide us copies that will suit my needs in 
21 response to the discovery request. 
22 MS. SEUBERT: So, we' 11 prepare supplemental 
23 discovery response with copies of all the invoices that 
24 were not included in the bank statements already 
25 provided. 
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1 A. I think later they did end up sending me 
2 something, but I can't recall for how much or when. 
3 Q. They, who is they? 
A. To be honest, I don't know. All I know --
5 oh, excuse me, IBEW, I believe is an electrical fund or 
6 something to that nature. I can't swear to it. 
7 Q. Do you recall approximately how much that 
8 was? 
A. I can't at this time. 
10 Q. Where did you deposit that money? 
11 A. I believe I deposited it in the Wells Fargo 
12 checking account. 
13 Q. All right. Did you have any other accounts 
14 that you utilized or opened in order to deposit monies 
15 that pertained to the Trust? 
16 A. The only account, and it is in my dad's name, 
17 there is -- it was like a savings. It was supposed to 
18 be for me, but they used his name on it for tax 
19 reporting purposes. And I paid a bill on that, and 




Q. I see. 
A. And that ' s it . 
Q. Got some additional documents that I'm going 
24 to ask you to identify for me. I think probably 
25 everybody else here knows exactly what this is and what 
















Here is Deposition Exhibit No. 3. 
Okay. 
And can you tell me have you ever seen that 
I don't recall seeing it at all. 
Q. Okay. Were you aware of the fact that Lot 34 
10 of the Lake View First Edition is part of that 15 acres 
11 that you described to me a bit earlier? 
12 A. I do know that the lots in the Trust are 34, 
13 35, and 36. 
14 Q. Okay. Were you aware that in 2002 Michael 
15 Stanley Cornell and Arlie Mary Cornell gave a gift deed 
16 to your brother of Lot 34? 
17 A. I don't recall that right now. 
18 Q. Did you receive a like gift at that time? 
19 A. Absolutely not. 
20 Q. Okay. Did you ever become aware of it prior 
21 to the time that your parents died; that they had given 
22 10 acres or -- excuse me, Lot 34 to John? 
23 A. I don't recall. 
24 Q. Did your parents ever give you any real 
25 estate? 
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Alison M. Brandt. Is that the same person that you 
indicated was remiss in advice that she gave to you? 
3 A. Correct, sir. 
4 Q. This may be simply typographical. I suspect 
5 that it is. 
6 A. Uh-huh (affirmative.) 
Q. But it appears to be notarized on March, 21st 
day of March, 2004, and yet the instrument itself is 
dated and recorded in March of 2005. Do you have any 
10 knowledge of that discrepancy? 
11 A. I do not. 
12 Q. Okay. Let me show you Deposition Exhibit No. 
13 5. Do you recognize that document? 
14 A. No, sir. 
15 Q. Were you aware there came a time when John 
16 Cornell quitclaimed Lot 34 back to his parents' 
17 Revocable Trust? 
18 A. Yes, sir. 
19 Q. Okay. Are you aware of what the 
20 circumstances were of that transfer? 
21 A. A couple of things. One is he owed a lot of 
22 money, and secondly that he was wanting out from his 
23 wife and so he wanted, I guess, not for her to do 
2 4 anything. I don't know. 
25 Q. How did you come to gain that information? 




A. No, sir. 
2 Q. I'm going to show you now Deposition Exhibit 
3 No. 4. 
A. Okay. Thank you. 
5 
6 
Q. Have you seen that document before? 
A. No, sir. 
7 Q. Okay. Do you understand that it is the 
8 document that transferred Lots 35 and 36 Lake View 
9 Edition from your parents to the Family Trust? 
10 A. I don't recall. 
11 Q. Okay. Were you involved in their estate 
12 planning back in 2005? 
13 A. No, sir. 
14 Q. Did you do bookwork for your parents prior to 
15 the time your mother died? 
16 A. I paid all their bills and everything that 
17 needed to be taken care of, but I didn't do any 
18 book-.,ork, per se. 
19 Q. I see. 
20 A. I wouldn't say. 
21 Q. Were you acquainted with the terms of the 
22 Trust back in 2005? 
23 A. No, sir. 
24 Q. I see that this instrument that I have given 
25 you is Deposition Exhibit No. 4, was notarized by 
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A. Well, he told me that he wanted to get out of 
2 the marriage. 
3 Q. When did he tell you this? 
A. If I'm not mistaken I'm guessing -- I could 
5 be wrong -- I'm guessing 2 or 3 of 2010. 
6 Q. Okay. This quitclaim deed was dated the 3rd 
7 of January, 2007. 
8 A. Uh-huh (affirmative.) 
Q. Is that the time that you understood that he 
10 wanted to get out of his marriage? 
11 A. Uhm, .I realize what you are saying, but I 
12 don't recall at this time. 
13 ~are that_y-0ur_b,;ot~1:._~ money 
14 __ .ta_pa~ taxes on Lot 34 after he quJ.!:.£!~.i.filfilLi,Uack 
15 to the Trust? 

































DEED OF GIFT 
Instrument # 190928 
CLEARWATER COUNTY. OROFINO. IDAHO 
2002·11·18 02:00:00 No. of Page.: 1 
Recorded £or: LINDA DAVIS • EMPIRE REAL TY 
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN C Fee:~ 
Ex-Officio Recorder Deputy :,mcil' ,mm 
R8V--P-,V 10 ~ % 
This Deed of Gift is made this .ltfi_ day ofNovember, 2002, between 
MICHAEL STANLEY CORNELL and ARLIE MARY CORNELL, husband and wife, 
of Orofino, Idaho, the donors, and JOHN HENRY CORNELL, a single man, 4119 
Eureka Ridge Road, Orofino, Idaho, the donee. 
The donors, for and in consideration oflove and affection which the donors have 
and bear unto the donee, their son, and for the purpose of making him a gift, do by these 
presents give, grant, transfer and release unto the donee, the following described real 
property, situated in the County of Clearwater, State ofldaho, to-wit: 
Lot 34, Lakeview First Addition 
according to the recorded plat thereof. 
together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the same unto the donee, his heirs and assigns, 
forever. 
IN W1TNESS WHEREOF, the donors have executed this Deed of Gift the day 
and year first above written. 
STATE OF IDAHO 




On this ./£ft day of November, 2002, before me a notary public in and for 
the State of Idaho, personally appeared MICHAEL STANLEY CORNELL and 
ARLIE MARY CORNELL, husband and wife, known to me to be the persons 
whose names are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me 
that they executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
otary public in and for the 
State ofldaho, residing at 
Orofino, therein. My O 
,--
commission expires: //-:.i /- :;> 
--1 JOHN HENRY CORNELL 
4 t 19 EUREKA RIDGE ROAD 
OROFINO, ID 83544 
395
:;EPTIC!":~ 1•'l"IEXEO .18l 
MED Cl , IVEREDD 
MAlLEDO 
Instrument # 20467 4 
CLEARWATER COUNTY , OROFINO, IOAHO 
2007-01-09 f; o.4:43:00 No. of .Pitges: 2 
Recorded for : ALISON BRANOT 
Ex-Offk:IO Recorder Deputy__.,_~J LLU,1........._-..c.. __ ..,.:,,q,_ ~H~-
ROBIN ~HRISTENSEN C ~·~ 
QUITCLAIM DE.ED R~ To~* 
TIIIS INDENTURE, made this 3ctf day o( )i_ KJUO :'.:l , 20°', between JOHN 
IENRY CORNELL, a married person dealing with his sole and separate property, P.O. Box 
61, Heyburn, Idaho 83336, hereinafter referred to as GRANTOR, and MICHAEL STANLEY 
~ORNELL and ARLIB MARY CORNELL, as Trustees for the MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND 
ill.LIE M. CORNELL REVOCABLE TRUST, dated November 1, 1996, referred to as 
}RANTEE. 
WITNESSETH: That the GRANTOR, for and in consideration of the sum of Ten 
uOLLARS lawful money of the United States of America, and other good and valuable 
;onsideration, to her in hand paid by the GRANTEE, the receipt whereof is hereby 
:1.cknowledged~ does by these presents remise, release and forever QUITCLAIM unto the said 
GRANTEE, and to said GRANTEE'S heirs, successors and assigns all that certain lot, piece, or 
parcel ofland, including any after acquired title or interest, situate, lying, and being on said 
property, located in Clearwater County, Idaho, described as follows 1 to~wit: 
Lot 34, Lakeview First Addition, according to the recorded plat thereof. 
SUBJECT TO: 
An Easement granted to the United States of America, as set forth in the 
document recorded on the records of Clearwater County, State of Idaho, on 
November 10, 197 6, as Instrument No. 113412. 
An Easement for access and utilities as shown on the recorded plats of the above-
described property recorded on the records of Clearwater County, State of Idaho, 
as Instrument No. 109374. 
Restrictions and covenants as contained in Land Use Agreement recorded as 
InstrumentNo. 109375, records of Clearwater County, State ofldaho. 
An Easement granted to Clearwater Power Company recorded on the records of 
Clearwater ColUlty, State of Idaho, on November 4, 1992, as Instrument No. 
QUITCLAIM DEED 




TOGETHER WITH all singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereto 
belonging or in anywise appertaining, the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, 
rents, issues and profits thereof, including after acquired title or interest. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD, all singular the said premises, together with appurtenances, 
unto the GRANTEE, and to the heirs, successors, and assigns forever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the GRANTOR has hereunto set his hand the day and year 
first above written. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss .. 
County of rfJ'ltJ jdJA . ) 
On this 3rd day of :san~ , 20oV, before me, a notary public in and 
for the State of Idaho, personally appearedJ HN HENRY CORNELL, a married person dealing 
with his sole and separate property, known or identified to me to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set 
day and year in this certificate first above written. 
- - -
1 CHEYENNE 8. SUCHAN • 
: NOTARY PUBLIC ' 
STATE OF IDAHO : 
.... - ~ ...... 
QUITCLAIM DEED 2 
ial seal the 
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1 do~ ' t recall . 
Q. Okay . How was his health at that time? 
A. Please excuse me, I'm thinking. I'm still 
not over the death of my brother so I -- that question 
5 escapes me right now. Could you please restate it one 
6 more time . 
Q. How was John's health -
A. His health . 
Q. -- at the time t hat he was living at home in 
10 Clearwater County? 
11 A. I would say okay . 
12 Q. Okay. Had he had any serious health problems 




A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When did he have serious health problems? 
A. It was very high blood pressure . He was 
17 working for Swift as a truck driver, and then I later 




Q. Okay. Do you know did he discuss that with 
A. He didn't personally, but he kept telling 
22 me -- he says -- please excuse me . I didn't understand 
23 what he was talking about because he was a different 
24 individual, and he'd say, well, I'm not going to live 
25 long, something like that . That's the best I can 
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what I'm wanting to know is: Have you've had any 
2 experience or training with acting as a Trustee, other 
3 than this Trust here? 
A. I haven't had any training, and I had hired 
5 an attorney prior to Ms. Seubert that was -- I'm trying 
to think of t he proper term, and I don't want to sound 
negative, but she was extremely remiss, to say the 
least . 
9 Q. I see, and you hired a lawyer to help you 




A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. How did you choose the lawyer? 
A. Well, sir, my dad had used her before, and I 
14 didn't know who else to go to. 
15 Q. Okay. So, you retained a lawyer to serve as 
16 your counsel as Trustee for your parents' Family Trust ; 
17 is that accurate? 
18 A. Please excuse me. Could you please restate 
19 the que stion again? 
20 Q. So you retained this attorney to assist you 
21 in carrying out your duties as Trustee for your 
22 family's Trust; is that correct? 
23 A. Yes , sir. 
24 Q. Okay, and do you know approximately when you 
25 retained that attorney for that purpose? 
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answer t hat right now. 
Q. How did you come t o know t hat he had HIV? 
A. was looking for information for this case, 
and I fou nd a document that stated so , sir . 
5 Q. All right. So , this was a f ter he was 
deceased; is that correct ? 
A. Yes , sir. 
8 Q. And when you say you found a document, is 
9 that a medical record or something else? 
10 A. Sir, I believe, to best of my knowledge, it 
11 was a medical record. It was something like this 
12 (indicating,) and it stated something to the fact of --
13 I believe he could only have a license for one year due 
14 to his HIV, and he would have to be rechecked . Please 






Q. Do you still have a copy of that record? 
A. Yes, sir , I do. 
Q. Would you -- did you bring it with you today? 
A. No , sir, I did not. 
Q. Would you provide a copy of that to your 
21 attorney and allow her to provide a copy of that to me? 
22 
23 
A. Absolutely, sir. 
Q. Now, I understand that for a time you worked 
24 for a credit union as a teller and in security, and you 
25 have some other college training and the like . But 
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A. Will you excuse me, please, just a moment. 
Q. Sure. 
A. I can 't recall right now . 
Q. Okay . I have a few items that I want to show 
5 you and ask you about, and I have provided copies of 
6 them to your counsel . And she has probably seen them 
10 
and perhaps you have, too, before, but this is marked 
as Exhibit No . 1 to this deposition . 
A. Okay. 
Q. I'm going to ask you to look over it and tell 
11 me whether or not you have seen that before. 
12 
13 
A. Okay . Yes, sir . 
Q. And did you see it at or about the time it 
14 was mailed to your brother on April 26th of 2010? 
15 A . I don ' t recall exactly. All I know is he 
16 began harassi ng me on the phone to a very bad degree, 
17 and I wasn ' t sure what to do so I called the attorney . 
18 Q. Was that the attorney that was representing 
19 t he Trust? 
20 
21 
A. Yes, sir . 
Q. Is that t he attorney you referred to that 
22 was -- I can't remember the word you described 
23 remiss, I think, is the word you used? 
24 
25 
A. Ye s , sir . 
Q. All right. Had Ms . Brandt been representing 





1 thcl Trust for some period of time before this? 
2 A. All I recall is my dad had some work done by 
3 her, and I just can't recall at this time. 
4 Q. Did you ever meet with Ms. Brandt and your 
5 brother at the same time? 
6 A. No, sir. 
10 
11 
Q. Do you recall the date your dad died? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was that? 
A. November 15th, 2009. 
Q. In this letter that you have in front of you 
12 there on Exhibit 1, the second paragraph says: I met 
13 with your sister, Ms. Toni Johnson, regarding the 
14 distribution of the Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. 
15 Cornell Revocable Trust before I received your message. 
16 As you know Ms. Johnson is the Successor Trustee of 
17 your parents' trust, and you and Ms. Johnson are the 
18 sole beneficiaries. Do you recall a meeting with 
19 yourself and Alison Brandt at some time prior to this 
20 letter? 
21 A. I can't recall at this time. 
22 Q. Okay. Is that statement accurate to the best 
23 of your knowledge; that she had met with you regarding 
24 the distribution of a Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. 
25 Cornell Revocable Trust? 
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Q. All right. So, is it your testimony that you 













A. No, I believe I had a fiduciary duty to 
protect the home and everything I could. 
Q. Okay, and this goes on to say: Trustees must 
ensure that Trust assets are managed appropriately 
while Trust administration takes place. Were you aware 
of that? 
A. I don't -- this was not said to me, but I did 
the very best I could. And my brother said that I 
coul_~~~ 
Q. Do you have any documents that indicate jo 
you your brother said anything with respect to how you 
might be able to use money from the Trust? 
A. I do not, sir. It was verbal. 
17 Q. In this letter Ms. Brandt says to your 
18 brother, the last paragraph on the first page: While 
19 we wait for a buyer for the home there are many monthly 
20 expenses associated with subdivision in which your 
21 parents' home is located that Ms. Johnson will need to 
22 pay from the Trust bank account funds. She will 
23 further use the funds minimally to do any necessary 
24 small repairs that the Realtor may suggest to improve 
25 the home's sale potential. Do you see that? 
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A. She met with me, but I don't recall her 
2 discussing anything about distribution of anything. 
3 Q. This letter goes on to say in the next 
paragraph: Ms. Johnson is fully aware that she has a 
5 fiduciary obligation to the Estate. Do you understand 
6 what that says? 
7 A. I believe I do. 
8 Q. Okay, and did you represent to Ms. Brandt and 
9 subsequently, then, to your brother that you were fully 
10 aware that you had a fiduciary obligation to the Trust 
11 Estate? 
12 A. I don't recall saying anything or speaking to 
13 my brother about that. Please excuse me. Could you 
14 ask the question again? 
15 Q. Did you instruct Ms. Brandt -- let's just ask 
16 it that way --
17 A. Uh-huh (affirmative.) Uh-huh (affirmative.) 
18 Q. -- to advise your brother that you were fully 
19 aware that you had a fiduciary obligation to the Trust 
20 Estate? 
21 A. I didn't ask her to say anything. 
22 Q. All right. Did you represent to her that you 
23 were fully aware that you had a fiduciary obligation to 
24 the Trust Estate? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you understand that you were authorized 
to use money from the Trust for these purposes listed 
here? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how did you come to that understanding? 
A. Because it solely dealt with the Trust as far 
. --------------~----
as the __ s~division_fees __ an~_l<~_fees and that. 




A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Okay, and who manages those? 
A. As far as what I have? 
Q. Yes. 
A. They are just personal 
Q. In the Trust home? 
A. Yes, sir. 
possessions in the 







I do, sir. 
Okay, and who manages those? 
I do, sir. 
And where are they? 
have one at American West Bank 
K & K REPORTING (208) 743-1380 





Q. And are these savings accounts or checking 
3 accounts? 
A. It is just a checking account. 
5 Q. Okay. What's your personal net worth? This 
6 is not any Trust property at all; this is just your 
personal net worth. 
A. I couldn't say right now right off the bat. 
I don't know. 
10 Q. All right. Do you have a rough estimate of 
11 what your bank account, what the balance of your bank 
12 account stands at right now? 







Q. Do you add to that monthly? 
A. Not at this time, but I will be. 
Q. Where will that come from? 
A. If everything goes correctly, SSI. 
Q. Have you applied for SSI? 
A. It was applied for me. I was in the 
20 hospital. 
21 Q. Did you deposit money regularly in your 
22 checking account? 
A. I did. 
Q. Where did you receive income? 
23 
24 
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I have a 1987 Jeep Wrangler that is not 








My dad and I owned an Isuzu Trooper. On the 





What year is that? 
2002. 
Did you buy that with your own funds? 
The Isuzu or the Jeep? 
10 The Isuzu. Q. 
A. 11 No, my father purchased it. 
Q. 12 Okay. So, was your name on the title for 
13 convenience? 
14 A. No, sir. My dad knew he was dying, and he 
15 wanted to make sure I had a vehicle to drive. 
16 Q. Oh, so when he bought it -- when did he buy 
17 it? 
18 A. 2002. He knew I did the main driving for my 
mom or he because his eyesight was not good. 
Q. All right. Have you been on the title to 
that vehicle for all of the time that he owned it or 







24 A. Not at the time that he purchased it, and I 
25 can't recall when he put me on the title. 
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1 given to me because I wore out my car and took care of 












How much money was that? 
$10,000. 
This was given to you by your mother before 
10 A. Long, long before she died. 
11 Q. Are there any other accounts other than your 
12 American West bank account? 
13 A. I have a Hughes Aircraft Federal Credit 
14 Union, and it is abbreviated -- excuse me, I can't say 
15 it right now. And there is probably, I'm guessing, 
16 roughly 5 to $7. 00 in either savings or checking. I'm 
17 not sure, and there might be another $5.00. 
18 Q. Anything else? 
19 A. Just a few cents, maybe, in another account, 











And where is the other account? 
Same, Hughes Aircraft Federal Credit 
Okay. Do you own a car? 
I do. 
What is it? 




1 Q. Now, are there any other personal assets that 
you claim are your own, apart from any of the assets 
3 that are in the Trust? 
A. have several things in the home. 
5 Q. All right. And they are furniture, is that 
6 accurate? 
7 A. Furniture. I can't think of the name of 
8 them -- furniture. have some TVs. What do you call 
-- some decorations, statutes, and at this moment I 
10 can't think of anything else right now. 
11 Q. Do you have some art? 
12 A. That's a good question. I purchased some 
13 prints for my mother, and so I don't know who that 












Q. Do you own any collectables yourself? 
A. I do. 
Q. What are they? 
A. LLadro mermaids. 
Q. Any other collectables? 
A. I do, but I can't think right now about that. 
Q. What's the value of the Lladro mermaids? 
A. I'm guessing roughly around $1,000. 
Q. Do you have any antiques that are yours? 
A. don't own any antiques. Well, no, I take 




that back. I do have a -- please excuse me. am 
2 trying to think of the name of it. I do have a chaise 
3 lounge. 
Q. When did you acquire that? 
5 A. Many, many years ago. 
6 Q. So, any house or home furnishings that there 
are in the house other than the chaise lounge and the 
8 Lladro mermaids are properties that belonged to the 
9 Trust; is that correct? 
10 A. Please restate the question again. 
11 Q. So, in the house you have certain personal 
12 items that you have named: The Lladro mermaids and the 
13 chaise lounge. And other than that, all of the 
14 property that's in the house is property of the Trust; 
15 is that correct? 
16 A. I own some other things, I can't think of at 
17 this time, but the rest of it is the Trust, yes. 
18 Q. Okay. Do you receive any disability payments 
19 of any kind-at this time? 
20 A. Not at this time. It is in the works. 
21 Q. All right. Are you represented by legal 
22 counsel in your efforts to get Social Security? 
23 A. No, I'm not. I received a letter from Social 
24 Security. 
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Q. The top of the page there Ms. Brandt says: 
Currently Ms. Johnson feels pressure from you to 
liquidate the assets of the Trust and disburse the 
money immediately. Do you recall feeling any pressure 
to liquidate the assets from John? 
A. Please excuse me, I'm thinking. I wouldn't 
say that I felt pressure. I was being extremely 
harassed via telephone, and I was bodily injured as 
well by him. 
Q. Did you tell Ms. Brandt about that? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q, ~fill_Jomething,.here about.,_QJ]LJ.Q 
circumstances---at--.t-M-s-..t.ime. Ms. JohnsoIL.cannot--£ul-fill 
her fiducia:ry._.o~_g~tion as Successor_ Tr.'!Ei!a.e and 
liquidate the assets as you wis1!_,.._lfu_a_L.cir.l:J!.~tances 
is she talking ai;;~t, do yo;;:now? 
·A. :_ci,~ t ~call aj;_jllis__tima._ ,C_airi__yc>lljl!i~se 
point out which paragraph that is? 
·-~, okay. It is the second sentence here on 






A. Okay, sure. I appreciate that, sir. Thank 
you. I don't recall that. She stated some things just 
because she stated them. They are not things -- I just 
can't answer anymore on that. 
Q. :,~t any do~mind that as 
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that the Trust owns, on that real estate the house is 
2 located, correct? 
3 A. Yes, sir. 
4 Q. And how many acres is that parcel? 
5 A. On the house, the parcel for the house itself 
6 or cumulative? 
7 Q. All of the :real estate that's being held in 
8 the name of the Trust. 
A. Okay, that would be 15 acres. 
10 Q. Okay. Do you claim to own any part of that 
11 as your own personal property; that is, your own 
12 individual property apart from the Trust? 
13 A. Are you asking if -- please excuse me. Can 
14 you restate that one more time? 
15 Q. In any of that 15 acres do you claim any of 
16 that as your individual property apart from the Trust? 
17 A. No, sir. 
18 Q. Okay. To your knowledge is the 15 acres the 
19 only real estate that the Trust owns in Clearwater 
20 County? 
21 A. Yes, sir. 
22 Q. Okay. All :right. I just wanted to call your 
23 attention just briefly again to Exhibit No. 1 on the 
24 second page. 
25 A. Okay. 
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liquidated right away after your parents died; is that 
---correct? 
A. No, sir. That is not correct. And I realize 
what legal· is, is legal is. My brother and I sat down 
and made ~-the !ll_ing;-~d. He told m~-;-
you_c_an_k~ep the money, you can keep the house, which I 
------------
~~h-~~-~~~..,_ _ _!M,_I_ 
don't recall anything about the mon!,y3ssue _at this 
~
Q. Okay. The last paragraph there says: 
Ms. Johnson would prefer that your communications be 
through me, so if you would like to be updated on 
progress please do not hesitate to write to me and 
advise me of such. Do you see that sentence? 
A. Yes, sir, I do. 
Q. Does that accurately state your wishes? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you ever have any communications directly 






A. At that time she, Alison Brandt, told Joh1f-·. 
that if he continued to contact me because he harassed/' 
me so badly that she would have to get a restraining 
order on him, and he just would call and scream and 
yell and stuff like that. And I had -- I think I had a 





1 cc:-.versation with him about what he did to me as far as 
2 injuring my body. 
3 Q. Okay. After this letter --
4 A. Yes, sir. 
5 Q. -- sometime after she said, you just talk to 
10 
me, did you have any further conversations with your 
brother? 
A. I can't recall at this time. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever see him again? 
A. The last time I saw him was the day that he 
11 injured me. 
12 
13 
Q. Which was what day? 
A. It was -- please excuse me. I believe 
14 February or March of 2010, approximately. 





A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you report this injury to the police? 
A. No, sir, but I did put him on report to a 
20 neighbor of mine that is a reserve deputy for 
21 Clearwater County Sheriff. 
22 Q. Who was that? 
23 A. Gary, G-a-r-y, Tragesser, T-r-a-g-e-s-s-e-r. 
24 Q. Okay. Was this the same encounter, that is, 
25 the one where you claim your body was injured by 
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1 before, to your knowledge? 
2 A. I have not. In fact, she has had the wrong 
3 address to send to me in the past, and she's never been 
4 one to send me things that I should have. At some 
5 point she didn't respond to me for three, four months. 
10 
11 
Q. Okay. Well, let's talk about the substance, 
subject matter of this, to see if you have any 
recollection of some of the events that are referenced 
here. 
A. Okay. 
Q. This is under date of December 2nd, 2010, and 
12 on the fourth paragraph in her letter Ms. Brandt 
13 addresses to Darrel Aherin. She says: Ms. Johnson has 
14 not disposed of any assets other than she has used some 
15 monies in the Trust to pay expenses associated with the 
16 real property and my fee. The main asset in the Trust 
17 is the Cornell home which is listed with the Real 
18 Estaters through Mike Harrington, Realtor. I'm not 







you see that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All right. 
time of the letter 
' Is it a true statement that at 
of December 2nd, 2010 you had 
24 not disposed of any of the assets of'the Trust except 
25 for to pay expenses associated with the real property 
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something that John did? 
2 A. Yes, sir. 
3 Q. Was there anybody present at the time when 
this occurred? 
5 A. No, sir. 
6 Q. To your knowledge, did your brother John ever 
communicate directly to Alison Brandt concerning 
8 information he wanted to pass onto you? 
9 A. She never gave me anything in those regards. 
1 O Q. Okay. Go to Exhibit No. 2 . We will give 
11 Exhibit No. 1 to Kristi and let her try to keep track 
12 of that. 
A. Certainly. 
Q. And I 'm going to ask you to read that. It 






17 Q. But if you' 11 take a look there and tell me 
18 whether or not you've seen that before. 
19 A. Okay. I don't recall seeing this. 
20 Q. All right. It says -- you'll see there on 
21 the second page at the bottom it says CC: Client? 




Q. Do you see that, where it says CC: Client? 
A. I do. 
Q. Are you saying that you've never seen this 
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~/-::: -and MsA .. Brant's fee? 
I also paid for myself for my expenses as 
well. 
Q. Did you tell Ms. Brandt that? 
A. Oh, yes, sir. In fact, my brother was fully U aware of that . He agreed to it. 
7 Q. Is it a true statement that the main asset of 
8 the Trust was the Cornells' home? 
9 
10 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And was it also true that the house was 
11 listed through the Real Estaters at $445, 000? 
12 A. I believe, sir, according to my Realtor it 
13 was listed at $450,000 originally. 
14 Q. Okay. How much money had you taken from the 
15 Estate for your own expenses at that point? 
16 
17 
A. I can't recall. 
Q. How much money had you paid from the Trust 
18 for Ms. Brandt's fee? 
19 A. I believe one was initial was between 150 and 
20 $17 5. The second one was $1500, but the retainer was 
21 used up by my sibling and his attorney. And it went 
22 I can't recall exactly how much over it went, but 
23 roughly that amount of money. 
24 Q. You've provided some Answers to 
25 Interrogatories in request for production. You've 




signed those with your lawyer, in which you provided 
2 some bank accounts that were bank accounts of the 
3 Trust. 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative.) 
5 Q. And it also provided some copies of checks 
10 
11 
that were issued from those bank accounts, and those 
were also a debit card, apparently, and so there are 
certain things listed as to where those monies were 
paid out? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative.) 
Q. I couldn't find, and maybe it was just that 
12 wasn't patient enough, but I couldn't find where this 
13 money came from that went to pay Alison Brandt. 
14 A. Okay. That would have been a cashier's 
15 check, two of them, from Wells Fargo Bank. 
16 Q. Okay. So, it wouldn't be reflected in the 
17 materials that you've provided to me? 
18 A. It would not, however -- I don't think I 
19 brought them. No -- I paid with cashier's checks. It 
20 would be on this summary. Excuse me, Karin. 
21 MS. SEUBERT: Can we go off the record? 
22 MR. CREASON: Sure. Let's just take a little 
23 break. 
24 (Recess at 10:08 a.m.) 
25 (Reconvened at 10: 10 a .m.) 
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it says 5/ 4/10. Then the very next entry, that says 
2 5/4/10 it says Alison Brandt, $1,500. Are those the 
3 entries you are referring to? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay, and can you find on the materials you 
provided to me, that is, the Wells Fargo checking 
7 account statements, or the bank statements, where that 
8 money is drawn out of the Wells Fargo account? 
A. I can't at this moment, but I believe my 
10 · attorney, Karin Seubert, 1 is looking for that 
11 information. 
12 MR. AHERIN: If she looks for that information 
13 those worksheets we were just looking at, can we have 
14 your office make a copy? I haven't seen them. 
15 MR. CREASON: I haven't either. We will get 
16 copies of the worksheets, yeah. 
17 A. Thank you. I can't locate it at this time. 
18 Q. (By Mr. Creason) It always pleases me to ask 
19 a bank teller to understand a bank statement and have 
20 them do what you' re doing right now. 
21 
22 
A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 
Q. If you will please give me the folder you 
23 have and tell me a little bit about those records that 
24 you just -- you've showed me a page of it. It looks 
25 like worksheets, spreadsheets. 
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1 Q. (By Mr. Creason) During our break, 
2 Ms. Johnson, you've had a chance to go back through 
3 some of your accounting records and the records that 
4 you've provided to me in relation to the question that 
5 I asked you about the payment or the retainer for 
6 Alison Brandt. Were you able to locate some 
7 information that will help us understand how she was 
paid and how much she was paid from the Trust? 
9 A. Yes, sir. 
10 Q. Okay, and where did you look to find this 
11 record? 
12 A. That was on a previous accounting that I 












Q. Okay. Do you have that piece of paper with 
A. I do, sir. 
Q. All right. Would you let me take a look at 
please. 
A. May I go ahead and point it out to you? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Right here (indicating.) 
Q. Okay. You've pointed out to me an entry on 
23 a, looks like, a work paper, accounting spreadsheet, a 
24 cashier's check number 0585904902 Alison Brandt, 
25 Attorney $125, and then in the column marked utilities 
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1 A. Okay, I'd be happy to. Please excuse me for 
2 a moment. 
Q. Sure. 
A. There you are. 
Q. All right. You've handed me four sheets. 





7 Q. They look like spreadsheets. Is that what 
8 you would call these? 
A. I believe so, sir. 
10 Q. All right. Tell me what those are. Are 
11 those your records? 
12 A. Yes, sir. 
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320 Michigan Avenue 
P.O. Box 2482 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 
Phone(208)476-7212 
Fax (208) 476-4642 
April 26, 2010 
JolmCome1l 
339 W. Highway 30 
Burley, Idaho 83318 
Re: Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell Revocable Trust 
Dear Jobn: 
Please accept my condolences on the loss of your father. He was a very kind man and I am sure 
he will be greatly missed. 
I met with your sister, Ms. Toni Jobnson, regarding the distribution of the Michael S. Cornell and 
Arlie.M. Cornell Revocable Trust before I received your message. As you know, Ms. Jobnson is 
the Successor Trustee of your parents' trust and you and Ms. Johnson are the sole beneficiaries. 
Ms. Johnson is fully aware that she has a fiduciary obligation to the trust estate. Trustees must 
ensure that trust assets are managed appropriately while trust administration takes place. This 
means that assets cannot be wasted, trust debts must be paid, and assets will be distributed to the 
beneficiaries as practicably as possible considering all circumstances. 
.... . 
.· ... ~ ... . .... - . -·.·-·· ' 
it is my understanding· that the main asset of your parents' trust is the real property and that this 
real property will need to be sold. The real estate market from a seller's standpoint in Orofino js 
not good. There was a time when homes such a~ your parents' were s~lling for very high prices 
but that is no longer the case. 
In any event, Ms. Johnson will be speaking with a realtor and pJacing the home on the market. 
l anticipate that a sale, for a reasonable price, will not occur quickly. Hopefully, I am wrong. 
While we wait for a buyer for the home there are many monthly expenses associated with the 
subdivision in which your parents' home is located that Ms. Johnson will need to pay from the 
trust bank account funds. She will further use the funds minimally to do any necessary small 
repairs that the realtor may suggest to improve the home's sale potential. 
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Currently, Ms. Johnson feels pressure from you to liquidate the assets of the trust and dispers
e 
the money immediately. Due to circums.tances at this time, Ms. Johnson cannot fulfill her 
fiduciary obligation as Successor Trustee and liquidate the assets as you wish. Undue pressu
re 
and profanity from you will only further strain your relationship and may cause Ms. Johnson
 to 
seek a restraining order from the court to stop any and all harassment on your part. 
Please be advised that Ms. Jolmson is doing everything she can to get the trust assets distribu
ted 
as quickly as possible, aUwithin her responsibilities and obligations as set forth in the Idaho 
Statutes. 
Ms. Johnson would prefer that your communication be. through me, so if you would like to b
e 
updated on her progress please do not hesitate to write to me and advise me of such. I can le
t 
you know what price the realtor suggests to place on your parents' home. if there are offer.<
: on 




Cc: Ms. Toni Johnson 
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deciding who wanted what. I don't recall what the date 
was on that. 
Q. Okay. So, that was perhaps in the carload of 
things? 
A. Yes . 
Q. Did you part on good terms back in February 
of 2010? 
A. Uhm, I really can't say one way or the other . 
Q. Okay. We don't have an Exhibit No. 11, but 
10 I ' ve already premarked this as No . 12, so I' 11 show you 
11 Exhibit No. 12 and ask you if you've seen that document 
12 before? 
13 A. Okay. I don't recall seeing this . 
14 Q. Do you know what that is? 
15 A. It says on here: Revocable Family Trust of 
16 Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell. 
17 Q. Is that the Trust which you are the Trustee? 
18 A. Uhm, I don't know, unless it says on here 
19 directly. All I can say is I haven't seen it before. 
20 Q. Why don ' t you look at it in connection with 
21 Exhibit No . 6 that is there by the Reporter. 
22 A. Okay . Thank you . 
23 Q. Why don't you also look at No. 8 right along 
24 side that and look at No . 7 as well . 
25 A. Thank you . 
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Q. Okay. Have you inventoried_ the private 
papers of 1our parents that ar~ in the house; in other 
---- ------3 words, have you gone through there and looked at them? 
A .. ~anest j t is a J at of junk as :fM_g_s 
5 just old receipts and stuff 
seeij anythin substantial ca.L.dmm....and 
gone·-~~aper. 
Q. Is there a safe or some other place where 
they kept important papers? 




Q. Safe deposit box? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did your parents or someone on their behalf 
14 share with you where they kept their important papers? 
15 
16 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay . Would you do a thorough search of the 
17 papers and if you have some doubt about their 
18 importance; in fact, if they are papers that pertain to 
19 your parents or your parents' property would you review 






A. Sure. May I write that down, please. 
Q. Yeah. 
MS . SEUBERT: I will write it down . 
A. Okay . Thank you . 
Q. (By Mr. Creason) What ' s the basis of your 
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Q. Now , I t hin k in answering questions that I 've 
2 posed to you in the last couple hours you've told me 
3 successively that you don't believe you had seen any of 
4 these documents before. Is that still your testimony? 
5 A. The only one right now that I recall seeing , 
I think -- I believe this is the one that I saw 
(handing paper to Mr. Creason.) 
Q. You believe you saw No . 6? 
A. Yes, sir . 
10 Q. Is that the one you thought was your in 
11 brother's hand or your dad's hand when they came back 
12 from Alison Brandt's? 
13 A. That is correct . 
14 Q. And that ' s No. 6, okay . So, would it be fair 
15 to say that you did not and have not until today seen 
16 the documents that empower you to act as a Trustee for 
17 the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and 
18 Arlie M. Cornell? 
19 A. I don't recall seeing those documents . 
20 Q. Did your parents have a Will, to your 
21 knowledge? 
·-22 A. I believe they did. If so, I don't know 
23 where t~h~ 
24 Q. Would they be in the house? 
25 A. If they are there they would be. 
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disability for Social Security benefits? 
2 A. Well, initially what happened -- I don't know 
3 really how to expl ain it. Could you repeat the 
question again, please? 
5 Q. My understanding is there is a pending claim 
6 for Social Security Disability that you made? 
A. Right, right , right. 
Q. I think you called it SSI? 
A. Correct . 
10 Q. Perhaps you mean something else . I don't 
11 know. 
12 A. Okay. 
13 Q. But what causes you to believe that you may 
14 be entitled to those benefits? 
15 A. Okay. At the time that it was applied for me 
16 I was extremely ill. I had a duodenal ulcer that was 
17 large, and it perforated my bowel and blew out my 
18 bowel. And at that time I had congestive heart failure 




Q. When was that? 
A. That was January 20th of this year . 




A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is the house currently listed? 










ARLIE M. CORNELL 
MICHAEL S. · CORNELL and ARLIE M. CORNELL, husband and wife, residents of the State of California, County of Orange, desire to set forth a Trust upon the· conditions and for the purposes hereafter set forth. This Trust will be known as the 11 MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND .ARLIE M. CORNELL REVOCABLE TRUST DATED 
.,Md v, l ; I 59 G · 11 
ARTICLE ONE 
Section 1.01 Trust Estate 
All property hereafter transferred or conveyed to and received by the Trustee to be held pursuant to the terms of this instrument is herein called the 11 Trust Esta:te" and shall be held, adminis.tered, and distributed by the Trustee as provided in this Declaration of Trust. 
· 
Section 1.02 Meaning of Words 
a) The term "Husband" shall mean MICHAEL S. CORNELL; 
b) The term "Wifen shall mean ARLIE M. CORNELL; 
c) The term "Trustor" shall refer individually and collectively to Husband and Wife. 
Section 1.03 Trustee Designation 
Husband and Wife are hereby designated as Co-Trustees of all trusts created by or to bi created pu~suant to this Declaration of Trust. Should either Husband or Wife become unable because of death, incapacity or other cause, to serve as such a Co-Trustee, or should either resign as such a Co-Trustee, before the natural termination of all trusts provided for in this Declaration, the remaining Co-Trustee, Husband or Wife,: shall thereafter serve as sole Tr~tee as provided in this Declaration. The term "Trustee" as used in this Declaration shall refer collectively to Husband 
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and Wife so long as they shall serve as such Co-Trustees and thereafter to such of them as may serve as sole Trustee. This paragraph is subject to Section 9.01.' 
Section 1. 04 Additions to Trust Properties 
a) At any time during the continuance of any trust hereunder, its Trustees, in their sole discretion after consideration of the possible tax consequences thereof to all ·concerned, is authorized to receive additions of cash or other propertieg to such trust, subject to any conditions to which such Trustees may agree, from any source whatsoever without limita(ion, whether by gift, will, or otherwise. However, the Trustees shall accept all assets 
which any person or persons.may -give, devise, and/or bequeath by last will and testament to·· any trust br trusts hereunder as well 
as all assets which 1iiay be transferred to such trust or trusts pursuant to the express P.rovisions of'any other trust document or documents of any kind.· 
b) Furthermore, ~-t any time any person or persons may designate any trust hereurider as the beneficiary, primary or contingent, of any insurance, pension I or other death benefit, relating to the life of anyone (such designation to be presumed to be revocable 
unless it is expressly irrevocable) and, until such benefit matures by reason of death, the. Trustees shall have no responsibility whatsoever with respect thereto, it being intended that, unless and until the trust which is the designated beneficiary of such death benefit becomes the owner of the insurance proceeds as actually become payable by reason of death. 
c) All additions, unless specifically designated to a certain trust or trusts hereunder or unless there is only one trust then in existence hereunder, shall be conside_red as made to the Trust as hereinafter ·defined. Any addition, including any income 
earned thereon prior to ·actual receipt 6£ the addition by the trust, shall be added to the corpus of su.ch trust and thereafter held, managed, and distributed by its Trustees as a part of the 
corpus to which the same is added. 
Section 1.05 Separate Propert;r to Remain Separate 
All property now or hereafter conveyed or transferred to the Trustee to be held by the Trustee pursuant to this Declaration which was community property, quasi-community property, or separate property at the time of such conveyance or transfer, 
shall remain, respectively, community property, quasi-community property, or the separate property of the Trw~tor transferring 
such property to the Trustee. 
When separate property is held in the Trust, it may be withdrawn from the Trust on the sole signature of the Trustor who put it in the Trust. This applies to real property, as well as personal property. 
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Section 1.06 Amendment and Revocation 
At any time during the joint lives of the Trustors, jointly as to 
Community Property and individually as to his or her own separate 
property, Trustors may, by a duly executed instrument; 
a) Amend this trust, agreement 
provisions) in any manner and/or 
(including its technical 
b) Revoke this trust agreement in part or in whole, in which 
latter event any and ·all trust properties shall forthwith revert 
to such Trustor free of trust. · Such instrument of amendment or 
revocation shall be effective immediately upon its proper 
execution by Trustor(s), but until a copy has been received by a 
trustee, that . Trustee s_hall not · incur any liability or 
responsibility either (i). for failing: to act in accordance with 
such instrument· or (ii) for acting in accordance with the 
provisions of. this trust agreement; without regard to such 
instrument. 
ARTICLE TWO 
Section 2.01 Trust Income 
During the joint lives of the Trustors, the Trustee shall ·at 
least annually unless otherwise directed by · both Trustors in 
writing, pay to or apply for the benefit of Husband and Wife, all 
of the net income from the Trust Estate in the same proportion as 
each of their respective interests in the Trust Estate. 
Section 2.02 Protection 
Incapacity 
of · Trustor J.Il Event of 
During the joint lives of the Trustors, should either Trustor 
become incapacitated as defined in Section 2.03 below, the 
Trustee may, in the Trustee 1 s discretion; 
a) Pay the entire net income of the 1Trust Estate in monthly or 
other convenient installments to the remaining competent Trustor; 
or 
b) Apply such portion of the net income, up to the whole 
thereof, of the Trust Estate as the Trustee may deem in his 
absolute discretion reasonable and proper for the benefit of the 
Trustor so adjudged to be incompetent or unable to manage his or 
her own affairs; or 
c) Declare void and without effect, any attempt by the Trustor 
to exercise the reserved· rights of revocation, amendment, 
withdrawal of assets, control over·Trustees, etc., unless a court 
of competent jurisdiction determines otherwise or Trustor 1 s 
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disappearance constitutes incapacity. During any period of. 
either Trustor's incapacity, this :Trust is irrevocable and 
unamendable. · As Trustors do not intend that any taxable gift be 
deemed made by reason of such irrevocability, it is expressly 
provided that, notwithstanding the foregoing, Trustors shall at 
all times have the power to appoint to any person, designated in 
any way in this agreement as a vested or contingent beneficiary, 
any and all assets contained in this trust at the time of 
Trust or 1 s death, said power being exercisable, however, only by 
specific reference to said power in Trust or's will duly provided 
for probate. 
Section 2.03 Incapacity 
Tn the event that any Tr:ustee or any ,beneficiary hereunder comes 
into possession of any of· the following: 
aY A court order 1 which such Trustee or beneficiary deems to be 
jurisdictionally proper and still concurrently applicable, 
holding a person to be legally incapacitated to act in his or her 
own behalf or appointing a guardian tq act for him or her,. or 
b) Duly executed 1 witnessed, acknowledged written certificates, 
at least. one of which is then unrevoked 1 of two licensed 
physictans (each of wh9m represents that he or she is certified 
by a recognized medical board), each certifying that such 
physician has examined a person and has concluded that 1 by reason 
of· accident, or mental deterioration, · or similar cause, such 
person had, at the date thereof, become incapacitated to act 
rationally and prudently in his or her own financial best 
interests 1 or 
c) Evidence which such Trustee or beneficiary deems to be 
creditable and still· currently applicable that a person has 
disappeared, · is unaccountably absent, or is being detained under 
duress where· he or she is unable effectively and prudently to 
look after his or her own interests. 
Then, in that event and under those circurnstar1ces: 
a) Such person shall be deemed to have 
· incapacitated, as that. term is used in and 





b) Such incapacity shall be deemed to continue until such court 
order, certificates, and/or circumstances have become 
inapplicable or have been revoked/ and 
c) The named successor trustee shall immediately become the 
Trustee, acting with all the rights and powers described herein. 
Any physician 1 s 
certificate to 
1ncapacitated, 
aforesaid certificate may be revoked by a similar 
the effect that such person is no longer thus 
executed either by ( i) the original certifying 
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physician or (ii) two other licensed, board certified physicians. 
No Trustee shall be under any duty to institute any inquiry into 
a person 1 s possible incapacity, but the expense of any such 
inquiry reasonably instituted may· be paid from .trust assets. 
Payment for said inquiry refers both to a reasonable inquiry as 
to the incapacity of such individual .·and to that inquiry as to 
the revocation of such a Certificate. 
Section 2. 04 Protection in the Event of Catastrophic 
Illness 
If both Trust ors are · living and a catastrophic illness. affects 
.one of the Trustors, then the remaining Trustor may divide the 
Trust assets ·in such a way as to qualify the infirm Trustor for 
state assistance payments and may remove the infirm Trustor as a 
Trustee of this ·Trust. A catastrophic . illness is one which is 
reasonably anticipated to extend for a period of six (6) months 
or longer,. and which renders the affected Trustor incompetent or 
in need of full time care. If competent, a Trustor may make the 
determination to divide the Trust Estate in accordance with these 
provisions. If the Trustor affected by the catastrophic illness 
is not competent to manage his or her:affairs, then the division 
shall be made by the person designated as the affected Trustor's 
·attorney-in-fact in his or her durable power of attorney, or by a 
court appointed con·servator of the affected Trustor. 
From and after the division of the Trust assets, the share of the 
Trust Estate set aside for each Trustor shall be his or her sole 
and separate property for all purposes 1 and if that property 
remains part of the Trust Estate, subject to the tEfrms and 
conditions set forth within this trust agreement. The Trustor 
who is not · infirm may use assets of the infirm Trustor to 
purchase an annuity or other assets which do not disqualify the 
infirm Trustor from state assistance . 
. Section 2 . 05 Principal Invasion 
During the joint lives of the Trustors, should the net income of 
the. Trust Estate be insufficient to provide for the care, 
maintenance or support of. the Trust ors as herein defined, the 
Trustee may, in the Trustee's absolute discretion, pay to or 
apply for the benefit .of the Trustors/ or either .of them, or any 
of their dependents, such amounts from the principal of the 
Trust Estate as the Trustee may, .tn the Trustee's absolute 
discretion, from. time to time deem necessary or advisable for 
the care, maintenance or support of 'the Trustors. As used in 
. this section, the term 11 care, maintenance or support of the 
Trustors" shall mean: 
a) The providing of proper care, maintenance and support for 
the Trustors, or either of them, during any period of illness, or 
other want or necessity; 
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b) The maintenance of the Trustors, and each of them, in the 
manner of living to which they, and each of them, are accustomed 
on the date of this Declarationi 
c) The support and maintenance in the manner in which they are 
accustomed on the date of this Declaration whether adult or 
minor, dependent on the Trust ors, or either of them, for such 
support and maintenance; and 
d) The education in the manner degired by the Trugtors of any 
person, whether adult or · minor, dependent on the Trust ors, or 
either of them, for such education. · 
ARTICLE 'THREE 
Section 3.01 Provisions After· First Death 
On the death of either Trustor, leaving the other Trust or 
surviving him or her, the· then· Trustee shall collect all 
insurance proceeds payable to the Trustee by reason of such 
death, all bequests and devises distributable to the Trust Estate 
under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased 
Trustor and convey the assets according to the instructions set 
forth herein. The Trustee may use all income and principal for 
the benefit of the surviving Trustor. 
Section 3.02 Last Expenses 
On the death of the first of the Trustors to die, the Trust shall 
pay either from the income ·or principal of the Trust as the 
Trustee in the Trustee's absolute discretion may determine, the 
expenses of the deceased Truster's last illness, funeral, burial 
and any inheritance, estate or death taxes that may be due by 
reason of the deceased Trustor I s death, unless that Trustee in 
his or her absolute . discretion determines that other adequate. 
provisions . ha·ve been · made :Eor the payment of such expenses and 
taxes, 
Section 3.'03 Surviving Spouse 
The Trustee shall hold, administer and distribute all Trust 
assets for the benefit of the surviving spouse, both as to income 
and principal, unless otherwise herein·provided. 
ARTICLE FOUR 
Section 4.01 Second Death 
On the death of the Trustor last to die, herein called "Surviving 
Trustor 11 , the principal of the Trust and any accrued or 
undistributed net income from the Trust shall go to the successor 
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Trustee and the Trustee shall apply and distribute the net income 
and principal of the Trust Estate as set forth herein. 
Section 4.02 Payment of the Second Death Expenses 
On· the death of the surviving Trust or, the Trustee shall pay 
either from the income or principal of the Trust or partly from 
the income and partly from the principal of. the Trust, as the 
Trustee in his or her absolute discretion may determine, the 
expenses·of the Surviving Trustor's last illness, funeral, burial 
and any inheritance, estate or death taxes that may be due b·y 
reason of the inclusion of any portiori of the Trust Estate in the 
Surviving Trustor' s estate for the · purposes o{ any such tax, 
unless the Trustee in his or her absolute discretion determines 
that other adequate provisions have b~en made for the payment of 
such expenses and taxes . '· 
Section 4.03 Trust Income and Principal Distribution 
On the death of the surviving Trustor ,: the Trust shall terminate 
and the Trustee shall; as soon as reasonably possible 1 divide the 
net income and principal remaining in· :the Trust into two {2) equal 
shares and distribute them to the following beneficiaries: 
TONIC. JOHNSON and JOHN H. CORNELL 
a) If any child, for whom a share of the Trust Estate has been 
set aside, $hould die prior to the above distribution, then the 
Trustee shall distribute all of such deceased child 1 s share of 
the Trust Estate to his or her surviving issue in equal shares. 
If any issue are minors, the funds from the Trust Estate shall be 
held in a bank, savings and loan or money market fund and used 
for their . care, welJ are. and college · education. Any funds 
.ce1uc1..i.11.i.11::J shall be distributed at age 25. If there is no 
survi vi·ng issue, then . all of the deceased child's share of the 
Trust Estate· shall be added to the · shares set aside for the 
benefit of the Trustors I other living child, as hereinabove 
provided, including proportionately both the distributed and the 
undistributed portions of each such share, to be distributed as 
an equal part of such other shares. 
b) If all of the Trustors' beneficiaries outlined above should 
die prior to final distribution of the Trust Estate, all of the 
Trust Estate not disposed of as hereinabove provided shall be 
distributed one-half (1/2) to the persons who would then be the 
husband's heirs and the other one-half (1/2) to the persons who 
would then be the heirs of the wife. The identities and 
respective shares of the aforesaid heirs to be determined in 
acc;rdance with the intestate succession laws of the State of 
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California then ,in effect relating to.the succession of separate 
property not acquired from a predeceased spouse. If either of 
the Trust ors have no such heirs, then all of the Trust estate 
shall be distributed to the aforesaid heirs of the other T:r'ustor~ 
Section 4.04 Trust Termination 
Unless sooner term~nated as otherwise provided herein, all of the 
trusts provided for herein shall terminate on the ~ of the 
syrvivor of the Trustor.£ and their children living at the date 
that any of the trusts created hereunder first becomes 
irrevocable. 
Section 4.05 Simultaneous Death 
Should both Trust ors die simultaneously or under any 
circumstances rendering it difficult or impossible to determine 
which Trustor predeceased the other, each Trustor shall, for the 
purpose of disposing of his separate ·property be deemed to have 
predeceased the other Trustor. 
ARTICLE FIVE 
Section. 5 . 01 N~_:_Inco~_Property ( C4':-4.---°cf _.,.~·....:_ck-c..,c-12_ 
During the lives of either of · the Trust ors, the Trustee i;z.-. ·'-~"' -~ 
authorized to retain in the trusts provided for in this t_..._..~~ '-<"-
Declaration, for so long as the Trustee may deem advisable and in 
the best interest of such trusts, any property received by the 
Trustee from the Trustors, or either cf them, whether or not such 
property is of the character permitted by law for the investment 
of trust funds. After the death of the last Trustor to die, the 
Successor Trustee may retain any such property in the trust 
provided for in this Declaration 9_nly SQ long_ .. ~ch property is 
productive o.f ing.g.me, - (subject to Section 5.08 of Article 5 
herein). · 
Section 5. 02 Trustee Powers 
The Trustee shall, with respect to any and all property which 
may at any time be held by the Truste·e in trust pursuant to this 
Declaration 1 whether such property constitutes principal or 
accumulated income of any trust provided for in this Declaration, 
have power, exercisable in the Trustee's absolute discretion at 
any time and from time to time on such terms and in such manner 
as the Trustee may deem advisable to: 
a) Sell, convey, exchange, convert, improve, repair, partition, 
divide, allot, subdivide, create restrictions, easements, or 
other servitudes thereon, operate and control; 
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b) Lease for terms within or beyond the term of any trust 
provided for.in.this Declaration and for any purpose, including 
exploration for and r.emoval of gas, oil. and other minerals; and 
enter into any covenants and agreements relating to the property 
so leased or any improvements which ·may then or thereafter be 
erected on such property; 
c) Encumber or hypothecate for any trust purpose by mortgage 1 
deed of trust 1 pledge or otherwise; 
d) Carry insurance 0£ such kinds and in such amounts at the 
expense of the trusts provided for in this Declaration as the 
Trustee may deem advisable; 
e) Commence or defend at the expense of any trust provided for 
in this Declaration such litigation with respect to any such 
trust or any property of the Trust :Estate as Trustee may deem 
advisable and employ, . for reasonable compensation payable by any 
such trust, such counsel as the Trustee.shall deem advisable for 
that purpose; 
f) So long as the original trustee or trustees are managing the 
Trust, they may invest and reinvest in common or preferred 
stocks, securities, investment trusts, bonds. and other property, 
real · or personal,· foreign or domestic, including any undivided 
interest in any one or more common trust funds, whether or not 
such investments be of the character permissible for investments 
by fiduciaries under any applicable law, and without regard to 
the effect any such investment may have upon the diversification 
of investments. Trustees ·are specifically authorized to invest 
in Mutual Funds, Limited Partnerships, option accounts (covered 
or not),· including, but not limited to, currency, Index, Stocks, 
Futures, Commodities> Precious Metals, etc., traded on the 
Chicago Board of Trade or ·.other nationally recognized Boards of 
Trade_ Trustees· ·expr~ssly :have the authority to trade on margin. 
g) Vote, by proxy or otherwise, in such manner as Trustee may 
determine ·to be: in t:he best interests· of the trust provided for 
in this Declaration, any securiLies having voting rights held by 
the Trustee pursuant to this Declaration; 
h) Pay any assessments or other charges levied on any stock or 
other security held by the· Trustee 'in .trust pursuant to this 
Declaration; 
i) Exercise or not exercise, as Trustee. may deem best, any 
subscription, conversion or other rights or options which may at 
any time attach, belong or be given instruments held by it in 
trust pursuant to this Declaration; 
j) Participate in any plans or proceedings for the foreclosure, 
reorganization, consolidation, merger or liquidation of any 
corporation or organization that has issued securities held by 
the- Trustee, or will issue securities to be held by Trustee in 
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trust pursuant to the terms of this Declaration, to deposit 
securities with and transfer title or securities on such terms as 
Trustee may· deem in . the best . interest of the trusts to any 
protective or other committee established to further or defeat 
any such pian or proceeding; · 
k) Enforce any mortgage or deed of trust or pledge held by 
Trustee in trust pursuant to this Declaration and at any sale 
under any such mortgage, deed of trust or pledge, to bid and 
purchase ·at the expense of any trust provided for. in thig 
Declaration, any property subject to such security instrument; 
1) Compro~ise, submit to arbitration, release with or without 
consideration and otherwise adjust any claims in favor of or 
against any trust provided for in this Declaration; 
m) Distribute gifts of up to $10,000.00 per year per donee out 
of principal or interest or in any proportion of the two that the 
Trustee 1 in his sole discretion, deems advisable; 
n) Invest in and guarantee a business or · Trustee of the Trust 






to any limitations expressly set forth in this 
and faithful performance of Trustee 1 s fiduciary 
to do all such acts 1 take all such proceedings, and 
such rights and privileges as could be done, taken 
by an absolute owner of the trust propertyi and. 
p) So long as both of the original Trustees are serving as 
Trustees hereunder, either of them shall have the power to bind 
the trust in any and all ·transactions, including, but not limited 
to (1) collecting receipts; (2) paying disbursements; {3) 
securing assets; (4) writing checks and making withdrawals from 
bank accounts; (.5) purchasing, selling and pledging securities 
and other property/ and ( 6) exercising: any power conferred on the 
Trustees pursuant to the terms. ·of thi~ Declaration of Trust, and 
the action of either original Trustee may be relied upon by third 
parties dealing with those Trustees or either of them. 
! 
q) The trustee' is empowered to buy~ sell, trade and deal in 
options, precious metals, stocks, bol)ds and securities of all 
nature (including "short II sales and speculative option 
transactions i.e. uncovered puts and calls, option spreads, 
option straddles,·. and option combinations) and commodities of 
every nature, and contracts for . the future deli very of 
commodities of every nature on margin and otherwise; and for such 
purpose to maintain and. operate margin and commodity accounts 
with brokers; and in connection therewith to borrow money and to 
pledge any and all stocks, bonds, securities, commodities and 
contracts for the future delivery theieof, held or purchased by 
the trustee, with such brokers as securities for loans and 
advances made to the trustee. 
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r) The successor trustee has the authority to enter the safe 
deposit box in Trustors 1 names, individually or as Trustees of 
the Trust, and remove the contents thereof. 
Section 5.03 Power to Borrow 
The Trustee shall have the power to borrow money for any trust 
purpose (including from the probate :estate for the purpose of 
paying taxes) on such terms and conditions as the Trustee may 
deem proper from any pergon, firm or corporation, including the 
power to borrow money on behalf of one trust from any other trust 
provided for in this Declaration, and to obligate the trusts, or 
any of them, provided for in this Declaration to repay such 
borrowed money. 
Section 5.04 Power To Loan to Trusts 
The Trustee is authorized to loan or advance Trustee's own funds 
to any trust provided for in this Declaration for any trust 
purpose and to charge for such loan or advance the rate of 
interest that Trustee, at the time such.--lo.an or advance is made, 
would have charged had such loan-or-- advance been made to a person 
not connected with such trusts having a net worth equal to the 
value of the principal of such trust. 'Any such loan or advance, 
together with the interest accruing on such loan or advance, 
shall be a first lien against the principal of the Trust to which 
such loan or advance is made and shall be repaid from the income 
or principal of such trust as in the discretion of the Trustee 
appears for the best interest of such trust and its 
beneficiaries. 
Section 5.05 
The Trustee is 
property from and 
Estate with or 
representative of 
Section 5.06 
Purchase of Securities 
authorized to purchase securities or other 
to make loans and advancements from the Probate 
without security to the executor or other 
the estate of either'. Trustor .. 
Manner of Holding Title 
The Trustee may hold securities or other property held by Trustee 
in trust pursuant to this Declaration in Trustee's name as 
Trustee under this Declaration, in Trustee I s own name without a 
designation showing it to be Trustee under this Declaration, in 
the name of Trustee I s nominee, or the Trustee may hold such 
securities unregistered in such condition that ownership will 
pass by delivery. 
Section 5.07 Expense and Proceeds Allocation 
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Declaration, 
the Trustee shall allocate all receipts and expenditures received 
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or incurred by Trustee in administering the trusts provided for 
in this Declaration to the income or principal of each such trust 
in the manner provicted in this Declaration to the income or 
principal of each such trust in the manner provided by the 
Revised Uniform Principle and Inqome Act in effect on the date of 
this Declaration in the State of California. 
Section 5.08 TrustorsT Residence 
After the death of the first Trustor to die, the Trustee is 
authorized to retain in any trust or ·trusts provided for in this 
Declaration for the personal use of. the Surviving Trustor any 
property occupied by the Trustors as their principle place of 
residence_ at the time of death of the first Trustor to die for so 
long ·as the Surviving Trustor may desire to occupy such residence 
property. During such retention, the Trustee shall pay,· from 
either the income or principal of the trust provided for in this 
Declaration as the Trustee may deem in the best interests of such 
trusts and their. bene_ficiaries, all taxes and assessments levied 
or assessed against s.uch property and. all costs of· keeping such 
property properly insured, maintained· and repaired. Surviving 
Trustor shall not be obligated for payment of rent. On written 
request of the Surviving Trustor, the Trustee may sell . such 
property and replace _it with other property, to be retained in 
trust in the same manner as the repl.a-ced residence property, 
suitable in the Trustee's judgment as a residence for the 
Surviving Trustor. 
ARTICLE SIX 
Section. 6.01 Coordination with Trustor's Probate Estate 
a) At any time during the continu~nce of the original trust 
hereunder and after the first Trustor's death, its Trustees m0y 
distribute to the deceased Trustoi 1 s probate estate, as a 
beneficiary of such trust, cash and/or. other property out of any 
assets then held by such trust, · including any which are 
classified as postdeath trust income, to whatever extent such 
Trustees, in their sole and uncontrolled discretion, deem 
·advisable in the best interest of Trustor' s beneficiaries 
generally. 
b) To relieve Trustor I s probate estate from the burden of 
paying them, any estate, inheritance, succession, or other 
similar death taxes which may be imposed as a result of Trustor 1 s 
death, as well as funeral, last illness, and administrative 
expense, debts, and other proper charges against Trustor's 
estate, may at any time be paid out· of any assets then held by 
the original trust hereunder, including.any which are classified 
as nostdeath trust income, to whatever extent the Trustees of the 
original Trust hereunder, in their sole and uncontrolled 
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discretion, deem advisable and in the best interest of the 
Trustor 1 s beneficiaries generally . 
. c) All other provisions ·hereof to tht:: contrary notwithstanding, 
· under no circumstances shall any : restricted proceeds, as 
hereinafter defined, be either di~ectly or _indirectly (i) 
distributed to or for the benefit of Trusto:r 1 s executors or 
Trustor's probate estate or (ii) used to pay any obligations of 
Trustor's estate. The term 11 restricted proceeds 11 means: 
1) All qualified plans 1 individual retirement 
accounts, or similar benefits which are received or receivable by 
any Trustee hereunder which, if · paid solely · to a beneficiary 
"other than the .executor 11 of the T:tustor' s estate, would be 
excluded from Trustor I s gross estate · for · federal estate tax 
purposes under Section 2039 of the · :Internal Revenue Code in 
effect at Trustor's death; and 
2) All proceeds of insurance on Trustor 1 s life whicti; 
if paid to a beneficiary other than Trustor 1 s estate, would be 
exempt £rom inheritance or similar death taxes under applicable 
state death tax laws. 
However, the term 11 restricted proceeds" shall not include any 
qualified plan or similar death benefits which would not in fact 
be excluded from Trustor' s gross estate under the applicable 
subsection. of Section 2039 even though such benefits were 
receivable by a beneficiary other than Trustor' s executor nor 
shall it include any life insurance proceeds which would be 
subject to no greater state or federal death tax should this 
-restriction not exist. 
Section 6.02 Direction to Minimize Taxes 
-In the administration of the trust hereunder, its fiduciaries 
shall exercise all tax related elections, options, and choices 
which they have, in· such manner as they in their sole but 
reasonable judgment (where appropriate, receiving advice of tax 
counsel), believe will achieve the :bverall minimum in total 
combined present and reasonably anti9ipated (but appropria'tely 
discounted) future administrative expenses and taxes of all 
kinds, upon not only such trust, but also its beneficiaries, the 
other trusts hereunder and their beneficiaries and Trustor 1 s 
probate estate. Without limitation on the generality of the 
foregoing direction (which shall to that extent supersede the 
usual fiduciary duty of impartiality), such fiduciaries shall not 
be accountable to· any person interested in any trust or in 
Trustor 1 s estate for the manner in which they shall carry out 
this direction-to minimize overall taxes and expenses (including 
any decision they may make not to incur the expense of detailed 
analysis of alternative choices) and, even though their decisions 
in this regard may result in increased tax or decreased 
distribution to a trust, to the estate, or to one or more 
beneficiaries, · there shall in no e·vent be any compensation 
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readjustments or reimbursements between any of the trusts 
hereunder or any of the trust or estate accounts or beneficiaries 
by reason of the manner in which the 'fiduciaries thus carry out 
said direction. 
ARTICLE SEVEN 
Section 7.01 Incontestability 
The beneficial provisions of this instrument (an<l of Trust or's 
Last Will and Testament) are intended to be in lieu of any other 
rights, claims, or interest of ·whatsoever natureJ whether 
statutory or otherwise, except bona fide pre-death debts, which 
any beneficiary hereunder may have against or in Trustor's estate 
or the properties. in trust hereunder. Accordingly, if any 
beneficiary hereunder asserts any claim (except a legally 
enforceable debt), ·statutory election, · or other right or interest 
against or in Trustor 1 s estate, Trustor 1 s Will, or any properties 
of this Trust, other than pursuant tc:i the express terms hereof or 
of said Will, or directly or indirectly contests, disputes 1 or 
calls into question, before any court, the validity of any 
provisions of .this instrument or of said Will, then: 
a) Such beneficiary shall thereby absolutely forfeit any and 
all beneficiary interests of whatsoever kind and nature which 
such beneficiary might otherwise have under this instrument and 
the interests of the other beneficiaries shall be proportionately 
increased and/or advanced; 
b) All of the provisions of this instrument, to the extent that 
they confer any benefits, powers, or right . whatsoever upon such 
claiming, electing, or contesting beneficiary, shall thereupon 
become absolutely void and revoked; and 
c) Such claiming, electing, or contesting beneficiary, 
acting as a Trustee hereunder, shall automatically cease 
Trustee and shall thereafter be ineligible either to 
remove or become a Trustee hereunder. 
if then 
to be a 
The foregoing shall not be construed, however, to limit the 
appearance of any beneficiary as a witness in any proceeding 
involving this instrument or said Will nor to limit any 
beneficiary's appearance in any capacity in any proceeding solely 




Section 8. 01 Ac.crued · Income; on Termination of 
Beneficial In.terest 
Whenever the right of any beneficiary to payments from the net 
income or principal of any trust provided for in this Declaration 
shall terminate either by reason of death or other cause, any 
accrued net income from such trust undistributed by the Trustee 
on.the date of such termination shall be held, administered and 
distributed by the Trustee in the sam~ manner as if such income 
had accrued and been received by the Trustee after -the date such 
beneficiary's right to receive payments from such trust 
terminated. 
Section 8.02 Periodic Accountings 
A Trustee shall be entitled to · pay himself reasonable 
compensation from time to. time without prior court order and 
shall be reimbursed for all out-of-pocket expenses incurred in 
administering the Trust . · 
During the lifetime of either Trustor 1 the Trustees shall account 
only to the Settlors or the survivor of. them, and their written 
approval shall be final and conclusive in respect to transactions 
disclosed in the account as to all beneficiaries of the trust, 
including unborn and contingent beneficiaries. After·. the deaths 
of both Trustors, the Trustees shall render an accounting from 
time to time but not less frequently than annually after any 
prior accounting·regarding the transactions of any trust created 
in this instrument. ' 
Acc~~tings shall be made by delivering a .written accounting to 
each beneficiary entitled to current income distribution, or if 
there are no current income beneficiaries; to each beneficiary 
entitled to current distribution out ~f income or principal in 
the Trustees' discretion·. If. any person entitled to receive an 
accounting is a minor or is under a disability, the accounting 
shall be delivered to his parents or the guardian of his person 
if he is a minor or to the guardian or conservator of his person 
if he is under any other disability. · Unless any beneficiary, 
including parents, guardians or conservators of beneficiaries, 
shall deliver a written objection to the Trustees within sixty 
( 6 O) days after receipt of the Trustees' account, the account 
shall be final and conclusive in respect to the transactisms 
disclosed in the account as to all benef itiaries of the trust 
including unborn and unascertained beneficiaries. After 
settlement of the account by agreement of the parties objecting 
to it or by the expiration of the sixty (60) day period, the 
Trustees shall no longer be liable to any beneficiary of the 
trust including unborn and unascertained beneficiaries, in 
respe~t to transactions disclosed in the account, except for the 
Trustees' intentional wrongdoing or fraud. 
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Section 8.03 Spendthrift Provision 
Except as ot_herwise expressly provided in this Declaration 1 no 
· beneficiary of any trust provided for in this Declaration shall 
have any right, · power or authority. to alienate 1 encumber or hypothecate his or her interest in the principal o"r income of 
such trus·t · iii ·-any----manner, nor shall such interest of any 
beneficiary be subject to cla~ms of his. o:i: he:r: __ ~r-~ditors or 
liable. to attachment, execution or- other process of law. 
Section· 8.04 Distribution ·in Kind or Cash 
On any di vision of the assets of the Trust Estate into shares or 
partial shares · and on any final or partial distribution of the 
assets of the Trust Estate or any trust provided for · in this 
Declaration,·· the Trustee, in its absolute discretion, may divide 
and distribute such assets in kind, may divide or distribute 
undivided interests of .such assets I OT may sell all or any part 
of such assets : and make- division or distribution in cash or 
partly in casb and partly ·1n kind. The decision of the Trustee, 
either prior to or on any division or distribution of such 
assets~ as to what constitutes·a proper division of such assets 
of the Trust Estate or any trust provided for in this Deylaration 
shall be binding on all persons in any manner interested in any 
trust provided for in this Declaration. 
Section 8.05 Definition of Children 
The .terms "child11 and 11 childrenJ1 as used in this Trust shall mean 
the lawful issue of the Trustors or either of them and include 
children legally adopted by the Trustors or either of them. 
ARTICLE NINE 




W-1...l....L act as Trustees in the following order of 
FIRST: The undersigned 1 MICHAEL S. CORNELL, Husband and 
ARLIE M .· CORNELL, Wife, together as co-trustees. 
SECOND: At the death or incapacity of the last survivor of the 
undersigned, TONIC. JOHNSON and JOHN H. CORNELL shall act as Co-
Trustees. 
THIRD: A trustee chosen by the majority of beneficiaries, with 
a parent or legal guardian voting for minor beneficiaries; 
provided, however, that the issue of any deceased child shall 
have collectively only one vote. 
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ARTICLE TEN 
Section 10.01 Perpetuities Savings Clause 
In any event and anything to the contrary herein contained 
notwithstanding, · the trusts c·reated in this agreement shall 
terminate upon the day_ next preceding the expiration of twenty-
one (2l) years after the death of the undersigned and their issue 
now living. In the event these trusts shall not have previously 
terminated in accordance with the terms provided for in this 
paragraph, the Trustee shall distribu'te the Trust Estate as it 
shall then be constituted, . together w{th any net income, to the 
beneficiaries then entitled to the income from the Trust Estate 
in the same ; · proportions in which they. are entitled to such 
income. 
ARTICLE ELEVEN 
Section 11_01 Governing Law 
I't is not . intended that the laws of · only one particular state 
shall necessarily govern all questions pertaining to all of the 
trusts hereunder. Rather; 
a) The validity of the trust hereunder, as well as that 
validity of the particular provisions of that trust, shall be 
governed by the laws of whatever state having any sufficient 
connection with such trust will support_ such validity. 
b) The meaning and effect of the terms of this trust instrument 
and of any other trust instrument :related hereto shall be 
governed by the laws · of the state in . which the initial trust 
under that trust instrument was created, that is, California in 
the case of this instrument, and such other state as may be 
designated in the governing-instrument of any trust receiving an 
appointment hereunder. · 
c) The administration of the trust hereunder shall be governed 
by · the laws of the state in which that trust is then being 
administered (based· on the location of the principal office of 
the Trustee then having custody of that Trust•s principal assets 
and records) , which state I s. courts shall have exclusive 
j·urisdiction over that administration of the trust with respect 
to any period during which it was thus being administered in that 
state. 
The foregoing shall apply even though the situs of some trust 
assets or the home of the Trustor, a trustee, or beneficiary may 
at some time.or times be elsewhere. 
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Section 11.02 Invalidity of Any Provision 
Should any provision of this Declaration be or become invalid or 
unenforceable, the remaining provisions of this Declaration shall be and continue to be fully effec.tive. 
Section 11.03 Successor Trustees 
Any successor Trustee taking office pursuant to Article Nine of this Declaration shall forthwith succeed to all title of the prior Trustee and· shall have all the ,power, rights, discretions 
and obligations conferred ori such Trustee by this Declaration. 
1.. We, and each of us_; have read the foregoing Declaration of Trust; . The foregoing Declaration of Trust correctly states the terms and conditi'oris.under which the T:rust Estate is to be held, 
managed, administered and disposed of by the Trustee; 
2. We, and each of us, approve such.Declaration of Trust in all particulars; and 
3 . As the Trustee named in such Declaration of Trust, we and 
each of usf approve and accept the trusts provided for in such Declaration. 
EXECUTED ON THIS / ! f- DAY OF __ # __ r_/_· _-____ , 197/,, AT 2°'" :r::: Q.._I\.. "'I , CALIFORNIA. 
BY:._--'!.~.:.___ _  · r _,:::...,L"'----""~=---·-----1RUSTEE 
MICHAELS. CORNELL 
BY: __,&L~· ~=ARL=~--'ir'--"-+-' ~M--1. tk~c~o,...C~""-'-"'L-l>C.f-(-----1RUSTEE 
-~/ 4: / J ~- . /. BY: 
-
· TRUSTOR 
___ .:__ ___________ _.._ ___ _ 
ty1ICHAEL. S. CORl~LL 
BY:---4-t:Zt,.4...4..i&."-"'~"6-~"'-'· .•-"-)1,'}-=-·_,_1.:..-..,.....C~"""'---...L C-~..c....i.-....._r,.e,.c.....~.,....--~· ~~~TR.USTOR 
ARLIE M. CORNELL'' 
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STA TE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
)SS 
COUNTY OF (J rP"Y"-fr. ) 
ON II-- 1 -9 G , .BEFORE ME, · hl~- ~, ..J,~ PERSONALLY 
APPEARED MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. CORN.ELL _){_ PERSONALLY ;;ok TO ME OR 
PROVED TO ME ON THE BASIS OF SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE TO BE THE PERSONS WHOSE 
NAMES ARE SUBSCRIBED TO THE WITHIN INSTRUMENT, AND ACKNOwtEDGED THAT THEY EXECUTED· THE SAME IN THEIR AUTHORIZED CAPACITIES, AND THAT BY THEIR SIGNATURES ON THE 
INSTRUMENT THE PERSONS, OR. THE ENTITY UPON BEHALF OF WHICH THE PERSONS ACTED, 
EXECUTED THE INSTRUMENT. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL. 












15 BY MR . CREASON: 
16 Q. Have you made any other plans or do you have 
17 any other commitments from anyone to assist you with 
18 your cash needs in taking care of this Trust property 













me to some degree with that. 
And who is that? 
Marlene Cunningham. 
And where does she reside? 
Las Vegas, Nevada . 
K & K REPORTING (208)743-1380 




Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
) 
) RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 
) 
---- ----------- -) 
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
On March 6, 2013 , the Estate of John Henry Cornell petitioned this Court to supervise 
adminstration of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell and 
order distribution of the Trust res. The Estate seeks (1) the return ofreal property placed by John 
Cornell in the Trust for safekeeping; and (2) the turnover of property which vested in John 
Cornell years before his death but was wrongly withheld from him. In order to receive the full 
amount actually due to John through distribution, the Estate also seeks a judgment against the 
trustee, Toni C. Johnson, for damage caused to the Trust res by her improper conduct. In other 
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words, not only does the Estate raise claims against the Trust for actions of the trustee, which 
John held at the time of his death, but the Estate also seeks the return of property, which 
belonged to John at the time of his death. 
Ms. Johnson's motion to dismiss raises before this court the issue of whether an estate 
may pursue the property interests of the decedent where the decedent failed to recover the 
property due him during his lifetime. The Court should deny Ms. Johnson's motion because 
(1) the nature of Ms. Johnson's appearance and legal representation in this matter creates a 
genuine issue of material fact; 1 (2) the Estate is not precluded from pursuing its claims through 
the law of the case doctrine; (3) actions seeking to adjudicate property rights and order proper 
distribution of the subject property survive the death of the property owner; and ( 4) even if the 
Estate's claims do not survive at law, equity demands that Ms. Johnson not be allowed to retain 
her ill gotten gains which she acquired through refusing to engage in proper conduct. 
II. FACTS & PROCEDURE 
Michael and Arlie Cornell established The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell 
and Arlie M. Cornell on November 1, 1996. The Trust appointed Toni Johnson and John Cornell 
to serve as successor co-trustees upon the death of the surviving Trustor. Arlie Cornell died on 
November 9, 2008. After her death, the Trust instrument was changed by Michael Cornell on 
August 6, 2009, removing John Cornell as an appointed successor trustee. Michael Cornell died 
on December 15, 2009. 
1 As set forth in greater detail herein, the Estate maintains that this is an issue of both form and substance. At the 
Court's May 17 hearing, Ms. Johnson's attorney made the statement that she only represented Ms. Johnson, and not 
the Trust. 
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John Cornell filed a Petition regarding the Trust on July 11, 2012. John died on August 
20, 2012. Ms. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 17, 2012, arguing that the claims 
in John's petition abated upon his death. Ms. Johnson also argued that because John died, there 
existed no legitimate party in interest unless and until the Estate was substituted into the action 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(l). For reasons beyond Kareen Cornell's 
control, John's attorney continued to prosecute the petition in John's name, personally. In late 
November 2012, Ms. Cornell appeared before this Court and notified the Court that she objected 
to any other person acting on behalf of her late husband. While this Court invited Ms. Cornell to 
submit briefing on John's petition, it did not bring her or the Estate into the litigation. Thus, Ms. 
Cornell's briefing was, in effect, amici briefing. On February 15, 2013, this Court issued a 
Memorandum Opinion. In that opinion, the Court dismissed the petition filed by John Cornell. 
The Court expressly invited Ms. Cornell to file claims on behalf of the Estate. 
Ms. Cornell responded to the Court's invitation by filing the Estate's Petition on February 
28, 2013. The Estate's petition seeks supervised administration and court ordered distribution of 
the Trust. The Estate's Petition alleges that Ms. Johnson (1) failed to act in conformity with the 
terms of the Trust; (2) breached her fiduciary duties when acting in her capacity as Trustee; 
(3) engaged in equitable conversion of the property belonging to John by refusing to distribute 
the property in accordance with the dictates of the Trust document and her fiduciary duty; and 
(4) was unjustly enriched by (a) misusing Trust assets for personal desires, and (b) refusing to 
comply with the terms of the Trust and her fiduciary duties in order to effect a distribution in her 
favor. 
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The Estate deposed Ms. Johnson on April 22, 2013. At her deposition, Ms. Johnson 
revealed that she holds in her possession personal and real property belonging to the Trust. See 
A.ff. of Theodore 0. Creason, Exh. A, p. 71 1.17 - p.72 1.7. Ms. Johnson also disclosed, through 
testimony and records provided at deposition, that she has commingled cash assets of the Trust 
with her own cash assets and with cash assets, she received from Kareen and John Cornell. See 
A.ff. of Theodore 0. Creason, Exh. B, pp. 49-63. Ms. Johnson stated that she has spent all of the 
cash assets she comingled with cash belonging to the Trust for her living expenses and expenses 
incurred maintaining and paying taxes on the Trust property. See A.ff. of Theodore 0. Creason, 
Exh. B, pp. 51-63. When asked to explain by what right she expended Trust assets and 
commingled Trust assets and the Cornells' assets with her own, Ms. Johnson testified that she 
received oral permission from John Cornell to take such actions and to live in the Trust's 
residential property without paying rent. When Ms. Johnson was confronted about the Trust's 
terms prohibiting commingling of assets or retaining non-income producing property upon death 
of the surviving Trustor, Ms. Johnson responded that she had her brother's permission and 
acquiescence to proceed this way.2 See A.ff. of Theodore 0. Creason, Exh. C, p. 2311.10-16. 
On May 7, 2013, Ms. Johnson filed her motion to dismiss the Estate's Petition. In her 
Memorandum in Support of that motion, Ms. Johnson claims that the Estate's Petition should be 
dismissed, as a matter of law, by arguing that (1) this Court's February 15, 2013 Memorandum 
2 Ms. Johnson's testimony creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding her conpliance with the Trust document 
Her testimony makes it abundantly clear that she did not believe she was bound by the provision and limitations 
contained in the trust document. In fact, she denies having seen the entire trust document until the time of the 
deposition. Johnson Depa. p. 73 II 9-19. There are a host of yet unanswered questions about the manner in which 
Ms. Johnson managed her parents' affairs after their deaths. Ms. Johnson testified that she believes that her father 
had a will when he died, and that it may be at the house. She has promised to find it and deliver it to Ms. Seubert, 
but so far, she has not done so. See Ajf. of Theodore 0. Creason, Exh. D, pp. 74-75. 
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Opinion binds the Estate; (2) the facts alleged due not support a cause of action for constructive 
trust; (3) all breach fiduciary duty claims abate upon death; ( 4) the claims of breach of contract 
and unjust emichment are actually breach of fiduciary duty claims, which abate; (5) the claim for 
conversation abates upon death; and (6) the Trust cannot hold a creditor's claim against Ms. 
Johnson because the Estate cannot establish a valid claim as against Ms. Johnson. 
On May 17, this Court held a hearing on the Estate's motion to stay the proceedings until 
the district court ruled on a recently filed Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act petition. 
While the Court denied the Estate's motion, a statement was made by opposing counsel that 
bears significant relevance to the current motion. Opposing counsel stated that she has been 
representing Ms. Johnson, personally, and has never considered herself the attorney on behalf of 
the Trust. As set forth below, Ms. Johnson's motion to dismiss should be denied because this 
creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding the Trust's position and the nature of Ms. 
Johnson's appearance and the arguments of counsel. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 
56( c ). 3 If reasonable persons could reach different findings or draw conflicting inferences from 
the evidence when all facts are liberally construed in favor of the Estate, the Court must deny Ms. 
3 Contrary to the assertion made in Ms. Johnson's brief, the Estate has not stipulated to treat Ms. Johnson's motion as 
a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, implicit in Ms. Johnson's filing is a request that the court onvert the 
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Johnson's motion. See Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., Inc., 135 Idaho 80, 83, 14 P.3d 1074, 
1077 (Ct. App. 2000); Coonse ex rel. Coonse v. Boise Sch. Dist., 132 Idaho 803, 805, 979 P.2d 
1161, 1163 (1999). Ms. Johnson carries the burden of establishing entitlement to summary 
judgment. 
B. The nature of Ms. Johnson's appearance and legal representation in this matter 
creates genuine issue of material fact 
The Court has been presented with evidence in the form of a statement on the record that 
creates a reasonable inference that Ms. Johnson has been pursuing this matter solely in her 
personal capacity. At the May 17 hearing, Ms. Johnson's attorney expressly stated on the record 
that she has only ever represented Ms. Johnson in her personal capacity and did not consider 
herself as attorney for the Trust. The scope of her attorney's representation is an issue of 
historical fact that cannot later be characterized based upon singularity of interest or desire to 
avoid challenges to procedural missteps. This disclosure creates genuine issues of fact regarding 
(1) whether Ms. Johnson may pursue a motion to dismiss in her personal capacity; (2) whether 
the Trust has appeared and provided its position as to the issues raised in the Estate's Petition, 
and (3) whether the actions taken and discovery provided by Ms. Johnson have any binding effect 
as against the Trust. The resolution of these facts is material to disposition of this matter. 
Therefore, Ms. Johnson's motion should be denied. 
The Estate's Petition seeks supervised administration of the Trust and Court ordered 
distribution. The Estate is a party to this action as a Petitioner claiming that the decedent was 
deprived of his property right, which vested at the time of the death of Michael Cornell, or 
motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, which the court must first do if it considers factual allegations 
outside the pleadings. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796 P.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1990). 
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shortly thereafter. The Estate also seeks an order of restitution to the Trust for those damages 
incurred by it because of Ms. Johnson's inequitable conduct. 
Ms. Johnson's personal interest in this litigation is that of a beneficiary of the Trust. Ms. 
Johnson has not sought joinder under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to be recognized as a 
party. The fact that Ms. Johnson has only been appearing in her personal capacity means that the 
Court has not been provided with an appearance by the Trust and statement of the Trust's 
position. Part of the basis for Ms. Johnson's request for summary judgment is her claim that 
John's interests in the property would not vest until distribution. While that may be the position 
of a beneficiary seeking a greater distribution of the Trust res, the Court should demand input 
from the Trustee-acting in her fiduciary capacity as trustee-before granting Ms. Johnson's 
request for summary judgment. 
Ms. Johnson's pursuit of this motion in her personal capacity is also inconsistent with her 
proposed interpretation of the Trust document. Ms. Johnson claims that all interests in the Trust 
res remain contingent until distribution. She further claims that no distribution has been effected 
in law or in fact. Therefore, she remains a contingent beneficiary to this day (under her 
reasoning). A contingent beneficiary is not a real party in interest, such that he or she may 
participate in actions involving the Trust. Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 
Idaho 866, 870, 993 P.2d 1197, 1201 (1999). Thus, under Ms. Johnson's proposed 
interpretation, she lacks standing to oppose supervised administration and Court ordered 
distribution of the Trust. 
The scope of representation of Ms. Johnson's counsel also creates genuine issues of 
material fact regarding the position of the Trust and the nature of disclosures made by Ms. 
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Johnson in this litigation. If the Trust has not appeared and has not retained counsel, then this 
failure is yet another grounds for instituting supervised administration and distribution of the 
Trust. When acting as a Trustee, Ms. Johnson holds a duty to each beneficiary to protect the 
Trust res, even if that protection is against her own actions. The Estate is now left to question 
whether the discovery produced and arguments propounded in this action are from a source 
acting in her capacity has Trustee or from an individual pursuing her personal interests. Because 
this question has been raised by Ms. Johnson at so late a date, her motion for summary judgment 
should be denied. 
C. The Estate is not precluded from pursuing its claims through the law of the case 
doctrine 
Ms. Johnson argues that the Estate should be precluded from litigating its claims based 
upon the Court's ruling against Margaret Watkins. Ms. Johnson cites the law of the case doctrine 
as the sole supporting legal authority for her argument. The law of the case doctrine does not 
apply to the Estate's Petition. 
The rule of the case doctrine applies where a case has left the jurisdiction of one court and 
proceeded on to another court acting in its appellate capacity. See Swanson v. Swanson, 134 
Idaho 512, 516, 5 P.3d 973, 977 (2000). The doctrine holds that once an appellate court has 
ruled on an issue, that ruling becomes the law of the case for all subsequent proceedings in the 
case. Id. It also holds that where a party fails to appeal an appealable ruling, the issue may not 
be reopened upon remand. Id. 
Here, the claims of the Estate set forth in its Petition have not left the jurisdiction of this 
Court. The language and the nature of this Court's Memorandum Opinion against Ms. Watkins 
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make clear that it was not issuing judgment as against the Estate. Instead, the Court invited the 
Estate to file a petition raising its claims against the Trust. Further, the Court could not have 
issued a judgment as against the Estate at that time, because the Estate was not a party to this 
litigation until it filed its Petition. Ms. Johnson continues to maintain that the Estate and Ms. 
Watkins are somehow the same party; they quite simply are not. The existence of a party is 
established by appearance and procedure, not by similarity of interests. While the Estate shares 
Ms. Johnson's dismay regarding the continued pursuit of "John Cornell's claims" by a person 
having no rightful authority to pursue those claims, the Estate cannot be bound by rulings against 
that person. The law of the case doctrine does not apply to the Estate's Petition. 
D. A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the Trust held property of 
John Cornell in a constructive trust at the time of his death 
Ms. Johnson argues that the doctrine of constructive trust is inapplicable because the 
Trust, not Ms. Johnson, holds legal title to disputed property. Ms. Johnson's argument 
misunderstands the nature of the Estate's Petition. The Petition does not allege that Ms. Johnson 
holds title the disputed property, but rather that Ms. Johnson engaged in inequitable conduct by 
retaining legal title in the name of the Trust. The doctrine of constructive trust holds that 
property may actually belong to another in a quasi-trust relationship in certain circumstances. 
The Estate's Petition alleges that the property due John under the Trust actually belonged to him 
in constructive trust at the time of his death. 
"When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title 
may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee." 
TRUST, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), trust (internal quotation marks and citation 
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omitted); see also Hanger v. Hess, 49 Idaho 325, 328, 288 P. 160, 161 (1930). The doctrine of 
constructive trust is a description of the nature by which a wrongdoer holds the property of 
another; the court deems that property as already belonging to the injured party at some earlier 
point in time. This doctrine rests upon "the fundamental rule of equity that equity regards that as 
done which ought to be done." See First Sec. Bank of Idaho, Nat. Ass 'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 
657,429 P.2d 386, 389 (1967) (discussing basis of doctrine of equitable conversion). 
In this case, Ms. Johnson ought to have distributed the Trust res as soon as reasonably 
practicable when the Trust automatically terminated upon the death of Michael Cornell. See 
Trust 4.03. The undisputed extended period of time between the death of Michael Cornell and 
the death of John Cornell, taken by itself, creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether a constructive trust arose. In its February 15 Memorandum, this Court found that Ms. 
Johnson "lived rent free in the home that is included in the trust and apparently paid all her living 
expenses from trust funds." At her deposition, Ms. Johnson testified that she comingled cash 
assets of the Trust with her own cash. Her records produced at deposition show that she 
comingled cash she received from John and Kareen with Trust cash assets. She testified that she 
has spent all the Trust's cash assets including the comingled funds on upkeep and taxes and on 
personal expenses. She has testified that she is making arrangements to borrow money from a 
relative to provide cash to live on. See Ajf. a/Theodore 0. Creason, Exh. E, p. 92 11. 15-25. In 
short, it appears that Ms. Johnson within a very short time after her father's death was treating 
Trust property as though it was her own. (See Ajf. of Theodore 0. Creason, Exh. B). Because 
John Cornell was entitled to distribution long before his death, and because Ms. Johnson 
deprived him of his property through inequitable conduct, the fundamental rule of equity governs 
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in this case: the Court should treat the Trust property as properly distributed to John long before 
his death. Therefore, the manner in which Ms. Johnson has retained that property is not through 
the terms of the Trust but through the doctrine of constructive trust. 
While evidence of Ms. Johnson's malfeasance supports a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty, it also supports a claim in equity that the property due to John was being held in 
constructive trust. By establishing that property being held in the name of the Trust was being 
held in constructive trust for John, the Estate can establish a property interest that existed at the 
time of death. A constructive trust has no terms other than that the property is due to the proper 
party. A claim for return of property survives the death of the decedent and passes to his 
personal representative. See 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 56. See Henshaw 
v. Miller, 58 U.S. 212 (1854) (cause for taking of chattels survives). Therefore, the Estate's 
claim of constructive trust should not be dismissed. 
E. The breach of contract claim is distinct from a breach of fiduciary duty claim 
Ms. Johnson argues that the Estate's breach of contract claim should be interpreted as a 
breach of fiduciary claim and deemed abated consistent with the reasoning of the Court in its 
February 15 Memorandum. A breach of contract claim is distinct from a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim. A breach of contract claim focuses on the trustee's failure to adhere to the terms of the 
trust document; a breach of fiduciary duty claim focuses on the trustee's failure to act in 
accordance with the standard of conduct required of the trustee under statutory and common law. 
"A trust is not itself a separate legal entity that can own property; rather, it is a 
relationship having certain attributes." In re Thompson, 454 B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr. D. Idaho 
2011 ). "A trust creates a fiduciary relationship in which the trustee is the holder of legal title to 
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the property subject to the beneficial interest of the beneficiary." DBSIITRI V v. Bender, 130 
Idaho 796, 808, 948 P .2d 151, 163 (1997). The scope and nature of that relationship is defined 
by the terms of the trust, i.e. the contract. A trustee's fiduciary duties and contractual duties are 
intertwined, yet distinguishable. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 defines a trust as 
... a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a manifestation 
of intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to 
the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of ... one or more persons, at 
least one of whom is not the sole trustee. 
The relationship between beneficiary and trustee is contractual in nature, having a standard of 
contractual dealing on the part of the truste.e as that of a fiduciary. To argue that no contractual 
claim may lie against the trustee is to argue that the terms of the trust document have no 
substance. 
terms: 
The contractual relationship established by the Trust document contains the following 
4.03 & 4.04: The Trust terminates automatically upon the death of the surviving Trustor 
and the successor Trustee is to distribute the property "as soon as 
reasonably possible." 
5.01: The only property which may be retained in the Trust after the death of the 
surviving Trustor is property productive of income. 
8.02: The successor Trustee shall render an accounting from time to time. 
The Estate alleges that Ms. Johnson breached these contractual provisions through her conduct. 
At deposition, Ms. Johnson conceded that she had not seen the trust instrument before the 
deposition. Rather, her position seems to be that despite her dispute with her brother, she had an 
oral agreement with him that she would live in the house rent free while she tried to sell it; that 
she would use the Trusts' cash for her living expenses; and that she would divide the proceeds 
with John when the house and real property sold. If that is the version of the facts the Court 
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accepts, then Ms. Johnson has not been following the terms of the Trust, rather the terms of the 
oral contract with John. In that scenario, the Trust res devolved to John Cornell and Ms. Johnson 
by intestate succession ( or Will if one if one is found) upon the death of Michael Cornell, subject 
to administration. I.C. §15-3-101. There are, of course, legal and evidentiary hurdles Ms. 
Johnson will have to overcome to succeed on this theory, but the point is she was bound to act in 
a contractual relationship with John with the terms of that contract either being the Trust or the 
oral agreement. 
F. The Estate's claims for breach of fiduciary duty did not abate upon John's death 
The common law governs the issue of survivability of an action upon death of the injured 
party in all actions where the injured party's cause of action arose prior to July 1, 2010. See 
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619 (2012). Johnson's argument on survival under the 
common law relies upon the analysis in Bishop. The Bishop Court set forth the general rule 
regarding survival of claims at common law: "Under the common law, claims arising out of 
contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate." 
Id. This case, however, does not fall under that general rule. The cause of action before the 
Bishop Court sounded in "pure tort" as it was for attorney malpractice and the contract between 
the attorney and his client provided no terms additional to those required of an attorney through 
his or her rules of professional responsibility. The cause of action did not involve a claim to 
property held in trust by another. 
While the Bishop Court identified the general rule, the common law is more nuanced in 
cases involving property. In such cases, the survival of an action depends upon the nature of the 
interest affected. 
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At common law survivable actions are those in which the wrong complained of 
affects primarily property and property rights, and in which any injury to the 
person is incidental, while nonsurvivable actions are those in which the injury 
complained of is to the person and any effect on property or property rights is 
incidental. . . . 
. . . The general rule is that, in addition to the causes of action arising out of 
contract recognized at common law, causes of action arising from torts to real and 
personal property survive and pass to the personal representative of the decedent, 
while purely personal torts do not survive in the absence of statutory provision. 
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 51. Thus, in cases where the injured party 
alleged an injury to his property-such as the existence or amount of his interest in a trust-the 
claim survives. See Henshaw v. Miller, 58 U.S. 212 (1854) (cause for taking of chattels 
survives). See also, Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 105, 15 P.3d 816, 818 (2000) (holding that 
issues regarding property survive). 
The survivability of this action is further supported by the fact that it arises pursuant to a 
remedial statute and that it is equitable in nature. The petition seeks recovery based upon a 
trustee's breach. A cause of action which is founded under Idaho Code§§ 15-7-101 through 15-
7-601. "A cause of action that is founded on a remedial statute ... survives the death of the party 
possessing the cause of action." 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 59. Further, 
the causes of action pled here are equitable in nature. 
The principle that a cause of action expires with the death or disability of a party 
generally does not apply to suits in equity; equitable remedies exist to the same 
extent in favor of and against executors and administrators as they do against the 
decedent, as long as the court can continue to grant effective relief in spite of the 
death. One of the main reasons for this stance for suits in equity is that such suits 
primarily pertain to property rights. 
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 60 (footnotes omitted). Thus, under the 
common law, the causes of action pled in this case survive John's death. 
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Idaho Code § 5-327(2) governs the issue of survivability of an action upon death of the 
injured party in all actions where the injured party's cause of action arose after July 1, 2010. 
While the causes of action in this case survive John's death under the common law (as set forth 
above), the Idaho legislature made survival explicit in its enactment of section 5-327(2): 
A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the wrongful 
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person 
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that 
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those 
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii) other out-of-pocket expenses 
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of 
such injured person and as a result of the wrongful act or negligence. Such action 
shall be commenced or, if already commenced at the time of the death of the 
injured person, shall be thereafter prosecuted by the personal representative of the 
estate of the deceased person or, if there be no personal representative appointed, 
then by those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of the 
deceased person according to the provisions of section 5-311(2)(a), Idaho Code. 
The facts pled in the Estate's Petition give rise to an action for the damage caused by Ms. 
Johnson's improper conduct. The alleged damage is diminution of the Trust res; a diminution in 
the value of the property interest John held in the Trust res. 
Both the common law and Idaho Code § 5-327 support a ruling that the causes of action 
set forth in the Estate's Petition survive the death of John. If the deceased held a property 
interest at the time of death, that interest falls into the estate, where it is later distributed to the 
beneficiaries. The alleged wrongdoer does not get to convert the deceased's property to her own 
simply because the deceased did not survive to the point of judgment. The Estate asks this Court 
to reject Johnson's proposed interpretations would result in an unjust and inequitable conclusion. 
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F. The Estate's claims of conversion did not abate upon John's death 
Ms. Johnson's argues that the Estate's claim of conversion abated upon John's death. In 
essence, she argues that a wrongdoer may retain the property of a decedent so long as the 
decedent is not able to recover the property prior to death. 
First, John held a vested property interest in the Trust res at the time of his death. The 
terms of the Trust are that "[ o ]n the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and 
the Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal remaining 
in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute them .... " Trust, 4.03 (emphasis added); 
see also 4.04. The Trust terminated automatically upon the death of Michael Cornell. Thus, the 
only action appropriate by Ms. Johnson was to transfer the property that now belonged to John 
from the Trust to John. Instead of delivering John's property to him, she withheld it. The Estate 
seeks a turnover of John's property on John's behalf. 
Second, John held an interest in that part of the Trust res which was placed in the Trust 
by him in the form of Lot 34. This is property that John transferred to the Trust for convenience 
because it was contiguous to his parents' home. Ms. Johnson's records show that John and 
Kareen continued to send cash for some period of time after Michael's death to cover the 
property taxes and other expenses associated with that lot. See A.ff of Theodore 0. Creason, Exh. 
B. 
A claim for return of property survives the death of the decedent and passes to his 
personal representative. See 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 56. See Henshaw 
v. Miller, 58 U.S. 212 (1854) (cause for taking of chattels survives). Therefore, the Estate's 
claim of conversion should not be dismissed. 
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G. The Estate's claims of unjust enrichment did not abate upon John's death 
Ms. Johnson seeks dismissal of the Estate's unjust enrichment claim based upon the 
arguments set forth by her regarding breach of contract and her attempted characterization of the 
unjust enrichment claim as a breach of fiduciary duty claim. First, while a cause of action for 
unjust enrichment has similar facts to a breach of contract cause of action, they are two distinct 
theories for relief. Breach of contract sounds in law. Unjust enrichment sounds in equity. 
"Unjust enrichment occurs where [ offending party] receives a benefit which would be inequitable 
to retain without compensating the [injured party] to the extent that retention is unjust." 
Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165 P.3d 261, 271 (2007). The damages 
available to the claimant on an unjust enrichment claim is the value of the amount by which the 
offending party was unjustly enriched. Barry v. Pac. W Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 
P.3d 440, 447 (2004). Like constructive trust, unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine that 
seeks to return to the injured party those amounts which were due to him or her in equity; 
amounts which equity deems property of the injured party. If the Estate prevails on its unjust 
enrichment claim, it will have established that John held an equitable interest in property prior to 
his death. The Estate holds the right and statutory duty to recover that property of the decedent 
and distribute it in probate. See Idaho Code§ 15-3-709. The claim for unjust enrichment should 
not be dismissed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Estate has raised several claims in law and equity seeking recovery of that property in 
which John Cornell held an interest at the time of his death; property which Ms. Johnson 
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withheld from him through her improper conduct. Ms. Johnson's motion to dismiss should be 
denied. 
DATED this 21st day of May, 2013. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
~~~~~<e«-
eodore 0. Creas~63 
Attorneys for Surviving Spouse, Kareen Cornell 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of May, 2013, I filed the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION RE: MOTION TO DISMISS with the Clerk of the Court, and 
provided a paper copy to the following persons: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Bo:;,;. 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
l (' 
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMil.Y TRUST OF ) 
MICHAELS. CORNEIL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
-----------~--) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF 
RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 
AY 2 8 2013 ~ 
COMES NOW Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attomey of record, Karin 
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., hereby submits this Reply Brief in support of the 
pending Motion to Dismiss, which is set for hearing on June 4, 2013. 
This Reply Brief does not restate the procedural and factual background of the case and 
applicable law previously submitted. Instead, it is limited in scope to the points raised by the 
Memorandum. in Opposition re: Motion to Dismiss dated May 21, 2013. 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. No issues of material fact related to Ms. Johnson's appearance and counsel preclude 
dismissal. 
The Estate raises a variety of questions relating to whether Respondent's involvement in 
this case has been in her personal capacity or capacity as trustee. To be clear, Respondent has 
participated ·in th.is action in her personal capacity and as trustee. The undersigned attorney 
represents Respondent in both capacities, just as counsel for Mrs. Cornell represents Mrs. Cornell 
in her capacity as surviving spouse and her capacity as personal representative of her deceased · 
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husband's estate (see Petition by Kareen Cornell as Personal Representative of the Estate of 
John Henry Cornell and as Surviving Spouse of John Henry Cornell. deceased benefidqry of 
the Revocable Family Tru~ of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell for Supervised 
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution dated February 26, 2013 (emphasis added)). 
Any inaccurate or hastily made comment by this attorney at the hearing of May 17, 2013 on Mrs. 
Cornell's Motion to Stay Proceedings was in error and is hereby retracted with apologies for any 
unintended confusion that may have been caused. 
This dual capacity is appropriate and consistent with Respondent's positions throughout 
this action because the ex.press terms of the trust provide that, upon Mr. Cornell's death with no 
surviving issue, Respondent becomes the sole surviving beneficiary. See Trust at§ 4.03(a). The 
Granters intent in this regard is unequivocal and clear: that the Trust assets be distributed. to 
lineal descendants of the Granters. Respondent, as trustee, is obligated to uphold the terms of the 
Trust and to defend the Trust against attempts to break its tenns. This obligation continues 
despite any mistakes that may have been made by the Trustee. 
To that end, Respondenfs personal interests and interests as Trustee are identical and the 
concerns raised by Mrs. Cornell do not raise genuine and material questions of fact. 
B. The Court's Memorandum Opinion is binding upon the Estate. 
Mrs. Cornell characterizes this Court's Memorandum Opinion as being against Margaret 
Watkins and contends that the Estate was not a parti to the case until l\1rs. Cornell filed her 
Petition in February 2013. Respondent respectfully disagrees. 
The Petition at issue in this Court's Memorandum Opinion of February 2013 was filed by 
John H. Cornell during his lifetime. Only the Estate is the successor in interest to John H. 
Cornell. Toe acts of Margaret Watkins, while acting as the Estate's temporary personal 
representative, are binding upon the Estate and current personal representative :tvlrs. Cornell. 
Mrs. Cornell's states "For reasons beyond Kareen Comelrs control, John's attorney 
continued to prosecute the petition in John's name, personally. In late November 2012, Ms .. 
Cornell appeared before this Court and notified the Court that she objected to any other person 
acting on behalf of her late husband_ vVhile this Court invited Ms. Cornell to submit briefing on 
John's petition, it did not bring her or the Estate into the litigation." Memorandum in Opposition 
re: Motion to Dismiss at 3. 
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If Mrs. Cornell believed that Margaret Watkins was not properly representing the 
interests of the · Estate during the time that Ms_ Watkins served as temporary personal 
representative, then it was not ''beyond Kareen Cornell's control" to file a· motion seeking the 
removal of Ms. Watkins as temporary per~onal representative for cause. which would have 
severely limited Ms. Watkins' functions. See I.C. § 15-3-61l(a). No such action was taken and 
no good cause has been shown to permit the Estate to re·ligitate the issues previously decided. 
That being said, this Court's Memorandum Opinion remains well-based in fact and law 
such that it is largely an academic exercise to debate whether dismissal is warranted due to the 
binding nature of the Memorandum Opinion or whether dismissal is war.ranted because the law 
remains the same, as discussed herein. No genuine fact has been shown to change the 
application oflaw to the essentially identical facts alleged. Dismissal remains appropriate. 
C. The causes of action in this proceeding do not survive Mr. John Cornell's death. 
The balance of the claims raised by :Mrs .. Cornell are either identical to. or variations upon 
the issues previously addressed by the Court: that the Estate's claims for constructive trust (see 
PP- 8-11), breach of contract (see pp. 11-13), breach of fiduciary duty (see pp. 13-15), conversion 
(see p. 16), and unjust enrichment (see p. 17) are not abated by the death of John H. Cornell. 
Each is discussed below. 
1. The Estate's constructive trust claim is an abated claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 
As for the Estate's claim under the doctrine of constructive trust, the Estate criticizes 
Respondent's analysis that because Toni Johnson did not hold title to the Trust assets, then ·a 
claim for constructive trust does not arise. 
First, this argument is flawed because a review of Idaho case law rmds that application of 
the doctrine of constructive trust has been limited to the improper acquisition of property, :not the 
retention of property as the Estate suggests. See Witt v. Jones. 111 Idaho 165, 168, 722 P.2d 474, 
477 (1986) (citing Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 559, 167 P. 481 (1917)); Snider v. Arnold, 153 
Idaho 641, 289 P.3d 43 (2012) (citing Davenport, 30 Idaho at 608, 167 P. at 483). 
Further, the Estate fails to distinguish Respondent's actions from a breach of her fiduciary 
duty, which is a tort abated by John's death. See infra 9I I(C)(3). The Estate has presented no 
facts or argument to support a distinct analysis except for the argument that constructive trust 
arises in equity, not in law. 
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The Estate asserts that "(t]he undisputed extended period of time between the death of 
Michael Com~ll and the death of John Cornell, taken by itself, creates a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding whether a constructive trust arose." Memorandum in Opposition re:· Motion to 
Dismiss at 10. Said determination is a question of law, not one of fact as there is no dispute that 
Michael Cornell died on December 15, 2009 and John Cornell on August 20, 2012. 
Respondent's actions as Trustee during this time period are also not in dispute as Respondent 
does not dispute that she failed to distribute Trust assets during this time period, that she was ill-
advised as·to her responsibilities, and made mistakes accordingly in terms of administration of 
Estate funds and lack of accounting. See Aff. of Theodore 0. Creason generally. There are 
simply no material facts of genuine dispute that preclude dismissal as a matter of law and the 
Estate has failed to support how its interpretation of the doctrine of constructive trust is in 
conformance with existing Idaho law or supported by the facts of this case. 
Instead, the Estate asserts that its claim for constructive trust is a claim for return of 
property, which survives the death of the decedent and passes to the decedent's personal 
representative. In support of this position it cites to a non-binding treatise and the U.S. Supreme 
Court case of Henshaw v_ Miller, 58 U.S. 212 (1854). The Estate's reliance is misplaced, 
however, because the Henshaw case interpreted the then Virginia statute which provided that 
''Executors shall have an action of trespass for a wrong done to the testator," which the Court 
interpreted to amend the common law to allow claims for trespass and talcing of chattel. Id. a.t 
221-22. Said decision does not stand for the broader application of the doctrine of constructive 
trust that the Estate suggests. Instead, the common law and Idaho Code Section 5-327 apply. 
For these reasons and the reasons previously briefed, the Estate's claim for constructive 
trust should be dismissed. 
2. The Estate's breach of contract claim is an abated claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
The Court's prior conclusion and reasoning reniains accurate: "the duties John asserts 
Toni breaches arise irrespective of contract. The duties are grounded in state law regardless of 
what the contract states. . . . The alleged wrongful acts of Toni are all ·breaches of fiduciary duties 
under state law that for purposes of abatement are in the nature of torts .... John makes no claim 
against Toni and the administration of the estate of their parents that survives his death under the 
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common law or under Idaho Code § 5-327.'' Memorandum Opinion at 9, 10, 17. See also infra 'I[ 
I(C)(3). 
Whether Respondent had fully reviewed or understood the Trust document is irrelevant. 
Whether Respondent acted in practical terms based on an oral conversation with her brother is 
irrelevant. Respondent does not contend that ignorance of the Trust's provisions relieve her from 
responsibility or that the beneficiaries had the authority to modify the Trust's terms. It is the 
Estate that raises that theory, although provides no legal authority to support the proposition that 
the beneficiaries to a trust may amend its terms through contract or factual basis as to what said 
alleged contract's terms were or consideration given that makes this alleged contract now 
enforceable against Respondent. For these reasons, the Estate's allegations in this regard do not 
preclude dismissal. 
Instead. the Trust document is not a contract, thus no breach of contract claim can arise 
from it. The existence of a 'Written document (the Trust Agreement) does not establish a 
contractual relationship between Respondent and the Estate (or its predecessors), nor does it 
establish a potential claim by the Estate against Respondent grounded in contract. Instead, said· 
relationship is fiduciary in nature. 
For these reasons and the reasons previously briefed and incorporated by reference herein, 
the Estate's claim for breach of contract must be dismissed. 
3. Toe Estate's claim for breach of fiduciary duty is abated. 
Respondent disagrees with the Estate's analysis that torts involving property do not abate. 
A claim for breach of fiduciary duty sounds in tort. See Jones v. Kootenai County Title 
Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 607, 612, 873 P.2d 861, 866 (Idaho 1994) ("A contract may .... create a state 
of things which furnishes the occasion for a tort l'f the relation of the plaintiff and the defendants 
is such that a duty to take due care arises therefrom irrespective of contract and the defendant is 
negligent, then the action is one of tort.") 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently discussed Idaho abatement law as follows: 
The abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative enactment addressing 
the survivability of a claim, the common law rules govern. Under the common 
law, claims arising out of contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, 
while those sounding in pure tort abate. 
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The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined by the 
purposes for which the attorney is retained. Breach of an. attorney's duty is 
negligence in tort. The contract basis of legal malpractice actions is the failure to 
perform obligations specified in the written contract. Thus, under the abatement 
rule, breach of duty is an action in tort, uot contract; that is, unless an auomey 
foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a specific outcome in the 
litigation or provides for a higher standard of care in the contract, he is held to the 
standard of care expected of an attorney. Breach of that duty is a tort. 
. . . [T]he contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are 
defmed by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attomey and client 
want to provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by ex.press language 
in the contract. Here, the standard of care in the contract is essentially the same as 
in any attorney-client relationship. Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated 
upon [ the client's] death. 
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620-21, 272 P.3d 1247, 1251-52 (2012) (citations omitted). 
Similar to the attorney-client relationship at issue in Bishop, the contours of the duties 
owed by a trustee to trust beneficiaries are defined by the Vniform Probate Code and Principal 
and Income Act. Here, the Trust contains no greater requirements than are set forth in said 
statutes. Therefore. the analysis of Idaho Code Section 5-327(2), and the common law rule of 
abatement prior to its amendment, applies. 
Because a breach of fiduciary duty arises in tort, it abates upon the injured person's death 
under the common law. As such, the Estate's breach of fiduciary duty claim is abated unless a 
statute precludes dismissal. 
The statutory section that governs the survivability of negligence claims is Idaho' Code 
Section 5-327(2), which was amended in 2010 with the amendment taldng effect on July 1, 2010. 
First, in its form prior to July l, 2010, Idaho Code Section 5-327 provided that claims for 
personal injury or property damage survived only the death of the wrongdoer. The later was not 
retroactive, thus applied until July 1, 2010. See Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251. 
Applymg the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Estate as successor in 
interest to John H. Cornell is the injured party. As such, the Estate's claims that may have arisen 
prior to July 1, 2010 were extinguished by John ComelPs death and must be dismissed. 
Second, Idaho Code 5-327(2) as amended and in effect on and after July 1. 2010 provides 
that claims for personal injury or property damage survive the .death of the injured person, but 
that recoverable damages are e~pressly limited to medical expenses, other out-of-pocket 
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expenses. and lost earnings prior to death. 
The tort of breach of fiduciary duty is neither an "action for personal injury" nor an action 
for "'property damage" as it does not involve tangible property that was allegedly damaged as is 
the common and ordinary meaning of the phrase "property damage." As such, this ,action falls 
outside of the amended Idaho Code Section 5-327(2), the general common law rule applies, and 
any claim for breach of fiduciary duty was extinguished by John Cornell's death. 
Further, even if the Court concludes that the Estate's claim is one for "property damage," 
no genuine issue of material fact exists that the Estate does not seek damages recoverable under 
the statute. The Estate clearly admits that it seeks "(1) the return of real property placed by John 
Cornell in the Trust for safekeeping; and (2) the turn.over of property which vested in John 
Cornell years before his death but was wrongful withheld from him." Memorandum in 
Opposition re: Motion to Dismiss at 1. Said relief does not include medical expenses, out-of-
pocket expenses or lost wages. As snch, the Estate's claim is outside of the scope of Idaho Code 
Section 5-327(2), is abated by John H. Cornell's death, and must be dismissed. 
4. The Estate's conversion claim is abated. 
In its opposition brief, the Estate does not dispute that conversion is an intentional tort. 
See Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 77,910 P.2d 744, 749 (1996). As such, the 
same analysis as the Estate's claim of breach of fiduciary duty applies, the conversion claim is 
abated and must be dismissed. 
The Estate discusses two points in the conversion section of its opposition brief: that John 
. Cornell held a vested property interest in the Trust res at his death, and that John held an interest 
in the real property that he had conveyed to the Trust. Memorandum in Opposition re: 
Memorandum to Dismiss at 16. Although it does not articulate it as such, Respondent concludes 
th.at the Estate in this regard actually refers to the doctrine of equitable conversion, not only the 
intentional tort of conversion. 
A review of Idaho case law finds no cases discussing the doctrine of equitable conversion 
outside of the context of disputed real estate transactions, and none in the trust context as the 
Estate proposes. The Idaho Supreme Court has discussed said doctrine as follows: 
The doctrine of equitable conversion is a fiction resting upon the fundamental rule 
of equity that equity regards ·that as done which out to be done. · Under the 
doctrine, an equitable conversion takes place when a contract for the sale of real 
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property becomes binding on the parties. The purchaser is then treated in equity 
as having an interei.;t in ~ealty, and the vendor an interest in personalty, that is. the 
right tq receive the purchase money. Th.us, wheu equitable conversion applies, the 
contract purchaser is deemed the equitable owner of the realty, and assumes the 
risk of loss on the property .... The doctrine of equitable conversion applies only 
if nothing in the contract states otherwise. Thus,· equitable conversion does not 
apply if the effect would be to shift the risk of loss to a buyer contrary to the terms 
of the parties' agreement. 
Holscher v. James, 124 Idaho 443, 446, 860 P.2d 646, 649 (1993) (citations omitted). 
First, the Estate does not explain how its position that the decedent held a vested interest 
in the Trust at the time of his death supports a claim for equitable conversion. It provides no 
Idaho authority to support its position that a claim for retu:m of property survives the death of the 
decedent and passes to the decedent's pers~nal representative, but instead cites to a non-binding 
treatise and the U.S. Supreme Court case of Henshaw v. Miller, 58 U.S. 212 (1854), which, as 
discussed supra, concerned a Virginia statute interpreted as having amended the common law to 
allow claims for trespass and taking of chattel. Id. at 221-22. Said decision does not stand for a 
broadened application of equitable conversion. 
Further, the Estate's position in this regard contradicts the express language of the Trust: 
t.i1~t all net income and principal remaming in the Trust vest in the surviving beneficiary should 
one beneficiary die prior to distribution leaving no issue. Trust at§ 4.03(a) (attached to Petition). 
If the decedent beneficiary's interest vested upon the Grantors; death, then the Trust language 
making survival until distribution a requirement would have no effect. It is the intention of the 
grantor which must be given effect when a reviewing court interprets a trust. Hedrick v. West 
One Bank, Idaho, N.A, 123 Idaho 803, 805, 853 P.2d 548, 551 (1993) (interpreting a will). · Here, 
the grantors' intent was clear: that the Trust be distributed to the lineal descendants of Michael and 
Arlie Cornell. Trust at§ 4.03(a) (attached to Petition). This clear and unambiguous intent cannot 
be reconciled with the position that John Cornell held a vested interest in the Trust res upon the 
Grantors' deaths. For these reasons, the Estate's claim of equitable conversion related to the 
Trust generally must be dismissed. 
Second, the Estate does not explain how its position that John Cornell's conveyance of 
real property supports a claim for equitable conversion. John Cornell conveyed said disputed 
property by quitclaim deed on January 3, 2007 retaining no interest of any kind. See Ajf. of 
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Theodore 0. Creason at Em. 5 to Exh. B. The Estate provides no deposition testimony, sworn 
statements or admissions to support the factual conclusion that said property had been 
"transferred. to the Trust for convenience beeause it was contiguous to his parents' home." 
Memorandum in Opposition re: Motion to Dismiss at 16. The Estate further asserts, without 
supporting affidavit, deposition testimony or admissions, that funds sent voluntarily by the 
decedent were to cover property taxes and expenses related to said lot. See Memorandum in 
Opposition re: Motion to Dismiss at 16 (citingAff. of Theodore 0. Creason, Exh. B).1 
Although the Estate is entitled to all reasonable inferences, it cannot rest upon the mere 
allegations,. but instead must set forth specific facts supported by the pleadings, deposition 
testimony, affidavits or admissions on file showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Shere v. 
Pocatello School Dist. No. 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489-90, 148 P.3d 1232, 1235-36 (2006); Summer 
v. Cambridge Joint School Dist. No., 432, 139 Idaho 953, 955, 88 P.3d 772, 774 (2004)'. Here, 
no such showing has been made to support its claim that the Estate holds a vested property 
interest in the real property that he conveyed to the Trust by Quitclaim Deed in 2007, or that 
funds were sent specifically to cover property taxes and related expenses. For these reasons, the 
Estate's claim of equitable conversion related to the real property previously conveyed by John 
Cornell should be dismissed. 
5. The Estate's lllljust enriclunent claim is an abated breach of fiduciary duty claim-
The Estate contends that "[u]njust enrichment occurs where offending party receives a 
benefit which would be inequitable to retain without compensating the injured party to the extent 
that retention is unjust." Memorandum in Opposition re: }(lotion to Dismiss at 17 (citation 
omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has discussed the equitable doctrine of unjust enrich.n:i,ent as 
follows: 
The two theories, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, are simply different 
l Tue underlined portion of the deposition testimony at p. 57 states: 
Q. Where did these monies come from? 
A. Okay. The 73_70 rrn not swe. 14000 I'm not sure_ My dad djd have a death benefit fund that vvas 
supposed to have been paid to rne_ My brother said, no problem. It was ~nt to him. His wife kept 500 of it, and I 
got the other part. I don't remember liow much that was. So, that's tbe best l can tell you on that. 
Q. Why did you believe the death benefit was supposed to go to you? 
A Because my dad said so, and, of course, when he was ill he b.ad problems doiflg certain thmgs, and he 
said I made a mistake. I said, oh, don't worry about it, dad, because ;it didn't matter to me one way or the other. But 
my brother agreed to send me part of the money back. 
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measures of recovery as equitable remedies. The doctrine of quantum meruit 
permits recovery, on the basis of an implied promise to pay, of the reasonable 
value of the services rendered or the materials provided. Unjust enrichment, as a 
fictional promise or obligation implied by law, allows recovery where the 
defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff that would be inequitable for 
the defendant to retain without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the 
benefit. 
Neither of these two theories allows recovery by a subcontractor who lacks a 
contractual relationship directly with a property owner. . . . In the present case, 
the plaintiff subcontractors, who did not have express contracts directly with 
NWP, were limited to recovery upon their claims under the mechanic's lien 
statute. Absent that right of recovery, they have no cause of action directly against 
NWP for alleged unjust enrichment. 
Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 767~68, 979 P.2d 627, 
640-41 (1999) (citations omitted). 
Here, John Cornell, during his lifetime, had a potential cause of action directly against 
Respondent in 'her capacity as Trustee for breach of fiduciary duty that was extinguished by his 
death. See supra <_i[I(C)(3). The relationship between trustee and beneficiary is fiduciary in 
nature, not contractual. See supra 9[ I(C)(l). As such, no claim for unjust enrichment can arise 
from it. 
For these reasons, the Estate's claim for unjust enrichment must be dismissed. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondent Toni Jol;inson respectfully requests that her Motion 
to Dimiss be granted and that the subject Petition be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 28th day of May, 2013. 
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1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Personal Representa1ive 
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COI:RT OF THE SECOND JUDICL.\L DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAH01 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the \,fatter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FA.MIL Y TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) THE ESTATE OF JOHN CORNELL'S 
) MOTION TO DISQI:ALIFY THE LAW 
) FIRM OF JONES, BROWER & 
) CALLERY1 PLLC 
----------------) 
COMES NOW the Estate of John Cornell and moves this Court for an order 
disqualifying the Trust's attorneys, Karin R. Seubert and the law firm of Jones, Brower & 
Callery, PLLC, from further representation of the Trust i.n this case due to a conflict in interest. 
This motion is based upon I.R.P.C. l.7(a) and the memorandum in support of this motion. 
DATED this _U_ day of June, 2013. 
THE ESTATE OF JOHN CORNELL'S MOTION 
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1212 Idaho Street 
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Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert. 
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1304 Idaho Street 
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Lewiston, ID 83501 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECO~D JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COWITY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE 
) ESTATE OF JOHN CORNELL'S 
) MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE LAW 
) FIRM OF JONES, BRO,VER & 
) CALLERY, PLLC 
---- ------------) 
COMES NOW the Estate of John Cornell ("the Estate") and submits it Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to DisquaHfy the law firm of Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC C'J, B & C") 
as attorneys for The Revocable Family Trust Of Michael S. Cornell And Arlie M. Cornell ('<the 
Trust"). 
I. FACTS & PROCEDURE 
The genesis of this petition is the alleged improper conduct of Ms. Toni Johnson, while 
serving as trustee of the Trust, which has damaged the Trust res and has deprive.d the Estate of 
its property interests. This Court has been supervising the administration of the Trust, through 
this cause number, since the filing of a previous petition by John Henry Cornell on July 11, 
2012. On May 17, 2013, Ms. Seubert stated for the record 'just to be clear" that J, B & Chas 
:vtEMORANDUM L~ SUPPORT OF THE ESTATE OF 
JOHN CORNELL'S MOTION TO DTSQUALIFY THE 
LAW FIRM OF JOI\ES, BROWER & CALLERY, PLLC - 1 
Creason, Moore, Dokkco & Gddl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, uwision, 11) 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fu: (208) 746-2231 
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only ever acted as attorneys on behalf of Ms. Johnson, personally; not as the Trust's attorneys. 
A review of the language in the pleadings filed in this matter supports that claim. 
Throughout this litigation, Ms. Johnson has taken the position that all claims that she 
damaged the Trust res, and thereby the beneficiaries, should be dismissed because (I) the 
entirety of the trust res should be distributed to her, and (2) any claims for damages abated upon 
the death of the only other beneficiary, John CorneU. In response to Ms. Seubert's clarifying 
remark, the Estate argued-in its memorandum in opposition to her motion to dismiss-that if 
J, B & C represented :Ms. Johnson and not the Trust, then the motion to dismiss should be 
denied and inquiry into the Trust's position should commence. Two days before the hearing on 
its Motion to Dismiss, J, B & C wrote in its reply brief that it has actually represented both Ms. 
Johnson and the Trust the entire time. 
II. ANALYSIS 
An irreconcilable conflict of interest exists between the interests of the Trust and those 
of Ms. Johnson, which preclude J, B & C from representing both clients under I.RP .C. 1. 7(a). 
In order to represent both parties, the Court must find that the Trust's interests allow for an 
interpretation that eliminates the Trust's power to protect itself, and rewards Ms. Johnson for 
improper conduct by distributing the entirety of the Trust res to her. This is an interpretation 
that conflicts ,..ith the plain language of the Trust document, the clear intent of the trustors, and 
the principles of equity. Recognizing this conflict provides context for Ms. Seubert's 
volunteered clarification during the May 17 hearing, and evidences J, B & C's inability to 
represent both parties. 
A. Standard of Review 
The decision to grant or deny a motion to disqualify counsel is ,vithin the discretion of 
the trial court. Weaver v. 1.'vfillard, 120 Idaho 692, 892 P.2d 110 (Ct.App. 1991); Crown v. 
Hawkins Co., Ltd., 128 Idaho 114, 910 P.2d 786 (Ct.App. 1996). The moving party has the 
burden of establishing grounds for disqualification. The goal of the court should be to shape a 
remedy which ·will assure fairness to the parties and the integrity of the judicial process. 
\vbenever possible, courts should endeavor to reach a solution that is least burdensome to the 
client. Weaver, 120 Idaho at 697. Vvnen a motion to disqualif'.y is filed by an opposing party, it 
should be viewed with caution. Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 32, 175 P .3d 186, 194 (2007). 
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B. A Conflict of Interest Exists Under Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct Ruic 1.7. 
As a general rule, a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a 
concurrent conflict of interest. I.RP. C. 1. 7. Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1. 7 provides as 
follows: 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of 
mterest exists if: 
(1) The representation of one client will be directly adverse to another dient; 
or 
(2) There is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients 
will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client, a former client, or a third person or by the personal interests of the 
la'-"yer, including family and domestic relationships. 
LR.P.C. 1.7(a)(l) & (2). 
Loyalty and independent judgment are "essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to 
a client." I.R.P.C. 1.7 Comment [IJ. Concurrent cont1icts of interest "can arise from the 
lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or from the lawyer's 
ovVIl interests." Id Loyalty to a current. client prohibits "undertaking representation directly 
adverse to that client ,:vithout that client's informed consent." Id at Comment [6]. Thus, absent 
consent, a "1av.'Yer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the la""yer 
represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated." Id. 
Accepting as true the statement of J, B & C in its Reply Brief on the Motion to Dismiss 
regarding representation of the Trust, J, B & C holds a duty to provide loyal and independent 
judgment to the Trust. In Idaho, a Trust does not have interests separate from that of its 
beneficiaries. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a trustee cannot represent a trust in a pro 
se capacity, and must employ a lawyer for that purpose, because "'[t]he trustee would be 
representing the interests of others, i.e. the beneficiaries, and therefore ,vould be engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law." Indian Springs, LLC v. Indian Springs Land, LLC, 14 7 Idaho 
737, 745, 215 P.3d 457,465 (2009). The Court has also held that in limited circumstances, an 
attorney has a duty to the beneficiaries under a testamentary instrument. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 
140 Idaho 134, l39, 90 P.3d, 884, 889 (2004) ("An attorney preparing testamentary instruments 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE ESTATE OF 
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owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or identified therein to prepare such instruments, and if 
requested by the testator to have them properly execute~ so to effectuate the testator's intent as 
expressed in the testamentary instrument."). 'w'hile no authority appears to exist directly on 
point in Idaho, there is case law from foreign jurisdictions that establish a duty between the 
attorney for the trust and the trust beneficiaries. "An attorney who acts as counsel for a trustee 
provides advice and guidance as to how that trustee may and must act to fulfill ms obligations to 
all beneficiaries. It follows that when an attorney undertakes a relationship as an advisor to a 
trustee, he in reality also assumes a relationship 1,vith the beneficiary akin to that between trustee 
and beneficiary." .Morales v. Field, Degoff, Huppert and Mcgowan, 99 Cal.App. 3d, 307, 316 
(Ct.App. 1st Div. 3). 
Ms. Seubert's statement at the May 17 hearing made clear that the position espoused in 
the filings was Ms. Johnson's personal position, not that of the Trust. After being presented 
with the consequences of that limited representation, J, B & C now takes the position that it can 
and always has represented Ms. Johnson, personally, and the Trust. Here, Ms. Johnson's 
position is that any damage done to the Trust res should be ignored under the doctrine of 
abatement. She argues that this proposition is true, regardless of whether she engaged in 
improper conduct while acting as trustee. This is, quite simply, not a position that the Trust can 
or should take. The Trust would be arguing for an interpretation of law and equity that 
frustrates the plain language of the Trust and the clear intent of the trustors to effect an equal 
distribution between children. The Trust would be arguing for an interpretation of lavv and 
equity that does not allow the Trust to recover for its damages. J, B & Chas an actual existing 
conflict of interest between representing Ms. Johnson and the Trust, of which the Estate is a 
bene.ficiary. 
Ill CONCLUSION 
The Estate requests that the Court order J,B & C be disqualified as attorneys for the 
Trust. 
DATED thisu.J_ day of June, 2013. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE Co.v'r ,e.. 1)1 rd_, 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWAl_ER ~~r~ _ 
. ~ ,·' Jly 
CV-2012-0000277 
The Matter of Michael S Cornell 
Hearing type: Motion to Dismiss 
Hearing type: Motion Hearing 
Hearing date: 06/04/2013 
Time: 4:11 PM - 5:01 PM 
Judge: Randall W. Robinson 
Courtroom: 002 
Court reporter: None 
Minutes Clerk: Jodie 
Tape Number: CV473-2 
COURT MINUTES 
4:11 The Honorable Randall W. Robinson presiding. 
Present in Court: 
SamuelCreason, Karin Seubert, Darrel Aherin 
4:12 Ms. Seubert - Explains and Clarifies Issues 
4:19 Mr. Creason - Response to issues of Trust; Representation Issue; Counsel for the 
The Trust? 
4:25 Colloquy between Court and Counsel 
4:57 Mr. Creason and Ms. Seubert - Rest 
4:57 Court - Explains and is Appreciative of each Attorney and their Briefings 
- All are Legitimate legal issues - possible Compromise by the parties 
- Will issue a Written Decision as soon as possible 
463
4:59 Mr. Creason - submitted an order in the Probate case, CV2012-439 
'Amended Order Appointing Personal Representative of the Estate of 
John Henry Cornell' clarifying language of the original order 
Court -Approves and signs the Amended Order 
5:01 Court is in Recess 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
ORDER AUGMENTING RECORD 
This matter having been called for hearing on June 4, 2013 on Appellee's Motion to 
Augment Record; the parties having appeared by and through their attorneys of record; the Court 
having considered the oral argument presented and record of the case; and good cause shown, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk's record is hereby augmented to include the following 
documents from the collateral matter In the Matter of the Estate of John H Cornell, deceased, 
Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-00439, certified copies of which are on file with this Court: 
1. Order of Appointment of Temporary Personal Representative entered November 15, 
2012; 
2. Order Appointing Personal Representative entered February 12, 2013; and 
3. Registry of Action as of May 7, 2013. 
ORDER AUGMENTING RECORD -1-
465
DATED this ~ day ofJune, 2013 . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
JUDGE MICHAE:r(J. G ( 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing . . ORDER 





hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
LJu· _liJl. 
By~_Cl~er~k o~~Co-u-¥'-+-, - ~ i ___....~ 
( 
ORDER AUGMENTING RECORD -2-
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THE REVOC/\l.3LE FAMILY TRUST ()I,' 




) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) BRIEF OF ESTATI~ OF JOHN H. 
) CORNELL 
) 
) RE: APPRAL OF MARGARET 
) WATKINS 
) 
COMES NOW Kureen Cornell, Personal Repre~entativc of the Estate of Joh11 Henry 
Cornell, hy and through her attorney of record, Theodore 0. Creason of Creason, Moore, Dokken 
& Geidl , PLLC. and l'ilcs this Brief in response:: to the 13ricf of Margaret Watkins ir1 support of 
her ~ppeal. 
Mwg,m::l Watkin:; app,;;:;il:, the February 15 , 2013 .Judgment of thEc! Magistrate Court 
dismissing all claims pursued on behall' of John Cornell, in bis name only, by Margarel Watkins. 
Ms. Watkins served her May 13, 2013 Brie[- in Support of Appeal upon the attorney of record for 
the .Estate of John l knry Cornell, Theodore 0. Creason. Though the Magistrate Court solicited 
URrnF OF ESTATE 
RE: WATKINS' Al'l'EAL-
C,·,·ason, Moore, D"kkc'll & {.,(ei<ll, !'Ll.C 
l'.0 . nrnwi,r X35. Lcwi>tu,1 , Ill 835111 
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input from the EsLuLc's attorney prior to issuing its judgment, the EsLuLc was not a party to the 
appealed action ut the time or the grant of judgn1enL Ms. Wat.kins chose to pursue this matter 
without substituting the Estate into the action pun;uartt to ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1 ). 
Funhcr, t.be Magistral;.; Court Jiu 11ot treat the E:-;U.1tc as a party Lo that action. R.uther, the court 
invited the Estate lo tile iLs own petition for any dain1s held against. THF. REVOCABI ,F: 
1:/\MiL Y TRUST 01" MICHA FL S. CORNELL AND J\RLJE M. CORNELL, which the 
Magistrate Court would consider under the san1e cause number, While the Estal<:: recognizes that 
it may encounter some of Lhe :-;amc legal re<l:i(ll1ing appealed in this matter-and the Estate 
rt::1.:ug11i:1.i.cs that it nrny ch;;ilkngc that rca::soning thrnugh its own appeal at a l'ulun,: date-the 
Estate declines any invitation to participate in this appeul as a pseudo-party <-md, thereby, waive 
its right lo u $epnratc and distinct judicial process. 
The Estate limits its brief i11 this matter (o the pm·posc of clarilyi11g its position, or \:;Lek 
thereor, in this appGal. 
DATED this l 0th day of June, 2013. 
13RIEF 01" ESTA'l'E 
LU:: WATKINS' APl'EAL- 2 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & CElDL, PLLC 
o~dJ,~.t== 
111eodore 0. C1·cason, 1SB #1563 
Attorneys for P.R. of Estat<::, Kareen Cornell 
Crcas,;,1, Mo1)1"~, Uolckcu & Geidl, l'LLC 
l'.0. Dn1,r~1· 835, 1,twt~lon, ID 83501 
(21\!l) 743-1~16: F,1x: (208) 746-2231 
F'. 4 
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l l-lERCl3Y Cl:RTIFY that on this 10th day of June, 2013, t riled the foregoing BRIEF OF 
ESTATE OF JOHN l-1. CORNELL RE: APPL:i\L OF MARGARET WATKINS with the Clerk of 
the Court, and provided a paper copy to the following persons'. 
Karin Seubert 
.10111::s, 131vw1;;1 &. C,1lkfy, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Slr\:ld 
P.O. Box 85,,1 
Lewiston, JD 8350 I 
Darrel W. Ahedn 
Aherin, Rice & Ancgon 
1212 Idaho Stn.:c:( 
P .0. Draw<.lr 698 
Lewiston, ID 83 50 J 
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Attorneys at Law 
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IN TIIB DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND TIJDICIAL DISTRICT OF Tiffi 
STATE OP IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CIEARWAIBR 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAELS. CORNEIL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL 
COMES NOW Appellee Toni C. Johnson. by and through her attorney of record, Karin 
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., hereby submits this Brief in Opposition to Appeal. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Comell established the Revocable Family Trust of 
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell on November l, 1996. See Exhibit A to Affidavit of 
Karin Seubert dated September 14, 2012 (hereinafter "Trust"). Through said trust, Mr. and :Mrs. 
Cornell named their two children. Toni C. Johnson and John H. Cornell, as the beneficiaries of 
the trust upon Mr. and Mrs. Cornell's deaths. Id. at§ 4.03. Arlie M. Cornell died on November 
9, 2008 and Michael S. Cornell died on December 15, 2009. See Petition for Supervised 
Administration and Removal of Trustee. (][ 2. 
BRIEF IN OPPOSIDON TO APPEAL -1-
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On July 11, 2012. John H. Comell initiated this proceeding. Petition for Supervised 
Administration and Removal of Trustee. John H. Cornell died on August 20, 2011 leaving no 
issue. Affidavit of Karin Seubert at 'J[ 2. 
Respondent Toni C. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 17, 2012 seeking to 
dismiss the Petition for Supervised Admini.stration- and Removal of Trustee on the basis that the 
claims of John H. Cornell were extinguished by his death. 
On November 15, 2012, in the probate action concerning the Estate of John H. Cornell, 
deceased, Margaret Watkins was appointed as Temporary Personal Representative of the Estate 
of John H. Cornell, deceased. See Order of Appointment of Temporary Personal Representative, 
Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-00439 dated November 15, 2012. 
On February 12, 2013, in the probate action concerning the Estate of John H. Cornell, 
deceased, Kareen Cornell was appointed as personal representative of the Estate of John H. 
Comell, deceased, thereby terminating the prior temporary appointment of Margaret Watlcins . 
. See Amended Order Appointing Personal Representative, Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-
00439, dated June 4, 2013. 
On February 15, 2013, the Magistrate Court entered its Memorandum Opinion and 
Judgment for Dismissal, which dismissed the Petition for Supervised Administration and 
Removal of Trustee on the basis that the claims raised in said Petition were extinguished by the 
death of John H. Cornell. Margaret Watkins filed her Notice of Appeal on March 26, 2013. 
Toni C. Johnson requests that this Court affirm the decision of the Magistrate Court on 
the grounds that, first, Margaret Watkins lacks standing to appeal said Judgment for Dismissal, 
and, second, that no reversible error has occuued because said Judgment is well based in fact and 
in law. 
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II. ARGUMENT 
l. Margaret Watkins has no standing to appeal the ruling of the Magistrate Court. 
Under Idaho law, 
Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this Court before reaching 
the merits of the case. The· doctrine of standing focuses on the party 'seeking relief 
and not the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. To s,atisfy the 
requirement of standing, litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an injmy 
in fact and a substantial lili:el:ihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or 
redress the claimed injury. The alleged injury must be to the litigant whose 
standing is at issue. 
Abolafia v. Reeves, Idaho Suprerne Court Case No. 38189-2010, 277 P.3d 345 (April 26, 2012) 
(quoting Troutner v. Kempthome, 142 Idaho 389, 392, 128 P.3d 926, 929 (2006); Young v. City 
of Ketcham, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002); Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 
Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 75?; 763 (1989)). 
In her Notice of Appeal, Margaret Watldns states: 
Margaret Watkins, an interested person, has a .right to appeal because she was 
appointed temporary personal representative and defended Toni Johnson's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. The Estate has a right to appeal to the District Judge 
Division of the District Court in the County of Clearwater the [Judgment for 
Dismissal] pursuant to Section 17-207 (7) of the Idaho Code. 
Notice of Appeal at'][ 2. She assens in her supporting brief that "[t)his appeal is made by one of 
the beneficiaries of the trust, John Camell." Brief in Support of Appeal at 1. This assertion is 
not supported by the record of the case. 
The termination of Margaret Watkins• appointment as temporary personal representative 
of the Estate of John H. Cornell, deceased, became effective February 12, 2013. Amended Order 
Appointing Personal Representative, Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-00439, dated June 4, 
2013- The subject Judgment for Dismissal was entered on February 15, 2013. Said Notice of 
Appeal was dated March 25, 2013. Id. 
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Termination of appointment of a personal representative ends the right and power 
pertaining to the office of personal representative and terminates the personal representative's 
authority to represent the estate in t:tny pending or future proceeding. LC. § 15-3-608. Here, 
Margaret Watkins' authority related to the Estate of John H. Cornell terminated as of February 
12, 2013. Whether the Estate had a right to appeal has no bearing on Margaret Watkins' standing 
to pursue an appeal because her authority related to the Estate had been extinguished. Therefore, 
when Margaret Watkins filed her Notice of Appeal on March 25, 2013, she had no authority to 
act on behalf of the Estate or John H. Cornell personally, thus she could not have been making 
this appeal on behalf of "one of the beneficiaries of the trust, John Cornell," as she asserts in said 
Notice. 
Because she had no authority to act on behalf of the Estate, then Margaret Watkins must 
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact to her individually and a substantial likelihood that the 
judicial relief requested will prevent the claimed injury to her individually. See Abolafia v. 
Reeves, Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 38189-2010, 277 P.3d 345 (April 26, 2012) (quoting 
Troutner v. Kempthome. 142 Idaho 389, 392> 128 P.3d 926, 929 (2006); Young v. City of 
Ketcham, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002); Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho· 
635, 641, 778 P.2d 757; 763 (1989)) .. The record of the case reflects that Margaret Watkins has 
no such injury that would grant her standing to pursue an appeal. 
In her Notice of Appeal, Ms. Watkins refers to herself as "an interested person." The 
term ''interested person" includes "heirs, devisees, children, spouses, c:reditors, beneficiaries, and 
any others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent~ 
ward; or protected person which may be affected by the proceeding." l.C. § 15-1-201(25). Ms. 
Watkins is not a beneficiary of the subject Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and 
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Arlie M. Cornell, and has asserted no property right in or claim agamst the Trust in her individual 
capacity. See Affidavit of Karin Seubert dated September 14, 2012 at E:ili. A and B; Registry of 
Action, In the Matter of the Estate of John H. Cornell, deceased, dated May 14, 2013. She has 
not filed a creditor's claim iri the estate of John H. Corn.ell, so the Court cannot conclude that she 
is a creditor for purposes of the Estate of Jolm H. Cornell. See Registry of Action, In the Manet 
of the Estate of John H. Cornell, deceased, dated May 14, 2013. Even if Ms. Watkins were a 
creditor of the Estate of John H. Cornell, deceased, she would not be a party aggrieved by the 
subject Judgment for Dismissal because only the Estate, through the authorized personal 
representative, has authority to prosecute claims against Toni J obnson in her personal capacity or 
~ her capacity as trustee of the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. 
Corn.ell.1 LC. § 15-3-715(22). 
For these reasons, Margaret Watkins' appeal should be dismissed for lack of standing. 
2. No reversible error has been shown. 
Before the Magistrate Court, Margaret Watkins, as then personal representative of the 
Estate of John R Cornell, argued that John H. Cornell's Petition set forth both claims for breach 
of fiduciary duty and for breach of trust, arguing _that said breach of trust claim sounds in 
contract. Response to Motion to Dismiss at 8-10. Margaret Watkins now argues that the 
Magistrate Court committed reversible error when it failed to recognize a potential breach of 
contract claim. Brief in Support of Appeal at 2-4. 
First, said argument is not preserved on appeal because Margaret Watkins failed to raise it 
1 It is Respondent's posftion that, after her appointtnent, current personal representative Kareen Cornell had the 
authority to appeal said Judgment for Dismissal on behalf of the Estate, thus pending the outcome of Margaret 
Watkins' appeal, the Estate is bound by said decision. The Estate takes the position that it is not a party to this 
appeal, nor bound by the Judgment for Dismissal. See Brief of Estate of John H. Cornell re: Appeal of Margaret 
Watkins dated June 10, 2013. 
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. before the Magistrate Court. Bannore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 343, 179 P.3d 303, 306 (2008) 
( citations omitted). 
Second, to the extent Appellant is now merely interchanging the descriptor of "breach of 
contract" for "breach of trust," Margaret Watkins provides no case law to support the conclusion 
that a breach of trust claim arises in contract_ Before the Magistrate Court, Margaret Watkins 
cited to Cruzen v. Boise City, 58 Idaho 406, 74 P.2d 1037 (1937), to support her argument that a 
breach of trust arises in contract. Response to Motion to Dismiss at 8. However, said case 
involved a dispute over liability a municipal corporation owes to bondholders for a deficiency in 
the collection of assessments due to embezzlement by the city clerk of the levied special 
assessments. Id. at 408, 74 P.2d at 1039. The Cruzen Court held that the subject bonds 
constituted an enforceable contract between the city and its bondholders and was not time barred. 
Id. at 415-417, 74 P.2d at 1046-48 (declining to consider whether statute concerning safekeeping 
of money by a county or the statute of limitations for breach of contract was implicated). 
The relationship between a bondholder and municipal corporation issuing bonds clearly 
conforms with the general requirements of an enforceable contract: off er, acceptance> meeting of 
the minds1 and consideration. Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 838 P.2d 293 (1992); Haener v. 
Adam Co. Highway Dist., 108 Idaho 170, 697 P.2d 1184 (1985); Gyurkey v. Bahler, 103 Idaho 
663,651 P.2d 928 (19$2); Vance v. Connell, 96 Idaho 417,529 P.2d 1289 (1974). 
No such contractual relationship between the successor trustee and beneficiary of a trust 
exists. The existence and involvement of a written document does not establish a contracrual 
relationship nor a potential claim against Toni Johnson grounded in contract. 
Instead, similar to the attorney-client relationship at issue in Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 
616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012), the duties owed by a trustee to trustee beneficiaries are defined by 
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statute. The trust documents at issue contain no greater requirements than are set forth in the 
Uniform Probate Code and Principal and Income Act. See Affidavit of Karin Seubert dated 
September 14, 2012 at E:ili. A and B. The standard of care in the trust document is essentially 
the same as in any trustee-beneficiary relationship. Id. As such, a claim for breach of said 
standard of care is a tort, and does not sound in contract as Margaret Watkins suggests. See Id. at 
620, 272 P.3d at 1251. See also Joties v. KootenaJ County Title Ins. Co., .125 Idaho 607, 614, 
873 P.2d 861, 868 (1994) ("a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is a negligence action in which 
the duty to act is created by the relationship between the parties.'') 
Last, Margaret Watkms did not raise in her Brief in Support of Appeal the issue of 
whether the Magistrate Court properly applied Idaho Code Section 5-327 in its Judgment for 
Dismissal> therefore it is not subject to review by the District Court and is not addressed in this 
response brief. See State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983) ("The 
Supreme Court will not review an issue that was not raised or argued in the briefs.") 
For these reasons, Margaret Watkins' appeal should · be dismissed for failure to 
demonstrate reversible error. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellee Toni Johnson respectfully requests that the District 
Court dismiss the appeal of Margaret Watkins based upon lack of standing and due to her failure 
to demonstrate reversible error. Appellant Toni Johnson respectfully requests an award of costs 
and attomey fees against Margaret Watkins pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 on the basis 
that the appeal was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. 
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DATED this JD day of June, 2013. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P .L.L.C. 
·By 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I . HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO APPEAL was, this J!l day of 
June, 2013, 
hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
./ by first class mail; or 
_v_ transmitted via facsimile 
to: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherln, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P .L.L.C. 
1219 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 835 





Attorney for Respondent 
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Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
SECOND ORDER AUGMENTING 
RECORD 
The Appellant Margaret Watkins, by and through her attorney of record, Darrel Aherin of 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon, the Appellee Toni Johnson, by and through her attorney of record, Karin 
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. , and the Estate of John H. Cornell, by and through 
its attorney, Samuel Creason of Creason, Moore, Dokken and Geidl, P.L.L.C., having stipulated on 
the record in open court on June 4, 2013 before the Honorable Randall W. Robinson to 
augmentation of the clerk's record as set forth below, and good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that the clerk's record is hereby augmented to include the Amended Order Appointing 
Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell entered on June 4, 2013 in the collateral 
matter In the Matter of the Estate of John H Cornell, deceased, Clearwater County Case No. CV 
2012-00439, a certified copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
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DATED this // t1<.-day of June, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing SECOND ORDER 
AUGMENTING RECORD was, this //-IJ day of 
June, 2013, 
hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
V mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
to: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore O. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By { ~ 
c1erkofCo 
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Jun 04 13 03:15p crea5on, Moore, & Dokken (2081 746-2231 F'. 2 
AM-
PM~ 
20 '!'~ JUN o 4 -
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason, ISB #8183 
Clerk Dist. Court 
Clearwater Coun , Idaho 
CREASON, MOORE, DOK.KEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
l 21 9 Idaho Street 
P .0. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 8350 l 
Telephone: (208) 743-15 I 6 
Facsimile: (208) 746-223 I 
Attorney for Surv~ving Spouse 
Of John Herny Cornell 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF l'HE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO; IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTA TE 
OF 
JOHN HENRY CORNELL, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV 2012-439 
AMENDED ORDER APPOINTING 
PERSONAL REPRESENT A 'rIVE 
OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN 
HENRY CORNELL 
The pet11ioner K.areen ComeH for an adjudication uf intestacy and detern1ination 
of hein, having come before the Co1..1.1i on February 6, 2013, the Court makes the 
following findings: 
1. John Cornell died on August 20, 2012, at the after of 47 years. At the tin1e of 
his death, the decedent was domiciled in Minidoka County, State of ldaho. 
ORDER APPOINTING P:ERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN 
HENRY CORNELL -- 1 
Creason1 Moore, Dokken 4'?., Geidl, PLLC 
r_Q, Drawer 835, l.,.1.:wistot1 ID 83501 (208)743-1516; l<'ai(208)74<i--2231 
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2. No adjudication has been made of whether Decl;'.dent died intestu.te. No Will 
has been admitted to probate. 
3. The decedent was survived by the following persons: 
Kareen Cornell 
Address 
P.O. Bu;,;. 361 
Heybllln, ldaho 83336 
Rclationshig 
Spouse 
4. Movant's Petition sets forth her priority as surviving spouse to appointment as 
personal representative of the Estate. 
WHERE.FORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Kareen Cornell is appointed 
Personal Representative of the Estate of John Ht:nry Cornell and tenninates the 
appointment of Mru:garet Watkins as acting temporary personal representative effective 
Febmary 12, 2013. 
DA TED tl1 is _lf6h\ay of June, 2013 h •nl- f /P {;,;.,, u G " /e b /./ '7 } ~ Z<>l 3 
,µ;r~--RANDALL W. ROBINSON, Judge 
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. ~~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDARD, IN AND FOR THE COUf\JTY OF C[cA~WATER 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL 
Case No. CV 2012-277 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
RE: KAREEN CORNELL 
This case involves the issue as to whether Kareen Cornell, the widow of John H. 
Cornell, may pursue the claims of John H. Cornell against Toni Johnson for wrongfully 
applying the proceeds of a trust to her personal needs rather than distributing John H. 
Cornell's share to Kareen Connell. 
Kareen Cornell, as personal representative of the Estate of John H. Cornell and 
surviving spouse of John H. Cornell, filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and 
Court Ordered Distribution ("Petition") of a trust created by the parents of John H. 
Cornell and Toni Johnson. Toni Johnson, the sole trustee for the trust and a named 
beneficiary of the trust, filed a Motion to Dismiss Kareen Cornell's Petition on the basis 
that Kareen Cornell's claims against Toni Johnson, derived from John H. Cornell's 
claims while alive, are abated with the death of John H. Cornell. The Motion to Dismiss, 
the previous Judgment for Dismissal filed in this case regarding the Petition filed by 
John H. Cornell, affidavits of the parties, the parties' Memoranda, the oral argument of 
the parties, and the file have been carefully considered. 
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I. Statement of Facts. 
On November 1, 1996, Michael Cornell and Arlie Cornell, husband and wife, and 
parents to Toni Johnson and John H. Cornell, created a revocable family trust ("Trust") . 
The Trust provides, "On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and 
the Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal 
remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the following 
beneficiaries: Toni C. Johnson and John H. Cornell." Trust§ 4.03. 
On November 9, 2008, Arlie Cornell passed away. On August 6, 2009, Michael 
Cornell signed the First Amendment of the Cornell Trust which named Toni Johnson 
("Toni") as sole trustee/successor trustee instead of Toni and John H. Cornell ("John") 
jointly serving in that capacity as provided for in the original Trust. On December 15, 
2009, Michael Cornell, the last Trustor, passed away. 
John was experiencing serious health and financial problems at the time his 
father, Michael Cornell, passed away. John failed to obtain necessary medical care 
because of his lack of finances. John contacted his sister, Toni, regarding the status of 
the Trust following his father's death, but Toni refused to speak to him. John wrote 
several letters and made several phone calls to the attorney for the estate requesting 
information as to the status of the Trust without a response from the attorney. In his 
third letter to the attorney dated September 17, 2010, John wrote, "Is it fair that Toni has 
a place to live and I do not have a place to live. Why should I incur living expenses and 
she is in complete control of everything, living off the money in the trust and living free in 
my parent's house which is also my house?" 
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In the nearly two (2) years from the last trustor's death through John's death, 
Toni failed to distribute any part of the Trust to John even while she lived rent free in the 
home that is included in the Trust. Toni used funds from the Trust for her personal 
benefit. Toni has not distributed any of the funds from the Trust other than for her own 
use. 
John received $3000 as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy on his father's 
life. Upon Toni's demand that he turn the money over to her, he sent a check for $2500 
to Toni and retained $500 for living expenses. 
On July 11, 2012, John filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and 
Removal of Trustee alleging breach of Toni's fiduciary duty to settle and distribute the 
Trust, Toni's mismanagement of the estate by paying her own personal expenses while 
failing to pay John his one-half share of the estate, and Toni's failure to provide an 
inventory of the assets. 
On August 20, 2012, John committed suicide. In the case of death of one of the 
beneficiaries, the Trust provides at 4.03(a), 
If any child, for whom a share of the Trust Estate has been set aside, 
should die prior to the above distribution, then the Trustee shall distribute 
all of such deceased child's share of the Trust Estate to his or her 
surviving issue in equal shares . . . If there is no surviving issue,, then all 
of the deceased child's share of the Trust Estate shall be added to the 
shares set aside for the benefit of the Trustors' other living child .... " 
John's wife, Kareen Cornell, survives him. However, John left no issue. Thus, 
the Trust proceeds, in the absence of any distribution prior to John's death, will go in its 
entirety to Toni. 
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II. Proceedings to date. 
On July 11, 2011, John H. Cornell filed a Petition for Supervised Administration 
and Removal of Trustee regarding the Trust through his attorney, Darrell Aherin. On 
August 11, 2011, John died leaving his wife, Kareen, and no issue. 
On September 17, 2012, Toni filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the basis 
that John's claims of Toni's malfeasance in administering the Trust were extinguished 
by his death. Karen Seubert submitted briefing for Toni and Darrell Aherin submitted 
briefing for the deceased John and John's aunt, Margaret Watkins, who was appointed 
as the temporary personal representative for John's estate. 
The hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was originally scheduled for November 27, 
2012. John's widow, Kareen Cornell, made her first appearance in this case on that 
date with Theodore Creason appearing for her. At Kareen Cornell's request, the 
hearing was continued. Oral argument was conducted on January 8, 2013 on Toni's 
Motion to Dismiss John's Petition with Ms. Seubert and Mr. Aherin presenting argument. 
Mr. Creason failed to appear due to a misunderstanding regarding the hearing. Another 
hearing was conducted on February 6, 2013 at which Ms. Seubert appeared for Toni, 
Mr. Aherin appeared for John and Margret Watkins, and Mr. Creason appeared for 
Kareen Connell. Briefing was provided by Mr. Creason and Ms. Seubert prior to the 
hearing in addition to the briefs that has been previously submitted by Ms. Seubert and 
Mr. Aherin. 
Ms. Seubert sought dismissal of Mr. Aherin's Petition on the basis of abatement 
of John's claims upon his death and that no substitution had been filed for John upon 
his death. This Court on the basis of solely the abatement issue dismissed John's 
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Petition. On February 9, 2013, this Court orally announced its decision granting Toni's 
Motion to Dismiss and then issued on February 15, 2013, Judgment for Dismissal and a 
supporting Memorandum Opinion. Kareen was given twenty (20) days to submit a 
Petition and make claims against Toni if she wished to proceed further in this case. 
On February 26, 2012, Kareen Connell, as the newly appointed personal 
representative of the Estate of John H. Cornell and as John's surviving spouse, filed a 
Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution. The Petition 
alleges that Ton i's misuse of the Trust funds constitutes conversion and violates 
additional equitable principles. The Petition alleges that Kareen is entitled in equity as a 
constructive trust to the one-half share of the Trust John would have received had he 
survived. 
On March 4, 2013, Toni filed her Motion to Dismiss Kareen's Petition. On May 7, 
2013, Toni filed her Memorandum of Law in Support of her second Motion to Dismiss. 
On May 22, 2013, Samuel Creason filed his Memorandum in Opposition and on May 
28, 2013, Ms. Seubert filed her Reply Brief. Oral argument was conducted on June 4, 
2013 with Samuel Creason representing Kareen and Toni represented by Karen 
Seubert. 
Ill. Legal Analysis. 
A Standard. 
Affidavits have been filed and considered. In considering matters outside the 
pleadings on a motion to dismiss, such motion must be treated as a motion for summary 
judgment. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Hellickson v Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 276, 769 P.2d 150, 153 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
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The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment has been often 
repeated by the appellate courts. 
All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving 
party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are 
to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 
Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). Summary judgment is 
appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 
(1991 ). 
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 529, 887 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1994). 
With respect to the abatement issue presented by Toni's Motion to Dismiss, there 
is no genuine issue of any material fact. I find it appropriate to consider Toni's motion to 
dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Toni's Motion for Summary Judgment 
raises two issues: (1) Do John's claims survive his death under the common law? (2) If 
not, has the Idaho legislature abrogated the common law and provided for the 
survivability of John's claims? 
B. Discussion. 
1. Standing 
Kareen argues that Toni lacks standing to make her arguments regarding the 
Trust because she is a contingent beneficiary. The Supreme Court in Car/ H. 
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 870, 993 P.2d 1197, 1201 
(1999) noted that a party to an action must actually benefit from the proceeding. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provides that "[e]very action shall be 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." I.R.C.P. 17(a). A real 
party in interest "is the person who will be entitled to the benefits of the 
action if successful, one who is actually and substantially interested in the 
subject matter." State, Dep't of Law Enforcement v. One 1990 Geo Metro, 
126 Idaho 675, 680, 889 P.2d 109, 114 (Ct.App.1995) (quoting Carrington 
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v. Crandall, 63 Idaho 651,658, 124 P.2d 914,917 (1942) (decision under 
statutory precursor to I.R.C.P. 17(a))). 
133 Idaho at 870,993 P.2d at 1201. 
The Supreme Court in Christensen held that the prospect of the Plaintiffs, as 
named beneficiaries under the trust, ever gaining any benefit from the trust was too 
remote to justify designating the Plaintiffs as a real party in interest. "(T)he co-plaintiffs, 
as children of Carl and Lenna, will have an interest in the assets of the Family Trust only 
if (1) Carl and Lenna do not exhaust the trust corpus during their lifetimes, and (2) funds 
remain after $100,000 is distributed to the Missionary Trust. Because the co-plaintiffs 
have a mere expectancy, they will not be entitled to the benefits of a successful suit." 
133 Idaho at 870, 993 P.2d at 1201. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the 
Plaintiffs' case on the basis that they were not a real party in interest. 
The facts of this case are substantially different than present in Christensen. 
In this case, the granters are deceased. Toni is the only person who has had access to 
the Trust and has used funds from the Trust. In fact, the gravamen of Kareen's petition 
is that Toni has misapplied the Trust for her own benefit to the exclusion of her 
deceased husband. If Kareen is granted the relief she seeks, Toni will be required to 
disgorge money she has misused and perform an accounting for all property in the trust. 
Kareen does not explain how Toni can be a real party in interest against whom relief is 
sought, but that Toni is not a real party in interest when she interposes defenses. 
There is no living beneficiary under the Trust other than Toni. Even though the 
Trust has not been yet been officially distributed by court order, Toni has used the 
proceeds as if the Trust disposition had been approved. She is the only person who is 
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named as trustee and the only person alive who is identified as beneficiary. The only 
contingency remaining is actually distributing the proceeds. Toni is clearly a real party 
in interest. If she is successful in this case, the entire Trust will be hers to do with as 
she wishes. 
Kareen argues that inartful words by Toni's counsel that she does not represent 
the Trust deprive Toni of the status of a real party in interest. To the contrary, Toni's 
personal interest and the Trust coincide since Toni is the only beneficiary and trustee 
still living. 
There is no factual issue as to whether Toni is a real party in interest. Kareen's 
argument is rejected. 
2. Law of the Case. 
Toni argues that this Court's previous Judgment with respect to the claims made 
by Mr. Aherin on behalf of Margaret Watkins and John requires dismissal of Kareen's 
Petition under the law of the case doctrine. The law of the case only applies to a 
decision made by an appellate court. Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 516, 5 
P.3d 973, 977 (2000). No appellate decision has been rendered on this case. 
Therefore, Toni's argument is rejected. 
Foreclosure of Kareen's ability to present arguments on her behalf would be 
especially unfair in this case. On the one hand, Toni has argued and will presumably 
argue at the appellate stage that any appeal taken by Margaret Watkins must be 
dismissed because Margaret Watkins is not a real party in interest as no substitution 
was ever filed for John following his death and Margaret Watkins is no longer personal 
representative. Kareen as a nonparty was limited to making arguments with respect to 
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the Petition filed by Mr. Aherin on behalf of her husband and pursued by Margaret 
Watkins. Under these circumstances, Kareen, as John's deceased widow and personal 
representative of John's estate, must be allowed to present her arguments to the Court 
as a real party in interest. 
This Court adheres to the reasons set forth in its Memorandum Opinion dated 
February 15, 2013 dismissing the Petition filed by John H. Cornell. However, Kareen 
makes new arguments why her Petition should withstand Toni's Motion to Dismiss. 
It is important to note that Kareen derives all her claims from the wrongs she 
alleges Toni committed against John. Toni asserts in her Motion that all the derivative 
claims asserted by Kareen are abated by John's death. 
3. Abatement. 
Kareen in her Petition alleges that Toni violated her fiduciary duties as a trustee 
to John under several provisions of the Trust Administration Act, Idaho Code § 7-301 et. 
seq. Petition at §§ 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, 3.17, 3.18, and 3.19. This argument has already 
been considered in the original Memorandum Opinion. However, because the analysis 
in finding the allegations of statutory violations to be abated are pivotal to addressing 
Kareen's other arguments, this Court's discussion addressing this allegation when 
dismissing John's Petition will be largely repeated here. 
The Supreme Court recently considered in Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 272 
P.3d 1247 (2012) when the claims of deceased individuals are abated or terminated. 
The abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative enactment 
addressing the survivability of a claim, the common law rules govern. See 
I.C. § 73-116 ("The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant 
to, or inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all 
cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all 
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courts of this state."); see also Evans v. Twin Falls Cnty., 118 Idaho 210, 
215, 796 P.2d 87, 92 (1990). Under the common law, claims arising out of 
contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding 
in pure tort abate. See Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 674-79, 34 P.2d 
957, 960-61 (1934); Kloepferv. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 417-18, 184 P. 477, 
477 (1919). 
Id. at 619-620. 
Thus, in order for John's claims to survive his death, his claims must 
sound in contract, and not in tort. The Bishop decision is instructive as to how to 
analyze whether a case sounds in contract or tort for purposes of abatement of 
the claim. The Bishop case involved a legal malpractice claim. Although the 
malpractice claim arose out of a contractual claim to perform legal services, the 
Supreme Court held the claim to sound in tort for purposes of abatement. 
As this Court previously recognized, "[l]egal malpractice actions are an 
amalgam of tort and contract theories." See Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 
702, 706, 652 P.2d 650, 654 (1982). The tort basis of legal malpractice 
actions flows from the elements of legal malpractice: "(a) the existence of 
an attorney-client relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part of the 
lawyer; (c) failure to perform the duty; and (d) the negligence of the lawyer 
must have been a proximate cause of the damage to the client. ... " Id. 
(quoting Sherry v. Diercks, 29 Wash.App. 433, 437, 628 P.2d 1336, 1338 
(1981)). "The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined 
by the purposes for which the attorney is retained." Johnson, 103 Idaho at 
704, 652 P .2d at 652; Fuller, 119 Idaho at 425, 807 P .2d at 643 (holding 
that the tort of legal malpractice is also a breach of the attorney-client 
relationship). Breach of an attorney's duty in negligence is a tort. See 
Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136, 90 P.3d 884, 886 (2004); 
Johnson, 103 Idaho at 704, 706-07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55. The 
contract basis of legal malpractice actions is the failure to perform 
obligations directly specified in the written contract. See Johnson, 103 
Idaho at 704, 706-07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55 (holding that a breach of 
contract claim would arise if the attorney did not do what he promised to 
do in the contract, e.g., failing to draw up a contract of sale). Thus, under 
the abatement rule, breach of duty is an action in tort, not contract; that is, 
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unless an attorney foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a 
specific outcome in the litigation or provides for a higher standard of care 
in the contract, he is held to the standard of care expected of an attorney. 
Breach of that duty is a tort. 
Id. at 620. 
The Idaho Supreme Court's analysis of whether legal malpractice claims 
are abated is very clearly applicable to this case. This case is a mixed tort and 
contract case. This case also involves torts arising from a contractual 
agreement. A tort basis for John's claims against Toni exists just as they were 
found to exist with respect to the legal malpractice claim in Bishop: (a) The 
existence of a fiduciary relationship is established by Toni being appointed as 
and acting as a trustee (b) Toni, the trustee, has duties to act in a particular 
fashion; (c) the alleged failure to meet those duties; (d) the failure of Toni to 
perform her duties was the proximate cause of John not receiving his share of 
the Trust during his lifetime. 
In Bishop, the Court held that 
the contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are 
defined by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attorney and 
client want to provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by 
express language in the contract. Here, the standard of care in the 
contract is essentially the same as in any attorney-client relationship. 
Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated upon Patricia Shelton's death. 
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho at 620,272 P.3d at 1251. 
Similarly, in this case, the contours of the duties owed by the trustee to the 
beneficiary are defined by sources outside the contract: Chapter 7 of the Uniform 
Probate Code, Idaho Code§ 15-7-101 et seq., and the Uniform Principal and Trust Act 
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at Idaho Code§ 68-10-101 et seq. Violation of these fiduciary duties arising under 
statute is a tort. Therefore, Kareen's claims of malfeasance by Toni arising from 
violations of statutes are dismissed as they are abated. 
Kareen argues that her husband's interest in the Trust arose immediately upon 
the grantors' death and therefore is not extinguished by his death. Kareen relies upon § 
4.03 of the Trust which provides in relevant part, "On the death of the surviving Trustor, 
the Trust shall terminate and the Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably as possible, 
divide the net income and principal remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and 
distribute them to the following beneficiaries: Toni C. Johnson and John H. Cornell." 
Kareen ignores§ 4.03(a) of the Trust immediately following which ties entitlement to the 
recipient being alive at the time of distribution and not the death of the last trustor. 
If any child, for whom a share of the Trust Estate has been set aside 
should die prior to the above distribution, then the Trustee shall distribute 
all of such deceased child's share to the Trust Estate to his or her 
surviving issue in equal shares .... If there is no surviving issue , then all of 
the deceased child's share of the Trust Estate shall be added to the 
shares set aside for the benefit of the Trustor's other living child, as 
hereinafter provided including both of the distributed and the undistributed 
portions of each such share, to be distributed as an equal part of such 
other shares. 
Kareen fails to point to any state law overriding the express terms of the Trust. 
Even if Kareen was able to point to a state statute, she does not explain how that 
would prevent abatement of the claims Kareen claims on behalf of her deceased 
husband. 
Kareen argues that Toni's failure to turn John's share of the Trust over to him 
creates a constructive trust over the property that Toni wrongly withheld from John. 
There are several problems with Kareen's argument. 
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The doctrine of constructive trust is a legal fiction created in the absence of a 
legal trust. 
Constructive trusts are created by courts of equity whenever title to 
property is found in one who in fairness ought not to be allowed to retain it. 
The defendant is treated as if he or she had been an express trustee from 
the date of the wrongful holding and is required to reconvey the property 
to the plaintiff. G.G. Bogert & G.T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts & Trustees§ 
471 (1978). 
Klein v. Shaw, 109 Idaho 237, 240, 706 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Ct. App. 1985). 
As this case already addresses a legal trust, there is no necessity to resort to the 
legal fiction of a constructive trust. Toni's failure to timely provide John his share of the 
estate is already covered by the Uniform Probate Code. The contours of the duties 
imposed by the Probate Code supplant equitable considerations. 
Second, the circumstances necessitating creation of a constructive trust squarely 
meets the definition of a tort. The definition of a tort is "(a) civil wrong, other than 
breach of contract, for which a remedy may be obtained, usu. in the form of damages; a 
breach of a duty that the law imposes on persons who stand in a particular relation to 
one another." TORT, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Kareen requests a 
constructive trust to address the civil wrong, the breach of duties Toni owed to John. As 
a cause of action sounding clearly in tort, Kareen's request for a constructive trust must 
be rejected as abated. Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho at 619-620, 272 P.3d at 1249-
1250. 
Kareen argues that her breach of contract claim must be viewed as separate 
from the breach of fiduciary claim and, as a contract claim, survives John's death. The 
Supreme Court in Bishop addressed the same claim. In the absence of finding that a 
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higher duty of care is provided for under the Trust agreement than provided under the 
statute, Bishop requires abatement of Kareen's claim. Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho at 
620,272 P.3d at 1251. Kareen fails to point out any way in which the Trust instrument 
imposes any duties upon Toni that are not also imposed by the Probate Code. This 
Court stands by its more detailed analysis when addressing John's claims that the Trust 
instrument gives no higher duty of care than the duty imposed by the Probate Code. 
Memorandum Opinion dated February 15, 2013 at 6-8. 
Kareen also argues that enforcement of the terms of an oral contractual 
agreement between John and Toni survives John's death. Kareen argues that a factual 
issue exists as to an oral agreement that Toni could live in the home that is part of the 
Trust rent free while she tried to sell it, that she could use the Trust to help pay for her 
living expenses and that she would divide the proceeds with John when the house and 
real property sold. Even accepting these facts as true, they do not provide any greater 
protection for John than already provided under the Trust or state law. Simply stating 
that proceeds of the estate will be divided equally between the parties merely reinforces 
the fiduciary duties under the Probate Code and the Trust to ensure John receives his 
share of the Trust. 
Besides, it is not the specific terms of the Trust that govern whether or not 
Kareen's claims are abated, but rather whether the failure to carry out the terms violates 
state law in the form of the Probate Code. The Supreme Court's analysis in Bishop 
makes clear that merely changing the terms of the underlying agreement is irrelevant to 
whether the case is abated unless a higher standard of care is provided for in cases, as 
here, involving a mixed tort and contract. Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho at 620, 272 P.3d 
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at 1251. No higher standard of care is set forth in the oral agreement. Therefore, 
Kareen's reliance on the oral and written Trust terms defeating abatement of her claims 
is rejected. 
This result is further supported by Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, 
Chartered, 125 Idaho 607,612,873 P.2d 861,866 (1994). The Court observed, '"A 
contract may ... create a state of things which furnishes the occasion for a tort. If the 
relation of the plaintiff and the defendants is such that a duty to take due care arises 
therefrom irrespective of contract and the defendant is negligent, then the action is one 
of tort." Jones, 125 Idaho at 612, 873 at 866. As stated above, the duties Kareen 
asserts Toni breaches arise irrespective of contract. The duties are grounded in the 
failure to abide by the fiduciary duties imposed by state law regardless of what the 
contract states. 
Kareen seeks to distinguish Bishop by relying on several Am.Jur. cites. Kareen 
argues that the survival of an action depends on the nature of the interest affected. 
Because property of the Trust is involved, as opposed to physical injury, the claim 
cannot be abated. 1 Am.Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival§ 51. Kareen also 
argues that the claims under the Probate Code survive because "(a) cause of action 
that is founded on a remedial statute survives the death of the party possessing the 
cause of action." 1 Am.Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival§ 59. Finally, Kareen, 
citing to 1 Am.Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival§§ 56 and 60, argues that her 
equitable claims of conversion and unjust enrichment survive because claims in equity 
are not abated. 
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These arguments were addressed in the Memorandum Opinion dated February 
15, 2013 filed in this case. While Kareen correctly sets forth these principles, she 
provides no explanation as to how they are consistent with Bishop. The Supreme Court 
in Bishop did not examine whether the claims were equitable or torts done to persons or 
to property in determining whether the joint contract and tort action survives the death of 
the party. Nor did the Supreme Court analyze whether the rules of professional conduct 
are remedial in nature for purposes of surviving the party's death. As Kareen's claims 
are in the nature of torts, Kareen's claims are abated by John's death. Therefore, 
Kareen's arguments are rejected. 
Kareen also cites Henshaw v. Miller, 58 US 212 ( 1854) in support of her 
argument. Henshaw involved the interpretation of Virginia statutes in determining 
whether a claim against the estate was abated. The United State Supreme Court held 
the claim against an executor for a wrong the deceased allegedly committed against the 
plaintiff was abated. Henshaw offers to assistance to Kareen. 
Kareen also argues that she is entitled to pursue return of Lot 34 which adjoins 
the real property of John's parents, the trustors. Kareen argues that John transferred 
the property to the Trust for convenience because it was contiguous to the parents' 
property and that John continued to pay taxes and other expenses on the property after 
it was quitclaimed. Memorandum in Opposition re Motion to Dismiss at 16. In order for 
Kareen's argument to be considered, there must be specific facts presented by affidavit 
or deposition supporting the argument. 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must then 
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of 
material fact. Id. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may 
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not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but 
the party's response ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). Such evidence may consist of 
affidavits or depositions, but "the Court will consider only that material ... 
which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible 
at trial." Harris v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 297-98, 
847 P.2d 1156, 1158-59 (1992). 
Sherer v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489-90, 148 P.3d 1232, 1235-36 
(2006). 
The property in question was transferred to the Trust on January 3, 2007. 
Affidavit of Theodore 0. Creason at Exhibit 5 to Exhibit B. However, there are no 
specific facts in the record to support the allegations regarding the purpose of the 
transfer nor that payments were made by John on the property after transfer. The only 
mention of the property by sworn testimony consists of Toni testifying she had no 
recollection of John paying money on the property and (2) the implication Toni drew 
from her brother's circumstances that he may have transferred the property to avoid 
creditors and any claim by his estranged wife. Affidavit of Theodore 0. Creason at 63 II. 
19-24 and at 64 II. 13-16. 
Kareen made no claim in her Petition regarding Lot 34 other than including in the 
statement of facts that John had deposited Lot 34, which adjoins his parents' property, 
by quitclaim deed into the Trust. Petition at§ 3.8. Nor did Kareen provide specific facts 
by affidavit or deposition to show that Lot 34 should be treated any different than the 
other property that is part of the Trust. Toni met her burden in establishing that there is 
no material issue of fact as to abatement of the claims surrounding the Trust. Kareen's 
argument must be rejected in the absence of specific facts showing why Lot 34 should 
be treated differently than the rest of the property held in the Trust. 
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Kareen argues that the legislature's enactment of Idaho Code § 5-327 abrogates 
abatement of her claim concerning the diminution of the value of the property interest 
_ John held in-the-proper:ty comprising-the Trust. Tbis claim has already been addressed 
in the Memorandum Opinion dated February 15, 2013 at 13-17. The diminution of 
John's interest in the Trust does not come within any of the listed three types of 
damages - medical expenses, out of pocket expenses nor lost wages- that a claim such 
as Kareen's can recover upon, even though otherwise abated. Kareen makes no new 
argument as to why this analysis is in error. I adhere to my analysis stated in the 
original Memorandum Opinion and reject Kareen's argument again. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and there 
being no material facts in dispute, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Toni C. Johnson of the 
Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee, converted into a Motion 
for Summary Judgment by the filing of Affidavits, shall be granted and the Petition for 
Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution will be dismissed as Kareen's 
claims set forth in her Petition do not survive John's death under common law, state law 
or the Trust. 
Dated this _1L day of June, 2013. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTR CT 
' 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL 
Case No. CV 2012-277 
JUDGMENT FOR DISMISSAL 
Based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth in the 
Memorandum Opinion Re: Kareen Cornell filed in this case on June 21, 2013, and good 
cause appearing thereby, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
That, there being no genuine issue of material fact, the Motion to Dismiss filed by 
Toni C. Johnson of the Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered 
Distribution filed by Kareen Cornell, converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment by 
the filing of Affidavits, IS HEREBY GRANTED and the Petition for Supervised 
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution is HEREBY DISMISSED. 
Dated this 1d.._ day of June, 2013. 
I 
Randall W Robinson, Magistrate 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF JDAHO, fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of; 
THE REVOCABLE F'AMIL Y TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF 
COMES NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Anegon, on behalf of Margaret 
Watkins, and provides Appellant's Reply Briefto Brief in Opposition to Appeal of Toni C. 
Johnson and the Brief of" Estate of John H. Cornell Re: Appeal of Margaret Watkins. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On November 15, 2012 Margaret Watkins was appointed Temporary Personal 
Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell in Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-
439. Toni C. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss John Cornell's Petition for Supervised 
Administration and Removal of Trustee claiming John Cornell's right to one-half of the Trust did 
not survive his death. To protect the rights and interests of John Cornell, Margaret Watkins, the 
aunt of John Cornell imd Toni Johnson, protected John Cornell's rights. Since the Court 
considered the issue during the time Margaret Watkins was the Temporary Personal 
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Repre1;:;entative, $he has continued to protect John Cornell's rights that occurred during the time 
she was the Temporary Personal Representative. 
Toni C. Johnson's Motion to Dismiss was made on the argument that John Cornell's right 
to one-half of the Trust, as set forth in the written Trust, sounded in tort and, therefore, died 
when he died. 
Toni C. Johnson has added another argument to try to deprive her brother, John Cornell, 
of his one-half of the Trust. Toni Johnson says Margaret Watkins is no longer the Temporary 
Personal Representative so she should not be able to proceed. Clearly, Toni Johnson will use 
any procedural or other argument she can to accomplish her goal of refusing to do what was 
required of her as trustee so she individually can obtain her brother's one-half interest in the 
Trust. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
This case is very straightforward. The Trust created by Michael C. Cornell and Arlie M. 
Cornell, parents of Toni Johnson and John Cornell, has been intentionally breached by one 
beneficiary, Toni C. Johnson, so the other beneficiary gets nothing. The beneficiary/trustee who 
has intentionally breached the Trust now says she gets the entire Trust because a personal injury 
tort claim dies when the beneficiary dies. In Toni C. Johnson's Brief in Opposition to Appeal, 
the trustee wants this Court to not allow John Cornell to have the right to appeal. Margaret 
Watkins, as Temporary Personal Representative, was the person who has put forward John 
Cornell's claim that he was entitled to one-half of the Trust created by his pa.rents, which he was 
to receive when his parents died. Margaret Watkins protected John Cornell's rights and 
continues to preserve John Cornell's right to one-half of the Trust. The Court proceedings in this 
Trust case started when John Comell was alive. Toni Johnson, within less than 30 days after her 
brother's death, filed a Motion to Dismiss his claim for one-half of the Trust he was entitled to. 
Margaret Watkins protected John Cornell's right to one-half of the Trust by contesting Toni C. 
Johnson's Motion to rnsmiss. Margaret Watkins continues to protect John Cornell's rights to 
one-half of the Trust. 
Toni C. Johnson has clearly not followed the Trust requirements to distribute one-half of 
the Trust to her brother. John Cornell's request in this case was to receive his property created 
by the Trust. This case is not a tort action. John Cornell was not seeking tort damages. He 
sought his property he was entitled to pursuant to a Trost created by his parents. A breach of the 
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duty to distribute property pursuant to a written document is now being claimed by the breaching 
party to be a tort claim and the property of Jolm Cornell should go to the person who breached 
the Trust. 
CONCLUSION 
To allow a person to obtain property by intentionally not transferring the property as soon 
as possible as required by a written document means the law must 100 percent ignore the 
requirements in the written document and substitute a theory that wrongdoing will be allowed to 
benefit the wrongdoer. 
r...J-
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D Federal Express 
~-S.Mail 
0 Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 746-2231 
D Federal Express 
~e,Jc:L 
DARREL W. AHERIN 
Aherin, Rice & Anegori 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8 183 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
I219 IdalioStreet 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743 -1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
Of Estate of John Hemy Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 















Case No. CV 2012-00277 




TO: TONIC. JOHNSON, AND HER ATTORNEY, KARIN SEUBERT, JONES, BROWER, & 
CALLERY, P.L.L.C., 1304 IDAHO STREET, P.O. BOX 854, LEWISTON, ID 83501 
EMAIL: KRSEUBERT@LEWISTON.COM 
AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The Estate of John Hemy Cornell, acting through its personal representative, 
Kareen Cornell, (hereinafter the "Estate") files this appeal from the Magistrate Court in and for 
the County of Clearwater. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston ID 83501 
(208)743-1516; Fax(208)746-2231 
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2. The Estate appeals to the District Court in and for the County of Clearwater. 
3. The Estate appeals the Magistrate Court's dismissal of the Estate's Petition for 
Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution. The Court's dismissal is set forth in 
its June 21, 2013 JUDGMENT FOR DISMISSAL and MEMORANDUM OPINION RE: 
KAREEN CORNELL upon which the judgment was based. 
4. The appeal is taken upon matters of both law and fact. 
5. The proceedings of the hearings were recorded or reported by the method of 
electronic recordings and are in the possession of the Clearwater County Clerk located in 









The statement of issues on appeal that the Estate intends to assert are as follows: 
Whether the Court erred in finding that in the absence of any distribution prior to 
John Cornell's death, the entirety of the Trust res should be distributed to Toni 
Johnson. 
Whether the Court erred in finding that all of the Estate's claims were based upon 
wrongs committed by Toni C. Johnson against John Henry Cornell, personally. 
Whether the Court erred in finding that claims for breach of a trustee's fiduciary 
duty abate upon death. 
Whether the Court erred in finding that tort claims alleging injury to property 
abate upon death. 
Whether the Court erred in finding that the doctrine of constructive trust was 
inapplicable. 
Whether the Court erred in finding that the Estate's conversion claims abated 
upon death. 
Whether the Court erred in finding that the Estate's unjust enrichment claims 
abated upon death. 







Whether the Court erred in finding that claims in equity could be re-characterized 
as claims at law, which abate upon death. 
Whether the Court erred in finding that claims for breach of contract could be re-~ 
characterized as tort claims, which abate upon death. 
Whether the Court erred in interpreting Idaho Code§ 5-327 in such a manner that 
claims for injury to property abate unless the injury results in medical expenses, 
out of pocket expense or lost wages. 
The above list of issues is not exhaustive and the Estate may assert other issues on 
appeal thereafter discovered by the Estate. 
DATED this 151 day of July, 2013 . 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
Samuel T. Creason, ISB #8183 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston ID 83501 
(208)743-1516; Fax(208)746-2231 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of July, 20T3, I caused a copy of theforegoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to the 
following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Fax: 208-746-9553 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
FIRST-CLASS MAIL 





Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston ID 83501 
(208)743-1516; Fax(208)746-2231 
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:•.N1·1~1tf J?, J;j] ,_ ;/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAlt ~ s'lfRICT O&cldaf p M. 
, STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATE~e,rr ft ~·~r) 
In the Matter of: ) CASE NO. CV~ 12-277 (sP Clerk 
) Deputy 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY 
TRUST OF MICHAEL S. 
CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) CLERK'S TRANSMITTAL OF COURT 
) FILE AND CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 




TO: The District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and for the County of Clearwater. 
Transmitted is the case file in the above captioned case. 
APPEAL FROM: Magistrate Division 
ORDER OR JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: Judgment For Dismissal and 
Memorandum Opinion RE: 
APPEALED BY: Personal Representative 
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: July 2, 2013 
APPEAL FEE PAID: _ Yes 
Kareen Cornell dated June 21, 
2013 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Theodore 0. Creason 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT: Karin Seubert 
OTHER ATTORNEYS: None 
3c:\ DATED this _ day of July, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Clerk's Transmittal 
of Court File and Certificate of Appe I to rnstrict Couct was hand-delivered, faxed or 
mailed , postage pre-paid, on the 3 day of July, 2013, to: 
Theodore 0 . Creason, 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
CARRIE BIRD 
Clerk of the District Court 
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l..D ./ 
JUL n s 2un or Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
' Clerk Dist. Court 
Clear.,•,t3r Coun , Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Nez Perce ) 
) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
KARIN SEUBERT, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That I am an attorney duly admitted to practice law before the Courts of the State of 
Idaho. The firm of Jones, Brower and Callery has been retained by Toni Johnson to defend 
against the Petition by Kareen Cornell as Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry 
Cornell and as Surviving Spouse of John Henry Cornell, deceased beneficiary of the Revocable 
Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M Cornell for Supervised Administration and Court 
Ordered Distribution filed on February 26, 2013. I am well informed as to the costs, 
disbursements and attorney fees of Toni Johnson in defending against said Petition; that to the 
best of my knowledge and belief, the items in Exhibits A and B to this Affidavit are correct and 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 1 
J 
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that the said disbursements have been necessarily incurred in this action and are being claimed in 
compliance with Rule 54(d) and 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. I make this 
Affidavit on behalf of Toni Johnson and in support of the Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees and, in particular, in support of a request for costs in the sum of$277.15 and for attorney's 
fees in the sum of $7,875.00, for a total of Eight Thousand One Hundred Fifty Two and 15/100 
Dollars ($8,152.15). 
To date either I have performed the following professional services in connection with 
said Petition by Kareen Cornell as Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell 
and as Surviving Spouse of John Henry Cornell, deceased beneficiary of the Revocable Family Trust 
of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M Cornell for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered 
Distribution: 
See Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
That the attorney time of the office for Karin Seubert was charged at the rate of $150.00 
per hour. Said rate is within the rates prevailing in the Second Judicial District for the State of 
Idaho. 
In my opm10n, based upon the appropriate factors to be considered by the Court, 
confirmation of $7,875.00 to Toni Johnson for attorney fees necessarily expended in the good 
faith defense of this action is reasonable. Specifically, Toni Johnson is the prevailing party as a 
full dismissal of the opposing party's claims was obtained. Defense of this action involved 
matters of law that were novel and required extensive time, research and consideration in order 
to adequately represent the interests of Toni Johnson. Further, the time limitations imposed by 
the circumstances of the case required extraordinary attention by the undersigned attorney, 
including that required by the pending appeal, which are not reflected in the attorney fee amount 
sought herein. Further, the circumstances of the case are such make it undesirable. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 2 
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Said figure specifically excludes amounts incurred for the probate of the estate of John 
Henry Cornell, deceased, or in defending against the appeal being pursued by Margaret Watkins, 
or in defending against the Petition filed by John Cornell during his lifetime. 
Additionally, to date, this firm has advanced the following costs for a filing fee in 
connection with the defense of said Petition by Kareen Cornell as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of John Henry Cornell and as Surviving Spouse of John Henry Cornell, deceased beneficiary 
of the Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M Cornell for Supervised 
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution: 
See Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
In my opinion, based on the appropriate factors to be considered by the Court, an award 
of Two Hundred Seventy Seven and 15/100 ($217.50) to Toni Johnson for costs necessarily 
expended in the good faith defense of this action is reasonable. Said cost was incurred for one 
copy of the deposition of Toni Johnson and is allowed as a matter of right pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
54( d)(l )(C)(l 0). 
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2013. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
By __ r~~-~ ~------".'------
KARIN SEUBERT 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2nd day of July, 2013. 
3 
Notary Public in and for the State ofldaho 
Residing at Lewiston, Idaho. 
My commission expires ,,,.J /o t.,(!y. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES was, this 2nd day of July, 2013, hand-delivered 
by providing a copy to Valley Messenger Service 
addressed to: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0 . Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
1219 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By r(U,w_~ 
KARIN SEUB RT 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 


































EXHIBIT A: Attorney Fees 
Service Provided 
Hearing on motion for consolidation. 
Telephone conference with client. 
Motion for protective order and related documents 
and correspondence; research. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Telephone conference with Creason. 
Telephone conference with Court. 
Hearing preparation; participated in hearing on 
Motion for protective order (telephonic). 
Telephone conference to client. Confirming letter. 
Telephone conference with client. 
Conference with client re: discovery response. 
Prepared draft discovery response. 
Prepared inventory, accounting; further work on 
discovery response. 
Further work on inventory, accounting, discovery 
response. 
Conference with client to review draft discovery 
response, inventory, accounting. 
Conference with Creason. Finalized discovery 
response. 
Deposition of Toni Johnson. 
Telephone conference with client. 
Memo. in support of motion to dismiss; research. 
Memo. in support of motion to dismiss; research. 
Reviewed Estate's motion to stay proceeding and 
related filings; research. 
Telephone conference with Creason. 
Research; objection for motion for stay. 
Participated in hearing on motion for stay. 
Conference with Creason. 
Reviewed response brief; research. 






























Telephone conference with client. 0.25 
Hearing preparation; travel to/from Orofino; 4.00 
attended hearing on motion to dismiss. 
Reviewed memorandum opinion; letter to client. 0.50 
Prepared memorandum of costs and attorney fees 1.00 
and related documents. 
TOTAL 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 

































EXHIBIT B: Costs 
Cost Incurred Amount 
One copy of deposition of Toni Johnson $277.15 
7 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
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Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1304 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
FIL~11 ~. 
. JUL O 5 2013 
k Dist Court 
Clearw3ter Coun . Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
COMES NOW Karin Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., on behalf of the 
Respondent Toni Johnson, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 15-8-208 and Rule 54(d), 54(e)(l) 
and 54( e )(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, submit the following items of costs to which 
the Court may order to be awarded to Respondent Toni Johnson and against the Estate of John H. 
Cornell, deceased, as follows: 
Costs (deposition copy, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(I0)) 
Reasonable attorney fees to be 
fixed by the Court as set out in 
the Affidavit for Attorney Fees 
filed herewith (specifically does 
not include costs related to 
probate of Estate of John Cornell 
or appeal being pursued by Margaret Watkins). 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 





DATED this 2nd day of July, 2013. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
KARIN SEUBERT being first duly sworn and on oath, deposes and says: 
That she is the attorney for Respondent Toni Johnson and as such is well informed as to 
the costs, disbursements and attorney fees of Toni Johnson; that to the best of her knowledge and 
belief, the items in the Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees are correct and that the said 
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in said action and are being claimed in compliance 
with Rule 54(d) and 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 2nd day ofJuly, 2013. 
L,.,....--- ,,,_ 
( __ !;tr> 1(. >c" ·i, 
KJ\RIN SEUBERT 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE. ) 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 2nd day of July, 2013. 
(SEAL) 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 
2 
NOTARY PUB).,IC for State ofldaho 
Residing at ltbi,{ (/VJ? 
My Commission Expires: 0-3/1Jtt/1y 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct 
copy· of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES was, this 2nd day of July, 
2013. 
to: 
hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
transmitted via e-mail 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
1219 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 
3 
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Jul OS 13 12:16p Creason, Moore, ~ Dokken 
Theodore 0 . Creason, ISB it 1563 
Samuel r. Creason 1SB #8183 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 ldaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 8350 ! 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Atttwncys for Person;.il Representative 
Of Estate of John Hc11ry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAi. Of STRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF lDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
ln the Matter of: 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
) ATTORNEY FEES (l.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. ) 
____ ) 
COMES NOW Kareen Camell, Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry 
Cornell, by and through her attomey of record, Samuel T . Creason of Creason, Moore, Dukkt:n & 
neidl, Pl .l .C:, and hereby moves this Court t() disal!ow all or part of the costs and attorney fees 
set forth i11 Toni Johnson's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. Movant basis this rn<.)tion 
upo11 the authorities and arguments set forth in the Memorandum in Suppo1t filed herewith. 
DATED this 9th day of July, 2013. 
, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
Atton1eys for Personal Rcprni:icl1tativc 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES (1.R.C.l'. 54(d)(6)) - l 
Cr~.1,011, Moore, Dokken & Ccii.11, PLLC 
P.O. Duwer 835, Lewis-ton, ll) 83501 
(l08) 743- 151\\; F;i~, (203) 740-2231 
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Jul OS 13 12:16p Creason, Moore, & Dokken (208] 746-2231 
CERTU'ICATE OF SERVlCE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of July, 2013, I filed the foregoing MOTION 
TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES (l.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) with the Clerk of the 
Court (via facsimile to (208) 476-9315), and also delivered a COJ>Y via facsimile to the 
following persons at the fi.lx. numbers desi1:,111ated below: 
DaiTcl W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
1212 ldaho Street 
P. 0. Drawer 698 
J.,ewisto11, ID 83501 
Ftu:: 208-716-3650 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES (J.n.c.r. 54(d)(6)) - 2 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 8350 I 
Fax: 208-746-9S53 
Cre,1,011, MoOI''-\ 0Qkk1t11 & Cd,H, l'LLC 
1•.o. Or,m~,r 835, l.owi~t(111, 10 8.'.\501 
(:Z.03) 743•1 :\16; Fa,: (2\111) 7ol6-Z2:I I 
p.4 
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Jul OS 13 12: 16p Creason, Moore, & Dokken 
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
12 I 9 Idaho Street 
P.O . Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (2.UX) '/4J-l '.:> 16 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
A tt.nrneys for Personal Representative 
Of Estate of John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRlCT COllRl' OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF lDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 01'' CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) 
) Case No . CV 20 I 2-00277 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) 
) RE: MOTION TO DISALLOW 
) COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
) (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) 
-----------------'--- ) 
Kareen Cornell, Personal Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell (hereinafter, 
''F\tate") objects to Johnson' s memorandum of costs and attorney fees on the grounds that the 
fees should not be awarded. Toni Johnson brings her claim for attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 15-8-208. Section l 5-8-208 provides that the court "rnuy, in its discreti<)n, order costs, 
including rensonable attorney's foes .... " The Court should disallow Johnson's motion for fees 
because an award be inequitable given that Johnson has admitted that she engaged in the 
breaches of fiducimy duty alleged in the Estate's Petiti(m. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT RI~: MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
(I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) • I 
Cr~:a.i;:c,n, Moore., Dokken & CcidJ, PLLC' 
r.o. Dr.,w~r 835, l . .i,,wiston, ID 83501 
(108) 743• l S 16; F'ax: (208) 74(,-22.1 I 
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Jul os 13 12: 16p Creason, Moore, ~ Dokken [208J 746-2231 
ANALYSIS 
Johnson raises Idaho Code § I 5~8~208 as the statutory grounds upon which she claims 
attorney fees. Section l 5-8-208 places determinations regarding an award of fees within the 
sound discretion of the district court. "That section allows c<.mrts to award foes in case$ govemed 
by the Trust and Estate Dis.pule Resolution Act whe.r'I doing so would be eq11iti1hlc." Ranncr Uji? 
Ins. Co_ v. Mark Wallace DLrson lrrevocahle Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 133, 206 P.3d 481,497 
(2009). Because an award in favor of Ms. Johnson would be inequitable, this Court should deny 
her moti<)n. 
The Estate's Petition raised several causes of action based upon alleged facts that Johnson 
damaged th,~ Trusj 1·es ami John Cornell by her inequitable behavior. One of the da:rnages 
suffered by John Co111ell was that Johnson's conduct essentially deprived him of the inheritance 
his parents intended to provide him. Johnson did 11ot dispute that she engaged in this behavior. 
In fact, Johnson's counsel conceded-and the Court fi.mn<l-that Johnson had engaged in many 
of the breaches alleged in the Estate's Petition. Ralht:r, Juhm;un pr1;:vailed on the iss1.,c of 
abatement of those causes of action upon the demise of John Cornell. Awarding attomey foes 
against the Estate of John Cornell to a person who admittedly engaged in the conduct giving rise 
to the plcd causes of action-and injuring John Cornell-would be inequitable. 
Further, the grounds upon which judgment was granted are not so clear that the Petition 
umld be characterized as in.;J.ppropriatdy filed. This Cou1i has noted at 01111 argument that the 
issues upon which judgment was granted are in an unsettled area of Idaho law. This Court also 
stated that the issues may need to be raised all the way to the Idaho Supreme Cou1t before any 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT RE: MOTION TU 
DISALLOW COSTS ANO ATTORNEY FEES 
(l.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) - 2 
c,·c;,:~nn.7 J\.tourc, Ookktn & Gddl, PLl..C 
P.0- D.-awer 8]5, Lcwlstoll, ID S350 I 
(20S) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
p.6 
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Jul OS 13 12:16p Crea5on, Moore, ~ Dokken (2081 746-2231 
dear resolution in this matter. Judgment on such an unsettled area oflaw, where the wrongdoing 
has been conceded, doe$ not support an award of attorney fees against the successor in interest to 
the injured party. 
CON CL UM UN 
Johnson ask!i this Court to onier a niscretionary award of fees pursuant to ldaho Cc.1de 
§ 15-8-208. The Court should decline to grant Johnson's request because doing so would not be 
equitable. 
DATED this 9th day of July, 2013. 
CRt:ASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
M.EMURANUl)M IN SUPPORT RE; MOTION l"O 
DlSALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEl:!:S 
(l.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) - 3 
Ct'C\:tt.:on, Moore, Dukki2'n. & G~idl, Pl .I .f' 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lcwi$(Okl, JD 8351.11 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-:2231 
p.7 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY i.hat on this 9th day of July, 2013, l filed the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT RE; MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY J?EES (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) with the Clerk of the Cou1t (via facsimile to (208) 476-
9315), and also delivered a copy via facsimile to the following persons al the fax numbers 
designated below: 
Dan·cl W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
1212 Idah(1 Stn::et 
P_ O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, 1D 83501 
Fax: 208-746-3650 
MEMUl{ANDUM IN SUPf'OH.T RE: MOTJON TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
(I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) - 4 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callc1·y, P .LL.C. 
i 304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box. 854 
Lewiston, lD 83501 
Fax: 208-746-.9553 
CrCBson, Muorll', D-Okk•m ,<:. G's'i<:11, PLL<': 
l'.0. Ura"·cr 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
{20!!) 743-1516; f,m (208) 746•2231 
p.8 
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorney for Margaret Watkins 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
MOTION TO MEDIATE 
COMES NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Anegon, on behalf of Margaret 
Watkins, and hereby requests that the Court set the above case for mediation. This motion is 
made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(k)(A). Mediation was suggested by Judge Randall Robinson as a 
means of reaching a resolution in this case and In the Matter of the Estate of John Henry Cornell, 
Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-439. 
The undersigned requests that the Honorable Jay Gaskill be appointed as mediator and a 
mediation be conducted in Lewiston, Idaho. 
If the matters are set for mediation, the undersigned, on behalf of Margaret Watkins, will 
agree to stay the current appeal in this matter pending the outcome of the mediation. 
Oral argument is requested. 
MOTION TO MEDIA TE -- 1 
N:\Cornell , John\Pleadings\Motion to Mediate.docx ser 
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DATED this ~ ay of July, 2013 . 
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
By ~J.ak 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Attorney for Margaret Watkins 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DARREL·W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the rf'.,....- day of July, 2013, I caused 
to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to the 
following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC. 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore O. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
MOTION TO MEDIATE-- 2 
N:\Comell , John\Pleadings\Motion to Mediate.docx ser 
D U.S. Mail 
D J-Iand Delivery 
lef" Facsimile 746-9553 
D Federal Express 
D U.S. Mail 
D _J fand Delivery 
~ Facsimile 746-2231 
~ ;j-~ 
DARREL W. AHERIN 
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorneys for Margaret Watkins 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
TO: TONIC. JOHNSON: 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
NOTICE OF TELEPHONIC HEARING 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTE that on Tuesday, July 30, 2013, at the hour of 1 :45 
p.m. (Pacific), or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, at the courtroom of the above 
entitled court, in Orofino, County of Clearwater, Idaho, the court will call on for telephonic 
hearing the Motion to Mediate filed herewith. 
DATED this ~ day of July, 2013. 
NOTICE OF TELEPHONIC HEARING -- 1 
N:\Comell , John\Pleadings\Notice of Telephonic Hearing.docx-cae 
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON " () ' 
By &d J-~ 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Attorney for Margaret Watkins 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF } 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL, ) 
) 
CASE NO. CV2012-277 
ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT 
ON APPEAL 
WHEREAS, a Notice of Appeal to the. District Court has been filed in the above 
matter and the Court being fully advised; 
IT IS HEREBY DETERMINED AND ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1 . Said appeal involves both questions of fact and questions of law; 
2. A transcript of the Motion Hearing held June 4, 2013 before the Magistrate's 
Division is required for the processing of the appeal; The appellant shall pay the 
District Court the estimate transcript fees of $200.00 within fourteen (14) days of 
the date of this order in accordance with I.R.C.P. 83 (k); and there will be no 
extensions granted. Fai.lure to pay will result in a dismissal of this matter. 
3. Upon payment of the estimated transcript fees, the transcriber shall prepare a 
transcript as proved in Rule 83(k). 
DATED this /Z,-day of July, 2013. 
ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL - 1 
NLJ1' .. 
Michael J. Griffin,,./ 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the fpregoing ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT ON 
APPEAL was mailed, postage prepaid this /;).Jli day of July, 2013, to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C 
P.O. Box854 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
P. 0. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Theodore 0 . Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
P. 0 . Drawer 835 




CARRIE BIRD, Clerk of Court 
By: {]~ Dep~ r 
ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL - 2 
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorney for Margaret Watkins 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED BY TONI C. 
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST 
COMES NOW Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Anegon, on behalf of Margaret 
Watkins and moves the Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6) for an order disallowing the costs and 
attorney fees sought in the Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees dated July 2, 2013, filed by 
Toni C. Johnson and Affidavit in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. 
Under the terms of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. 
Cornell, dated November 1, 1996, hereinafter "The Trust," Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. 
Cornell, or the survivor between them, were Co-Trustees. The Trust further provided that upon 
the death or incapacity of the last survivor of the initial trustees, Toni C. Johnson and John H. 
Cornell would act as successor trustees. This could not be modified after Arlie M. Cornell died. 
After the death of Arlie M. Cornell, Michael S. Cornell illegally modified The Trust to 
appoint Toni C. Johnson as sole successor trustee upon his death or incapacity, and John H. 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED BY TONI C. 
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST -- I 
N:\Comell , John\Pleadings\Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees.docx ser 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
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Cornell as trustee in the event Toni C. Johnson could not act. Section 1.06 of The Trust provides 
that amendments to The Trust could be made "during the joint lives of the Trustors" (emphasis 
added). 
Toni C. Johnson has been serving as sole successor trustee since the death of Michael S. 
Cornell on December 15, 2009 in violation of the trust. 
No inventory of the assets in The Trust at the time of the death of Michael S. Cornell has 
been provided by Toni Johnson. 
The Trust, Section 4.03 provides as follows: 
On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall tenninate and the Trustee 
shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal 
remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the 
following beneficiaries: TONI C. JOHNSON AND JOHN H. CORNELL. 
Toni C. Johnson is asking this court to continue rewarding her for intentionally breaching 
the trust because the trust terminated on December 15, 2009. Toni C. Johnson should pay the 
attorney fees personally because had she distributed the assets timely, the claimed attorney fees 
and costs would not have been incurred. 
The main asset of The Trust is the house and real property. Toni C. Johnson has been 
residing in the house since Michael S. Cornell's death on December 15, 2009. The property 
remains in the name of The Trust and was not distributed to the two beneficiaries "as soon as 
reasonably possible". Toni C. Johnson has paid no rent during her tenancy of the premises. 
Toni C. Johnson has mismanaged the Trust in that she has used a substantial amount of 
the monies available to pay both expenses of maintaining the real property, where she has 
resided for three years and to pay her personal expenses. No money was distributed to John 
Henry Cornell. 
Toni C. Johnson has breached her fiduciary duty to settle and distribute the Trust in 
accordance with the terms of the Trust. The actions and mismanagement of The Revocable 
Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell by Toni C. Johnson are the sole cause 
of this action. 
The Trust should not be responsible for Toni C. Johnson's attorney fees or costs. 
Oral argument is requested. 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED BY TONI C. 
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST -- 2 
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees.docx ser 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 




DATEDthis / 2. dayofJuly,2013. 
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
By t/_Q~J.cL 
Darrel w. Aherin 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the / 2-~ day of July, 2013, I caused 
to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to the 
following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC., 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore O. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED BY TONIC. 
JOHNSON AGAINST THE TRUST -- 3 
~ .S.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 746-9553 
D Federal Express 
G"'u.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 746-2231 
DARREL W. AHERIN 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorneys at Law 
Lewiston, Idaho 
N:\Cornell , John\Pleadings\Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees.docx ser 
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Case No: CV-201 2~6000277 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
__ J ; 
~i ·I< D:st. Cm .. r, 




Tuesday, September 03, 2013 
Randall W. Robinson 
Magistrate Courtroom 
10:00 AM 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on July 25th, 2013. 
KARIN SEUBERT 
P.O. BOX 854 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
){_ Mailed Hand Delivered 
THEODORE 0 . CREASON 
P.O. DRAWER 835 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
::i_ Mailed Hand Delivered 
DARREL W.AHERIN 
P.O. BOX 698 1212 IDAHO ST. 
LEWISTON ID 83501-0698 







July 25,th, 20,:t::f :e,0 
Carrie Birq: \ ' 
Clerk :Of_l('he Dis~ct Court 6~\~ : 
Deput?fe 
DOC22cv 7 /96 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
IN THE MATTER OF 







CASE NO. CV2012-277 
COURT MINUTES 
Michael J. Griffin, District Judge Presiding 
Darrel Aherin, Attorney 
Karin Seubert, Attorney 
Theodore Creason, Attorney 
Christy L. Gering, Deputy Court Clerk 
Date: 07/30/2013 Tape: CD577-1 Time: 1:50 p.m. 
Subject of Proceeding: Telephonic Motion Hearing 
MINUTE ENTRY: 
1 :50 Honorable Michael J. Griffin presiding. Court gives introductions. Parties present 
by phone: Darrel Aherin, Attorney; Karin Seubert, Attorney; Theodore Creason, 
Attorney. Court advises this is the time set for a motion hearing. Court inquires of 
counsel their thoughts as to mediation. 
1 :51 Mr. Creason speaks and does not feel mediation would be beneficial with Ms. 
Watkins. 
1 :52 Ms. Seubert is not opposed to mediation but does not feel it would be productive to 
mediate with Ms. Watkins. 
1 :52 Mr. Aherin speaks and argues his motion to mediate. 
1 :55 Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding 
2:00 Court speaks and inquires of counsel regarding mediation as to Ms. Watkins. 
2:00 Ms. Seubert speaks and does not see Ms. Watkins interest to this case. 
Christy Gering 
Deputy Clerk 
Court Minutes - 1 
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IN THE MATTER OF MICHAELS. CORNELL 
CASE NO. CV2012-277 
2:01 Mr. Aherin speaks. 
2:03 Court inquires if Mr. Creason and Ms. Seubert are adamantly opposed or 
somewhat opposed to the mediation with all three parties at the table. 
2:04 Mr. Creason responds. 
2:04 Ms. Seubert responds. 
2:05 Mr. Aherin responds. 
2:07 Court denies the motion for mediation. Court further speaks regarding the appeal 
and advises once the transcript is prepared, a briefing schedule and will be set. 
2:09 Court in recess. 
Court Minutes - 2 
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Aue; 13 13 04: 13p Cr ea5on, Moore, ~ Dokken 
Theodore 0. Creason, IS!i #1563 
Samuel T. Creason !Sl3 HS 183 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 T c..lahi, S ln.;el 
P .O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 8350 l 
Telephone: (208) 743- 15 I 6 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Pen;onal Representative 
Of Estale of John 1-lemy Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF lDAl-IO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
I11 L1 1e 1\,tattcr of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMlL Y TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012 00277 ) 
~ NOTICE OF HEARING 
) 
) RE: MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 
(I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6)) 
N n1iu~ is hereby given that the undersigned will call on for hearing Motion to Disallow 
Costs and Attorney Fees (I.R.C.P . 549(d)(6)) claimed hy Toni C. Johnson against the Trust on 
Tuesday, Septemhcr 3) 2013, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard in the 
courtroom al the Clearwater County Courthouse, Orofino, Idaho. 
DATED thi~ I J t11 day of Augu:,t, 2013. 
NOTICf, OF HEAIUNG - I 




/ . ~ 
~~&?~--
Theodore 0. Creason, JSB # 1563 
Attorney ror Pcti,ioner Kareen Curndl 
Crc:1su11, Moore, Dokkcu &. Geidl, l'LLC 
l'.0. 0rawc,· 835, Lewiston lD 8.3501 
(Z08)743-J :516; F:,x(;208)74(i-2231 
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Aue:; 13 13 04: 13p Creason, Moore, ~ Dokken (2081 746-2231 
CERTIFlCA TE OF MAILING 
I Hl2RbBY CERTIFY that on this 13lli day of August, 2013, a copy of the foregoing 
NOTlCE OF HEARING RE: MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
(l.K.C.[>. 54(<.l.)(6)) W(.LS served by the n1ethod indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLP 
1304 Idaho Street 






Lewiston, Tdaho 83501 +- (208)1~ '"'l Y'll · '1a $'$',! 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Ancgon 
1212 Idaho StTcct 
P. 0. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 




.. ....:f:: FAX TRANSMISSION 
(208)344 H:lft I "-"""1 l.O '>U $1.J 
(_4.ft,J;;·e ~-~-r~---· 
Theodore 0. Ctcason, 1SB ff 1563 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
J?.O. Dra~·ier 835, Lewiston ID $3501 
('.W8)743·15Hi; Fax(208)746-2231 
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IN THE MATTER OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL, ETAL. 
Presiding Judge: Randall W. Robinson 
Court Clerk: 
Tuesday, September 03, 2013 at 10:00 AM 
Plaintiff's Counsel: 
Defendant's Counsel: 
Court Hearing Type: Motion 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRIC 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARW 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
e · · ~ Flr;-D AM 
Si:P n_n 2013 ] 
Giork Dist. C urt 
learwater Coun , Idaho /I I 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL 
Case No. CV 2012-277 
MEMORANDUM OPINION RE 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
The issue addressed is whether to grant Toni Johnson attorney fees and costs 
against the estate of John H. Cornell as requested by the Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2013. Darrell Aherin Esq., appearing on behalf of the 
deceased John H. Cornell, filed an objection and memorandum in opposition to the 
request as did Samuel Creason, who appeared on behalf of Kareen Cornell, the 
personal representative of the estate of John H. Cornell. Oral argument was heard on 
September 4, 2013, Karen Seubert presenting argument on behalf of Ms. Johnson and 
Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason presenting argument as well. 
On February 15, 2013, this Court dismissed the claims of the deceased John H. 
Cornell and on June 21, 2013 dismissed the claims of Karen Cornell. As the prevailing 
party, Ms. Johnson seeks attorney fees and the costs of a deposition pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 15-8-208. Idaho Code § 15-8-208 provides: "Either the district court or the court 
on appeal may, in its discretion, order costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be 
awarded to any party (a) from any party to the proceedings." 
Ms. Seubert conceded at oral argument, and I so find, that the arguments made 
by Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason were not made frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
MEMORANDUM OPINION-1 
RE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
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foundation. The arguments that were made were cogent and reasoned and excellent in 
shedding light on an abstruse area of the law. Therefore, the issue is whether this 
Court should exercise its discretion to award attorney fees and costs in favor of Toni 
Johnson against the Estate of John H. Cornell. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has observed that Idaho Code § 15-8-208 "allows 
courts to award fees in cases governed by the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act 
when doing so would be equitable." Banner Life Insurance v. Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 
147 Idaho 117, 133, 206 P.3d 481 (2009). Under the circumstances of this case, it 
would be inequitable and inappropriate to award attorney fees to Ms. Johnson against 
the estate of John H. Cornell. 
The dismissals were not based upon the merits of the claims made on behalf of 
the deceased John H. Cornell and his estate, but rather upon the abatement of Mr. 
Cornell's claims against Ms. Johnson upon Mr. Cornell's death. The facts are more fully 
set forth in the Memorandum Opinions. Ms. Johnson and Mr. Cornell are siblings and 
were named as recipients of a trust established by their parents. 
Following the death of the last surviving parent, Ms. Johnson was required under 
state law and the terms of the trust to distribute the assets of the trust as expeditiously 
as possible to herself and Mr. Cornell. In the nearly two (2) years from the last truster's 
death through Mr. Cornell's death, Ms. Johnson failed to distribute any part of the Trust 
to Mr. Cornell. Mr. Cornell waited in vain for funds from the trust to pay for necessary 
medical care that he could not obtain without money from the trust. Mr. Cornell 
contacted Ms. Johnson and her attorney, a different attorney than her present attorney, 
MEMORANDUM OPINION-2 
RE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
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several times for accountings and for word on the status of the trust. He never received 
a response. 
Ms. Johnson used funds from the trust for her personal expenses while Mr. 
Cornell was making his requests for information regarding distribution of the trust. Ms. 
Johnson lived rent free in the home that is included in the Trust. Ms. Johnson entirely 
thwarted the intentions of her parents in establishing the trust for her brother to receive 
half the estate. Ms. Johnson dishonored the trust her father placed in her when he 
named her as the sole person responsible for distribution of the trust. Ms. Johnson 
acted inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself and not share 
one cent with her brother. 
Ms. Johnson egregiously wronged her brother during his lifetime. Now she 
wishes to continue wronging her brother after his death by not only keeping the assets 
that were intended for Mr. Cornell, but also raiding his estate for her attorney fees. 
Certainly, this is not the result that the parents of Mr. Cornell and Ms. Johnson intended 
when they created the trust. 
The law of abatement is an unsettled area of law. The issue of abatement only 
arose after Mr. Cornell filed his action against Ms. Johnson for her mismanagement of 
the estate. Although the arguments of Mr. Cornell and his estate were rejected, the 
arguments were soundly based. The inequitable conduct of Ms. Johnson justified the 
vigorous arguments made on behalf of Mr. Cornell. I, therefore, reject Ms. Johnson's 
request for attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell. 
Ms. Johnson also requests that she be awarded $277.15 for the costs of 
obtaining a copy of her deposition. Ms. Johnson asserts she is entitled to the award as 
MEMORANDUM OPINION-3 
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a prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(C)(10). Rule 
54(d)(1) provides, "Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be allowed 
as a matter of right of the prevailing party or parties unless otherwise ordered by the 
court." (emphasis added). Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(10) relied upon by Ms. Johnson provides, 
"When costs are awarded to a party, such party shall be entitled to the following costs, 
actually paid, as a matter of right: ... (10) Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition 
taken by any of the parties to the action in preparation for trial of the action." (emphasis 
added). 
The decision whether to grant costs is a matter of discretion. It would be 
inequitable to award Ms. Johnson her costs for the same reason it is inequitable to 
award her attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell. 
CONCLUSION 
Toni Johnson's request for an award of attorney fees and the cost of a deposition 
from the estate of John H. Cornell is denied for the reasons set forth above. 
Dated this M day of September, 2013. 
Randall W Robinson, Magistrate 
MEMORANDUM OPINION-4 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct cop~ of the foregoing Judgment of 
Dismissal was mailed postage pre-paid, on the Y day of () cm k n'I b -tY-
2013, to: 
Samuel Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, and Callery, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
MEMORANDUM OPINION-5 
RE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
Darrell Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
CARRIE BIRD 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRIC 2p :(~ ti 2fll3 
Clerk Dist. C urt FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEAR TEBearwaterCoun , Idaho 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL 
Case No. CV 2012-277 
ORDER RE ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS 
Based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth in the 
Memorandum Opinion Re Attorney Fees and Costs, the Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2013 is HEREBY DENIED. 
Dated this kL day of September, 2013. 
ORDER RE ATTORNEY FEES-1 
AND COSTS 
Randall W Ro6Tr,;on, Magistrate 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Re Attorney 
Fees and Costs was mailed postage pre-paid, on the 1 t-'1. day of 
c'S~~kmtgv , 2013, to: 
Samuel Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, and Callery, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
ORDER RE ATTORNEY FEES-2 
AND COSTS 
Darrell Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
CARRIE BIRD 
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AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorney for Margaret Watkins 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD 
COMES NOW the appellant, Margaret Watkins, by and through her attorney of record, 
Darrel W. Aherin of Aherin, Rice & Anegon, and moves the Court for an order augmenting the 
clerk's record to add the following documents: 
1. Memorai'l.dum Opinion Re Attorney Fees and Costs entered September 6, 2013 
(copy attached hereto as Exhibit A); and 
2. Order Re Attorney Fees and Costs entered September 6, 2013 (copy attached 
hereto as Exhibit B). 
The specific grounds for this request are that said documents support the appellant's Brief 
in Support of Appeal and Appellant Reply Brief and are necessary in order to allow the District 
Court to be fully advised. 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD -- 1 
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~ 
DATED this / Z day of September, 2013 . 
AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
By J)aJ_;) uL 
Darrel W. Aherin, Attorney for 
Appellant, Margaret Watkins 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DARREL W. AHERIN, hereby certify that on the / 2-~day of September, 2013, I 
caused to be served a copy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC., 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore O. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD -- 2 
N:\Comell, John\Pleadings\Motion to Augment Record.docx-- lgs 
l!YiJ. S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 
D Federal Express 
@rU.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 
D Federal Express 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT L-,_:EP n b.. ~~·r_3 _ 
c1mk D,st. C urt 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARW~TEF§l22,r,vats_::_9_Q~nty, Idaho ., 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL 
Case No. CV 2012-277 
MEMORANDUM OPINION RE 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
The issue addressed is whether to grant Toni Johnson attorney fees and costs 
against the estate of John H. Cornell as requested by the Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2013. Darrell Aherin Esq. , appearing on behalf of the 
deceased John H. Cornell, filed an objection and memorandum in opposition to the 
request as did Samuel Creason, who appeared on behalf of Kareen Cornell, the 
personal representative of the estate of John H. Cornell. Oral argument was heard on 
September 4, 2013, Karen Seubert presenting argument on behalf of Ms. Johnson and 
Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason presenting argument as well. 
On February 15, 2013, this Court dismissed the claims of the deceased John H. 
Cornell and on June 21, 2013 dismissed the claims of Karen Cornell. As the prevailing 
party, Ms. Johnson seeks attorney fees and the costs of a deposition pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 15-8-208. Idaho Code § 15-8-208 provides: "Either the district court or the court 
on appeal may, in its discretion, order costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be 
awarded to any party (a) from any party to the proceedings." 
Ms. Seubert conceded at oral argument, and I so find, that the arguments made 
by Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason were not made frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
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foundation. The arguments that were made were cogent and reasoned and excellent in 
shedding light on an abstruse area of the law. Therefore, the issue is whether this 
Court should exercise its discretion to award attorney fees and costs in favor of Toni 
Johnson against the Estate of John H. Cornell. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has observed that Idaho Code § 15-8-208 "allows 
courts to award fees in cases governed by the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act 
when doing so would be equitable." Banner Life Insurance v. Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 
147 Idaho 117, 133, 206 P.3d 481 (2009). Under the circumstances of this case, it 
would be inequitable and inappropriate to award attorney fees to Ms. Johnson against 
the estate of John H. Cornell. 
The dismissals were not based upon the merits of the claims made on behalf of 
the deceased John H. Cornell and his estate, but rather upon the abatement of Mr. 
Cornell's claims against Ms. Johnson upon Mr. Cornell's death. The facts are more fully 
set forth in the Memorandum Opinions. Ms. Johnson and Mr. Cornell are siblings and 
were named as recipients of a trust established by their parents. 
Following the death of the last surviving parent, Ms. Johnson was required under 
state law and the terms of the trust to distribute the assets of the trust as expeditiously 
as possible to herself and Mr. Cornell. In the nearly two (2) years from the last trustor's 
death through Mr. Cornell's death, Ms. Johnson failed to distribute any part of the Trust 
to Mr. Cornell. Mr. Cornell waited in vain for funds from the trust to pay for necessary 
medical care that he could not obtain without money from the trust. Mr. Cornell 
contacted Ms. Johnson and her attorney, a different attorney than her present attorney, 
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several times for accountings and for word on the status of the trust. He never received 
a response . 
Ms. Johnson used funds from the trust for her personal expenses while Mr. 
Cornell was making his requests for information regarding distribution of the trust. Ms. 
Johnson lived rent free in the home that is included in the Trust. Ms. Johnson entirely 
thwarted the intentions of her parents in establishing the trust for her brother to receive 
half the estate. Ms. Johnson dishonored the trust her father placed in her when he 
named her as the sole person responsible for distribution of the trust. Ms. Johnson 
acted inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself and not share 
one cent with her brother. 
Ms. Johnson egregiously wronged her brother during his lifetime. Now she 
wishes to continue wronging her brother after his death by not only keeping the assets 
that were intended for Mr. Cornell, but also raiding his estate for her attorney fees . 
Certainly, this is not the result that the parents of Mr. Cornell and Ms. Johnson intended 
when they created the trust. 
The law of abatement is an unsettled area of law. The issue of abatement only 
arose after Mr. Cornell filed his action against Ms. Johnson for her mismanagement of 
the estate. Although the arguments of Mr. Cornell and his estate were rejected, the 
arguments were soundly based. The inequitable conduct of Ms. Johnson justified the 
vigorous arguments made on behalf of Mr. Cornell. I, therefore, reject Ms. Johnson's 
request for attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell. 
Ms. Johnson also requests that she be awarded $277.15 for the costs of 
obtaining a copy of her deposition. Ms. Johnson asserts she is entitled to the award as 
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a prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(C)(10). Rule 
54(d)(1) provides, "Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be allowed 
as a matter of right of the prevailing party or parties unless otherwise ordered by the 
court." (emphasis added). Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(10) relied upon by Ms. Johnson provides, 
"When costs are awarded to a party, such party shall be entitled to the following costs, 
actually paid, as a matter of right: ... (10) Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition 
taken by any of the parties to the action in preparation for trial of the action." (emphasis 
added). 
The decision whether to grant costs is a matter of discretion. It would be 
inequitable to award Ms. Johnson her costs for the same reason it is inequitable to 
award her attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell. 
CONCLUSION 
Toni Johnson's request for an award of attorney fees and the cost of a deposition 
from the estate of John H. Cornell is denied for the reasons set forth above. 
Dated this Ii/, day of September, 2013. 
Randall W Robinson, Magistrate 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copi of the foregoing Judgment of 
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Lewiston, ID 83501 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICI L~p (f fl Zfll3 l 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWy\TEBearwaterCo~~~~l~~s~~c~ u~~ 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL 
Case No. CV 2012-277 
ORDER RE ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS 
Based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth in the 
Memorandum Opinion Re Attorney Fees and Costs, the Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2013 is HEREBY DENIED. 
Dated this uL day of September, 2013. 
ORDER RE ATTORNEY FEES-1 
AND COSTS 
Randall W Robinson, Magistrate 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Re Attorney Fees . and Costs was mailed postage pre-paid, on the 11-'"l day of ('s~,)~\'"\\JH'.v , 2013, to: 
I 
Samuel Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
P. 0. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, and Callery, P.L.LC. 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
ORDER RE ATTORNEY FEES-2 
AND COSTS 
Darrell Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
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Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8183 
) 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
Of Estate of John Hemy Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
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__ _ ) 
COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, acting on behalf of the Estate of John Cornell as its duly 
appointed Personal Representative, by and through its attorney of record, Samuel T. Creason of 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, and moves the Court for an order augmenting the 
clerk' s record to add the following documents: 
1. The Magistrate Court's September 6, 2013 Memorandum Opinion re Attorney 
Fees and Costs (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A); and 
2. The Magistrate Court's September 6, 2013 Order re Attorney Fees and Costs (a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B). 
Movant requests such an order on the grounds that the memorandum and order attached 
hereto are properly part of the Clerk' s record pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(11), 
as those filings are part of the official magistrate court file. 
MOTION TO AUGMENT - 1 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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DATED this ,Z.9'--day of September, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ of September, 2013, I filed the foregoing MOTION 
TO AUGMENT RECORD with the Clerk of the Comi, and provided a copy to the following persons: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
1212 Idaho Street 
P. 0. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seube1i 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P .O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARW.~_,_.__li)a_iv_~a_te_rC_o_un~, ld=a;.;.;:ho'--1,W. 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
IN THE MA TIER OF THE 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL 
Case No. CV 2012-277 
MEMORANDUM OPINION RE 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
The issue addressed is whether to grant Toni Johnson attorney fees and costs 
against the estate of John H. Cornell as requested by the Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2013. Darrell Aherin Esq., appearing on behalf of the 
deceased John H. Cornell, filed an objection and memorandum in opposition to the 
request as did Samuel Creason, who appeared on behalf of Kareen Cornell, the 
personal representative of the estate of John H. Cornell. Oral argument was heard on 
September 4, 2013, Karen Seubert presenting argument on behalf of Ms. Johnson and 
Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason presenting argument as well. 
On February 15, 2013, this Court dismissed the claims of the deceased John H. 
Cornell and on June 21, 2013 dismissed the claims of Karen Cornell. As the prevailing 
party, Ms. Johnson seeks attorney fees and the costs of a deposition pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 15-8-208. Idaho Code § 15-8-208 provides: "Either the district court or the court 
on appeal may, in its discretion, order costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be 
awarded to any party (a) from any party to the proceedings." 
Ms. Seubert conceded at oral argument, and I so find, that the arguments made 
by Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason were not made frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
MEMORANDUM OPINION-1 
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foundation. The arguments that were made were cogent and reasoned and excellent in 
shedding light on an abstruse area of the law. Therefore, the issue is whether this 
Court should exercise its discretion to award attorney fees and costs in favor of Toni 
Johnson against the Estate of John H. Cornell. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has observed that Idaho Code § 15-8-208 "allows 
courts to award fees in cases governed by the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act 
when doing so would be equitable." Banner Life Insurance v. Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 
147 Idaho 117, 133, 206 P.3d 481 (2009). Under the circumstances of this case, it 
would be inequitable and inappropriate to award attorney fees to Ms. Johnson against 
the estate of John H. Cornell. 
The dismissals were not based upon the merits of the claims made on behalf of 
the deceased John H. Cornell and his estate, but rather upon the abatement of Mr. 
Cornell's claims against Ms. Johnson upon Mr. Cornell's death. The facts are more fully 
set forth in the Memorandum Opinions. Ms. Johnson and Mr. Cornell are siblings and 
were named as recipients of a trust established by their parents. 
Following the death of the last surviving parent, Ms. Johnson was required under 
state law and the terms of the trust to distribute the assets of the trust as expeditiously 
as possible to herself and Mr. Cornell. In the nearly two (2) years from the last trustor's 
death through Mr. Cornell's death, Ms. Johnson failed to distribute any part of the Trust 
to Mr. Cornell. Mr. Cornell waited in vain for funds from the trust to pay for necessary 
medical care that he could not obtain without money from the trust. Mr. Cornell 
contacted Ms. Johnson and her attorney, a different attorney than her present attorney, 
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several times for accountings and for word on the status of the trust. He never received 
a response. 
Ms. Johnson used funds from the trust for her personal expenses while Mr. 
Cornell was making his requests for information regarding distribution of the trust. Ms. 
Johnson lived rent free in the home that is included in the Trust. Ms. Johnson entirely 
thwarted the intentions of her parents in establishing the trust for her brother to receive 
half the estate. Ms. Johnson dishonored the trust her father placed in her when he 
named her as the sole person responsible for distribution of the trust. Ms. Johnson 
acted inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself and not share 
one cent with her brother. 
Ms. Johnson egregiously wronged her brother during his lifetime. Now she 
wishes to continue wronging her brother after his death by not only keeping the assets 
that were intended for Mr. Cornell, but also raiding his estate for her attorney fees. 
Certainly, this is not the result that the parents of Mr. Cornell and Ms. Johnson intended 
when they created the trust. 
The law of abatement is an unsettled area of law. The issue of abatement only 
arose after Mr. Cornell filed his action against Ms. Johnson for her mismanagement of 
the estate. Although the arguments of Mr. Cornell and his estate were rejected, the 
arguments were soundly based. The inequitable conduct of Ms. Johnson justified the 
vigorous arguments made on behalf of Mr. Cornell. I, therefore, reject Ms. Johnson's 
request for attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell. 
Ms. Johnson also requests that she be awarded $277.15 for the costs of 
obtaining a copy of her deposition. Ms. Johnson asserts she is entitled to the award as 
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a prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(C)(10). Rule 
54(d)(1) provides, "Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be allowed 
as a matter of right of the prevailing party or parties unless otherwise ordered by the 
court." (emphasis added). Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(10) relied upon by Ms. Johnson provides, 
"When costs are awarded to a party, such party shall be entitled to the following costs, 
actually paid, as a matter of right: ... (10) Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition 
taken by any of the parties to the action in preparation for trial of the action." {emphasis 
added). 
The decision whether to grant costs is a matter of discretion. It would be 
inequitable to award Ms. Johnson her costs for the same reason it is inequitable to 
award her attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell. 
CONCLUSION 
Toni Johnson's request for an award of attorney fees and the cost of a deposition 
from the estate of John H. Cornell is denied for the reasons set forth above. 
Dated this /J, day of September, 2013. 
IJttJrL 
Randall W Robinson, Magistrate 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct cop~ of the foregoing Judgment of 
Dismissal was mailed postage pre-paid, on the Cf day of () '<Q k rn b -tr , 
2013, to: 
Samuel Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, and Callery, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRI 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEAR 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
IN THE MA TIER OF THE 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL 
Case No. CV 2012-277 
ORDER RE ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS 
SEP fl 6 2013 
Based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth in the 
Memorandum Opinion Re Attorney Fees and Costs, the Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2013 is HEREBY DENIED. 
Dated this 6-r;L day of September, 2013. 
ORDER RE ATTORNEY FEES-1 
AND COSTS 
tf1JJJ:1L 
Randall W Robinson, Magistrate 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Re Attorney 
Fees and Costs was mailed postage pre-paid, on the q 1-4t day of 
,~~m'o~v: , 2013, to: 
Samuel Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
P. 0. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, and Callery, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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Case No. CV 2012-00277 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
RE: MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD 
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned will call on for hearing Motion to Augment 
Record on Tuesday, November 5, 2013, at 10:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be 
heard in the courtroom at the Clearwater County Comihouse, Orofino, Idaho. 
DATED this 25111 day of September, 2013 . 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
muel T. Creason, ISB 
Attorney for Petitioner Kareen Cornell 
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Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLP 
1304 Idaho Street 
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Attorneys at Law 
Post OfficeBox 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
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Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
· NOTICE OF NO OBJECTION 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her 
attorney of record, Karin Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., has no objection to the 
Motion to Augment Record dated September 25, 2013 filed by Kareen Cornell, acting on behalf of 
the Estate of John Cornell, which is set for hearing on November 5, 2013 at 10:30 a.m., and further 
has no objection to the Motion to Augment Record dated September 12, 2013 filed by Margaret 
Watkins. 
DATED this _lL_ day of October, 2013. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Karin Seubert 
Attorney for Respondent 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF NO 
OBJECTION was, this L/ day of October, 2013, 
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mailed, postage pre-paid, 
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Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Samuel T. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
1219 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By ta~ -~~(.t 
· Karin Seubert 
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This case is about the actions of Toni C. Johnson while she served as the successor 
trustee of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell ("Trust"). 
Ms. Johnson concedes that during the over two and a half years that she served as successor 
trustee, she repeatedly made improper use of the Trust res for her own benefit. She also 
concedes that during that time she engaged in inequitable conduct in order to deprive her brother, 
John Cornell-a co-beneficiary-of his interest in the Trust res. Now, she argues that because 
John Cornell died before he could stop her from continuing in this line of conduct, any claims he 
held abated and there exists no judicial recourse for the heirs of John Cornell. The question 
before the Court is whether the Estate of John Cornell may pursue recovery of John Cornell's 
I- interest in the Trust res. 
I 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Estate of John Henry Cornell comes before this Court on appeal from dismissal of its 
petition for supervised administration and court ordered distribution of The Revocable Family 
Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M Cornell. The magistrate court dismissed the Petition on 
the grounds that the Estate's claims did not survive the death of John Henry Cornell. Petitioner 
appeals. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
This matter comes before the Court after the conclusion of a highly irregular course of 






initiated through a Petition filed by John Henry Cornell on July 11, 2012. John Cornell died 
from an apparent suicide on August 20, 2012. Ms. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss on 
September 17, 2012, arguing that the claims in John Cornell's petition abated upon his death. 
Ms. Johnson also argued that because John died, there existed no legitimate party in interest 
unless and until the Estate was substituted into the action pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 25(a)(l). 
For reasons beyond Kareen Cornell's control, John Cornell's -attorney continued to 
prosecute the petition in John Cornell's name, personally. In late November 2012, Ms. Cornell 
appeared before the Court and notified the Court that she objected to any other person acting on 
behalf of her late husband. While the magistrate court invited Ms. Cornell to submit briefing on 
pending action, it did not bring her or the Estate into the litigation. Thus, Ms. Cornell's briefing 
was, in effect, amici briefing. On February 15, 2013, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion. 
In that opinion, the Court dismissed the petition filed by John Cornell, personally. However, the 
Court expressly invited Ms. Cornell to file claims on behalf of the Estate. 
Ms. Cornell responded to the Court's invitation by filing the Estate's Petition on February 
28, 2013. While many of the Estate's claims were identical to those raised by John Cornell in his 
August 2012 petition, the Estate also raised additional claims. The Estate's Petition alleged that 
Ms. Johnson (1) failed to act in conformity with the terms of the Trust; (2) breached her fiduciary 
duties when acting in her capacity as Trustee; (3) engaged in equitable conversion of the 
property belonging to John Cornell by refusing to distribute the property; and ( 4) was unjustly 







terms of the Trust and her fiduciary duties in order to effect a distribution in her favor. The 
Estate sought supervised administration, court ordered distribution of the Trust, and a judgment 
against Ms. Johnson for injuries caused to the Trust. The Petition set forth the following legal 
and equitable causes of action: (A) breach of fiduciary duty; (B) constructive trust; (C) breach of 
contract; (TI) conversion; and (E) unjust enrichment. 
No Answer has ever been filed to those allegations. Instead, Ms. Johnson filed a Motion 
to Dismiss the Estate's Petition on March 1. Ms. Johnson argued that the petition should be 
dismissed because (1) the Estate was bound by the Court's February 15 memorandum opinion, 
and (2) the Estate's Petition either failed to state a cause of action or stated causes of action 
which abated upon the death of John Cornell. Ms. Johnson based her abatement arguments on 
\ the same theory that the magistrate court adopted in dismissing Mr. Cornell's claims. 
The magistrate court granted Ms. Johnson's motion on June 21. In its memorandum 
opinion, the court concluded that (A) all claims for breach of fiduciary duty abated, at common 
law and under Idaho statute, upon death; (B) the doctrine of constructive trust was inapplicable 
and an action under that doctrine was in tort, which abated upon death; (C) the claims for breach 
of contract were co-extensive with the statutory duties of a trustee and, therefore, were breach of 
fiduciary duty claims which abated upon death; (D) claims for equitable conversion sounded in 
tort and, therefore, abated upon death; and (E) claims for unjust enrichment sounded in tort and, 
therefore, abated upon death. The magistrate court based its ruling upon the following 
conclusions of law: (1) the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion of Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 







the death of the claimant; and (2) the Idaho legislature did not abrogate that rule with the 
amendment of Idaho Code § 5-327, except for claims for recovery of medical expenses, out of 
pocket expenses, and lost wages. As set forth herein, the court's conclusions are erroneous. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Michael and Arlie Cornell established The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell 
and Arlie M. Cornell ("Trust") on November 1, 1996. The Trust was established to provide for 
Michael and Arlie during their lifetimes, with the remainder to be distributed to their two 
children: Toni Johnson and John Cornell. Arlie Cornell died on November 9, 2008. Michael 
Cornell died on December 15, 2009. Ms. Johnson has been the sole Trustee since that time. 
As a successor trustee, Ms. Johnson was to have a very limited role. Ms. Johnson's sole 
duty as trustee was to distribute the trust assets. Over the months and years following Michael 
Cornell's death, Ms. Johnson failed to distribute the Trust. Instead, she "egregiously wronged 
her brother during his lifetime. Mem. Op. re Attorney Fees and Costs 3. "Ms. Johnson acted 
inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself and not shar[ing] one cent 
with her brother." Id. She refused to distribute the Trust, despite John Cornell's repeated 
objections and pleas that she do so, in part, so that he could "pay for necessary medical care that 
he could not obtain without money from the trust." Id. at 2. John Cornell was never able to 
compel distribution before his death on August 20, 2012. 
Ms. Johnson's discovery responses in this case substantiate the concerns and frustrations 
that Mr. Cornell raised in the over two and one-half years between the surviving trustor's death 





personal use of the real and personal property of the Trust. She lives rent-free in the home that is 
included in the Trust. She has commingled cash assets of the Trust with her own cash assets. 
She has depleted the cash assets of the Trust, with not only expenses of the Trust but also her 
personal expenses. To date, the only distributions that Ms. Johnson has made are the unreported 
distributions made through her personal use of the Trust res. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. The issue before the Court is the survival of causes of actions regarding (a) proper 
administration of the Trust, and (b) proper distribution of assets to which the Trust is title owner. 
Under its terms, the Trust was to terminate upon the death of the surviving trustor-. in this case, 
December 15, 2009. As successor Trustee, Toni Johnson was to distribute the Trust res "as soon 
as reasonably possible." Ms. Johnson concedes that she acted inequitably: she mismanaged the 
Trust, she commingled assets, she used Trust funds for personal use, and she refused to distribute 
the Trust res, despite John Cornell's demands. John Cornell died in August 2012. May the 
Estate of John Cornell pursue not only his interests in the remaining Trust property, but also 
claims for the diminution of that property through mismanagement by Toni Cornell? 
ARGUMENT 
The Estate's Petition raises claims against Ms. Johnson based upon conduct occurring 
since December 15, 2009, the date she accepted appointment as successor trustee of the Trust. 
The law governing survival of actions upon the death of the injured party was changed on July 1, 
2010, when the amended Idaho Code § 5-327 became effective. Prior to that point in time, 
issues of survival upon the death of the injured party were governed by the common law. Thus, 
this case requires the Court to determine whether the Estate's claims survive at common law and 
under section 5-327. The magistrate court granted Ms. Johnson's motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that (1) under the common law, all causes of action sounding in tort abate upon the 









tort are limited, upon the death of the injured party, to recovery for damages not sought in the 
Estate's petition. 
A. Standard of Review 
The magistrate court dismissed this action on a summary judgment standard, because it 
considered affidavits filed by the parties. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). An appellate Court 
exercises de nova review over a grant of summary judgment Constr. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. 
Assurance Co. of Am., 135 Idaho 680, 682, 23 P.3d 142, 144 (2001). 
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 
56( c ). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court "liberally 
construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all 
reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Constr. Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 135 Idaho 
at 682, 23 P.3d at 144. If, as the result of such a liberal construction, the Court finds that 
reasonable persons could reach different findings or draw conflicting inferences from the 
evidence, the Court must deny the motion. Thus, Ms. Johnson carries the burden of proving that 
reasonable persons could not draw conflicting inference from the evidence, when the record is 
construed in a light most favorable to the Estate. 
B. The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate at Common Law. 
1. The Estate's Tort Claims Did Not Abate 
The Estate's tort claims did not abate at common law, because the claims seek damages 




common law, every cause of action sounding in tort abates upon the death of the injured party. 
The court based its ruling entirely on the Idaho Supreme Court case of Bishop v. Owens, 152 
Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012). The magistrate court found the following language from 
Bishop dispositive in this case: "Under the common law, claims arising out of contracts 
generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate." Id. at 619, 
272 P.3d at 1250. The magistrate court's broad application of Bishop is in error. The Bishop 
Court identified the general rule regarding abatement of tort claims at common law. Id. While 
· that general rule is certainly applicable to this case, it is not dispositive. The Bishop Court was 
not presented with facts that required it to analyze some of the more nuanced applications of the 
abatement doctrine. The magistrate court erred in applying the general rule of Bishop to this 
case because (a) the Estate's tort claims seek redress for injury done to the decedent's property 
interests; (b) the Estate's tort claims are founded upon a remedial statute; and (c) the Estate's tort 
claims are not legal claims but rather claims in equity. As set forth below, each of these 
distinctions dictates a finding that the Estate's tort claims survived the death of John Cornell. 
The Bishop Opinion does not-either by its facts or by its language-set precedent 
regarding abatement of causes of action Estate's claims. The Bishop Court was presented with 
facts far different from this case. First, the decedent in Bishop brought a legal malpractice claim, 
alleging that her former attorney injured her by failing to properly advise her about the 
consequences of a negotiated settlement with respect to subrogated interests. Id. at 618, 272 
P.3d at 1249. Here, the Estate claims that the defendant injured John Cornell by depriving him 
his property ( which she still retains) and, at the same time, diminishing the value of that 
-7-
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prope1iy. Second, the decedent in Bishop did not rely upon a statute or equitable doctrine to 
identify a unique duty or standard of care; she relied upon a legal representation agreement 
which applied the same standard to which all Idaho attorneys are held, the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Responsibility. Id. at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251. Here, the Estate has raised tort claims 
based upon the remedial statutes set forth in the Idaho Code which govern the conduct of 
trustees, and based upon equitable doctrines. Third, the decedent in Bishop sought an award of 
money damages, not relief in the form of restoration and distribution of certain identified assets 
to which she believed she was entitled. Id. at 619, 272 P.3d at 1250. Here, the Estate seeks 
restoration and distribution of certain assets-the Trust res. These three factual distinctions 
explain why the Bishop Court had no need to proceed beyond a recitation of the general rule and 
r- . evidence why the magistrate court erred in giving Bishop such a broad interpretation. 
The language of the Bishop Opinion does not support the magistrate court's interpretation 
of the Bishop language as universal. The Bishop Opinion cites Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 
184 P. 477 (1919) as support for its general rule. Kloepfer makes express that which Bishop 
assumes: "As a general rule, in the absence of a statute providing otherwise, causes of action ex 
contractu survive, while causes ex delicto do not. However, there are well-recognized 
exceptions to both branches of the rule." Id. (emphasis added). These well-recognized 
exceptions mandate survival of the Estate's claims. 
Subsequent Supreme Court case law also conflicts with the magistrate court's 
interpretation. Based on Bishop, the magistrate court ruled that "in order for John's claims to 






Kareen Cornell 10. In the January 2013 case of St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. 
Luciani, the Supreme Court considered whether a given tort claim could be assigned after the 
death of the injured party, particularly in light of its opinion in Bishop. 154 Idaho 37,293 P.3d 
661, 667 (2013). The Court affirmed the rule from MacLoed v. Stelle, where it held that "'if [a 
tort claim] survives, it may be assigned; if not, it may not,' [the Court] also held that an 'injury 
[that] lessens the estate of the injured party does survive, and that is assignable." Luciani, 154 
Idaho at_, 293 P.3d at 667 (quoting MacLoed, 43 Idaho 64, 75, 249 P. 254, 257 (1926)). 
Thus, even as recent as January 2013, the Idaho Supreme Court assumed that certain tort claims 
survive the death of the injured party, even after Bishop. 
a. The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims seek redress 
for injury to property. 
One of the well-recognized exceptions to the rule of abatement of tort claims is that tort 
claims survive where they are actions for recovery or protection of a property interest. 
The general rule is that, in addition to the causes of action arising out of contract 
recognized at common law, causes of action arising from torts to real and personal 
property survive and pass to the personal representative of the decedent, while 
purely personal torts do not survive in the absence of statutory provision. 
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 51. Thus, in cases where the injured party 
alleged an injury to his property-such as the existence or amount of his interest in a trust-the 
claim survives. See Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 105, 15 P.3d 816, 818 (2000) (holding that 
while a divorce proceeding abates upon death, "[i]f property issues are involved, the action 




Here, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Cornell held a vested 
property interest in the Trust res at the time of his death. Upon accepting appointment as 
successor trustee, Ms. Johnson's obligations to the Trust and Mr. Cornell (as the beneficiary) 
were clear. 
On the death of the surviving Truster, the Trust shall terminate and the 
Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and 
principal remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute 
them to the following beneficiaries: TONI C. JOHNSON and JOHN H. 
CORNELL. 
Trust§ 4.03. However, the very next provision of the Trust gives rise to much of the confusion 
in this matter. The Trust proceeds to set forth the terms for distribution in the event that one or 
both of the Trustors' children should die. 
If any child ... should die prior to the above distribution, then the Trustee 
shall distribute all of such deceased child's share to his or her surviving 
issue in equal shares. . . . If there is no surviving issue, then all of the 
deceased child's share of the Trust Estate shall be added to the shares set 
aside for the ... other living child .... " 
Trust§ 4.03(a). Ms. Johnson argued that because John Cornell died before he could compel her 
to distribute the Trust res, any interest he held in the Trust died with him; thus, she should 
receive the entirety of the Trust res. The Estate maintains that John Cornell's interest in the 
Trust res vested upon the death of Michael Cornell. The Estate also argues that even if John 
Cornell's interest did not vest upon the death of Michael Cornell, it vested at the point in time 
where equity would presume proper distribution because "equity regards that as done which 
ought to be done." See First Sec. Bank of Idaho, Nat. Ass 'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 657, 429 






The magistrate court ruled that because John Cornell died prior to distribution, he could 
not have obtained a vested interest in the Trust res. 1 See Memorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell 
12. The magistrate court did not provide any discussion or analysis regarding ambiguity within 
the document or the intent of the Trustors. The magistrate court did not provide any discussion 
or analysis regarding the Estate's arguments that, at the very latest, John Cornell's interest vested 
under equity. These omissions are of particular import because the magistrate court later found 
that Ms. Johnson acted against the intent of the Trustors. See Memorandum Op. re: Attorney 
Fees and Costs 3. Therefore, the magistrate erred when it ruled that, as a matter of law, John 
Cornell did not hold a vested interest. 
b. The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims are founded 
upon a remedial statute. 
The survivability of this action is further supported by the fact that the claims arise 
pursuant to a remedial statute. In Bishop, the decedent merely relied on a common law duty. 
Here, the Estate seeks recovery based, in part, upon a trustee's breach of fiduciary duty, as 
defined in Idaho Code§§ 15-7-101 through 15-7-601. "A cause of action that is founded on a 
remedial statute ... survives the death of the party possessing the cause of action." 1 Am. Jur. 
2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 59. Therefore, the Estate's breach of fiduciary duty 
claims did not abate. 
1 The magistrate court was not explicit about why it rejected the Estate's arguments regarding 
continuing jurisdiction over administration of the Trust. It appears, however, that the magistrate 
court rejected that argument based upon the court's finding that Toni Johnson was the only 








c. The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims are not legal 
claims, but claims in equity. 
Finally, the survivability of this action is further supported by the fact that it seeks 
recovery through equitable causes of action. In Bishop, the only cause of action was the legal 
theory of malpractice. Here, the Estate has raised several equitable doctrines entitling it to relief. 
"In equity, abatement signifies a present, temporary suspension of further proceedings in a suit 
because of want of proper parties. It is an interruption or suspension of a suit, the equivalent of a 
stay of proceedings, and the suit may be revived and proceed to its regular determination." 1 
Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § l (footnotes omitted). 
The principle that a cause of action expires with the death or disability of a party 
generally does not apply to suits in equity; equitable remedies exist to the same 
extent in favor of and against executors and administrators as they do against 
the decedent, as long as the court can continue to grant effective relief in spite of 
the death. One of the main reasons for this stance for suits in equity is that 
such suits primarily pertain to property rights. 
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 60 (footnotes omitted) (emphases added).2 
The magistrate court erred in ruling that the claims of conversion, constructive trust, and unjust 
enrichment abated under Bishop. See A1emorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell 13-15. 
Conversion. The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of conversion. "The 
act of wrongfully and permanently depriving someone of his property establishes conversion." 
In re Pangburn, 154 Idaho 233, 296 P.3d 1080, 1085 (2013). These are the exact elements 
2 See also Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645,649 (4th Cir. 1942); 
Glojek v. Glojek, 254 Wis. 109, 115, 35 N.W.2d 203,206 (1948); Hughey v. Mooney, 282 S.C. 
597, 602, 320 S.E.2d 475, 477 (Ct. App. 1984); Miller v. Hayman, 766 So. 2d 1116, 1118 n.1 





[ alleged by the Estate. As set forth above, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding 
whether John Cornell held a vested interest in the Trust res at the time of his death. "At common 
law, the right to bring an action for the conversion of goods in the lifetime of the decedent owner 
generally survived to the personal representative .... " 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and 
Revival§ 76. The consequence of the magistrate's ruling evidences the reason for the equitable 
exception to the rule of abatement: if the Estate's claims did not survive John Cornell's death, 
then Ms. Johnson will be allowed to enjoy property which she did not own, and which she now 
possess only as a result of her inequitable conduct. Such a result is patently inequitable. The 
Estate's claims for redress through the doctrine of conversion did not abate. 
Constructive Trust. The Estate seeks recovery under the the equitable doctrine of 
\ ~ constructive trust. It is "the fundamental rule of equity that equity regards that as done which 
ought to be done." See First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 91 Idaho at 657, 429 P.2d at 389 (discussing 
basis of doctrine of equitable conversion). Ms. Johnson ought to have distributed the Trust res 
long before the death of John Cornell. It is undisputed that Ms. Johnson engaged in inequitable 
conduct by retaining legal title to the assets of the Trust in the name of the Trust. "When 
property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in 
good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee." TRUST, 
Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), trust (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 
also Hanger v. Hess, 49 Idaho 325, 328, 288 P. 160, 161 (1930). The doctrine of constructive 
trust is a description of the nature by which a wrongdoer holds the property of another; the court 





The court's ruling regarding abatement is erroneous. While the Idaho Supreme Court has 
not expressly addressed the issue of survival of constructive trust claims at common law, it 
presumed their survival in Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676, 678 (1935). The 
Estate's claims for redress through the doctrine of constructive trust did not abate. 
The magistrate court also supported its grant of summary judgment against this claim by 
ruling that a constructive trust could not have arisen in this case as a matter of law: "As this case 
already addresses a legal trust, there is no necessity to resort to the legal fiction of a constructive 
trust." A!emorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell 13. The Estate is unaware of any authority argued 
by the parties ( or otherwise existing at law or in equity) supporting a finding that the doctrine of 
constructive trust is unavailable in cases involving express trusts. The constructive trust in 
which the Trust held John Cornell's property is distinct from the actual trust arrangement that 
existed prior to the constructive trust arising. The doctrine of constructive trust is particularly 
applicable to the facts of this case. Ms. Johnson ought to have distributed the Trust res as soon 
as reasonably practicable when the Trust automatically terminated upon the death of Michael 
Cornell. Ms. Johnson acted inequitably by retaining the Trust res in name of the Trust, while 
using it for her own benefit. Reasonable persons could reach different findings or draw 
conflicting inferences from the evidence with respect to whether a constructive trust arose based 
upon (i) the extended period of time between the death of Michael Cornell and the death of John 
Cornell; and (ii) the undisputed inequitable conduct by Ms. Johnson. Therefore, the magistrate 







Unjust Enrichment. The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of unjust 
emichment. "Unjust emichment occurs where [ offending party] receives a benefit which would 
be inequitable to retain without compensating the [injured party] to the extent that retention is 
unjust." Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165 P.3d 261, 271 (2007). The 
damages available to the claimant on an unjust enrichment claim is the value of the amount by 
which the offending party was unjustly enriched. Barry v. Pac. W Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 
834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004). Like constructive trust, unjust emichment is an equitable 
doctrine that seeks to return to the injured party those amounts which were due to him or her in 
equity; amounts which equity deems property of the injured party. If the Estate prevails on its 
unjust emichment claim, it will have established that John Cornell held an equitable interest in 
property prior to his death. The Estate has a statutory duty to recover property of the decedent 
and distribute it in probate. See Idaho Code § 15-3-709. The Estate's claims for redress through 
the doctrine of unjust emichment did not abate. 
2. The Estate's Breach of Contract Claims Did Not Abate 
As with the tort claims, the magistrate court relied exclusively on Bishop to support its 
ruling of abatement of the contract claims. The court interpreted Bishop as standing for the 
proposition that where the duties placed upon the defendant could be found at law, all contract 
claims should be re-characterized as tort claims. Memorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell 13-14. 
The magistrate court found that the Estate failed "to point out any way in which the Trust 
instrument imposes any duties upon Toni [Johnson] that are not also imposed by the Probate 





and, therefore, abated upon the death of John Cornell. The court ruling was erroneous because 
(a) the analysis in Bishop was in response to a relationship that was not contractual in nature; and 
(b) the Estate's contract claims identify contractual duties which do not exist at law. 
The magistrate court's reliance upon Bishop to re-characterize the Estate's contract 
claims was in error. In Bishop, the question before the court was whether the decedent could 
pursue a legal malpractice action through breach of contract claims. Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620, 
272 P.3d at 1251. The plaintiffs theory in Bishop was that it could either sue for legal 
malpractice, which sounded in pure tort, or for breach of the legal representation agreement, 
which sounded in contract. Id. The Bishop Court actually held this theory correct. See id. The 
reason the contract claims failed in Bishop is that the plaintiff had not alleged breach of a 
I- specific term within the contract, but instead alleged breach of the term referencing the common 
law duties owed by every attorney to that attorney's clients. Id. at 621, 272 P.3d at 1252. The 
Bishop Court explained that if such a provision were enough to transform the pure tort action of 
legal malpractice into a breach of contract action, there would exist "a per se breach of contract 
action in every legal malpractice action." Id. The relationship between attorney and client is not 





The relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary is contractual in nature. "A trust is 
not itself a separate legal entity that can own property; rather, it is a relationship having certain 
attributes." In re Thompson, 454 B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011). "A trust creates a 









beneficial interest of the beneficiary." DBSIITRI Vv. Bender, 130 Idaho 796,808,948 P.2d 151, 
163 (1997). The scope and nature of that relationship is defined by the terms of the trust, i.e. the 
contract. A trustee's fiduciary duties and contractual duties are intertwined, yet distinguishable. 
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 defines a trust as 
... a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a manifestation 
of intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to 
the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of ... one or more persons, at 
least one of whom is not the sole trustee. 
The Estate has identified specific provisions within the Trust document-the trust contract-
which Ms. Johnson breached. 
4.03 & 4.04: The Trust terminates automatically upon the death of the surviving Trustor 
and the successor Trustee is to distribute the property "as soon as 
reasonably possible." 
5.01: The only property which may be retained in the Trust after the death of the 
surviving Trustor is property productive of income. 
8.02: The successor Trustee shall render an accounting from time to time. 
The Estate alleges that Ms. Johnson breached these contractual provisions through her conduct. 
These provisions set forth specific duties outside the general fiduciary duties found in the probate 
code. There exist clear and distinct terms in the trust contract regarding conduct after the death 
of Michael Cornell. The Estate's allegation that Ms. Johnson breached those terms is far 
different that a general allegation that she did not administer the trust expeditiously in 
accordance with Idaho Code § 15-7-301. The Estate's allegation that Ms. Johnson breached the 
trust contract by retaining non-income producing property in the Trust, identifies a duty that 
cannot be found anywhere in statute. A breach of contract claim is distinct from a breach of 






terms of the trust document; a breach of fiduciary duty claim focuses on the trustee's failure to 
act in accordance with the standard of conduct required of the trustee under statutory and 
common law. To argue that no contractual claim may lie against the trustee is to argue that the 
terms of the trust document have no substance. 
C. The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate Under Idaho Code§ 5-327(2). 
The magistrate court held that the Estate's causes of action arising after July 1, 2010 
abated pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-327(2). It based this holding on its interpretation of 
subsection 5-327(2) as allowing survival in property damage cases only for recovery for medical 
expenses, other out-of-pocket expenses, and loss of earnings. The court's error was the result of 
construing the language of the statute in such a rigid manner as to produce an absurd result upon 
application. 
While the Estate's causes of action survived John Cornell's death under the common law, 
the Idaho legislature made survival explicit in its enactment ofldaho Code § 5-327(2): 
A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the wrongful 
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person 
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that 
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those 
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii) other out-of--pocket expenses 
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of 
such injured person and as a result of the wrongful act or negligence. Such action 
shall be commenced or, if already commenced at the time of the death of the 
injured person, shall be thereafter prosecuted by the personal representative of the 
estate of the deceased person or, if there be no personal representative appointed, 
then by those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of the 
deceased person according to the provisions of section 5-311(2)(a), Idaho Code. 
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·The first sentence of subsection 327(2) states that tort causes of action for "personal injury or 
property damage" do not abate upon the death of the injured party. The second sentence then 
contains a proviso limiting recovery to medical expenses, other out-of-pocket expenses, and loss 
of earnings. Because this proviso does not expressly limit itself to the antecedent of "personal 
injury" claims, the magistrate court concluded that the proviso also applies to causes of action for 
property damage. 
The proper application of Idaho Code § 5-327(2) is revealed through the syntactic and 
contextual canons of statutory interpretations. The following principles of statutory 
interpretation should be employed here: 
1. the objective is to derive the intent of the legislature; 
2. language should be interpreted in the context of the entire document; 
3. language should be given its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and 
4. language is to be interpreted in accord with common sense and reason. 
See State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P .3d 970, 973 (2011) and Smith v. Dep 't of 
Employment, 100 Idaho 520,522,602 P.2d 18, 20 (1979). The issue before this Court is whether 
the legislature intended the second-sentence proviso to apply to both personal injury actions and 
property damage actions. 
The subordinate clause at the end of the second sentence supports an interpretation which 
limits the proviso to personal injury cases. The subordinate clause restricts recovery in the listed 
areas to those damages which resulted from the wrongful act or negligence; and incurred "prior 
to the death of the injured person." The limitation of damages to those incurred prior to the 





actions for economic harms suffered, excluding damages such as pain and suffering. A property 
damage action, by its nature, seeks only recovery economic harm suffered. 
Interpreting the listed areas of recovery in accord with common sense and reason, the 
listed areas for recovery support an interpretation which limits the proviso to personal injury 
cases. It is the rare property damage case where "medical expenses" are incurred. It is also rare 
to have a property damage case where the plaintiff seeks "loss of earnings." Those two areas 
are, however, common in personal injury actions. Not only do these areas of recovery counsel 
against applying the proviso to the property damage case, they support allowing full recovery in 
property damage cases. In. one sense, every property damage claim could be categorized as a 
claim for recovery of out of pocket expenses. 
The magistrate courts rigid interpretation of Idaho Code § 5-327(2) was in error. The 
subsection, however, provides a sensible and reasonable result when interpreted through the 
syntactic and contextual canons of statutory interpretations. The Estate asks this Court to reverse 
the magistrate court's grant of summary judgment and rule that the second sentence proviso in 
the subsection does not constitute a limitation on property damage actions. 
CONCLUSION 
Both the common law and Idaho Code § 5-327 support a ruling that the causes of action 
set forth in the Estate's Petition survived the death of John Cornell. The Estate has raised several 
claims in law and equity seeking recovery of that property in which John Cornell held an interest 
at the time of his death. The property interests of a decedent do not die with that decedent. 








interests and the claims for property damage pass to his Estate, where the interests may be 
pursued on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Estate. Ms. Johnson has conceded that she acted 
inequitably. Neither law nor equity allows her to continue her inequitable conduct by now 
depriving John Cornell's heirs of his property. The Estate asks this Court to reverse the 
magistrate court's ruling and remand the case for further proceedings. 
DATED this~ay of October, 2013. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
Samuel T. Creason, ISB #8183 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned does hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF were served by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
1212 Idaho Street 
P. 0. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
DATED this }1:~ay of October, 2013. 
-22-











AHERIN, RICE & ANEGON 
Darrel W. Aherin 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0698 
(208) 746-3646 
ISB# 1534 
Attorney for Margaret Watkins 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL, 
NO. CV 2012-00277 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD 
On September 13, 2013, Margaret Watkins filed a Motion to Augment the Record 
to allow this Court to make a part of the record it considers in the pending Appeal, the Magistrate 
Memorandum Opinion Re Attorney Fees and Costs entered September 6, 2013, and the Order Re 
Attorney Fees and Costs entered September 6, 2013. 
A Notice of Non-Opposition was filed by Respondent, Toni C. Johnson, to Margaret 
Watkins' Motion to Augment the Record. 
Based on the forgoing, the record is augmented to include the Magistrate 
Memorandum Opinion Re Attorney Fees and Costs and Order Re Attorney Fees and Costs. 
DATED this 2'i'-L day of October, 2013. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD -- 1 
N:\Cornell, John\Pleadings\Order Granting Motion to Augment Record .docx 
lgs 
596
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, %.A,;-e_ tk t , hereby certify that on the 30 !!.' day of October, 2013, I 
caused to be served a coy/copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following: 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice & Anegon 
Attorney at Law 
1212 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 698 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, PLLC. 
Attorney at Law 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore O. Creason 
Samuel T. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
Attorney at Law 
1219 Idaho 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
~ U.S. Mail 
0 Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 746-3646 
D Federal Express 
~ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 746-9553 
0 Federal Express 
~ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 746-2231 
D Federal Express 
Clerk of the Court 
By &-k~ 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD -- 2 
N:\Cornell, John\Pleadings\Order Granting Motion to Augment Record .docx 
!gs 
597
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason ISB #8 183 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Kareen Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 









Case No. CV 2012-00277 
ORDER RE: AUGMENT RECORD 
On September 26, 2013, Kareen Cornell filed a Motion to Augment the Record to allow 
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Based on the forgoing the record is augmented to include the Magistrate's Memorandmn 
Opinion Re: Attorney Fees and Costs and Order Re: Attorney Fees and Costs. 
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CORNELL. ) 
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STIPULATION TO AUGMENT 
COMES NOW Margaret Watkins, by and through her attorney of record, Darrel Aherin of 
A.herin, Rice and Anegon, Kareen Cornell, as personal representative of the Estate of John Cornell, 
through the Estate's attorney ofrecord, Samuel Creason of Creason, Moore, Dokken and Geidl, and 
Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Karin Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, 
P.L.L.C., and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 6(e)(3) and 83(q), hereby stipulate and agree to entry of an order 
augmenting the clerk's record to add the Memorandum Opinion re: Attorney Fees and Costs entered 
by the Magistrate Court in this proceeding on September 6, 2013 , a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit A hereto, and the Order re: Attorney Fees and Costs entered by the Magistrate Court in this 
proceeding on September 6, 2013 , a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B hereto. The paiiies 
hereby waive hearing on the Motion to Augment Record dated September 25, 2013 filed by Kareen 
Cornell and on the Motion to Augment Record dated September 12, 2013 filed by Margaret Watkins, 
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and agree to entry of the proposed Order filed herewith without further notice. 
3~ DATED this O day of October, 2013. 
DATED this~ day of October, 2013. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
By ~"j_.-~'-/s LT.CREASON 
DATED this ~ day of October, 2013. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
By ~ ~ 
KARIN SEUBERT 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRIC CiorkD:st._J u 
FOR THE STATE OF lDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWA°[Egfi)arwaterCoun , Idaho 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATIER OF THE 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL 
Case No. CV 2012-277 
MEMORANDUM OPINION RE 
ATIORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
The issue addressed is whether to grant Toni Johnson attorney fees and costs 
against the estate of John H. Cornell as requested by the Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2013. Darrell Aherin Esq., appearing on behalf of the 
deceased John H. Cornell, filed an objection and memorandum in opposition to the 
request as did Samuel Creason, who appeared on behalf of Kareen Cornell, the 
personal representative of the estate of John H. Cornell. Oral argument was heard on 
September 4, 2013, Karen Seubert presenting argument on behalf of Ms. Johnson and 
Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason presenting argument as well. 
On February 15, 2013, this Court dismissed the claims of the deceased John H. 
Cornell and on June 21, 2013 dismissed the claims of Karen Cornell. As the prevailing 
party, Ms. Johnson seeks attorney fees and the costs of a deposition pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 15-8-208. Idaho Code § 15-8-208 provides: "Either the district court or the court 
on appeal may, in its discretion, order costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be 
awarded to any party (a) from any party to the proceedings." 
Ms. Seubert conceded at oral argument, and I so find, that the arguments made 
by Mr. Aherin and Mr. Creason were not made frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
MEMORANDUM OPINION-1 
RE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
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foundation. The arguments that were made were cogent and reasoned and excellent in 
shedding light on an abstruse area of the law. Therefore, the issue is whether this 
Court should exercise its discretion to award attorney fees and costs in favor of Toni 
Johnson against the Estate of John H. Cornell. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has observed that Idaho Code § 15-8-208 "allows 
courts to award fees in cases governed by the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act 
when doing so would be equitable." Banner Life Insurance v. Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 
147 Idaho 117,133,206 P.3d 481 (2009). Under the circumstances of this case, it 
would be inequitable and inappropriate to award attorney fees to Ms. Johnson against 
the estate of John H. Cornell. 
The dismissals were not based upon the merits of the claims made on behalf of 
the deceased John H. Cornell and his estate, but rather upon the abatement of Mr. 
Cornell's claims against Ms. Johnson upon Mr. Cornell's death. The facts are more fully 
set forth in the Memorandum Opinions. Ms. Johnson and Mr. Cornell are siblings and 
were named as recipients of a trust established by their parents. 
Following the death of the last surviving parent, Ms. Johnson was required under 
S+ ... +e l.-.,u ...... ..i the + .... rms ..... +he +rus+ to .-lic-+ribu+e the ....... e+s o+ +he tru"'t a"' ev'"'ed·1+·1"'11"'1" LQL IQYV QIIU LC Ill VI LI LI L Ul;;)l I l I Q;;:>;;) l I UI I ,> 0 Af-' lVU.:>Jy 
as possible to herself and Mr. Cornell. In the nearly two (2) years from the last trustor's 
death through Mr. Cornell's death, Ms. Johnson failed to distribute any part of the Trust 
to Mr. Cornell. Mr. Cornell waited in vain for funds from the trust to pay for necessary 
medical care that he could not obtain without money from the trust. Mr. Cornell 
contacted Ms. Johnson and her attorney, a different attorney than her present attorney, 
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several times for accountings and for word on the status of the trust. He never received 
a response. 
Ms. Johnson used funds from the trust for her personal expenses while Mr. 
Cornell was making his requests for information regarding distribution of the trust. Ms. 
Johnson lived rent free in the home that is included in the Trust. Ms. Johnson entirely 
thwarted the intentions of her parents in establishing the trust for her brother to receive 
half the estate. Ms. Johnson dishonored the trust her father placed in her when he 
named her as the sole person responsible for distribution of the trust. Ms. Johnson 
acted inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself and not share 
one cent with her brother. 
Ms. Johnson egregiously wronged her brother during his lifetime. Now she 
wishes to continue wronging her brother after his death by not only keeping the assets 
that were intended for Mr. Cornell, but also raiding his estate for her attorney fees. 
Certainly, this is not the result that the parents of Mr. Cornell and Ms. Johnson intended 
when they created the trust. 
The law of abatement is an unsettled area of law. The issue of abatement only 
arose after Mr. Cornell filed his action against Ms. Johnson for her mismanagement of 
the estate. Although the arguments of Mr. Cornell and his estate were rejected, the 
arguments were soundly based. The inequitable conduct of Ms. Johnson justified the 
vigorous arguments made on behalf of Mr. Cornell. I, therefore, reject Ms. Johnson's 
request for attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell. 
Ms. Johnson also requests that she be awarded $277 .15 for the costs of 
obtaining a copy of her deposition. Ms. Johnson asserts she is entitled to the award as 
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a prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(C)(10). Rule 
54(d)(1) provides 1 "Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be allowed 
as a matter of right of the prevailing party or parties unless otherwise ordered by the 
court." (emphasis added). Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(10) relied upon by Ms. Johnson provides, 
"When costs are awarded to a party, such party shall be entitled to the following costs, 
actually paid, as a matter of right: ... (10) Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition 
taken by any of the parties to the action in preparation for trial of the action." (emphasis 
added). 
The decision whether to grant costs is a matter of discretion. It would be 
inequitable to award Ms. Johnson her costs for the same reason it is inequitable to 
award her attorney fees from the Estate of John H. Cornell. 
CONCLUSION 
Toni Johnson's request for an award of attorney fees and the cost of a deposition 
from the estate of John H. Cornell is denied for the reasons set forth above. 
Dated this hJ-, day of September, 2013. 
14/lrL 
Randall W Robinson 1 Magistrate 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRI 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEAR 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL 
Case No. CV 2012-277 
ORDER RE A TIORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS 
Based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth in the 
Memorandum Opinion Re Attorney Fees and Costs, the Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2013 is HEREBY DENIED. 
Dated this kL day of September, 2013. 
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I. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action involves a dispute over the administration of a trust. One of the trust 
beneficiaries, John Cornell, filed a petition seeking relief against his sister in her capacity as 
trustee of the subject trust. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cornell died. His Petition was dismissed after 
Mr. Cornell's death. Subsequently, his estate filed a separate petition raising claims related to 
the trust administration. The Magistrate Court dismissed the Estate's petition. The Estate now 
appeals. The question before the Court is whether Mr. Cornell's death abates the Estate's claims 
related to the trust. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Given the highly unusual posture of this proceeding, the factual background and course 
of the proceedings overlap to such a degree that it is appropriate to discuss both together. 
Background 
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell established the Revocable Family Trust of 
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell on November 1, 1996. Petition for Supervised 
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution of Trust at ,r,r 3.1, 3.4, Exh. A (said Exhibit 
hereinafter referred to as "Trust"). Through said Trust, Mr. and Mrs. Cornell named their two 
children, Toni C. Johnson and John H. Cornell, as the beneficiaries of the trust upon Mr. and 
1 
Mrs. Cornell's deaths. Id. at § 4.03 of Exh. A. On August 6, 2009, Michael S. Cornell as 
I l_ 
surviving grantor and trustee named Toni C. Johnson as sole trustee/successor trustee. Id. at 
Exh. B. 
Arlie M. Cornell died on November 9, 2008 and Michael S. Cornell died on December 







Litigation Concerning Cornell Revocable Living Trust 
On July 11, 2012, John H. Cornell filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and 
Removal of Trustee, which originally initiated this proceeding. Id. at lj[lj[ 2.3, 3.9. 
John H. Cornell died on or around August 20, 2011 leaving no issue. Id. at lj[ 3.10. 
Respondent Toni C. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 17, 2012 seeking to 
dismiss the Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee on the basis that the 
claims of John H. Cornell were extinguished by his death. 
Briefing in support of and in opposition to dismissal was submitted by Respondent 
through counsel and Mr. Aherin for John Henry Cornell (and presumably for Margaret Watkins 
who as of November 15, 2012 served as temporary personal representative of the Estate of John 
Henry Cornell). Memorandum of Law filed November 1, 2012; Response to Respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss filed November 15, 2012; Respondent's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss filed November 20, 2012. Said Motion was first called for hearing on November 27, 
2012, at which time it was continued to allow participation by Kareen Cornell. 
Said Motion was called for hearing for a second time on January 8, 2013, at which time 
Respondent through counsel and Mr. Aherin on behalf of John Henry Cornell (and presumably 
Margaret Watkins who at that time served as temporary personal representative of the Estate of 
John Henry Cornell) presented oral argument. Mr. Creason did not participate at that hearing on 
Kareen Cornell's behalf due to what was later discovered to be a misunderstanding. 
Subsequent briefing in support of and in opposition to dismissal was submitted by Ms. 
Seubert for Respondent and Mr. Creason for Kareen Cornell. Memorandum re: Respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss filed January 18, 2013; Respondent's Brief in Reply to Brief of Surviving 









Said Motion was called for hearing for a third time on February 6, 2013, at which Ms. 
Seubert for Respondent, Mr. Aherin for John Henry Cornell (and at that time Margaret Watkins 
as temporary personal representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell), and Mr. Creason for 
Kareen Cornell presented oral argument. 
After considering the above-referenced briefing and oral argument presented, this Court 
issued an oral ruling in open court on February 12, 2013 dismissing the Petition for Supervised 
Administration and Removal of Trustee and granted the Estate twenty days in which to raise any 
claims of the Estate. A written opinion and judgment followed. Id. at ,r 3 .11; Memorandum 
Opinion and Judgment for Dismissal entered February 15, 2013. 
Margaret Watkins, as a self-identified "interested person," has appealed said 
Memorandum Opinion and Judgment for Dismissal. Said appeal remains pending before this 
Court and the Court has indicated that oral argument on Ms. Watkins' appeal and the Estate's 
appeal will be scheduled concurrently. 
On February 26, 2013, Kareen Cornell as then personal representative of the Estate of 
John H. Cornell and as his surviving spouse, filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and 
Court Ordered Distribution. 
On March 4, 2013, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss. Briefing in support of and in 
opposition to dismissal was submitted by counsel for Respondent and Mrs. Cornell. Oral 
argument was presented on June 4, 2013. The Magistrate Court issued its 
Estate o(John H Cornell. deceased 
John H. Cornell died on or around August 20, 2011 leaving no issue. Id. at ,r 3 .10. 
On November 15, 2012, in the probate action concerning the Estate of John H. Cornell, 
deceased, Margaret Watkins was appointed as Temporary Personal Representative of the Estate 
3 
615
r--L of John H. Cornell, deceased. See Order of Appointment of Temporary Personal Representative, 
i 
L 
Clearwater County Case No. CV 2012-00439. 
On February 12, 2013, in the probate action concerning the Estate of John H. Cornell, 
deceased, Kareen Cornell was appointed as personal representative of the Estate of John H. 
Cornell, deceased, thereby terminating the prior temporary appointment of Margaret Watkins. 
See Order Appointing Personal Representative, Letters of Testamentary, Clearwater County 
Case No. CV 2012-00439. 
A. 
II. ARGUMENT 
The Estate's claims against Respondent abated upon the death of John Cornell 
based upon the application ofldaho Code § 5-327(2). 
The Estate asserts that the Magistrate Court erred in dismissal of its tort claims in its 
application of Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012), to this case. Appellant's 
Brief at 6-9. The Magistrate Court relied upon the Bishop decision to conclude that the general 
rule requires that claims sounding in tort do not survive the claimant's death. Memorandum 
Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 9-12. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has discussed Idaho abatement law as follows: 
The abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative enactment addressing 
the survivability of a claim, the common law rules govern. Under the common 
law, claims arising out of contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, 
while those sounding in pure tort abate. 
. . . The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined by the 
purposes for which the attorney is retained. Breach of an attorney's duty is 
negligence in tort. The contract basis of legal malpractice actions is the failure to 
perform obligations specified in the written contract. Thus, under the abatement 
rule, breach of duty is an action in tort, not contract; that is, unless an attorney 
foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a specific outcome in the 
litigation or provides for a higher standard of care in the contract, he is held to the 
standard of care expected of an attorney. Breach of that duty is a tort. 
. . . [T]he contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are 








want to provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by express language 
in the contract. Here, the standard of care in the contract is essentially the same as 
in any attorney-client relationship. Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated 
upon [the client's] death. -
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620-21, 272 P.3d 1247, 1251-52 (2012) (citations omitted). 
Similar to the attorney-client relationship at issue in Bishop, the contours of the duties 
owed by a trustee to trust beneficiaries are defined by the Uniform Probate Code and Principal 
and Income Act. Here, the Trust contains no greater requirements than are set forth in said 
statutes. Therefore, the common law rule of abatement applies. 
Because a breach of fiduciary duty arises in tort, it abates upon the injured person's death 
under the common law. As such, the Estate's breach of fiduciary duty claim is abated unless a 
_ statute precludes dismissal. 
The statutory section that governs the survivability of negligence claims is Idaho Code 
Section 5-327(2), which was amended in 2010 with the amendment taking effect on July 1, 2010. 
The Magistrate Court correctly concluded that the Estate's claims are outside of the scope of 
Idaho Code Section 5-327(2). See infra § II(H). 
As such, the Estate's negligence claims are abated by John H. Cornell's death and no 
reversible error has been shown. The Magistrate Court's dismissal should be affirmed. 
B. There is no exception to the abatement rule for torts for injury to property. 
The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred when it rejected its argument that an 
exception to the general rule of abatement exists where damages are sought for injury to 
property. Appellant's Brief at 9. This issue was raised below and addressed by in the Magistrate 
Court's decision as follows: 
Kareen seeks to distinguish Bishop by relying on several Am. Jur. Cites. Kareen 
argues that the survival of an action depends on the nature of the interest affected. 
Because property of the Trust is involved, as opposed to physical injury, the claim 
cannot be abated. 1 Am.Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival § 51 .... 
While Kareen correctly sets forth these principles, she provides no explanation as 
to how they are consistent with Bishop. The Supreme Court in Bishop did not 
examine whether the claims were equitable or torts done to persons or to property 
in determining whether the joint contract and tort action survives the death of the 
party. . . . As Kareen's claims are in the nature of torts, Kareen's claims are 









Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 15-16. 
The Estate argues that the purported exception to the general abatement rule for cases for 
injury to property is "[o]ne of the well-recognized exceptions" under Idaho law. Appellant's 
Brief at 9. In support of this "well-recognized exception," Mrs. Cornell cites to the Idaho cases 
of Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 15 P.3d 816 (2000), and First Sec. Bank of Idaho, Nat. 
Assn 'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429 P.2d 386 (1967). See Appellant's Brief at 9, 10. Said cases 
do not stand for the proposition that such an exception has been recognized under Idaho law. 
The Barnes case was a divorce action where the husband died during the pendency of an 
appeal after entry of an interlocutory divorce. There, the surviving wife sought to 
"posthumously reunite the parties based on a procedural flaw in the motion for summary 
judgment." Id. at 107, 15 P.3d at 820. The Barnes decision stands for the limited principle that 
where a divorced spouse dies prior to resolution of the division of community property and 
debts, the resolution of said division of property survives. Id. Said case does not discuss nor 
recognize any exception to the abatement rule outside of a divorce proceeding. 
The Rogers case was an interpleader action where a dispute arose between three creditors 
over funds related to a contract dispute. 91 Idaho at 655, 429 P.2d at 387. The quote relied upon 
by Appellant, "equity regards that as done which ought to be done," was part of a discussion of 
the doctrine of equitable conversion. 91 Idaho at 657, 429 P.2d at 389; Appellant's Brief at 10. 
Said case does not discuss nor recognize any exception to the abatement rule. 
A review of Idaho case law fmds no other cases that recognize or create an exception to 
the general abatement rule discussed in Bishop v. Owens. See infra Il(A). 
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's 







C. There is no exception to the abatement rule for claims based upon a remedial 
statute. 
The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred when it rejected its argument that an 
exception to the general rule of abatement exists where damages are sought upon a remedial 
statute. Appellant's Brief at 11. This issue was raised below and addressed by in the Magistrate 
Court's decision as follows:· 
Kareen seeks to distinguish Bishop by relying on several Am. Jur. Cites. . .. 
Kareen also argues that the claims under the Probate Code survive because "(a) 
cause of action that is founded on a remedial statute survives the death of the 
party possessing the cause of action." 1 Am.Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and 
Revival § 59. · 
While Kareen correctly sets forth these principles, she provides no explanation as 
to how they are consistent with Bishop. The Supreme Court in Bishop did not 
examine whether the claims were equitable or torts done to persons or to property 
in determining whether the joint contract and tort action survives the death of the 
party. Nor did the Supreme Court analyze whether the rules of professional 
conduct are remedial in nature for for purposes of surviving the party's death. As 
Kareen's claims are in the nature of torts, Kareen's claims are abated by John's 
death. Therefore, Kareen's arguments are rejected. 
Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 15-16. 
Appellant cites to no case law or statutory authority in support of her position, but instead 
relies upon a treatise, 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival § 59, without further 
authority or relationship to Idaho law. 
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's 
dismissal should be affirmed. 
D. The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in rejecting the 
Estate's conversion claim. 
The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of conversion. Appellant's Brief 
at 12-13. The Magistrate Court rejected the Estate's conversion claim concluding that the 
conversion claim are in the nature of torts, thus abated by Mr. Cornell's death. Memorandum 





L Appellant cites to no case law or statutory authority in support of her position, but instead 
relies upon a treatise, 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival § 59, without further 
authority or relationship to Idaho law. 
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's 
dismissal should be affirmed. 
E. The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in rejecting the 
Estate's constructive trust claim. 
The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of constructive trust. Appellant's 
Brief at 13-14. The Magistrate Court rejected the Estate's constructive trust claim concluding 
that the Idaho Probate Code supplants equitable considerations and that the circumstances 
necessitating creation of a constructive trust meets the definition of a tort. Memorandum 
Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 12-13. 
"A constructive trust arises where legal title to property has been obtained through actual 
fraud, misrepresentations, concealments, taking advantage of one's necessities, or under 
circumstances otherwise rendering it unconscionable for the holder of legal title to retain 
beneficial interest in the property." Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 168, 722 P.2d 474,477 (1986) 
(citing Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 559, 167 P. 481 (1917)). A "constructive trust arises from 
the legal title holder's wrongful actions and not from any intent to create a trust." Snider v. 
Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 289 P.3d 43 (2012) (citing Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 599, 608, 167 
P. 481,483 (1917)). 
The Magistrate Court concluded that the Estate's constructive trust claim is a tort. 
Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 12 (citing Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619-20, 





[ wrong, the breach of duties Toni owed to John. As a cause of action sounding clearly in tort, 
Kareen's request for a constructive trust must be rejected as abated."). 
I 
I 
The Estate asserts that the Idaho decision of Brasch v. Brasch, 5 5 Idaho 777, 4 7 P .2d 67 6 
(1935) holds that the survival of constructive trust claims is presumed. The Brasch case 
involved a dispute over whether a statute of limitations had run prior to a decedent's death. Id. 
The Court concluded that the statute of limitations for the disputed claim had run during the 
decedent's lifetime, therefore the plantiff s demand was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. 
at 780, 47 P.2d at 679. The case discussed the probate statute then in effect, which read: "If a 
person entitled to bring an action die before the expiration of the term limited for the 
commencement thereof, and the cause of action survive, an action may be commenced by his 
representatives, after the expiration of that time, and within one year from his death[.]" Id at 
679, 47 P.2d at 678 (LC. A., sec. 5-231) (emphasis added). The statute in question recognizes 
the question of abatement by conditioning the tolling of a statute of limitations only where "the 
cause of action survive[ s]." It does not recognize a presumption, instead a condition precedent. 
The Estate argues that "Ms. Johnson ought to have distributed the Trust res as soon as 
reasonably practicable when the Trust automatically terminated upon the death of Michael 
Cornell. Ms. Johnson acted inequitably by retaining the Trust res in the name of the Trust, while 
using it for her own benefit." As the Magistrate Court previously concluded in its Memorandum 
Opinion dated February 15, 2013, "[t]he constructive trust argument is indistinguishable from 
[ the Estate's] arguments regarding breaches of fiduciary duties." 
The Estate has provided no authority or explanation to explain the distinction it is 
asserting, nor to show reversible error in rejecting its constructive trust claim. Therefore, the 






I F. The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in rejecting the 
Estate's unjust enrichment claim. 
The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. Appellant's 
Brief at 15. The Magistrate Court rejected the Estate's unjust enrichment claim concluding that 
the unjust enrichment claim is in the nature of torts, thus abated by Mr. Cornell's death. 
Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 15-16. 
"Unjust enrichment, as a fictional promise or obligation implied by law, allows recovery 
where the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff that would be inequitable for the 
defendant to retain without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit." Great Plains 
Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 123 Idaho 754, 767, 979 P.2d 627, 640 (1999) 
(citing Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d 
1012, 1205 (1974)). Unjust enrichment claims involve claims based on an implicit promise to 
pay. Id., 979 P.2d at 640. 
As with the conversion and constructive trust claim, Appellant cites to no controlling 
authority to support its assertion the Bishop abatement rule does not apply to claims arising in 
equity. Appellant's Brief at 15. Further, Appellant provides no explanation of how the 
Magistrate Court erred in its conclusion that "[a]s Kareen's claims are in the nature of torts, 
Kareen's claims are abated by John's death." Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 16. 
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's 
dismissal should be affirmed. 
G. The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in rejecting the 
Estate's breach of contract claim. 
The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred by relying upon Bishop "to re-





The Magistrate Court discussed the Estate's breach of contract claim as follows: 
Kareen argues that her breach of contract claim must be viewed as separate from 
the breach of fiduciary claim and, as a contract claim, survives John's death. The 
Supreme Court in Bishop addressed the same claim. In the absence of finding 
that a higher duty of care is provided for under the Trust agreement than provided 
under the statute, Bishop requires abatement ofKareen's claim. Bishop v. Owens, 
152 Idaho at 620,272 P.3d at 1251. Kareen fails to point out any way in which 
the Trust instrument imposes any duties upon Toni that are not also imposed by 
the Probate Code. This Court stands by its more detailed analysis when 
addressing John's claims that the Trust instrument gives no higher duty of care 
than the duty imposed by the Probate Code. Memorandum Op. Feb. 15, 2013 at 
6-8. 
Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 13-14. In the earlier opinion referenced therein, the 
Magistrate Court discussed the Bishop decision to conclude that like Bishop, this case is a mixed 
tort and contract case involving torts arising from a contractual agreement. Memorandum 
Opinion Feb. 15, 2013 at 6. The Magistrate Court further concluded that the duties owed by the 
trustee to a beneficiary are defined by the Uniform Probate Code and Uniform Principal and 
Income Act. Id. at 7. Violation of these fiduciary duties arising under statute is a tort, not a 
contract. Id. 
Specifically, the Bishop Court analyzed the interplay of tort and contract theories in the 
attorney-client context as follows: 
[T]he contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are defined by 
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attorney and client want to 
provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by express language in the 
contract. Here, the standard of care in the contract is essentially the same as in 
any attorney-client relationship. Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated upon 
Patricia Shelton's death. 
Although the medical malpractice cases on which Owens relies are governed by 
specific statute, the fact that a proponent labels his or her action as sounding in 
contract as well as malpractice does not make the underlying action contract. The 
"theory" of relief sought is not different. A holding to the contrary would create a 
per se breach of contract action in every legal malpractice action. Legal 
malpractice has traditionally been treated as the proper claim where an attorney 
breaches his or her duty, which arises from the attorney-client relationship. 
As noted in the previous section, because the contingent fee agreement in this 
matter contained no express language providing for a higher standard of care, the 
duty owed by Owens is not defined by the contingent fee agreement. The 





said manner and do all things necessary, appropriate, or advisable, in regard 
thereto" is not materially different from the standard applied in the legal 
malpractice claim. Thus, this action is really a malpractice claim disguised as a 
contract claim. A person cannot change a tort action into a contract action simply 
by labeling it as such. Hayward, 136 Idaho at 350, 33 P.3d at 824. 
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620-21, 272 P.3d 1247, 1251-52 (2012)). 
Here, like in Bishop, Appellant's breach of contract claim is really a breach of fiduciary 
duty claim disguised or labelled as a contract claim. The subject trust contained no provisions 
providing for a higher standard of care than established in the Uniform Probate Code. 
Appellant cites to no authority to support its assertions that "a breach of contract claim is 
distinct from a breach of fiduciary duty claim." Appellant's Brief at 17. Appellant further 
asserts that "[t]o argue that no contractual claim may lie against the trustee is to is to argue that 
the terms of the trust document have no substance." Id. at 18. The trust document has substance, 
but it is the same substance as found in statute. As such, the Estate's breach of contract claim 
abates. 
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's 
dismissal of the Estate's breach of contract claim should be affirmed. 
H. The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied LC. § 5-327(2) 
\_ The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred in its interpretation of Idaho Code 
I_ 
Section 5-327(2). Appellant's Brief at 18-20. The Estate contends that "the court's error was the 
result of construing the language of the statute in such a rigid manner as to produce an absurd 
result upon application." Id. at 18. 
It is important to note that said statutory section was amended in 2010, where the Estate's 
claims cover a time period relating back to December 15, 2009, which is the death of the last 
grantor's death. In light of said amendment, a two-part analysis is needed to properly consider 
the Estate's claims. 
Prior to its amendment, which took effect on July 1, 2010, said statute read as follows: 
Causes of action arising out of injury to the person or property, or death, caused 
by the wrongful act or negligence of another, except actions for slander or libel, 
shall not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer, and each injured person or the 
personal representative of each one meeting death, as above stated, shall have a 
cause of action against the personal representative of the wrongdoer; provided, 
however, the punitive damages or exemplary damages shall not be awarded nor 








shall not recover judgment except upon some competent, satisfactory evidence 
corroborating the testimony of said injured person regarding negligence and 
proximate cause. 
LC. § 5-327 (through July 1, 2010) (emphasis added). 
In its prior form, the clear language of the statute reflects that survivability applied only 
after the death of the wrongdoer, not the death of the injured party as the subsequent amendment 
addressed. Because the amendment to Idaho Code Section 5-327(2) was not retroactive, said 
amendment applied only to actions which arose on or after the statute's effective date. See 
Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251. Therefore, the statute in its original form applies 
from the death of Michael S. Cornell on December 15, 2009 until July 1, 2010. The Estate's 
predecessor in interest, John Cornell, is the injured party and Toni Johnson the wrongdoer for 
purposes of this appeal. Because the alleged "injured party" is the decedent as opposed to the 
"wrongdoer," any claims of John Cornell that may have arisen between December 15, 2009 and 
July 1, 2010 abated upon his death. No reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate 
Court's dismissal as it relates to claims arising prior to July 1, 2010 should be affirmed. 
The Estate's parsing of the current statute applies only to its claims that arose on or after 
July 1, 2010. In its current form, Idaho Code§ 5-327(2) states in relevant part as follows: 
A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the wrongful 
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person 
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that 
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those 
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii) other out-of-pocket expenses 
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of 
such injured person as a result of the wrongful act or negligence. 
The Estate argues that the limitation on recovery for medical expenses, other out-of-pocket 
expenses, and loss of earnings applies only to personal injury cases, not cases involving property 
damages. Appellant's Brief at 18-20. Said interpretation does not employ the well-recognized 
I [_ principles of statutory interpretation cited to by Appellant. See Appellant's Brief at 19 ( citing 







100 Idaho 520, 522, 602 P.2d 18, 20 (1979)). Specifically, Appellant cites to no legislative 
history that would support her conclusion. Appellant parses the second sentence of said statute 
in an attempt to limit the statute's application to personal injury cases, thereby ignoring the 
context of the entire document, which is clearly applicable to "a c;ause of action for personal 
injury or property damage." (emphasis added). Appellant's interpretation relies upon 
speculation and generalities (specifically that "medical expenses" rarely, in his opinion, are 
incurred in property damage cases), in order to deviate from the plain and ordinary meaning of 
"such action." Further, said limited interpretation, which rejects its application to property 
damages cases despite their specific inclusion by reference, departs from common sense and 
reading. The Estate cites to no case law supporting this interpretation of the statute. For these 
reasons, no reversible error has been shown and the Magistrate Court's application of Idaho 
Code 5-327(2) should be affirmed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Respondent respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Judgment 
for Dismissal and Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell, both entered June 21, 2013. 
DATED this 19th day of November, 2013. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF was, this J5. day ofNovember, 2013, 
_6and-delivered; 
__ mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first-class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
to: 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Samuel T. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C. 
1219 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Darrel W. Aherin 
Aherin, Rice and Anegon 
1212 Idaho St. 
P.O. Drawer 698 










CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT 
CLEAR\1\/AlER COUNTY 
J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST 
OF MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND 
· ARLIE M. CORNELL. 
) 







APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court 
of the Second Judicial District for Clearwater County 
Honorable Randall W. Robinson, Magistrate Judge Presiding 
Counsel for Appellant 
· Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
Samuel T. Creason, ISB #8183 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street, P. 0. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516 
Counsel for Respondent 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street, P.O. Box 854 




1- TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I 
TABLE OF AUTHORlTIES .......................................................................................................... ii 






ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 2 
A. The Estate's Tort Claims Did Not Abate at Common Law ................................................ 2 
(1) Tort claims seeking redress for injury to property are an exception to the general rule 
of abatement ............................................................................................................................ 4 
(2) Tort claims seeking redress based upon a remedial statute are an exception to the 
general rule of abatement ........................................................................................................ 5 
(3) Tort claims based in equity and not in law do not abate .............................................. 6 
B. The Estate's Complaint States Separate Contract Claims .................................................. 6 
C. The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate Under Idaho Code§ 5-327(2) ................... 7 









TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 105, 15 P.3d 816, 818 (2000) ................................................... 5 
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619 (2012) ..................................................... 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676 (1935) ..................................................................... 7 
First Sec. Bank of Idaho, Nat. Ass 'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654,657,429 P.2d 386, 389 ................ 5 
Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477 (1919) .............................................................. 3, 5, 6 
MacLeodv. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64,249 P. 254,257 (1926) ............................................................ 4, 6 
St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! Med Ctr. v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37,293 P.3d 661 (2013) 2, 4, 5, 6, 
7 
Statutes 






This Court must determine whether, through the doctrine of abatement, Toni C. Johnson 
can avoid repayment of her brother's estate, the Estate of John Cornell, for property losses from 
admittedly improper conduct. 
Johnson's arguments regarding common law abatement are based upon an expansive 
interpretation of a single sentence in Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619 (2012). Johnson 
proposes an interpretation which would dictate that all claims which are torts-or which could be 
re-characterized as torts-abate upon the death of the injured party, absent a statutory exception. 
Johnson's interpretation conflicts with pre-Bishop and post-Bishop precedent, as well as the 
language and facts from Bishop, itself. The Court should reject Johnson's proposed 
interpretation of Bishop. Without Johnson's proposed universal rule of abatement, the Court 
must determine whether the Estate's claims fall within one of the exceptions to the general rule 
that tort claims abate. The Estate's claims fall within three such exceptions: the exception for 
claims seeking redress for injury to property; the exception for claims founded upon a remedial 
statute; and the exception for claims that are not legal claims, but claims in equity. 
Johnson's arguments regarding the Estate's breach of contract claims proposes a legal 
analysis whereby the court must re-characterize every breach of contract claim into a tort claim if 
the contract does not provide for a higher standard of care than established at law. Johnson's 
analysis should be rejected, as it would create an unsubstantiated and unworkable standard which 





Finally, Johnson's argument regarding statutory abatement under Idaho Code § 5-327(2) 







determined by the language of the statute, common sense, and reason. 
The Estate requests that this honorable Court reverse the judgment of the magistrate 
court. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Estate's Tort Claims Did Not Abate at Common Law. 
Johnson argues that Bishop established the following universal statements as a rule of 
law: All claims which can be characterized as a tort claim abate at common law unless a 
statutory exception exists. See Resp. Br. 5, ,2. Johnson's proposed rule of abatement would 
prohibit the Estate from pursuing its claims against her for the property she wrongfully withheld 
from her brother. Johnson's interpretation stretches Bishop far beyond the scope of its facts and 
far beyond the Idaho Supreme Court's treatment of Bishop earlier this year in St. Luke's Magic 
Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 293 P.3d 661 (2013). 1 In Luciani, the Court 
made clear that Bishop did not establish a universal statement of law, but rather re-iterated what 
had long been the rule at common law in Idaho: exceptions exist to the general rule that tort 
claims abate. See id. at 667. 
The Bishop Opinion included a statement that "[u]nder the common law, claims arising 
out of contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure tort 
1 Because St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Luciani has not yet been published in the 









abate." 152 Idaho 616, 619, 272 P.3d 1247, 1250 (2012). As set forth in the Estate's Opening 
Brief, Johnson's interpretation of this sentence is erroneous. See App. Br., 7-9. Johnson's 
interpretation conflicts with (a) the language of the Bishop Opinion; (b) the Bishop Court's 
citation to Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477 (1919) as authority; and (c) the post-
Bishop authority of Luciani. 
The question before the Luciani Court was whether a legal malpractice claim could be 
assigned as part of an asset and liability transfer from one entity to another. Id. at 663. The 
Court's consideration of assignability included a discussion of its precedent on survival in 
Bishop. Id. The issue of survival was raised by the defendants in Luciani, likely because "[t]he 
assignability of a cause of action is ... intimately associated with, and in most cases held to 
depend upon, the same principle as the survival of a cause of action. Thus, if it survives, it may 
be assigned; if not, it may not." MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 P. 254, 257 (1926). The 
Luciani defendants argued that Bishop stood for the proposition that all legal malpractice claims 
abated at common law-just as Johnson argues here-and, therefore, that such claims are 
unassignable. Luciani, 293 P.3d at 667. The Court rejected this reasoning. 
The Supreme Court first made clear that Bishop did not stand for the proposition that all 
legal malpractice claims sounded in pure tort. Id. The Court then made clear that Bishop did not 
stand for the proposition that every tort claim abated at common law. 
The malpractice claim here sounds in tort and, therefore, the MacLeod case 
provides some guidance. Although we stated that "if [ a tort claim] survives, it 
may be assigned; if not, it may not," we also held that an "injury [that] lessens the 
estate of the injured party does survive, and that it is assignable." 43 Idaho at 75, 













injury to property" may be assigned, it seems clear that personal injuries of the 
type alleged here-malpractice leading to an alleged loss of millions of dollars-
are precisely that. See id. The crux of St. Luke's lawsuit against Luciani is that the 
alleged malpractice substantially impacted the value of the assets it acquired from 
Magic Valley. 
Id. (quoting Macleod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 P. 254, 257 (1926)) (alterations in original). 
Thus, the Macleod Opinion is still good law in this jurisdiction with respect to the intimately 
associated issues of assignability and survival. 
Having established that the Bishop Opinion did not create a universal rule of abatement, 
the question before this Court is whether the Estate's claims fall within any of the "well-
recognized exceptions" to the general rule that tort claims abate. See Kloepfer, 32 Idaho 415, 184 
P. 477. The Estate's Opening Brief shows that its claims fall within three well-recognized 
exceptions: (1) the exception for claims seeking redress for injury to property, see App. Br. 9-11; 
(2) the exception for claims founded upon a remedial statute, see App. Br. 11; and (3) the 
exception for claims that are not legal claims, but claims in equity, see App. Br. 12-14. 
(1) Tort claims seeking redress for injury to property are an exception to the general rule of 
abatement. 
The exception to abatement for claims seeking redress for injury to property is an 
expressly identified exception in Luciani. 293 P.3d at 667 ("[an] injury that lessens the estate of 
the injured party does survive"). In her brief, Johnson does not provide analysis of the Luciani 
Opinion; instead, she argues that two other cited cases are inapposite. See Resp. Br. 6 ( disputing 
applicability of Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 105, 15 P.3d 816, 818 (2000) & First Sec. 
Bank of Idaho, Nat. Ass'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654,657,429 P.2d 386,389 (1967)). 
-4-
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1 · The Estate directs this Court to Barnes as merely one example of Idaho courts' treatment 
,. of a decedent's claims regarding property interests upon the decedent's death. Those claims do 
I 
not abate. The Estate directs this Court to Rogers as authority for the finding that, at the very 
least, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether John Cornell held a vested 
property interest in the Trust res at the time of his death. By conceding inequitable conduct, 
Johnson has conceded that John Cornell held an interest at the date of death; she merely argues 
that her inequitable conduct succeeded in divesting him of that interest. Thus, Johnson has 
conceded those facts necessary for the Estate to pursue its claim at trial. 
The cases of Barnes and Rogers provide exemplary support for that which is explicitly 
stated in Luciani, MacLeod, and Kloepfer: an estate may pursue the claims of the decedent 
seeking redress for injury to property. 
(2) Tort claims seeking redress based upon a remedial statute are an exception to the general 
rule of abatement. 
Johnson's argument regarding this exception presumes that Bishop established a 
universal rule against survivability. Johnson then proposes an analysis whereby the Court must 
find abatement absent the provision of Idaho case law directly overcoming that universal rule. 
As set forth in the Estate's briefing, Bishop provides no such universal rule. Where no 
controlling authority exists, Idaho courts look to other jurisdictions and sources in determining 
[ . whether an exception should be recognized in Idaho.2 The second edition of American 
[ 
2 See St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'[ Med. Ctr. v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 293 P.3d 661 (2013) 
(looking to California, Nebraska, Indiana, Kansas, Virginia, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, 








Jurisprudence sets forth the general rules of law for United States' jurisdictions based upon a 
comprehensive review of case law. In fact, this same treatise was relied upon by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Luciani. 293 P .3d at 665 & 666. The Estate maintains that the magistrate 
court's analysis was in error for the reasons set forth in the Estate's Opening brief. 
(3) Tort claims based in equity and not in law do not abate. 
With respect to the Estate's equitable claims, Johnson once again argues that this Court 
must find that the Estate's claims abated absent controlling case law expressly providing for an 
exception to the general rule in Bishop. This type of analysis runs contrary to the Idaho Supreme 
Court's consideration of other jurisdictions and authorities when analyzing issues of assignment 
and survival.3 With respect to the Estate's arguments regarding the re-characterization of its 
equitable claims as legal claims, Johnson provides no argument or analysis additional to that set 
forth by the magistrate court. The Estate maintains that the magistrate court's analysis was in 
error for the reasons set forth in the Estate's Opening brief. 
Idaho 64, 249 P. 254, 255 (1926) (looking to California, New York, Wisconsin, Ohio, Kansas, 
Montana, Connecticut, Alabama, Colorado, and multiple secondary sources); Kloepfer v. Forch, 
32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477 (1919) (looking to Virginia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, 
Indiana, California, and Corpus Juris). 
3 Johnson challenges the Estate's citation to Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676 (1935) 
as appearing to presume survival. The Estate provided this citation as a supplement to the 
general rule of survival of equitable claims, as set forth in the second edition of American 
Jurisprudence. The Estate still maintains that the Brasch Court appears to presume survival. In 
Brasch, the Court considered whether an estate could pursue a constructive trust claim on behalf 
of a decedent. Id. The Brasch Court held that the estate could not pursue the claims because the 






B. The Estate's Complaint States Separate Contract Claims. 
Johnson proposes an interpretation of Bishop that not only created a universal rule of 
abatement, but that also dictates that all other claims-whether in tort or contract, whether in law 
or equity-ought to be re-characterized and held abated. The magistrate court erred in its 
interpretation. In its Opening Brief, the Estate distinguished its contract claims from those found 
in Bishop be setting forth the distinct factual scenarios, and identifying specific trust provisions 
that required certain duties not identified in the Uniform Probate Code. Johnson argues that even 
though the Estate has identified specific terms, it has still only made a tort claim because "no 
provisions [ of the trust] provid[ e] for a higher standard of care than established in the Uniform 
Probate Code." Resp. Br. 12, ifl. 
Johnson reasons that where (1) the law presumes a standard of care, (2) the contract does 
not provide a distinct standard of care, and (3) the cause of action alleges a breach of that 
standard of care, then the claim is made in tort and not contract. If Johnson's proposed reasoning 
were to prevail, a contract cause of action would rarely exist. The law presumes a standard of 
care in every contract, whether it be a standard of good faith and fair dealing or a higher standard 
based upon the relationship of the parties. Johnson's attempt to distinguish contract claims from 
tort claims based upon the document's identification of a unique standard of care is 
unsubstantiated and unworkable. 
C. The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate Under Idaho Code§ 5-327(2). 
The Estate was unable to identify Idaho case law addressing the application of the 






legislature's choice of arrangement and wording is inarticulate. The Court is left with the task of 
deriving the intent of the legislature. In accomplishing its task, the Court must determine if 
common sense and reason counsel a finding that the legislature intended to limit property 
damage cases to recovery for "medical expenses," "other out-of-pocket expenses" and "loss of 
earnings actually suffered" where those damages are incurred "prior to the death of such injured 
period as a result of the wrongful act or negligence." For the reasons set forth in the Estate's 
Opening brief, the Estate maintains that the legislature did not intend the second sentence to 
function as a limitation on property damage claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The property interests of a decedent survive the decedent, they do not die and they do not 
abate. The magistrate court erred in its expansive reading of Bishop and erred in its rigid 
interpretation of Idaho Code § 5-327(2). The Estate asks this Court to reverse the grant of 
summary judgment. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2013. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
amuel T. Creason, ISB #8183 
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COURT MINUTES 
Michael J. Griffin, District Judge Presiding 
Darrel Aherin, Attorney 
Karin Seubert, Attorney 
Theodore Creason, Attorney 
Christy L. Gering, Deputy Court Clerk 
Date: 02/18/2014 Tape: CD610-1 Time: 8:30 a.m. 




8:30 Honorable Michael J. Griffin presiding telephonically. Court gives introductions. 
Parties present: Darrel Aherin, Attorney for; Karin Seubert, Attorney for; Theodore 
Creason, Attorney for. Court advises this is the time set for oral argument. Court 
apologizes and further advises it was his understanding this hearing would be 
telephonic, so he set matters in another county and will not be here in person. 
Court inquires if the Court Reporter is present. Clerk advises he is not. 
8:30 In response to inquiry from the Court, Mr. Creason waives the Court Reporter. 
8:30 In response to inquiry from the Court, Mr. Aherin waives the Court Reporter. 
8:31 In response to inquiry from the Court, Ms. Seubert waives the Court Reporter. 
8:31 Mr. Ted Creason advises he is covering for Sam Creason as his wife is giving birth 
right now. Mr. Creason gives argument. 
8:35 Mr. Aherin gives argument. 
Christy Gering 
Deputy Clerk 
Court Minutes - 1 
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IN THE MATTER OF MICHAELS. CORNELL 
CASE NO. CV2012-277 
8:38 Ms. Seubert gives argument. 
8:43 Court questions Ms. Seubert. 
8:45 Ms. Seubert responds. 
8:46 Mr. Creason gives rebuttal argument. 
8:47 Mr. Aherin gives rebuttal argument. 
8:48 Ms. Seubert gives rebuttal argument. 
8:50 Court thanks counsel for their time and will get a decision out soon. 
8:50 Court in recess. 
Approved: ~ 
Michaelriffin, District Judge 
Court Minutes - 2 
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this court's Order Re: Appeal filed contemporaneously. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNY OF CLEARWATER 
) 
IN THE MATTER OF: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE ) 
M.CORNELL. ) 
CASE NO. CV 2012-277 
ORDER RE: APPEAL 
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell, husband and wife, created a trust (Cornell 
family trust) while living in California. They had two children, John Cornell and Toni Johnson, 
both of whom survived their parents. 
Arlie and Michael Cornell were originally co-trustees of their family trust. Arlie Cornell 
died on November 9, 2008. 
On August 6, 2009 Toni Johnson was appointed sole trustee of the Cornell family trust. 
Michael Cornell died on December 15, 2009. 
The trust provided that the trustee would divide the trust property equally between Toni 
Johnson and John Cornell as soon as reasonably possible after the death of both grantors. Toni 
Johnson did not distribute any of the trust property to John Cornell, but did use some of the trust 
property for her own benefit. 
John Cornell filed a Petition for Supervised Administration of the Cornell family trust, 
and removal of Toni Johnson as trustee on July 11, 2012. 
John Cornell died on August 20, 2012. 
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Margaret Watkins, a sister of Arlie Cornell, was appointed temporary personal 
representative of John Cornell's estate (Clearwater County Case #CV12-439) on November 13, 
2012. 
Kareen Cornell, wife of John Cornell, was appointed personal representative of John 
Cornell's estate on February 6, 2013. Margaret Watkins' appointment as personal representative 
was terminated on February 12, 2013. 
The Magistrate issued a summary judgment on February 15, 2013. That order dismissed 
the petition for supervised administration of the Cornell family trust and petition for removal of 
the trustee (the petition had been filed by John Cornell and pursued by Margaret Watson). 
Kareen Cornell, on behalf of her husband's estate, filed a petition for supervised 
administration of the Cornell family trust on February 26, 2013. 
The Magistrate issued a summary judgment dismissing Kareen Cornell's petition on June 
21, 2013. 
Margaret Watson appealed the Magistrate's summary judgment on March 26, 2013. 
On July 2, 2013 Kareen Cornell filed an appeal of the Magistrate's second summary 
judgment. 
APPELLATE ISSUES 
Does Margaret Watson have standing to appeal? 
Does Kareen Cornell have standing to appeal? 
Did the Magistrate err is dismissing the petition to remove Toni Johnson as trustee 
without addressing that issue? 
Did the Magistrate err is determining that Toni Johnson's breach of fiduciary duty to 
John Cornell was a tort which abated upon his death? 
LEGAL ST AND ARD 
The court defers to the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial competent 
evidence, but exercises free review of the law and its application to the facts. 
DISCUSSION 
Margaret Watson is no longer the personal representative of John Cornell's estate. She 
has no standing to pursue any claims of John Cornell against Toni Johnson or claims John 
Cornell may have against the Cornell family trust. 
ORDER RE: APPEAL-2 
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Kareen Cornell, as the personal representative of John Cornell's estate, does have 
standing to pursue claims against Toni Johnson and the Cornell family trust. 
Kareen Cornell is permitted to appeal the Magistrate's decisions that fall within Idaho 
Code 17-201. 
The Magistrate correctly treated the two Petitions for supervised administration of the 
Cornell family trust as motions for summary judgment since the court considered affidavits and 
other evidence. 
When the first petition for supervised administration was filed it included a petition to 
remove Toni Johnson as trustee. Idaho Code 15-7-308 provides the grounds for removal of a 
trustee. A trustee may be removed for specific acts of malfeasance. The court may initiate the 
removal of the trustee on its own motion, or in response to a petition for removal. 
When a petition for removal of a trustee is filed that issue must be addressed by the court 
prior to any pending motion for supervised administration. In this case the Magistrate did not 
discuss the petition to remove Toni Johnson as trustee in his opinion, but merely denied the 
petition. This court is unable to determine if the Magistrate considered that motion or merely 
failed to include his reasoning in his opinion. The findings of fact would seem to indicate 
sufficient grounds for removing Toni Johnson as trustee, but that decision would be in the 
discretion of the trier of fact. This court is unable to determine from the record if the Magistrate 
recognized that issue as one of discretion, acted within the bounds of his discretion, and reached 
his decision by reason. 
For that reason the case shall be remanded to the trial court to address his reasons for 
dismissing the petition for removal of Toni Johnson as trustee. 
As a matter of guidance Idaho Code 5-327 does not apply to the facts as found by the 
Magistrate in this case. There was no personal injury to John Cornell. None of the property that 
should have been distributed to John Cornell was damaged. The breach of a fiduciary duty to 
distribute property from a trust to the beneficiaries is not the same as damage to the items to be 
distributed. 
A trustee is liable under Idaho Code 15-7-306 for a variety of acts, including torts. That 
liability is the same as the liability of a personal representative of an estate, see the comments to 
Idaho Code 15-7-306 and Idaho Code 15-3-808. 
ORDER RE: APPEAL-3 
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Dated this ~Lday of April, 2014. 
/~~ 
Michael J. Griffin 
District Judge 
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COMES NOW Kareen Cornell, acting in her capacity as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of John Henry Cornell, by and through her attorney, Samuel T. Creason of Creason, 
Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, and hereby moves this Court for an Order removing Toni 
Johnson as trustee of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell . 
... 
DATED this l_Z;___ day of May, 2014. 
MOTION TO REMOVE - 1 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
amuel T. Creason, ISB # 8183 
Attorneys for Estate 
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I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Court must decide whether Toni Johnson engaged in conduct during her tenure as 
successor trustee of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell 
("Trust") such that she should be removed. The Estate of John Cornell ("Estate") asks the Court 
to order her removal based upon her well-established breaches of trust, failures in proper 
administration, and acts frustrating the purpose of the trustors in forming the trust. The Estate 
also moves the Court to restrain Ms. Johnson's actions during the pendency of the Court ' s 
consideration of this motion. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
RE: MOTION TO REMOVE - 1 
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This matter comes before the Court on remand from the District Court instructing the 
Magistrate Court to determine whether Ms. Toni Johnson ought to be removed as trustee of the 
Trust. The District Court also provided guidance on questions regarding the survival of actions 
by the Estate and the availability of damages should the Estate prevail on its claims. The Estate 
now brings before the Court the question of removal. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Estate filed a Petition for supervised administration of the Trust on February 28, 
2013. The Estate's Petition alleged that Ms. Johnson: (1) failed to act in conformity with the 
terms of the Trust; (2) breached her fiduciary duties when acting in her capacity as Trustee; 
(3) engaged in equitable conversion of the property belonging to John Cornell by refusing to 
distribute the property; and (4) was unjustly enriched by (a) misusing Trust assets for personal 
desires, and (b) refusing to comply with the terms of the Trust and her fiduciary duties in order to 
effect a distribution in her favor. The Estate sought supervised administration, court ordered 
distribution of the Trust, and a judgment against Ms. Johnson for injuries caused to the Trust. 
The Petition set forth the following legal and equitable causes of action: (A) breach of fiduciary 
duty; (B) constructive trust; (C) breach of contract; (D) conversion; and (E) unjust enrichment. 
No Answer has ever been filed to those allegations. Instead, Ms. Johnson filed a Motion 
to Dismiss the Estate's Petition on March 1. The Magistrate Court granted Ms. Johnson's 
Motion on June 21. In its memorandum opinion, the Court concluded that: (A) all claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty abated, at common law and under Idaho statute, upon death; (B) the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
RE: MOTION TO REMOVE - 2 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
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doctrine of constructive trust was inapplicable and an action under that doctrine was in tort, 
which abated upon death; (C) the claims for breach of contract were co-extensive with the 
statutory duties of a trustee and, therefore, were breach of fiduciary duty claims which abated 
upon death; (D) claims for equitable conversion sounded in tort and, therefore, abated upon 
death; and (E) claims for unjust enrichment sounded in tort and, therefore, abated upon death. 
The Magistrate Court based its ruling upon the following conclusions of law: (1) the Idaho 
Supreme Court Opinion of Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619 (2012) stands for the 
proposition that all claims sounding in tort abate at common law upon the death of the claimant; 
and (2) the Idaho Legislature did not abrogate that rule with the amendment of Idaho Code § 5-
327, except for claims for recovery of medical expenses, out of pocket expenses, and lost wages. 
Appeal was taken to the District Court. On April 8, 2014, the District Court issued an 
Order reversing the ruling of the Magistrate Court and remanding the case for further 
proceedings. The District Court ruled that the Magistrate Court ought to have first ruled upon 
the question of whether Ms. Johnson should be removed as trustee of the Trust before proceeding 
to the arguments regarding limitation on damages and abatement. The District Court then went 
on to rule that: (1) damages were not limited by law in this matter; and (2) the trustee could be 
held liable in tort for injury to the property of John Cornell. 
C. Statement of Facts1 
Michael and Arlie Cornell established the Trust on November 1, 1996. The Trust was 
established to provide for Michael and Arlie during their lifetimes, with the remainder to be 
1 All of the facts set forth herein have been established through prior pleadings on record with 
the Court. Instead of resubmit such evidence through subsequent affidavit, Petitioner 
incorporates the submissions of record in this matter by reference. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
RE: MOTION TO REMOVE - 3 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
654
distributed to their two children: Toni Johnson and John Cornell. Arlie Cornell died on 
November 9, 2008. Michael Cornell died on December 15, 2009. Ms. Johnson has been the sole 
trustee since that time. 
As a successor trustee, Ms. Johnson was to have a very limited role. Ms. Johnson's sole 
duty as trustee was to distribute the trust assets. Over the months and years following Michael 
Cornell's death, Ms. Johnson failed to distribute the Trust. Instead, she "egregiously wronged 
her brother during his lifetime." Mem. Opinion re Attorney Fees and Costs at 3. "Ms. Johnson 
acted inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself and not shar[ing] one 
cent with her brother." Id. She refused to distribute the Trust, despite John Cornell's repeated 
objections and pleas that she do so, in part, so that he could "pay for necessary medical care that 
he could not obtain without money from the trust." Id. at 2. John Cornell was never able to 
compel distribution before his death on August 20, 2012. 
Ms. Johnson's discovery responses in this case substantiate the concerns and frustrations 
that Mr. Cornell raised in the over two and one-half years between the surviving trustor's death 
and Mr. Cornell's death. At her deposition, Ms. Johnson admitted that she routinely makes 
personal use of the real and personal property of the Trust. She lives rent-free in the home that is 
included in the Trust. She has commingled cash assets of the Trust with her own cash assets. 
She has depleted the cash assets of the Trust, with not only expenses of the Trust but also her 
personal expenses. To date, the only distributions that Ms. Johnson has made are the unreported 
distributions made through her personal use of the Trust res. 
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION 
1. As successor trustee, Toni Johnson was to distribute the Trust res "as soon as 
reasonably possible." Ms. Johnson concedes that she acted inequitably: she mismanaged the 
Trust, she commingled assets, she used Trust funds for personal use, and she refused to distribute 
the Trust res, despite John Cornell's demands. John Cornell died in August 2012. Should Toni 
Johnson be removed as trustee? 
2. Whether the Court ought to enter an order restraining Ms. Toni Johnson from 
making any distribution of Trust assets pending a decision on this petition? 
IV. ANALYSIS 
1. The Court should remove Ms. Toni Johnson as trustee of the Trust. 
The Idaho Uniform Probate Code sets forth the grounds upon which a court may remove 
the trustee of a trust. Here, several grounds exist mandating the removal of Toni Johnson as 
trustee of the Trust. Idaho Code§ 15-7-308(2) allows for removal of a trustee where "the trustee 
has committed a material breach of trust;" "the trustee is unfit or unable to administer the trust;" 
"removal of the trustee would substantially further the trustor's purpose in creating the trust;" or 
other good cause supports removal. These four grounds each independently provide grounds for 
removal. 
Johnson should be removed because she has committed a material breach of trust. Ms. 
Johnson had a duty to observe reasonably prudent standards for handling the trust assets and to 
handle the funds for the benefit of the Trust's beneficiaries. Idaho Code § 15-7-302. Instead, 
Ms. Johnson failed to keep proper accounts of the Trust and refused to provide information to 
Mr. Cornell. See Idaho Code§ 15-7-303. Ms. Johnson commingled cash assets of the Trust with 
her own cash assets and with cash assets. Ms. Johnson stated that she has spent all of the cash 
assets of the Trust for her living expenses and expenses incurred maintaining and paying taxes on 
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the Trust property. "Ms. Johnson egregiously wronged her brother during his lifetime." Mem. 
Opinion re Atty. Fees. Despite Mr. Cornell's pleas, "Mr. Cornell waited in vain for funds from 
the trust to pay for necessary medical care that he could not obtain without money from the 
trust." Id. 
Ms. Johnson has also shown herself unable or unfit to administer the trust. Idaho Code 
§ 15-7-308(2)(b). "Following the death of the last surviving parent, Ms. Johnson was required 
under state law and the terms of the trust to distribute the assets of the trust as expeditiously as 
possible to herself and Mr. Cornell." Mem. Opinion re Atty. Fees. See Idaho Code§ 15-7-301 (a 
trustee has a general duty "to administer the trust expeditiously for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries"); Trust § 4.03 and 4.04. Ms. Johnson has failed to make a single proper 
distribution of the Trust in the 3.5 years she has served as trustee. 
Ms. Johnson should be removed because doing so would substantially further the 
trustor' s purpose. Idaho Code § 15-7-308(2)( e ). "Ms. Johnson entirely thwarted the intentions 
of her parents in establishing the trust for her brother to receive half the estate. Ms. Johnson 
dishonored the trust her father placed in her when he named her as the sole person responsible for 
distribution of the trust. Ms. Johnson acted inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust 
upon herself and not share one cent with her brother." Instead, "Ms. Johnson used funds from 
the trust for her personal expenses . . . . Ms. Johnson lived rent free in the home that is included 
in the Trust." Mem. Opinion re Atty. Fees. Ms. Johnson has, and continues to, frustrate the clear 
purpose of the trustors through her actions as trustee. 
Other good cause exists for the removal of Ms. Johnson as trustee of the Trust. Idaho 
Code § 15-7-908(2)(f). Ms. Johnson's intransigence during her tenure as trustee evidences her 
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settled position of contempt for the interests of her brother as beneficiary of the Trust. The 
breaches set forth herein are not isolated or innocent, but rather establish a pattern of 
unwillingness to act in accordance with her duties as trustee. 
2. Whether the Court ought to enter an order restraining Ms. Toni Johnson 
from making any distribution of Trust assets pending a decision on this petition? 
The Court has authority to "order such appropriate relief as may be necessary to protect 
the trust property or the interests of the beneficiaries" pending a determination on removal. 
Idaho Code § 15-7-308(3). Given the malfeasance set forth herein, the Estate requests that the 
Court enter an order restraining Ms. Toni Johnson from making any distribution of Trust assets 
pending a ruling. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The record in this case has established the indisputable nature of Ms. Johnson' s 
mishandling of the Trust. Based upon the authorities set forth herein, the Estate asks that the 
Court remove Ms. Johnson from her position as trustee of the Trust. 
DATED this ~ y of May, 2014. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ y of May, 2014, I filed the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT RE: MOTION TO REMOVE TRUSTEE with the Clerk of the 
Court, and provided a paper copy to the following persons: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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TRUSTEE 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned will call on for hearing the MOTION 
TO REMOVE TRUSTEE before the Magistrate on Tuesday, May 27, 2014, at 3:00 p.m., or as 
soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in a courtroom of the Clearwater County Courthouse, 
Orofino, Idaho. 
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DATED this JCctay of May, 2014. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
rnuel T. Creason, ISB # 8183 
Attorneys for Estate 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ y of May, 2014, a copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF HEARING was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
ln the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT 
) OFTRUSTEE 
) 
) (Idaho Code § 15-7-403) 
) 
______________ ) 
Applicant, Kareen Cornell, states and represents to the Court that: 
(1) Applicant's interest in this matter is that of Personal Representative of the Estate 
of John Henry Cornell ("Estate"); the Estate claims a beneficiary interest in the Trust. Applicant 
has priority as the only representative of a beneficiary interest other than: 
NAME RELATIONSHIP/PRIORITY 
Toni C. Johnson Current Trustee & Beneficiary 
APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT- 1 
ADDRESS 
c/o Karin Seubert 
Jones Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Creason, Moor,, Dokken & Gtidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawn 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-IS16; Fu: (208) 746-2231 
662
(2) The Michael and Arlie Cornell established the Trust on November I, 1996. The 
Trust was established to provide for Michael and Arlie during their lifetimes, with the remainder 
to be distributed to their two children: Toni Johnson and John Cornell. Arlie Cornell died on 
November 9, 2008. Michael Cornell died on December 15, 2009. Ms. Johnson has been the sole 
Trustee since that time. The true state of assets and liabilities of the Trust are unknown at this 
time as a result of administration by Ms. Johnson. 
(3) Applicant has filed a Motion to Remove the Trustee, concurrently herewith. The 
existing trustee of the trust is: 
NAME 
Toni C. Johnson 
ADDRESS 
c/o Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & CalJery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
(4) Appointment is sought for: 
NAME 
Kareen Cornell 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
ADDRESS 
P.O. Box 361 
Heyburn, ID 83336 
(5) There exist no contingent beneficiaries for the trust. 
( 6) A copy of the trust is in the possession of the Court. 
(7) After the exercise of reasonable diligence, the Applicant is unaware of any 
instrument revoking the trust. 
(8) Termination of the appointment of the prior trustee is sought through pleadings 
tiled concurrently herewith. 
WHEREFORE, APPLICANT REQUESTS: 
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I. That Kareen Cornell be appointed trustee of the trust; 
2. That the Court recognize the acceptance of the duties of the office of trustee filed 
herewith; 
3. That letters of trusteeship be issued. 
DATED this J~ay of May, 2014. 
CREASON MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
VERIFICATION 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of C. Pt S s I t4 ) 
Applicant, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in the foregoing application are true, 
accurate, and complete to the best of applicant' s knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this .11:.._ day of May 2014 . 
.GA~ E. PRICE 
(.')~ARV pUBUC 
STATE OF IOAHO 
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ST A TE OF IDAHO 
: ss . 
. ·'\ 
County of _l;:,...=o..=S'--'~"-'i'"""q,.,.___ 
The undersigned hereby accepts appointment to the office of trustee of The Revocable 
Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell and agrees to perform and discharge the 
trust of that office. The undersigned hereby submits personally to the jurisdiction of this Court in 
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any proceeding relating to the trust that may be instituted by an interested person as defined by 
the Idaho Unifonn Probate Code. 
DA TED this l '- day of May, 2014. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /2,., day of May, 2014. 
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A~~ 
~ry Public for Idaho 
Residing or employed at tJ(.A..,,.... fry_ Id~ 
My Appointment Expires: C::, -/-'/7 
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ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT with the Clerk of the Court, and provided a paper copy to 
the following persons: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
13 04 Idaho Street 
P.0.Box 854 
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NOTICE OF HEARING 
RE: APPLICATION FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEE 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned will call on for hearing the 
APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEE before the Magistrate on Tuesday, May 
27, 2014, at 3:00 p.m. , or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in a courtroom of the 
Clearwater County Courthouse, Orofino, Idaho. 
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. """ DATED this ~ day of May, 2014. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
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Attorneys for Estate 
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Karin Seubert 
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Attomeys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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Idaho State Bar No. 7813 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THEREVOCABlEFAMlLYTRUSTOF ) 
:tv1'.ICHAEL S. CORNEIL~ ARLIE M. ) 
CORNEIL. ) 
) 
_____ _____ ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO 
REMOVE TRUSTEE & APPLICATION 
FOR APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEE 
COMES NOW Respondent Toni Johnson, by and through her attorney of record, Karin 
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., and objects to the Motion to Remove Trustee and 
Application for Appointment of Trustee filed by Kareen Cornell, as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of John Henry Cornell (the "Estate''), and set for hearing in this matter on May 27, 2014 at 
3:00p.m. 
The primary basis of this objection, as discussed further below, is that the Estate's requests 
are outside the scope of the Magistrate Court's authority on remand. 
As this Court is familiar, this proceeding involves two separate petitions, one filed by John 
Cornell during his lifetime (Petition for Supetvised Administration and Removal of Trustee filed 
July 11, 2012 ("First Petition")) and a second filed by the Estate (Petition for Supervised 
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution dated February 26, 2013 (''Second Petition")). The 
First Petition and Second Petition involve the same factual allegations, however only the First 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
TO REMOVE ... -1 -
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Petition sought the relief of removal of the. trustee. The Estate now seeks to expand the scope of its 
Second Petition through the Motion to Remove Trustee and Application for Appointment of Trustee 
to include removal of the trustee. 
Respondent sought dismissal of both petitions based on the abatement of John Cornell's 
claims upon his death, which this Magistrate Court granted. See Judgments of Dismissal dated 
Febmary 25, 2013 and June 21, 2013. Margaret Watldns appealed the dismissal of the Frrst 
Petition. See Notice of Appeal dated March 25, 2013. The Estate expressly "decline[d] any 
invitation to participate in [Watkins' appeal of the First Petition] as a pseudo-party and, thereby, 
. waive its right to a separate and distinct judicial process." Brief of Estate re: Watkins' Appeal dated 
June 10, 2013. The Estate appealed the dismissal of the Second Petition. See Notice of Appeal 
dated July 1, 2013. The District Court addressed both appeals concurrently, concluded that 
Margaret Watkins lacked standing to pursue any claims of John Cornell, and remanded the case to 
the Magistrate Court "to address [itsJ reasons for dismissing the petition for removal of Toni 
Johnson as trustee." See Order RE: Appeal and Order Remanding Case filed April 8, 2014. 
Subsequently, the Estate filed the subject Motion to Remove Trustee and Application for 
Appointment of Trustee. 
"Issues not raised below but raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered or 
reviewed. The general rule is that, on remand, a trial court has authority to take actions it is 
specifically directed to take, or those which are subsidiary to the actions directed by the appellate 
court." Mountainview Landowners Coop. Assn., Inc. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 866, 136 P.3d 332, 
337 (2006) (quoting Whitted v. Canyon County Bd. of Comm'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 112, 44 P.3d 1173, 
1177 (2002); State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883,886, 11 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000)). 
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed a similar procedural situation in Walters v. Industrial 
Indemnity Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 836, 949 P.2d 223 (1997) ("Walters If'). In Walters 1, the Idaho 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 127 Idaho 
933, 908 P.2d 1240. Subsequent to said decision, the claimant sought to amend his complaint to 
raise constitution claims that had previously not been raised before the trial court and that the 
appellate court had refused to consider in its Walters I decision. 130 Idaho at 837, 949 P.2d at 224. 
In Walters II, the Court concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider a motion to 
amend on remand. Id. at 837-38, 949 P.2d at 224-25 (quoting Mountain Home Lumber Co. v. 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
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Swartwout, 33 Idaho 737, 740-41, 197 P. 1027, .1028 (1921) ("The mandate of the reviewing court 
is binding upon the lower court, and :must be strictly followed: Where the appellate court remands a 
cause with directions to enter judgment for one of the parties, the judgment of.the appellate court is 
a final judgment in the cause, and the entry thereof in the lower comt is a purely ministerial act ... 
A trial court has no authority to enter any judgment or order not in confonnity with the order of the 
appellate court. That order is conclusive on the parties, and no judgment or order different from or 
in addition to that directed by it can have any effect. No modification of the judgment so directed 
can be made by the trial court, nor can any provision be ingrafted on or taken from it."). 
Here, the District Court has empowered the Magistrate Court on remand to "address (its] 
reasons for dismissing the petition for removal of Toni Johnson as trustee." See Order RE; Appeal 
filed April 8, 2014. The only reasonable reading of said ruling is that it relates to the First Petition 
only, since the Second Petition contained no such removal request, as supported by the Estate's 
recognition of the same and request to seek such a4ditional relief. Because said relief is outside the 
scope of the Second Petition, the Motion and Application before the Court essentially constitute 
amendments to the Second Petition without leave of this Court as required by I.R.C.P. 15(a). 
As was the procedural circumstances in the Walter proceeding discussed above, the 
Magistrate Court lacks authority on remand to grant such leave to amend or to consider the 
additional relief sought. As such, said Motion and Application should be denied. 
Because the Estate did not appeal the dismissal of the First Petition and instead, the appeal 
of its dismissal was pursued by a patty that the District Court concludes lacked standing, then the 
dismissal of the First Petition cannot now at this late date be revived by the Estate, who expressly 
declined to participate in the Watkins' appeal. See State v Tucker, 103 Idaho 885, 655 P.2d 92 
(Ct.App. 1982) (holding that' the requirement of perfecting an appeal within the applicable time 
period is jurisdictional; an appeal taken after expiration of the filing period will be dismissed). For 
purposes of the appeal of the First Petition's dismissal, the Estate is not Margaret Watkins 
successor. As such, the Estate has waived any and all potential arguments relative to the trustee's 
removal as raised in the First Petition. 
Respondent additionally notes that this Court expressly gave the Estate, through its then 
newly appointed personal representative, twenty days from February 15, 2013 to file claims on 
behalf of the Estate. See Merrwrandum Opinion and Judgment for Dismissal entered February 15, 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
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2013. Said time period expired on March 7, 2013. The Motion and Application now before the 
Court were not filed until May 13, 2014, and are lllltimely based upon this Court's prior order. 
Even if the Estate had timely raised or preserved the· removal issue, it lacks standing under 
the statute to seek removal of the trustee. Section 15-7-308(1) of the Idaho Code rrovides as 
follows: 
A trustee may be removed in accordance with the terms of the trust or by the comt 
on its own initiative or on petition of a rrustor, cotrustee, or beneficiary. 
The Motion to Rem.ove Trustee fails to comply with said requirement, and as such1 should 
be dismissed. Said Motion is brought by Kareen Cornell, acting in her capacity as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of John Henry Cornell. It is not brought by the Court on its own 
initiative. The Estate is neither a trustor nor cotrustee. The Estate is not a beneficiary of the Trust, 
which expressly provides that all net 'income and principal remaining in the Trust Estate vest in 
Respondent as the sole surviving beneficiary upon the death of John H. Cornell where John H. 
Cornell leaves no surviving issue. See Trust at§ 4.03(a). 
As such, the Estate now lacks standing to pursue a removal action. Similarly, even if the 
removal action within the First Petition had been preserved, the Estate lacked standing to pursue 
upon John Cornell's death. Any other conclusion would lead to ridiculous results where the 
trustee sought to be removed is the sole surviving sole beneficiary. 
As to the consideration of the removal action contained in the First Petition, the same 
analysis applies. While John Cornell had standing to make such a request during his lifetime, 
upon his death, said standing lapsed upon his death under the express terms of the Trust. 
Because· John Cornell's claims against the trustee abated upon his death, no party retained 
standing or a legitimate interest to pursue the trustee removal action, so good cause exists for its 
dismissal as was implicit in this Court's original ruling. 
For these reasons, Respondent requests that this Court deny the Estate's Motion to 
Remove Trustee and Application for Appointment of Trustee and confirm its implicit denial of the 
dismissal of the removal action contained in the First Petition. 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
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DATED this ~3 dayofMay,2014. 
JONES, BROWER & CAI.LERY, P.L.L.C. 
By__,_.;:;:~~-~&»Jtw=~-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO 
MOTION TO REMOVE TRUSTEE AND 
APPIJCATION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
TRUSTEE was, this «~ day of May, 2014, 
transmitted via facsimile to: 
Samuel T. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
1219 Idaho St. 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
By~&vlect-
Karin Seubert 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
TO REMOVE. .. 
-5-
Karin Seubert . 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CASE NO. CV2012-277 
COURT MINUTES 
Randall W. Robinson, Magistrate Judge Presiding 
Karin Seubert, Attorney 
Theodore Creason, Attorney 
Lisa McMillan, Deputy Court Clerk 
Date: 05/27/2014 Tape: CD481-2 Time: 3:16 p.m. 
Subject of Proceeding: Matter Of Revocable Family Trust Hearing 
MINUTE ENTRY: 
3:16 Honorable Randall W. Robinson presiding. Court gives introductions. Parties 
present Attorney; Karin Seubert, Attorney; Theodore Creason, . Court advises he 
will be addressing the motion for the new trustee and the remand . 
3:16 Court states he has read both parties excellent briefs and asks Mr. Creason if he's 
had a chance to read Ms. Seubert's brief. 
3: 17 Mr. Creason speaks and states he has read Ms. Seubert's brief, but doesn't feel 
he's had enough time as he'd like or is entitled to. 
3: 17 Court advises he will begin with the statute regarding the removal of trustee. 
Statute 15-7 -308 
3: 18 Mr. Creason argues his motion. 
3:20 Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding removal of Ms. Johnson. 
3:23 Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding abatement. 
3:28 Mr. Creason argues there is someone now who claims to be the sole beneficiary 
but it's an argument. 
3:29 Court states that Judge Griffin stated statute doesn't apply. 
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3:30 Mr. Creason believes Court is misreading Judge Griffin's decision. 
3:32 Court believes abatement does extinguish any remedy. 
3:33 Mr. Creason argues the abatement issue was briefed and argued in front of the 
District Court. If Judge Griffin wasn't over turning your decision on abatement why 
would he remand at all. 
3:33 Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding issue of appointment of trustee. 
3:34 Mr. Creason states he is not removing his request. Asks the Court to enter a 
temporary restraining order/injunction against the trustee and to grant two weeks to 
do some research and re-brief it for another remand. 
3:35 Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding a remand. 
3:36 Court states when an appeal is filed a motion for stay could be granted. 
3:37 Court states he's inclined to grant Mr. Creason the two weeks. 
3:38 Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding probate. 
3:38 Mr. Creason states the objection was untimely and should be stricken for time 
factors. Also, states their Motion that's unopposed. 
3:39 Court asks Mr. Creason if he would still like the two weeks. 
3:39 Mr. Creason feels one week would be sufficient. 
3:39 Ms. Seubert apologizes for not filing objection timely. She explains time factors 
came from Mr. Creason and his client. 
3:40 Ms. Seubert argues her objection. 
3:42 Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding what remand asked Court to do. 
3:46 Ms. Seubert would like to make clear for the record in terms of consideration for 
this removal action that this case has never had an evidentiary hearing. She feels 
the Court has only ever heard one side of the story during this entire case. 
Court Minutes - 2 
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3:48 Ms. Seubert argues her reading of Judge Griffin's decision is he has inadvertently 
confused the removal of personal representative with the removal of a trustee and 
that there is not an automatic stay in the removal of a trustee, only contained in the 
removal of a personal representative. 
3:48 Colloquy with Court and counsel regarding automatic stay in estates. 
3:50 Ms. Seubert states she is reading from Idaho Code 15-3611 Part A which deals 
with termination of appointment by removal with cause. 
3:51 Mr. Creason doesn't feel the stay issue is effecting the Court proceedings today. 
Mr. Creason feels the Court has authority under 15-7-308 sub. 3 to stay. 
3:53 Mr. Creason states the heir can come in and motion for removal of PR. 
3:53 Mr. Creason feels the Judge has said that Ms. Johnson can be held liable and that 
the Judge has said that this Court should consider whether Ms. Johnson should be 
removed and for the reasons in our briefing she should be removed. 
3:54 Court is in recess. 
Court Minutes - 3 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
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IN THE MATTER OF THE 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL 
Case No. CV 2012-277 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
RE REMAND ORDER 
This case concerns a trust which identifies John Cornell and Toni Johnson as 
beneficiaries. John Cornell died before his sister and trustee of the trust, Toni Johnson, 
distributed John Cornell's share of the trust to him. Under the terms of the trust, Toni 
Johnson is entitled to the entire trust as John Cornell passed away before he received 
any part of the trust. 
John Cornell's widow, Kareen Cornell, filed a petition for supervised 
administration and court ordered distribution seeking relief against Toni Johnson based 
upon claims personal to John Cornell for how Toni Johnson allegedly mishandled the 
trust. The issue animating this case is whether John Cornell's claims against Toni 
Johnson survive his death. 
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HISTORY OF THE CASE 
On July 11, 2012, this case was initiated by John Cornell as a Petition for 
Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee. John Cornell died on August 20, 
2012. Margaret Watkins, a relative of John Cornell, pursued the claims of John Cornell 
set forth in his Petition after his death. 
On September 14, 2012, Toni Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on 
the grounds that the claims of John Cornell were abated upon the death of John 
Cornell. This Motion was granted on February 15, 2013 based upon a Memorandum 
Opinion filed on the same date. 
On February 26, 2013, Kareen Cornell filed on behalf of the deceased John 
Cornell a petition for supervised administration and court ordered distribution. On 
March 14, 2013, Toni Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss based again upon abatement of 
the claims of John Cornell upon his death. After considering the briefs and oral 
arguments of the parties, this Court on June 21, 2013, granted the Motion to Dismiss 
and dismissed the action based upon a Memorandum Opinion filed on the same date. 
Timely appeals were taken by Kareen Cornell and Margaret Watkins. On April 8, 
2014, the District Court remanded this case for this Court "to address his reasons for 
dismissing the petition for removal of Toni Johnson." Order Re Appeal at 3. On May 
13, 2014, Kareen Cornell, after the remand order, filed a Motion To Remove Trustee 
and an Application for Appointment of Trustee seeking appointment of herself to serve 
as trustee. 
On May 27, 2014, oral argument was heard with regards to the remand order 
and Kareen Cornell's motions. Kareen Seubert appeared on behalf of Toni Johnson 
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RE: REMAND ORDER 
680
and Samuel Creason appeared on behalf of Kareen Cornell. This Memorandum 
Opinion addresses the remand order and Kareen Cornell's Motions together. 
DISCUSSION 
The remand order specifically requests this Court to address the petition for 
removal of Toni Johnson. Significantly, the request for removal of Toni Johnson as 
trustee was only made in the original Petition filed by John Cornell and pursued after his 
death by Margaret Watkins. The District Court found Margaret Watkins to not have any 
standing to pursue the claims of John Cornell against Toni Johnson. Therefore, she 
has nu standing to seek removal of Toni Johnson as trustee. Idaho Code§ 15-7-
308(1). 
Kareen Cornell did not request removal of Toni Johnson until after the remand 
order was filed. Therefore there was no party with standing who had requested removal 
of Toni Johnson prior to the remand order. However, the merits of the request for 
removal of the trustee as set forth in the remand order and the motions filed by Kareen 
Cornell after the remand order will be addressed. 
Idaho Code § 15-7-308( 1) sets forth the terms of when a trustee can be 
removed: "A trustee may be removed in accordance with the terms of the trust or by the 
court on its own initiative or on petition of a truster, cotrustee. or beneficiary." 
Kareen Cornell is not a truster or a cotrustee. Nor is she a beneficiary as set 
forth in this Court's prior opinion. Kareen Cornell's only claim to the trust is derivative 
through her deceased husband for the wrongs Toni Johnson allegedly committed while 
administering the estate. These derivative claims are abated by the death of John 
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Cornell. Therefore, Kareen Cornell is not a beneficiary. Therefore, she has no standing 
to request removal of Toni Johnson as the trustee. 
The wrongs Toni Johnson is alleged to have committed are against John Cornell. 
The claims of John Cornell, given the type of claims asserted, abated with his death. It 
would be anomalous to remove the sole surviving beneficiary as the trustee. It would 
make no sense to remove the sole beneficiary from handling the distribution of the 
estate to herself. 
The decision to remove a trustee is discretionary. It makes no sense to exercise 
that discretion against the sole beneficiary under the circumstances of this case. No 
allegation has been made that Toni Johnson is incapable of handling her own affairs. 
Therefore, I deny Kareen Cornell's motion to remove Toni Johnson as the trustee. 
Kareen Cornell's application for appointment of trustee is also denied for the 
same reasons that her motion for removal of trustee is denied. Kareen Cornell has no 
interest in the trust and could be expected based upon her claims to interfere with Toni 
Johnson's rights as the sole beneficiary. Also, appointment of someone other than Toni 
Johnson to serve as trustee would violate the terms of the trust. Revocable Family 
Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell dated November 1, 1996 at§ 9.01 and 
as amended on August 6, 2009, attached as Exhibits A and B to Affidavit of Karin 
Seubert dated September 17, 2012. 
The District Court also offers "(a)s a matter of guidance Idaho Code § 5-327 does 
not apply to the facts as found by the Magistrate in this case." Order Re Appeal at 3. 
Kareen Cornell argues that the District Court is thereby directing this Court to address 
the merits of her claim irrespective of the abatement of John Cornell's claims. Kareen 
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Cornell's argument is rejected as it fails to recognize that the basis for the dismissal of 
her claims rests upon the common law, not Idaho Code§ 5-237, and that this Court 
agrees with the District Court's analysis of Idaho Code§ 5-237. 
As to the merits, there is no question that the state legislature created a cause of 
action against the trustee for wrongs committed by the trustee as alleged in this case. 
There is no question that John Cornell if he was alive would have a cause of action 
based upon the allegations of malfeasance committed by Toni Johnson. 
However, the essence of the abatement doctrine is that it extinguishes causes of 
action once the wronged individual dies. In this case, the alleged wronged individual, 
John Cornell, died without having his claims resolved before his death. Under the 
common law doctrine of abatement as set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Bishop 
v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012), this Court found that John Cornell's 
actions abated with his death. Memorandum Opinion Re Kareen Cornell June 21, 2013 
at 9-18 and Memorandum Opinion February 15, 2013 at 5-13. 
The Supreme Court noted in Bishop, "The abatement rule holds that in the 
absence of a legislative enactment addressing the survivability of a claim, the common 
law rules govern." Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,619,272 P.3d 1247, 1250 (2012). 
The Supreme Court also noted that the Idaho state legislature in 2010 modified the 
common law rule very narrowly at Idaho Code § 5-237 allowing some derivative actions 
to proceed which would otherwise be abated under the common law. However, in 
Bishop, the Supreme Court did not retroactively address the reach of the law. 
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Thus, applying the District Court's guidance, Idaho Code § 5-237 does not apply. 
Therefore, the common law as interpreted by the Idaho Supreme Court requires finding 
the claims of John Cornell abate upon his death. 
To make clear, Idaho Code§ 5-237 modifies the common law of abatement. 
Idaho Code § 5-237 allows for some types of actions to proceed that would otherwise 
be prohibited under the common law of abatement. The decision as to whether 
abatement extinguishes a cause of action is a two-step process. First, are the claims 
abated under the common law? Second, if abated under the common law, does Idaho 
Code § 5-237 override the common law and allow for the derivative claim to proceed? 
This Court applied the test adopted by the Supreme Court in Bishop and found 
that Kareen Cornell's derivative claims based upon the alleged wrongs done to her 
husband are abated under the common law. Kareen Cornell has provided no new 
argument as to why this Court's analysis is incorrect nor does the District Court's 
remand address the abatement of the claim under common law. Thus, this Court 
adheres to its analysis provided in the two earlier Memorandum Opinions and finds that 
Kareen Cornell's derivative claims are abated under the common law. 
The District Court's guidance that Idaho Code § 5-237 does not apply to this 
case is precisely the result also found by this Court. "Therefore, Idaho Code§ 5-237(2) 
does not overrule the common law abatement of John [Cornell's] causes of action." 
Memorandum Opinion February 15, 2013 at 17. As set forth in the earlier Memorandum 
Opinions, the wrongs alleged to have been committed by Toni Johnson do not survive 
under the common law of abatement nor do the alleged wrongs come within the ambit 
of Idaho Code § 5-237 which supersedes the common law under very limited 
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circumstances. Those limited circumstances are simply not present in this case. 
Memorandum Opinion February 15, 2013 at 13-17. Thus, dismissal of Kareen Cornell's 
Petition is appropriate. 
Kareen Cornell makes two additional arguments in support of her Motions at the 
hearing. Kareen Cornell argues that this Court should grant her motion to remove Toni 
Johnson as trustee because Ms. Johnson never filed an objection to her motion until 
four days before the hearing. I reject Kareen Cornell's argument. The arguments have 
been addressed several times during the course of this action. Kareen Cornell has not 
shown any prejudice. 
Kareen Cornell also asks for an order restraining Toni Johnson from taking 
further action with respect to the trust. Idaho Code§ 15-7-308(3) provides, "Pending a 
final decision on the petition to remove the trustee, the court may order such 
appropriate relief as may be necessary to protect the trust property or the interests of 
the beneficiaries." I do not choose to exercise my discretion to order a restraining order. 
A final decision is made based upon this Memorandum Opinion to dismiss Kareen 
Cornell's Petition. I do not find Kareen Cornell to be a beneficiary whose interest would 
be protected by a restraining order. It has been more than two (2) years since this case 
was initiated. 
I do not find it appropriate to override the clear language of the trust granting Toni 
Johnson the whole trust upon her brother's death. In any event, if this Court's decision 
on abatement is incorrect and Ms. Kareen Cornell's arguments on the merits prevail on 
appeal, Toni Johnson will be liable for any wrongs committed. 
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CONCLUSION 
In compliance with the remand order, the motion to remove Toni Johnson as the 
trustee is denied for the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion. Kareen 
Cornell's motions filed after the remand order are also denied for the reasons set forth 
in this Memorandum Opinion. The decision to dismiss Kareen Cornell's Petition is 
reaffirmed. 
Dated this i fuay of June, 2014. 
MltL 
ftandallWRobinson , Magistrate 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Mea orandum 
Opinion Re Remand Order was mailed postage pre-paid, on the }b- day of 
:Si 11'.)L , 2014, to: 
.,. 
Samuel Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, and Callery, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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FINAL JUD®MENT 
RE REMAND ORDER 
Based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law filed in the Memorandum 
Opinion Re Remand Order in this Case on June 16, 2014, and good cause appearing 
thereby, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
That consistent with the Remand Order of the District Court, the motion for 
removal of the Trustee IS HEREBY DENIED for the reasons set forth in the 
Memorandum Opinion; 
That Kareen Cornell's Motion to Remove Trustee and Application for Removal of 
Trustee filed after the Remand Order was entered ARE HEREBY DENIED; 
That the Judgment for Dismissal filed in this case on June 21, 2013 is hereby 
reaffirmed and Kareen Cornell's Petition for Supervised Administration and Court 
Ordered Distribution IS HEREBY DISMISSED with prejudice. 
Dated this Jkf day of June, 2014. /] 
L~)/!~ ~ SCAR D Randall W Robinson, Magistrat 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Judgment Re 
Remand Order was mailed postage pre-paid, on the I(:,~ day of 
::!,AO e... , 2014, to: 
Samuel Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, and Callery, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STAIB OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) ) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMil,Y TRUST OF ) 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
MOTION TO CORRECT CLltRlCAL 
MISTAKES 
COMES NOW Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through her attorney of record, Karin 
Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to I.RC.P. 60(a). hereby moves this 
Court for a court order confirming and clarifying that its citations to Idaho Code§ 5-237 (emphasis 
added) on pages 5 and 6 of the Memorandum Opinion re: Remand Order entered on June 16, 2014 
were clerical errors and that the intended. statutory citations are Idaho Code§ 5-327. 
DA TED this ~0 day of June, 2014. 
MOTION TO CORRECT 
CLERJCAL MISTAKES 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
By~~ 
Karin Seubert 
Attorney for Respondent 
-1-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
· correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO 
CORRECT CLERICAL MISTAKES was, this~O 
day ofJune, 2014, 
~ hand-delivered by providing a 
to: 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed; postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
Samuel Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C. 
1219 Idaho St 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIS1RICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNfY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) ) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Respondent Toni C. Johnson, by and through 
her attorney of record, Karin Seubert of Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. will call up for 
hearing her Motion to Correct Clen'cal Mistakes at the hour of2:15 p.m. on July 7, 2014, before 
the Honorable Magistrate of the above Court. 
DATED this c2£) day ofJune, 2014. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
By~~ 
Karin. Seubert 
Attorney for Respondent 
NOTICE OF HEARING -1-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a troe and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
HEARING was, this~ day of June, 2014, 
~ hand-delivered by providmg a 
to: 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted. via facsimile 
Samuel Creason 
Creason. Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C. 
1219 Idaho St 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston. ID 83501 
By ~~ 
Karin Seubert 
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Karin Seubert 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 854 
1104 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208/743-3591 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. ) 
CORNELL. ) 
Case No. CV 2012-00277 
ORDER CLARIFYING CITATIONS 
This matter having been called for hearing on July 7, 2014 on Respondent Toni C. Johnson's 
. Motion to Correct Clerical Mistakes, and good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND 
CONFIRMED that all references to Idaho Code§ 5-237 contained in the Memorandum Opinion re: 
Remand Order entered in this proceeding on June 16, 2014 were in error, and the intended statutory 
citations are Idaho Code § 5-327. Said Memorandum Opinion re: Remand Order is hereby 
incorporated herein by reference and amended in accordance with this Order. 
DATED this -'7rf ! day ofJuly, 2014. 
GE RANDALL W. ROBINSON 
. ORDER CLARIFYING CITATIONS -1-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
CLARIFYING CITATIONS was, this----'=l_ day of 
July, 2014, 
hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
./ mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
transmitted via facsimile 
to: 
Karin Seubert 
· Jones, Brower and Callery, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0 . Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
B~ [Y'cJY) 
Clerk of Court 
ORDER CLARIFYING CITATIONS -2-
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CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
of Estate of John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) Case No. CV 2012-00277 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
) I.R.C.P. 83 
) Fee Category: L(2) 
) Filing Fee: $81.00 
) 
TO: TONI C. JOHNSON, AND HER ATTORNEY, KARIN SEUBERT, JONES, 
BROWER, & CALLERY, P.L.L.C., 1304 IDAHO STREET, P.O. BOX 854, 
LEWISTON, ID 83501. EMAIL: KRSEUBERT@LEWISTON.COM 
AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The Estate of John Henry Cornell, acting through its personal 
representative, Kareen Cornell, (hereinafter the "Estate") files this appeal from the 
Magistrate Court in and for the County of Clearwater. 
2. The Estate appeals to the District Court in and for the County of Clearwater. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 1 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
696
3. The Estate appeals the Magistrate Court's denial of the Estate's Motion to 
Remove Trustee and Application for Removal of Trustee and dismissal of the Estate's 
Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution. The Court' s 
denial and dismissal are set forth in its June 16, 2014, FINAL JUDGMENT RE: 
REMAND ORDER and MEMORANDUM OPINION RE: REMAND ORDER upon 
which the judgment was based. 
4. The appeal is taken upon matters of law. 
5. The proceedings of the hearings were recorded or reported by the method of 
electronic recordings and are in the possession of the Clearwater County Clerk located in 
Orofino, Idaho. The Estate requests that the Court order that no transcript need be 
prepared pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83U)(2). 




Whether the Court erred in finding that any claims to the Trust res by, 
through, or on behalf of John Henry Cornell abated upon the death of John 
Henry Cornell? 
The above list of issues is not exhaustive and the Estate may assert other 
issues on appeal thereafter discovered by the Estate. 
- ~ DATED this L_ day of July 2014. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 2 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
uel T. Creason, IS 
Attorney for Personal Representative of 
Estate of John Henry Cornell 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this r:-day of July, 2014, a copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 3 
X FIRST-CLASS MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
FAX TRANSMISSION (208) 746-9553 
EMAIL krseubert@lewiston.com 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, JD 83501 
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This case is about the actions of Toni C. Johnson while she served as the successor 
trustee of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell ("Trust"). 
Ms. Johnson concedes that during the over two and a half years that she served as successor 
trustee, she repeatedly made improper use of the Trust res for her own benefit. She also 
concedes that during that time she engaged in inequitable conduct in order to deprive her brother, 
John Cornell-a co-beneficiary-of his interest in the Trust res. Now, she argues that because 
John Cornell died before he could stop her from continuing in this line of conduct, any claims he 
held abated and there exists no judicial recourse for the heirs of John Cornell. Tue question 
before the Court is whether the Estate of John Cornell may pursue recovery of John Cornell's 
interest in the Trust res. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Estate of John Henry Cornell comes before this Court on appeal from dismissal of its 
petition for supervised administration and court ordered distribution of The Revocable Family 
Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M Cornell: The magistrate court dismissed the Petition on 
the grounds that the Estate's claims did not survive the death of John Henry Cornell. Petitioner 
appeals. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
This matter comes before the Court after the conclusion of a highly irregular course of 
proceedings before the magistrate court. The case identified by case number CV 2012-277 was 
initiated through a Petition filed by John Henry Cornell on July 11, 2012. John Cornell died 
1 Petitioner sets forth a verbatim copy of her brief filed in the previous appeal of this matter, any 





[- from an apparent suicide on August 20, 2012. Ms. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss on 
September 17, 2012, arguing that the claims in John Cornell's petition abated upon his death. 




unless and until the Estate was substituted into the action pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 25(a)(l). 
For reasons beyond Kareen Cornell's control, John Cornell's attorney continued to 
prosecute the petition in John Cornell's name, personally. In late November 2012, Ms. Cornell 
appeared before the Court and notified the Court that she objected to any other person acting on 
behalf of her late husband. While the magistrate court invited Ms. Cornell to submit briefing on 
pending action, it did not bring her or the Estate into the litigation. Thus, Ms. Cornell's briefing 
was, in effect, amid briefing. On February 15, 2013, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion. 
In that opinion, the Court dismissed the petition filed by John Cornell, personally. However, the 
Court expressly invited Ms. Cornell to file claims on behalf of the Estate. 
Ms. Cornell responded to the Court's invitation by filing the Estate's Petition on February 
28, 2013. While many of the Estate's claims were identical to those raised by John Cornell in his 
August 2012 petition, the Estate also raised additional claims. The Estate's Petition alleged that 
Ms. Johnson (1) failed to act in conformity with the terms of the Trust; (2) breached her fiduciary 
duties when acting in her capacity as Trustee; (3) engaged in equitable conversion of the 
property belonging to John Cornell by refusing to distribute the property; and ( 4) was unjustly 
enriched by (a) misusing Trust assets for personal desires, and (b) refusing to comply with the 
terms of the Trust and her fiduciary duties in order to effect a distribution in her favor. The 
Estate sought supervised administration, court ordered distribution of the Trust, and a judgment 




and equitable causes of action: (A) breach of fiduciary duty; (B) constructive trust; (C) breach of 
contract; (D) conversion; and (E) unjust enrichment. 
No Answer has ever been filed to those allegations. Instead, Ms. Johnson filed a Motion 
r--
1 to Dismiss the Estate's Petition on March 1, 2013. Ms. Johnson argued that the petition should 
be dismissed because (1) the Estate was bound by the Court's February 15, 2013, memorandum 
opinion, and (2) the Estate's Petition either failed to state a cause of action or stated causes of 
action which abated upon the death of John Cornell. Ms. Johnson based her abatement 
arguments on the same theory that the magistrate court adopted in dismissing Mr. Cornell's 
claims. 
The magistrate court granted Ms. Johnson's motion on June 21, 2013. In its 
memorandum opinion, the court concluded that (A) all claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
abated, at common law and under Idaho statute, upon death; (B) the doctrine of constructive trust 
was inapplicable and an action under that doctrine was in tort, which abated upon death; (C) the 
claims for breach of contract were co-extensive with the statutory duties of a trustee and, 
therefore, were breach of fiduciary duty claims which abated upon death; (D) claims for 
equitable conversion sounded in tort and, therefore, abated upon death; and (E) claims for unjust 
l_ enrichment sounded in tort and, therefore, abated upon death. The magistrate court based its 
ruling upon the following conclusions of law: (1) the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion of Bishop v. 
Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619 (2012) stands for the proposition that all claims sounding in tort 
abate at common law upon the death of the claimant; and (2) the Idaho legislature did not 
abrogate that rule with the amendment of Idaho Code § 5-327, except for claims for recovery of 










The Estate filed an Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District court on 
October 13, 2013. The Estate's Appeal alleged that both the common law and Idaho Code§ 5-
327 supported a ruling that the causes of action set forth in the Estate's Petition survived the 
death of John Cornell. On April 8, 2014, the District Court remanded the case back to the 
Magistrate Court. The District Court instructed the Magistrate Court to first determine whether 
Toni Johnson ought to be removed as trustee. 
On May 13, 2014, Ms. Cornell filed a Motion to Remove Trustee and an Application for 
Appointment of Trustee seeking appointment to herself to serve as trustee. Oral arguments were 
heard on May 27, 2014, with regards to the remand order and Ms. Cornell's motion. In its 
memorandum opinion the court concluded that (A) because a request for removal was not made 
within the Estate's Petitioner, there existed no party with standing to request removal of Toni 
Johnson; (B) the Estate's claims abated upon the death of John Cornell, and (C) therefore, she 
did not have standing to request removal of Toni Johnson under Idaho Code § 15-7-308; and 
(D) it was nonsensical for the Court to order removal of Toni Johnson once the Court has found 
that no other beneficiaries exist. 
The magistrate court based its ruling upon the following conclusions of law: (1) the Idaho 
Supreme Court Opinion of Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619 (2012) stands for the 
proposition that all claims sounding in tort abate at common law upon the death of the claimant; 
and (2) the Idaho legislature did not abrogate that rule with the amendment of Idaho Code § 5-
327, except for claims for recovery of medical expenses, out of pocket expenses, and lost wages. 




C. Statement of Facts 
Michael and Arlie Cornell established The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell 
and Arlie M. Cornell ("Trust") on November 1, 1996. The Trust was established to provide for 
Michael and Arlie during their lifetimes, with the remainder to be distributed to their two 
children: Toni Johnson and John Cornell. Arlie Cornell died on November 9, 2008. Michael 
Cornell died on December 15, 2009. Ms. Johnson has been the sole Trustee since that time. 
As a successor trustee, Ms. Johnson was to have a very limited role. Ms. Johnson's sole 
duty as trustee was to distribute the trust assets. Over the months and years following Michael 
Cornell's death, Ms. Johnson failed to distribute the Trust. Instead, she "egregiously wronged 
her brother during his lifetime. Mem. Op. re Attorney Fees and Costs 3. "Ms. Johnson acted 
r ... inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself and not shar[ing] one cent 
I 
with her brother." Id. She refused to distribute the Trust, despite John Cornell's repeated 
objections and pleas that she do so, in part, so that he could "pay for necessary medical care that 
he could not obtain without money from the trust." Id. at 2. John Cornell was never able to 
compel distribution before his death on August 20, 2012. 
Ms. Johnson's discovery responses in this case substantiate the concerns and frustrations 
I l that Mr. Cornell raised in the over two and one-half years between the surviving truster's death 
I 
L 
and Mr. Cornell's death. At her deposition, Ms. Johnson admitted that she routinely makes 
personal use of the real and personal property of the Trust. She lives rent-free in the home that is 
included in the Trust. She has commingled cash assets of the Trust with her own cash assets. 
She has depleted the cash assets of the Trust, with not only expenses of the Trust but also her 
personal expenses. To date, the only distributions that Ms. Johnson has made are the unreported 
distributions made through her personal use of the Trust res. 
-5-
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r ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I 
1. The issue before the Court is the survival of causes of actions regarding (a) proper 
administration of the Trust, and (b) proper distribution of assets to which the Trust is title owner. 
Under its terms, the Trust was to terminate upon the death of the surviving trustor-in this case, 
December 15, 2009. As successor Trustee, Toni Johnson was to distribute the Trust res "as soon 
as reasonably possible." Ms. Johnson concedes that she acted inequitably: she mismanaged the 
Trust, she commingled assets, she used Trust funds for personal use, and she refused to distribute 
the Trust res, despite John Cornell's demands. John Cornell died in August 2012. May the 
Estate of John Cornell pursue not only his interests in the remaining Trust property, but also 
claims for the diminution of that property through mismanagement by Toni Johnson? 
ARGUMENT 
The Estate's Petition raises claims against Ms. Johnson based upon conduct occurring 
since December 15, 2009, the date she accepted appointment as successor trustee of the Trust. 
The law governing survival of actions upon the death of the injured party was changed on July 1, 
I 2010, when the amended Idaho Code § 5-327 became effective. Prior to that point in time, 
issues of survival upon the death of the injured party were governed by the common law. Thus, 
this case requires the Court to determine whether the Estate's claims survive at common law and 
under section 5-327. The magistrate court granted Ms. Johnson's motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that (1) under the common law, all causes of action sounding in tort abate upon the 
death of the injured party; and (2) under Idaho Code§ 5-327(2), all causes of action sounding in 
tort are limited, upon the death of the injured party, to recovery for damages not sought in the 
Estate's petition. 
I 
A. Standard of Review 
The magistrate court dismissed this action on a summary judgment standard, because it 
considered affidavits filed by the parties. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). An appellate Court 
exercises de novo review over a grant of summary judgment. Constr. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. 








Summary judgment is only appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 
56(c). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court "liberally 
construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all 
reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Constr. Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 135 Idaho 
at 682, 23 P.3d at 144. If, as the result of such a liberal construction, the Court finds that 
reasonable persons could reach different findings or draw conflicting inferences from the 
evidence, the Court must deny the motion. Thus, Ms. Johnson carries the burden of proving that 
reasonable persons could not draw conflicting inference from the evidence, when the record is 
construed in a light most favorable to the Estate. 
B. The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate at Common Law. 
1. The Estate's Tort Claims Did Not Abate 
The Estate's tort claims did not abate at common law, because the claims seek damages 
for the deprivation and diminution of a property interest. The magistrate court ruled that, at 
common law, every cause of action sounding in tort abates upon the death of the injured party. 
The court based its ruling entirely on the Idaho Supreme Court case of Bishop v. Owens, 152 
l Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012). The magistrate court found the following language from 
Bishop dispositive in this case: "Under the common law, claims arising out of contracts 
generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate." Id. at 619, 
272 P.3d at 1250. The magistrate court's broad application of Bishop is in error. The Bishop 
Court identified the general rule regarding abatement of tort claims at common law. Id. While 
that general rule is certainly applicable to this case, it is not dispositive. The Bishop Court was 




l abatement doctrine. The magistrate court erred in applying the general rule of Bishop to this 
case because (a) the Estate's tort claims seek redress for injury done to the decedent's property 
interests; (b) the Estate's tort claims are founded upon a remedial statute; and (c) the Estate's tort 
claims are not legal claims but rather claims in equity. As set forth below, each of these 






The Bishop Opinion does not-either by its facts or by its language-set precedent 
regarding abatement of causes of action Estate's claims. The Bishop Court was presented with 
facts far different from this case. First, the decedent in Bishop brought a legal malpractice claim, 
alleging that her former attorney injured her by failing to properly advise her about the 
consequences of a negotiated settlement with respect to subrogated interests. Id. at 618, 272 
P.3d at 1249. Here, the Estate claims that the defendant injured John Cornell by depriving him 
his property (which she still retains) and, at the same time, diminishing the value of that 
property. Second, the decedent in Bishop did not rely upon a statute or equitable doctrine to 
identify a unique duty or standard of care; she relied upon a legal representation agreement 
which applied the same standard to which all Idaho attorneys are held, the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Responsibility. Id. at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251. Here, the Estate has raised tort claims 
based upon the remedial statutes set forth in the Idaho Code which govern the conduct of 
trustees, and based upon equitable doctrines. Third, the decedent in Bishop sought an award of 
money damages, not relief in the form of restoration and distribution of certain identified assets 
to which she believed she was entitled. Id. at 619, 272 P.3d at 1250. Here, the Estate seeks 
restoration and distribution of certain assets-the Trust res. These three factual distinctions 
explain why the Bishop Court had no need to proceed beyond a recitation of the general rule and 









The language of the Bishop Opinion does not support the magistrate court's interpretation 
of the Bishop language as universal. The Bishop Opinion cites Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 
184 P. 477 (1919) as support for its general rule. Kloepfer makes express that which Bishop 
assumes: "As a general rule, in the absence of a statute providing otherwise, causes of action ex 
contractu survive, while causes ex delicto do not. However, there are well-recognized 
exceptions to both branches of the rule." Id. ( emphasis added). These well-recognized 
exceptions mandate survival of the Estate's claims. 
Subsequent Supreme Court case law also conflicts with the magistrate court's 
interpretation. Based on Bishop, the magistrate court ruled that "in order for John's claims to 
survive his death, his claims must sound in contract, and not in tort." Memorandum Op. re: 
Kareen Cornell 10. In the January 2013 case of St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. 
Luciani, the Supreme Court considered whether a given tort claim could be assigned after the 
death of the injured party, particularly in light of its opinion in Bishop. 154 Idaho 37,293 P.3d 
661, 667 (2013). The Court affirmed the rule from MacLoed v. Stelle, where it held that "'if [a 
tort claim] survives, it may be assigned; if not, it may not,' [ the Court] also held that an 'injury 
[that] lessens the estate of the injured party does survive, and that is assignable." Luciani, 154 
Idaho at 41, 293 P.3d at 667 (quoting MacLoed, 43 Idaho 64, 75,249 P. 254,257 (1926)). Thus, 
even as recent as January 2013, the Idaho Supreme Court assumed that certain tort claims 
survive the death of the injured party, even after Bishop. 
a. The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims seek redress 
for injury to property. 
One of the well-recognized exceptions to the rule of abatement of tort claims is that tort 













The general rule is that, in addition to the causes of action arising out of contract 
recognized at common law, causes of action arising from torts to real and personal 
property survive and pass to the personal representative of the decedent, while 
purely personal torts do not survive in the absence of statutory provision. 
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 51. Thus, in cases where the injured party 
alleged an injury to his property-such as the existence or amount of his interest in a trust-the 
claim survives. See Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 105, 15 P.3d 816, 818 (2000) (holding that 
while a divorce proceeding abates upon death, "[i]f property issues are involved, the action 
continues solely to resolve those issues"). 
Here, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Cornell held a vested 
property interest in the Trust res at the time of his death. Upon accepting appointment as 
successor trustee, Ms. Johnson's obligations to the Trust and Mr. Cornell (as the beneficiary) 
were clear. 
On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the 
Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and 
principal remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute 
them to the following beneficiaries: TONI C. JOHNSON and JOHN H. 
CORNELL. 
Trust§ 4.03. However, the very next provision of the Trust gives rise to much of the confusion 
in this matter. The Trust proceeds to set forth the terms for distribution in the event that one or 
both of the Trustors' children should die. 
If any child ... should die prior to the above distribution, then the Trustee 
shall distribute all of such deceased child's share to his or her surviving 
issue in equal shares. . . . If there is no surviving issue, then all of the 
deceased child's share of the Trust Estate shall be added to the shares set 
aside for the ... other living child .... " 
Trust§ 4.03(a). Ms. Johnson argued that because John Cornell died before he could compel her 
to distribute the Trust res, any interest he held in the Trust died with him; thus, she should 




[- Trust res vested upon the death of Michael Cornell. The Estate also argues that even if John 
1- Cornell's interest did not vest upon the death of Michael Cornell, it vested at the point in time 
I 
where equity would presume proper distribution because "equity regards that as done which 
ought to be done." See First Sec. Bank of Idaho, Nat. Ass 'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 657, 429 
P.2d 386, 389 (1967). 
The magistrate court ruled that because John Cornell died prior to distribution, he could 
not have obtained a vested interest in the Trust res.2 See Memorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell 
12. The magistrate court did not provide any discussion or analysis regarding ambiguity within 
the document or the intent of the Trustors. The magistrate court did not provide any discussion 
or analysis regarding the Estate's arguments that, at the very latest, John Cornell's interest vested 
1 · under equity. These omissions are of particular import because the magistrate court later found 
that Ms. Johnson acted against the intent of the Trustors. See Memorandum Op. re: Attorney 
Fees and Costs 3. Therefore, the magistrate erred when it ruled that, as a matter of law, John 
Cornell did not hold a vested interest. 
L 
b. The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims are founded 
upon a remedial statute. 
The survivability of this action is further supported by the fact that the claims arise 
pursuant to a remedial statute. In Bishop, the decedent merely relied on a common law duty. 
Here, the Estate seeks recovery based, in part, upon a trustee's breach of fiduciary duty, as 
defined in Idaho Code§§ 15-7-101 through 15-7-601. "A cause of action that is founded on a 
remedial statute ... survives the death of the party possessing the cause of action." 1 Am. Jur. 
2 The magistrate court was not explicit about why it rejected the Estate's arguments regarding 
continuing jurisdiction over administration of the Trust. It appears, however, that the magistrate 
court rejected that argument based upon the court's finding that Toni Johnson was the only 
remaining entity with an interest in the Trust. 
-11-
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[~ 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival§ 59. A statutory right exists to hold a trustee liable for her 





cmt. Liability for a trustee and for a personal representative as to a beneficiary focuses upon 
injury to the estate or the trust res, rather that the person. See id.; Idaho Code § 15-3-808. 
Therefore, the Estate's breach of fiduciary duty claims did not abate. 
c. The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims are not legal 
claims, but claims in equity. 
Finally, the survivability of this action is further supported by the fact that it seeks 
recovery through equitable causes of action. In Bishop, the only cause of action was the legal 
theory of malpractice. Here, the Estate has raised several equitable doctrines entitling it to relief. 
"In equity, abatement signifies a present, temporary suspension of further proceedings in a suit 
because of want of proper parties. It is an interruption or suspension of a suit, the equivalent of a 
stay of proceedings, and the suit may be revived and proceed to its regular determination." 1 
Am. Jur. 2dAbatement, Survival, and Revival§ l (footnotes omitted). 
The principle that a cause of action expires with the death or disability of a party 
generally does not apply to suits in equity; equitable remedies exist to the same 
extent in favor of and against executors and administrators as they do against 
the decedent, as long as the court can continue to grant effective relief in spite of 
the death. One of the main reasons for this stance for suits in equity is that 
such suits primarily pertain to property rights. 
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 60 (footnotes omitted) (emphases added).3 
The magistrate court erred in ruling that the claims of conversion, constructive trust, and unjust 
enrichment abated under Bishop. See Memorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell 13-15. 
3 See also Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645,649 (4th Cir. 1942); 
Glojek v. Glojek, 254 Wis. 109, 115, 35 N.W.2d 203, 206 (1948); Hughey v. Mooney, 282 S.C. 
597, 602, 320 S.E.2d 475, 477 (Ct. App. 1984); Miller v. Hayman, 766 So. 2d 1116, 1118 n.1 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) 
-12-
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Conversion. The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of conversion. "The 




In re Pangburn, 154 Idaho 233, 296 P.3d 1080, 1085 (2013). These are the exact elements 
alleged by the Estate. As set forth above, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding 
whether John Cornell held a vested interest in the Trust res at the time of his death. "At common 
law, the right to bring an action for the conversion of goods in the lifetime of the decedent owner 
generally survived to the personal representative .... " 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and 
Revival§ 76. The consequence of the magistrate's ruling evidences the reason for the equitable 
exception to the rule of abatement: if the Estate's claims did not survive John Cornell's death, 
then Ms. Johnson will be allowed to enjoy property which she did not own, and which she now 
possess only as a result of her inequitable conduct. Such a result is patently inequitable. The 
Estate's claims for redress through the doctrine of conversion did not abate. 
Constructive Trust. The Estate seeks recovery under the the equitable doctrine of 
constructive trust. It is "the fundamental rule of equity that equity regards that as done which 
ought to be done." See First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 91 Idaho at 657, 429 P.2d at 389 (discussing 
basis of doctrine of equitable conversion). Ms. Johnson ought to have distributed the Trust res 
long before the death of John Cornell. It is undisputed that Ms. Johnson engaged in inequitable 
conduct by retaining legal title to the assets of the Trust in the name of the Trust. "When 
property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in 
good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee." TRUST, 
Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), trust (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 




trust is a description of the nature by which a wrongdoer holds the property of another; the court 
deems that property as already belonging to the injured party at some earlier point in time. 
The court's ruling regarding abatement is erroneous. While the Idaho Supreme Court has 
i not expressly addressed the issue of survival of constructive trust claims at common law, it 
l 
presumed their survival in Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676, 678 (1935). The 
Estate's claims for redress through the doctrine of constructive trust did not abate. 
The magistrate court also supported its grant of summary judgment against this claim by 
ruling that a constructive trust could not have arisen in this case as a matter of law: "As this case 
already addresses a legal trust, there is no necessity to resort to the legal fiction of a constructive 
trust." Memorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell 13. The Estate is unaware of any authority argued 
by the parties ( or otherwise existing at law or in equity) supporting a finding that the doctrine of 
constructive trust is unavailable in cases involving express trusts. The constructive trust in 
which the Trust held John Cornell's property is distinct from the actual trust arrangement that 
existed prior to the constructive trust arising. The doctrine of constructive trust is particularly 
applicable to the facts of this case. Ms. Johnson ought to have distributed the Trust res as soon 
as reasonably practicable when the Trust automatically terminated upon the death of Michael 
Cornell. Ms. Johnson acted inequitably by retaining the Trust res in name of the Trust, while 
using it for her own benefit. Reasonable persons could reach different findings or draw 
conflicting inferences from the evidence with respect to whether a constructive trust arose based 
upon (i) the extended period of time between the death of Michael Cornell and the death of John 
Cornell; and (ii) the undisputed inequitable conduct by Ms. Johnson. Therefore, the magistrate 




Unjust Enrichment. The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of unjust 
enrichment. "Unjust enrichment occurs where [ offending party] receives a benefit which would 
be inequitable to retain without compensating the [injured party] to the extent that retention is 
unjust." Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165 P.3d 261, 271 (2007). The 
damages available to the claimant on an unjust enrichment claim is the value of the amount by 
which the offending party was unjustly enriched. Barry v. Pac. W Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 
834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004). Like constructive trust, unjust enrichment is an equitable 
doctrine that seeks to return to the injured party those amounts which were due to him or her in 
equity; amounts which equity deems property of the injured party. If the Estate prevails on its 
unjust enrichment claim, it will have established that John Cornell held an equitable interest in 
property prior to his death. The Estate has a statutory duty to recover property of the decedent 
and distribute it in probate. See Idaho Code § 15-3-709. The Estate's claims for redress through 
the doctrine of unjust enrichment did not abate. 
2. The Estate's Breach of Contract Claims Did Not Abate 
As with the tort claims, the magistrate court relied exclusively on Bishop to support its 
ruling of abatement of the contract claims. The court interpreted Bishop as standing for the 
proposition that where the duties placed upon the defendant could be found at law, all contract 
claims should be re-characterized as tort claims. Memorandum Op. re: Kareen Cornell 13-14. 
The magistrate court found that the Estate failed "to point out any way in which the Trust 
instrument imposes any duties upon Toni [Johnson] that are not also imposed by the Probate 
Code." Id. As a result, the magistrate court held the contract claims were actually tort claims 





\ (a) the analysis in Bishop was in response to a relationship that was not contractual in nature; and 
(b) the Estate's contract claims identify contractual duties which do not exist at law. 
The magistrate court's reliance upon Bishop to re-characterize the Estate's contract 
claims was in error. In Bishop, the question before the court was whether the decedent could 
I · pursue a legal malpractice action through breach of contract claims. Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620, 
l_. 
272 P.3d at 1251. The plaintiffs theory in Bishop was that it could either sue for legal 
malpractice, which sounded in pure tort, or for breach of the legal representation agreement, 
which sounded in contract. Id. The Bishop Court actually held this theory correct. See id. The 
reason the contract claims failed in Bishop is that the plaintiff had not alleged breach of a 
specific term within the contract, but instead alleged breach of the term referencing the common 
I law duties owed by every attorney to that attorney's clients. Id. at 621, 272 P.3d at 1252. The 
Bishop Court explained that if such a provision were enough to transform the pure tort action of 
legal malpractice into a breach of contract action, there would exist "a per se breach of contract 
action in every legal malpractice action." Id. The relationship between attorney and client is not 





The relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary is contractual in nature. "A trust is 
not itself a separate legal entity that can own property; rather, it is a relationship having certain 
attributes." In re Thompson, 454 B.R. 486, 492 (Banlcr. D. Idaho 2011). "A trust creates a 
fiduciary relationship in which the trustee is the holder of legal title to the property subject to the 
beneficial interest of the beneficiary." DBSIITRI. Vv. Bender, 130 Idaho 796,808,948 P.2d 151, 









The Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 defines a trust as 
... a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a manifestation 
of intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to 
the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of ... one or more persons, at 
least one of whom is not the sole trustee. 
The Estate has identified specific provisions within the Trust document-the trust contract-
which Ms. Johnson breached. 
4.03 & 4.04: The Trust terminates automatically upon the death of the surviving Trustor 
and the successor Trustee is to distribute the property "as soon as 
reasonably possible." 
5.01: The only property which may be retained in the Trust after the death of the 
surviving Trustor is property productive of income. 
8.02: The successor Trustee shall render an accounting from time to time. 
The Estate alleges that Ms. Johnson breached these contractual provisions through her conduct. 
These provisions set forth specific duties outside the general fiduciary duties found in the probate 
code. There exist clear and distinct terms in the trust contract regarding conduct after the death 
of Michael Cornell. The Estate's allegation that Ms. Johnson breached those terms is far 
different that a general allegation that she did not administer the trust expeditiously in 
accordance with Idaho Code§ 15-7-301. The Estate's allegation that Ms. Johnson breached the 
trust contract by retaining non-income producing property in the Trust, identifies a duty that 
cannot be found anywhere in statute. A breach of contract claim is distinct from a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim. A breach of contract claim focuses on the trustee's failure to adhere to the 
terms of the trust document; a breach of fiduciary duty claim focuses on the trustee's failure to 
act in accordance with the standard of conduct required of the trustee under statutory and 
common law. To argue that no contractual claim may lie against the trustee is to argue that the 







C. The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate Under Idaho Code § 5-327(2). 
The magistrate court held that the Estate's causes of action arising after July 1, 2010 
abated pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-327(2). It based this holding on its interpretation of 
subsection 5-327(2) as allowing survival in property damage cases only for recovery for medical 




construing the language of the statute in such a rigid manner as to produce an absurd result upon 
application. 
While the Estate's causes of action survived John Cornell's death under the common law, 
the Idaho legislature made survival explicit in its enactment ofldaho Code§ 5-327(2): 
A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the wrongful 
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person 
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that 
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those 
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii) other out-of-pocket expenses 
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of 
such injured person and as a result of the wrongful act or negligence. Such action 
shall be commenced or, if already commenced at the time of the death of the 
injured person, shall be thereafter prosecuted by the personal representative of the 
estate of the deceased person or, if there be no personal representative appointed, 
then by those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of the 
deceased person according to the provisions of section 5-3 l 1(2)(a), Idaho Code. 
The first sentence of subsection 327(2) states that tort causes of action for "personal injury or 
property damage" do not abate upon the death of the injured party. The second sentence then 
contains a proviso limiting recovery to medical expenses, other out-of-pocket expenses, and loss 
of earnings. Because this proviso does not expressly limit itself to the antecedent of "personal 






The proper application of Idaho Code § 5-327(2) is revealed through the syntactic and 
contextual canons of statutory interpretations. 
interpretation should be employed here: 
The following principles of statutory 
1. the objective is to derive the intent of the legislature; 
2. language should be interpreted in the context of the entire document; 
3. language should be given its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and 
4. language is to be interpreted in accord with common sense and reason. 
See State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011) and Smith v. Dep't of 
Employment, 100 Idaho 520,522,602 P.2d 18, 20 (1979). The issue before this Court is whether 
the legislature intended the second-sentence proviso to apply to both personal injury actions and 
property damage actions. 
The subordinate clause at the end of the second sentence supports an interpretation which 
limits the proviso to personal injury cases. The subordinate clause restricts recovery in the listed 
areas to those damages which resulted from the wrongful act or negligence; and incurred "prior 
to the death of the injured person." The limitation of damages to those incurred prior to the 
death of the injured person evidences the legislature's intent to limit recovery in personal injury 
actions for economic harms suffered, excluding damages such as pain and suffering. A property 
damage action, by its nature, seeks only recovery economic harm suffered. 
Interpreting the listed areas of recovery in accord with common sense and reason, the 
listed areas for recovery support an interpretation which limits the proviso to personal injury 
cases. It is the rare property damage case where "medical expenses" are incurred. It is also rare 
to have a property damage case where the plaintiff seeks "loss of earnings." Those two areas 
are, however, common in personal injury actions. Not only do these areas of recovery counsel 










property damage cases. In one sense, every property damage claim could be categorized as a 
claim for recovery of out of pocket expenses. 
The magistrate courts rigid interpretation of Idaho Code § 5-327(2) was in error. The 
subsection, however, provides a sensible and reasonable result when interpreted through the 
syntactic and contextual canons of statutory interpretations. The Estate asks this Court to reverse 
the magistrate court's grant of summary judgment and rule that the second sentence proviso in 
the subsection does not constitute a limitation on property damage actions. 
CONCLUSION 
Both the common law and Idaho Code§ 5-327 support a ruling that the causes of action 
set forth in the Estate's Petition survived the death of John Cornell. The Estate has raised several 
claims in law and equity seeking recovery of that property in which John Cornell held an interest 
at the time of his death. The property interests of a decedent do not die with that decedent. 
Neither do the decedents claims for damage to his property done by others. Both the property 
interests and the claims for property damage pass to his Estate, where the interests may be 
pursued on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Estate. Ms. Johnson has conceded that she acted 
inequitably. Neither law nor equity allows her to continue her inequitable conduct by now 
L depriving John Cornell's heirs of his property. The Estate asks this Court to reverse the 
I 
L 
magistrate court's ruling and remand the case for further proceedings. 
DATED this9"-day of July, 2014. 
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A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action involves a dispute over the administration of a trust. One of the trust 
beneficiaries, John Cornell, filed a petition seeking relief against his sister in her capacity as 
trustee of the subject trust. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cornell died. His Petition was dismissed after 
Mr. Cornell's death. Subsequently, his estate filed a separate petition raising claims related to 
the trust administration. The Magistrate Court dismissed the Estate's petition. The Estate 
appealed the original dismissal of the Estate's petition, which the District Court remanded on 
issues umelated to the abatement claim. On remand, the Magistrate Court addressed the District 
Court's concerns and affirmed its prior dismissal based upon abatement. The Estate now 
appeals. The question before the Court is whether Mr. Cornell's death abates the Estate's claims 
related to the trust. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Given the highly unusual posture of this proceeding, the factual background and course 
of the proceedings overlap to such a degree that it is appropriate to discuss both together. 
Background 
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell established the Revocable Family Trust of 
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell on November 1, 1996. Petition for Supervised 
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution of Trust at,-[,-[ 3.1, 3.4, Exh. A (said Exhibit 
hereinafter referred to as "Trust"). Through said Trust, Mr. and Mrs. Cornell named their two 
children, Toni C. Johnson and John H. Cornell, as the beneficiaries of the trust upon Mr. and 
1 Toni Johnson has adopted the same approach as the Estate in its Appellant's Brief of submitting a nearly verbatim 
copy of her brief filed in the previous appeal with any substantive additions in text underlined. Portions not relevant 
to the current appeal have been stricken. 
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Mrs. Cornell's deaths. Id. at § 4.03 of Exh. A. On August 6, 2009, Michael S. Cornell as 
surviving grantor and trustee named Toni C. Johnson as sole trustee/successor trustee. Id. at 
Exh.B. 
Arlie M. Cornell died on November 9, 2008 and Michael S. Cornell died on December 
15, 2009. Id. at ,r,r 3.4, 3.6. 
Litigation Concerning Cornell Revocable Living Trust 
On July 11, 2012, John H. Cornell filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and 
Removal a/Trustee, which originally initiated this proceeding. Id. at ,r,r 2.3, 3.9. 
John H. Cornell died on or around August 20, 2011 leaving no issue. Id. at ,r 3.10. 
Respondent Toni C. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 17, 2012 seeking to 
dismiss the Petition for Supervised Administration and Removal of Trustee on the basis that the 
claims of John H. Cornell were extinguished by his death. Said Motion was granted on February 
15, 2013. 
Margaret Watkins, the former temporary personal representative then as a self-identified 
"interested person," appealed. The District Court subsequently determined that Margaret 
Watkins lacked standing to pursue claims of John Cornell against Toni Johnson or the Cornell 
Family Trust. She has not participated in the proceedings since that time. 
On February 26, 2013, Kareen Cornell as then personal representative of the Estate of 
John H. Cornell and as his surviving spouse, filed a Petition for Supervised Administration and 
Court Ordered Distribution. On March 4, 2013, Respondent filed a second Motion to Dismiss. 
On July 21, 2013, the Magistrate Court dismissed the Estate's Petition on the basis of abatement. 
The Estate then appealed said decision to the District Court. The District Court 
considered said appeal concurrent to the appeal pursued by Margaret Watkins. The District 
2 
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Court issued its Order Remanding Case and Order RE: Appeal on April 8, 2014, which 
remanded the case to Magistrate Court for further ruling on the request to remove Toni Johnson 
as trustee. Id. On remand, the Magistrate Court denied the request to remove Toni Johnson as 
trustee and reaffirmed its prior dismissal on grounds of abatement. Memorandum Opinion re: 
Remand Order entered June 16, 2014. The Estate now appeals that decision. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Estate's claims against Respondent abated upon the death of John Cornell 
based upon the application ofldaho Code § 5-327(2). · 
The Estate asserts that the Magistrate Court erred in dismissal of its tort claims based on 
application of Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012), to this case. Appellant's 
Brief at 6-9. The Magistrate Court relied upon the Bishop decision to conclude that the general 
rule requires that claims sounding in tort do not survive the claimant's death. Memorandum 
Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 9-12. The Estate contends that the Magistrate Court misapplied 
the Bishop decision. As discussed further below, the Magistrate Court did not err in its 
application of the Bishop decision. 
In Bishop, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed Idaho abatement law as follows: 
The abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative enactment addressing 
the survivability of a claim, the common law rules govern. Under the common 
law, claims arising out of contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, 
while those sounding in pure tort abate. 
.. . The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined by the 
purposes for which the attorney is retained. Breach of an attorney's duty is 
negligence in tort. The contract basis of legal malpractice actions is the failure to 
perform obligations specified in the written contract. Thus, under the abatement 
rule, breach of duty is an action in tort, not contract; that is, unless an attorney 
foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a specific outcome in the 
litigation or provides for a higher standard of care in the contract, he is held to the 
standard of care expected ofan attorney. Breach of that duty is a tort. 
. . . [T]he contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are 
defined by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attorney and client 
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want to provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by express language 
in the contract. Here, the standard of care in the contract is essentially the same as 
in any attorney-client relationship. Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated 
upon [ the client's] death. 
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620-21, 272 P.3d 1247, 1251-52 (2012) (citations omitted). 
Similar to the attorney-client relationship at issue in Bishop, the contours of the duties 
owed by a trustee to trust beneficiaries are defined by the Uniform Probate Code and Principal 
and Income Act. Here, the Trust contains no greater requirements than are set forth in said 
statutes. Therefore, the common law rule of abatement applies. 
Because a breach of fiduciary duty arises in tort, it abates upon the injured person's death 
under the common law. As such, the Estate's breach of fiduciary duty claim is abated unless a 
statute precludes dismissal. 
The statutory section that governs the survivability of negligence claims is Idaho Code 
Section 5-327(2), which was amended in 2010 with the amendment taking effect on July 1, 2010. 
The Magistrate Court correctly concluded that the Estate's claims are outside of the scope of 
Idaho Code Section 5-327(2). See infra § ll(H). 
As such, the Estate's negligence claims abated upon John H. Cornell's death and no 
reversible error has been shown. The Magistrate Court's dismissal should be affirmed. 
B. There is no exception to the abatement rule for torts for injury to property. 
The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred when it rejected its argument that an 
exception to the general rule of abatement exists where damages are sought for injury to 
property. Appellant's Brief at 9-11. This issue was raised below and addressed by in the 
Magistrate Court's decision as follows: 
Kareen seeks to distinguish Bishop by relying on several Am. Jur. Cites. Kareen 
argues that the survival of an action depends on the nature of the interest affected. 
Because property of the Trust is involved, as opposed to physical injury, the claim 
cannot be abated. 1 Am.Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival § 51 .... 
While Kareen correctly sets forth these principles, she provides no explanation as 
to how they are consistent with Bishop. The Supreme Court in Bishop did not 
examine whether the claims were equitable or torts done to persons or to property 
in determining whether the joint contract and tort action survives the death of the 
party. . . . As Kareen's claims are in the nature of torts, Kareen's claims are 
abated by John's death. Therefore, Kareen's arguments are rejected. 
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Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 15-16. 
The Estate argues that the purported exception to the general abatement rule for cases for 
injury to property is "[o]ne of the well-recognized exceptions" under Idaho law. Appellant's 
Brief at 9. In support of this "well-recognized exception," Mrs. Cornell cites to the Idaho cases 
of Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 15 P.3d 816 (2000), and First Sec. Bank of Idaho, Nat. 
Assn 'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654,429 P.2d 386 (1967). See Appellant's Brief at 9, 10. Said cases 
do not stand for the proposition that such an exception has been recognized under Idaho law. 
The Barnes case was a divorce action where the husband died during the·pendency of an 
appeal after entry of an interlocutory divorce. There, the surviving wife sought to 
"posthumously reunite the parties based on a procedural flaw in the motion for summary 
judgment." Id. at 107, 15 P.3d at 820. The Barnes decision stands for the limited principle that 
where a divorced spouse dies prior to resolution of the division of community property and 
debts, the resolution of said division of property survives. Id. Said case does not discuss nor 
recognize any exception to the abatement rule outside of a divorce proceeding. 
The Rogers case was an interpleader action where a dispute arose between three creditors 
over funds related to a contract dispute. 91 Idaho at 655, 429 P.2d at 387. The quote relied upon 
by Appellant, "equity regards that as done which ought to be done," was part of a discussion of 
the doctrine of equitable conversion. 91 Idaho at 657, 429 P.2d at 389; Appellant's Brief at 10. 
Said case does not discuss nor recognize any exception to the abatement rule. 
A review of Idaho case law finds no other cases that recognize or create an exception to 
the general abatement rule discussed in Bishop v. Owens. See infra II(A). 
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's 
dismissal should be affirmed. 
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C. There is no exception to the abatement rule for claims based upon a remedial 
statute. 
The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred when it rejected its argument that an 
exception to the general rule of abatement exists where damages are sought upon a remedial 
statute. Appellant's Brief at 11-12. This issue was raised below and addressed by in the 
Magistrate Court's decision as follows: 
Kareen seeks to distinguish Bishop by relying on several Am. Jur. Cites. . .. 
Kareen also argues that the claims under the Probate Code survive because "(a) 
cause of action that is founded on a remedial statute survives the death of the 
party possessing the cause of action." 1 Am.Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and 
Revival§ 59. 
While Kareen correctly sets forth these principles, she provides no explanation as 
to how they are consistent with Bishop. The Supreme Court in Bishop did not 
examine whether the claims were equitable or torts done to persons or to property 
in determining whether the joint contract and tort action survives the death of the 
party. Nor did the Supreme Court analyze whether the rules of professional 
conduct are remedial in nature for for purposes of surviving the party's death. As 
Kareen's claims are in the nature of torts, Kareen's claims are abated by John's 
death. Therefore, Kareen's arguments are rejected. 
Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 15-16. 
Appellant relies upon a treatise, 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival§ 59, to 
support the position that a cause of action founded upon a remedial statute does not abate upon 
the injured party's death. The Estate cites to no Idaho authority to support said broad principle, 
which is contrary to the principles established in the Bishop decision. 
The Estate further relies upon Idaho Code Sections 15-7-306 and 15-3-808 in support of 
its position that liability for a trustee to a beneficiary focuses upon injury to the estate or the trust 
res, as opposed to the person. Appellant's Brief at 12. Said statutory provisions are essentially 
identical with one another except that I.C. 15-7-306 applies to trustees and I.C. 15-3-808 applies 
to personal representatives of decedent's estates. 
Specifically, Idaho Code Section 15-7-306(b) provides that "[al trustee is personally 
liable for obligations arising from ownership or control of property of the trust estate or for torts 
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committed in the course of administration of the trust estate only if he is personally at fault." A 
review of Idaho case law finds no cases analyzing this statutory section that support an exception 
to the general rule of abatement for cases pursued under a remedial statute. Of the two found 
reported decisions citing to LC. 15-7-306, the Dennett v. Kuenzli decision, 130 Idaho 21, 936 
P .2d 219 ( Ct.App. 1997), confirms that a trustee's assignment of an option contract from himself 
personally to himself as trustee does not render the option contract inoperable, and the Ko/ouch 
v. First Sec. Bank decision, 128 Idaho 186, 911 P.2d 779 (Ct.App. 1996), upholds an award of 
extraordinary costs to the moving party in a removal action. Neither case is applicable here, nor 
supports the conclusion that an exception to the general rule of abatement exists where damages 
are sought upon a remedial statute. 
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's 
dismissal should be affirmed. 
D. The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in rejecting the 
Estate's conversion claim. 
The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of conversion. Appellant's Brief 
at 12-13. The Magistrate Court rejected the Estate's conversion claim concluding that the 
conversion claim are in the nature of torts, thus abated by Mr. Cornell's death. Memorandum 
Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 15-16. 
Appellant cites to no case law or statutory authority in support of her position that the 
Estate now can pursue said conversation claim after John Cornell's death, but instead relies upon 
a treatise, 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival § 59, without further authority or 
relationship to Idaho law. 
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's 
dismissal should be affirmed. 
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E. The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in reiecting the 
Estate's constructive trust claim. 
The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of constructive trust. Appellant's 
Brief at 13-14. The Magistrate Court rejected the Estate's constructive trust claim concluding 
that the Idaho Probate Code supplants equitable considerations and that th~ circumstances 
necessitating creation of a constructive trust meets the definition of a tort. Memorandum 
Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 12-13. 
"A constructive trust arises where legal title to property has been obtained through actual 
fraud, misrepresentations, concealments, taking advantage of one's necessities, or under 
circumstances otherwise rendering it unconscionable for the holder of legal title to retain 
beneficial interest in the property." Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 168, 722 P.2d 474, 477 (1986) 
(citing Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 559, 167 P. 481 (1917)). A "constructive trust arises from 
the legal title holder's wrongful actions and not from any intent to create a trust." Snider v. 
Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 289 P.3d 43 (2012) (citing Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 599, 608, 167 
P. 481,483 (1917)). 
The Magistrate Court concluded that the Estate's constructive trust claim is a tort. 
Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 12 (citing Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619-20, 
272 P.3d 1247, 1249-50 (2012)) ("Kareen requests a constructive trust to address the civil 
wrong, the breach of duties Toni owed to John. As a cause of action sounding clearly in tort, 
Kareen's request for a constructive trust must be rejected as abated."). 
The Estate asserts that the Idaho decision of Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676 
(1935) holds that the survival of constructive trust claims is presumed. The Brasch case 
involved a dispute over whether a statute of limitations had run prior to a decedent's death. Id. 
The Court concluded that the statute of limitations for the disputed claim had run during the 
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decedent's lifetime, therefore the plantiffs demand was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. 
at 780, 47 P.2d at 679. The case discussed the probate statute then in effect, which read: "If a 
person entitled to bring an action die before the expiration of the term limited for the 
commencement thereof, and the cause of action survive, an action may be commenced by his 
representatives, after the expiration of that time, and within one year from his death[.]" Id at 
679, 47 P.2d at 678 (LC. A., sec. 5-231) ( emphasis added). The statute in question recognizes 
the question of abatement by conditioning the tolling of a statute of limitations only where "the 
cause of action survive[ s]." It does not recognize a presumption, instead a condition precedent. 
The Estate argues that "Ms. Johnson ought to have distributed the Trust res as soon as 
reasonably practicable when the Trust automatically terminated upon the death of Michael 
Cornell. Ms. Johnson acted inequitably by retaining the Trust res in the name of the Trust, while 
using it for her own benefit." As the Magistrate Court previously concluded in its Memorandum 
Opinion dated February 15, 2013, "[t]he constructive trust argument is indistinguishable from 
[the Estate's] arguments regarding breaches of fiduciary duties." 
The Estate has provided no authority or explanation to explain the distinction it is 
assep:ing, nor to show reversible error in rejecting its constructive trust claim. Therefore, the 
Magistrate Court's dismissal should be affirmed. 
F. The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in reiecting the 
Estate's uniust enrichment claim. 
The Estate seeks recovery under the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. Appellant's 
Brief at 15. The Magistrate Court rejected the Estate's unjust enrichment claim concluding that 
the unjust enrichment claim is in the nature of torts, thus abated by Mr. Cornell's death. 
Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 15-16. 
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"Unjust enrichment, as a fictional promise or obligation implied by law, allows recovery 
where the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff that would be inequitable for the 
defendant to retain without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit." Great Plains 
Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 123 Idaho 754, 767, 979 P.2d 627, 640 (1999) 
(citing Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d 
1012, 1205 (1974)). Unjust enrichment claims involve claims based on an implicit promise to 
pay. Id., 979 P.2d at 640. 
As with the conversion and constructive trust claim, Appellant cites to no controlling 
authority to support its assertion the Bishop abatement rule does not apply to claims arising in 
equity. Appellant's Brief at 15. Further, Appellant provides no explanation of how the 
Magistrate Court erred in its conclusion that "[a]s Kareen's claims are in the nature of torts, 
Kareen's claims are abated by John's death." Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 16. 
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's 
dismissal should be affirmed. 
G. The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied the law in rejecting the 
Estate's breach of contract claim. 
The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred by relying upon Bishop "to re-
characterize the Estate's contract claims[.]" Appellant's Brief at 15-16. 
The Magistrate Court discussed the Estate's breach of contract claim as follows: 
Kareen argues that her breach of contract claim must be viewed as separate from 
the breach of fiduciary claim and, as a contract claim, survives John's death. The 
Supreme Court in Bishop addressed the same claim. In the absence of finding 
that a higher duty of care is provided for under the Trust agreement than provided 
under the statute, Bishop requires abatement of Kareen's claim. Bishop v. Owens, 
152 Idaho at 620,272 P.3d at 1251. Kareen fails to point out any way in which 
the Trust instrument imposes any duties upon Toni that are not also imposed by 
the Probate Code. This Court stands by its more detailed analysis when 
addressing John's claims that the Trust instrument gives no higher duty of care 
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than the duty imposed by the Probate Code. Memorandum Op. Feb. 15, 2013 at 
6-8. 
Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell at 13-14. In the earlier opinion referenced therein, the 
Magistrate Court discussed the Bishop decision to conclude that like Bishop, this case is a mixed 
tort and contract case involving torts arising from a contractual agreement. Memorandum 
Opinion Feb. 15, 2013 at 6. The Magistrate Court further concluded that the duties owed by the 
trustee to a beneficiary are defined by the Uniform Probate Code and Uniform Principal and 
Income Act. Id. at 7. Violation of these fiduciary duties arising under statute is a tort, not a 
contract. Id. 
Specifically, the Bishop Court analyzed the interplay of tort and contract theories in the 
attorney-client context as follows: 
[T]he contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are defined by 
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attorney and client want to 
provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by express language in the 
contract. Here, the standard of care in the contract is essentially the same as in 
any attorney-client relationship. Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated upon 
Patricia Shelton's death. 
Although the medical malpractice cases on which Owens relies are governed by 
specific statute, the fact that a proponent labels his or her action as sounding in 
contract as well as malpractice does not make the underlying action contract. The 
"theory" of relief sought is not different. A holding to the contrary would create a 
per se breach of contract action in every legal malpractice action. Legal 
malpractice has traditionally been treated as the proper claim where an attorney 
breaches his or her duty, which arises from the attorney-client relationship. 
As noted in the previous section, because the contingent fee agreement in this 
matter contained no express language providing for a higher standard of care, the 
duty owed by Owens is not defined by the contingent fee agreement. The 
language in the contingent fee agreement that "attorneys shall represent Client in 
said manner and do all things necessary, appropriate, or advisable, in regard 
thereto" is not materially different from the standard applied in the legal 
malpractice claim. Thus, this action is really a malpractice claim disguised as a 
contract claim. A person cannot change a tort action into a contract action simply 
by labeling it as such. Hayward, 136 Idaho at 350, 33 P.3d at 824. 
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620-21, 272 P.3d 1247, 1251-52 (2012)). 
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Here, like in Bishop, Appellant's breach of contract claim is really a breach of fiduciary 
duty claim disguised or labelled as a contract claim. The subject trust contained no provisions 
providing for a higher standard of care than established in the Uniform Probate Code. 
Appellant cites to no authority to support its assertions that "a breach of contract claim is 
distinct from a breach of fiduciary duty claim." Appellant's Brief at 17. Appellant further 
asserts that "[t]o argue that no contractual claim may lie against the trustee is to is to argue that 
the terms of the trust document have no substance." Id. at 18. The trust document has substance, 
but it is the same substance as found in statute. As such, the Estate's breach of contract claim 
abates. 
For these reasons, no reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate Court's 
dismissal of the Estate's breach of contract claim should be affirmed. 
H. The Magistrate Court correctly considered and applied LC. § 5-327(2) 
The Estate argues that the Magistrate Court erred in its interpretation of Idaho Code 
Section 5-327(2). Appellant's Brief at 18-20. The Estate contends that "the court's error was the 
result of construing the language of the statute in such a rigid manner as to produce an absurd 
result upon application." Id. at 18. 
It is important to note that said statutory section was amended in 2010, where the Estate's 
claims cover a time period relating back to December 15, 2009, which is the death of the last 
grantor's death. In light of said amendment, a two-part analysis is needed to properly consider 
the Estate's claims. 
Prior to its amendment, which took effect on July 1, 2010, said statute read as follows: 
Causes of action arising out of injury to the person or property, or death, caused 
by the wrongful act or negligence of another, except actions for slander or libel, 
shall not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer, and each injured person or the 
personal representative of each one meeting death, as above stated, shall have a 
cause of action against the personal representative of the wrongdoer; provided, 
however, the punitive damages or exemplary damages shall not be awarded nor 
penalties adjudged in any such action; provided, however, that the injured person 
shall not recover judgment except upon some competent, satisfactory evidence 
corroborating the testimony of said injured person regarding negligence and 
proximate cause. 
LC.§ 5-327 (through July 1, 2010) (emphasis added). 
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In its prior form, the clear language of the statute reflects that survivability applied only 
after the death of the wrongdoer, not the death of the injured party as the subsequent amendment 
addressed. Because the amendment to Idaho Code Section 5-327(2) was not retroactive, said 
amendment applied only to actions which arose on or after the statute's effective date. See 
Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251. Therefore, the statute in its original form applies 
from the death of Michael S. Cornell on December 15, 2009 until July 1, 2010. The Estate's 
predecessor in interest, John Cornell, is the injured party and Toni Johnson the wrongdoer for 
purposes of this appeal. Because the alleged "injured party" is the decedent as opposed to the 
"wrongdoer," any claims of John Cornell that may have arisen between December 15, 2009 and 
. July 1, 2010 abated upon his death. No reversible error has been shown, and the Magistrate 
Court's dismissal as it relates to claims arising prior to July 1, 2010 should be affirmed. 
The Estate's parsing of the current statute applies only to its claims that arose on or after 
July 1, 2010. In its current form, Idaho Code§ 5-327(2) states in relevant part as follows: 
A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the wrongful 
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person 
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that 
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those 
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii) other out-of-pocket expenses 
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of 
such injured person as a result of the wrongful act or negligence. 
The Estate argues that the limitation on recovery for medical expenses, other out-of-pocket 
expenses, and loss of earnings applies only to personal injury cases, not cases involving property 
damages. Appellant's Brief at 18-20. Said interpretation does not employ the well-recognized 
principles of statutory interpretation cited to by Appellant. See Appellant's Brief at 19 ( citing 
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011); Smith v. Dept. of Employment, 
100 Idaho 520, 522, 602 P.2d 18, 20 (1979)). Specifically, Appellant cites to no legislative 
history that would support her conclusion. Appellant parses the second sentence of said statute 
in an attempt to limit the statute's application to personal injury cases, thereby ignoring the 
context of the entire document, which is clearly applicable to "a cause of action for personal 
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mJury or property damage." (emphasis added). Appellant's interpretation relies upon 
speculation and generalities (specifically that "medical expenses" rarely, in his opinion, are 
incurred in property damage cases), in order to deviate from the plain and ordinary meaning of 
"such action." Further, said limited interpretation, which rejects its application to property 
damages cases despite their specific inclusion by reference, departs from common sense and 
reading. The Estate cites to no case law supporting this interpretation of the statute. For these 
reasons, no reversible error has been shown and the Magistrate Court's application of Idaho 
Code 5-327(2) should be affirmed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Respondent respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Judgment 
for Dismissal and Memorandum Opinion re: Kareen Cornell, both entered June 21, 2013, and 
the Memorandum Opinion re: Remand Order entered June 16, 2014. 
DATED this If day of August, 2014. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
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This Court must determine whether, through the doctrine of abatement, Toni C. Johnson 
can avoid repayment of her brother's estate, the Estate of John Cornell, for property losses from 
admittedly improper conduct. 
Johnson's arguments regarding common law abatement are based upon an expansive 
interpretation of a single sentence in Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 619 (2012). Johnson 
proposes an interpretation which would dictate that all claims which are torts-or which could be 
re-characterized as torts-abate upon the death of the injured party, absent a statutory exception. 
Johnson's interpretation conflicts with pre-Bishop and post-Bishop precedent, as well as the 
language and facts from Bishop, itself. The Court should reject Johnson's proposed 
interpretation of Bishop. Without Johnson's proposed universal rule of abatement, the Court 
must determine whether the Estate's claims fall within one of the exceptions to the general rule 
that tort claims abate. The Estate's claims fall within three such exceptions: the exception for 
claims seeking redress for injury to property; the exception for claims founded upon a remedial 
statute; and the exception for claims that are not legal claims, but claims in equity. 
Johnson's argument regarding the Estate's breach of contract claims proposes a legal 
analysis whereby the court must re-characterize every breach of contract claim into a tort claim if 
the contract does not provide for a higher standard of care than established at law. Johnson's 
1 Petitioner sets forth a verbatim copy of her brief filed in the previous appeal of this matter, any 




analysis should be rejected, as it would create an unsubstantiated and unworkable standard which 
would, in practical effect, eliminate nearly all breach of contract claims. 
Finally, Johnson's argument regarding statutory abatement under Idaho Code § 5-327(2) 
sets forth a proposed interpretation which conflicts with the intent of the legislature, as 
determined by the language of the statute, common sense, and reason. 
The Estate requests that this honorable Court reverse the judgment of the magistrate 
court. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Estate's Tort Claims Did Not Abate at Common Law. 
Johnson argues that Bishop established the following universal statements as a rule of 
law: All claims which can be characterized as a tort claim abate at common law unless a 
statutory exception exists. See Resp. Br. 4, if2. Johnson's proposed rule of abatement would 
prohibit the Estate from pursuing its claims against her for the property she wrongfully withheld 
from her brother. Johnson's interpretation stretches Bishop far beyond the scope of its facts and 
far beyond the Idaho Supreme Court's treatment of Bishop earlier this year in St. Luke's Magic 
Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 293 P.3d 661 (2013). In Luciani, the Court 
made clear that Bishop did not establish a universal statement of law, but rather re-iterated what 
had long been the rule at common law in Idaho: exceptions exist to the general rule that tort 
claims abate. See id. at 42, 293 P.3d at 667. 
The Bishop Opinion included a statement that "[u]nder the common law, claims arising 











abate." 152 Idaho 616, 619, 272 P.3d 1247, 1250 (2012). As set forth in the Estate's Opening 
Brief, Johnson's interpretation of this sentence is erroneous. See App. Br., 7-9. Johnson's 
interpretation conflicts with (a) the language of the Bishop Opinion; (b) the Bishop Court's 
citation to Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477 (1919) as authority; and (c) the post-
Bishop authority of Luciani. 
The question before the Luciani Court was whether a legal malpractice claim could be 
assigned as part of an asset and liability transfer from one entity to another. Luciani, 154 Idaho 
at 39, 293 P.3d at 663. The Court's consideration of assignability included a discussion of its 
precedent on survival in Bishop. Id. The issue of survival was raised by the defendants in 
Luciani, likely because "[t]he assignability of a cause of action is ... intimately associated with, 
and in most cases held to depend upon, the same principle as the survival of a cause of action. 
Thus, if it survives, it may be assigned; if not, it may not." MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 
P. 254, 257 (1926). The Luciani defendants argued that Bishop stood for the proposition that all 
legal malpractice claims abated at common law-just as Johnson argues here-and, therefore, 
that such claims are unassignable. Luciani, 54 Idaho at 43,293 P.3d at 667. The Court rejected 
this reasoning. 
The Supreme Court first made clear that Bishop did not stand for the proposition that all 
legal malpractice claims sounded in pure tort. Id. The Court then made clear that Bishop did not 
stand for the proposition that every tort claim abated at common law. 
The malpractice claim here sounds in tort and, therefore, the MacLeod case 
provides some guidance. Although we stated that "if [ a tort claim] survives, it 









estate of the injured party does survive, and that it is assignable." 43 Idaho at 75, 
249 P. at 257. If personal injury claims that "diminish the estate [and are] an 
injury to property" may be assigned, it seems clear that personal injuries of the 
type alleged here-malpractice leading to an alleged loss of millions of dollars-
are precisely that. See id. The crux of St. Luke's lawsuit against Luciani is that the 
alleged malpractice substantially impacted the value of the assets it acquired from 
Magic Valley. 
Id. (quoting MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 P. 254, 257 (1926)) (alterations in original). 
Thus, the MacLeod Opinion is still good law in this jurisdiction with respect to the intimately 
associated issues of assignability and survival. 
Having established that the Bishop Opinion did not create a universal rule of abatement, 
the question before this Court is whether the Estate's claims fall within any of the "well-
recognized exceptions" to the general rule that tort claims abate. See Kloepfer, 32 Idaho 415, 184 
P. 477. The Estate's Opening Brief shows that its claims fall within three well-recognized 
exceptions: (1) the exception for claims seeking redress for injury to property, see App. Br. 9-11; 
(2) the exception for claims founded upon a remedial statute, see App. Br. 11; and (3) the 
exception for claims that are not legal claims, but claims in equity, see App. Br. 12-14. 
(1) Tort claims seeking redress for injury to property are an exception to the general rule of 
abatement. 
The exception to abatement for claims seeking redress for injury to property is an 
expressly identified exception in Luciani. 54 Idaho at 43, 293 P.3d at 667 ("[an] injury that 
lessens the estate of the injured party does survive"). In her brief, Johnson does not provide 
[ analysis of the Luciani Opinion; instead, she argues that two other cited cases are inapposite. See 
I_ 











(2000) & First Sec. Bank of Idaho, Nat. Ass 'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 657, 429 P.2d 386, 389 
(1967)). 
The Estate directs this Court to Barnes as merely one example ofldaho courts' treatment 
of a decedent's claims regarding property interests upon the decedent's death. Those claims do 
not abate. The Estate directs this Court to Rogers as authority for the finding that, at the very 
least, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether John Cornell held a vested 
property interest in the Trust res at the time of his death. By conceding inequitable conduct, 
Johnson has conceded that John Cornell held an interest at the date of death; she merely argues 
that her inequitable conduct succeeded in divesting him of that interest. Thus, Johnson has 
conceded those facts necessary for the Estate to pursue its claim at trial. 
The cases of Barnes and Rogers provide exemplary support for that which is explicitly 
stated in Luciani, MacLeod, and Kloepfer: an estate may pursue the claims of the decedent 
seeking redress for injury to property. 
(2) Tort claims seeking redress based upon a remedial statute are an exception to the general 
rule of abatement. 
Johnson's argument regarding this exception presumes that Bishop established a 
universal rule against survivability. Johnson then proposes an analysis whereby the Court must 
find abatement absent the provision of Idaho case law directly overcoming that universal rule. 
As set forth in the Estate's briefing, Bishop provides no such universal rule. Where no 





whether an exception should be recognized in Idaho.2 The second edition of American 
Jurisprudence sets forth the general rules of law for United States' jurisdictions based upon a 
comprehensive review of case law. In fact, this same treatise was relied upon by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Luciani. 154 Idaho at 41 & 42, 293 P.3d at 665 & 666. The Estate supported 
its reliance upon the second edition of American Jurisprudence by pointing out that the remedial 
statutes ofldaho Code§§ 15-7-306 & 15-3-808 focus upon the injury to the Estate or trust res in 
determining the liability of a personal representative or trustee. Thus, the statutory guidance on 
these remedial statutes is consistent with the reasoning set forth in the Estate's Opening Brief. In 
response, Johnson again argues that this Court must disregard such guidance and find abatement, 
absent an express statement by the Supreme Court overturning Bishop. Johnson's argument fails 
r·· because she presupposes the accuracy of her interpretation of Bishop before considering the 
statutes, instead of allowing these authorities to guide the interpretation of Bishop. Where 
l Johnson's proposed interpretation conflicts with nearly every other area of legal guidance, the 
Court should find that the proposed interpretation fails, rather than finding that it somehow 
constitutes a sea change to the state of the law. The Estate maintains that the magistrate court's 
analysis was in error for the reasons set forth in the Estate's Opening brief. 
(3) Tort claims based in equity and not in law do not abate. 
2 See St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 293 P.3d 661 (2013) 
(looking to California, Nebraska, Indiana, Kansas, Virginia, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Maine, ALR, and Am.Jur.2d); MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 
Idaho 64, 249 P. 254, 255 (1926) (looking to California, New York, Wisconsin, Ohio, Kansas, 
Montana, Connecticut, Alabama, Colorado, and multiple secondary sources); Kloepfer v. Forch, 
32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477 (1919) (looking to Virginia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, 




I With respect to the Estate's equitable claims, Johnson once again argues that this Court 
must find that the Estate's claims abated absent controlling case law expressly providing for an 
exception to the general rule in Bishop. This type of analysis runs contrary to the Idaho Supreme 
Court's consideration of other jurisdictions and authorities when analyzing issues of assignment 
and survival.3 With respect to the Estate's arguments regarding the re-characterization of its 
equitable claims as legal claims, Johnson provides no argument or analysis additional to that set 
forth by the magistrate court. The Estate maintains that the magistrate court's analysis was in 
error for the reasons set forth in the Estate's Opening brief. 
B. The Estate's Complaint States Separate Contract Claims. 
Johnson proposes an interpretation of Bishop that not only created a universal rule of 
abatement, but that also dictates that all other claims-whether in tort or contract, whether in law 
or equity-ought to be re-characterized and held abated. The magistrate court erred in its 
interpretation. In its Opening Brief, the Estate distinguished its contract claims from those found 
in Bishop by setting forth the distinct factual scenarios, and identifying specific trust provisions 
that required certain duties not identified in the Uniform Probate Code. Johnson argues that even 
though the Estate has identified specific terms, it has still only made a tort claim because "no 
3 Johnson challenges the Estate's citation to Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676 (1935) 
as appearing to presume survival. The Estate provided this citation as a supplement to the 
general rule of survival of equitable claims, as set forth in the second edition of American 
Jurisprudence. The Estate still maintains that the Brasch Court appears to presume survival. In 
Brasch, the Court considered whether an estate could pursue a constructive trust claim on behalf 
of a decedent. Id. The Brasch Court held that the estate could not pursue the claims because the 





though the Estate has identified specific terms, it has still only made a tort claim because "no 
provisions [ of the trust] provid[ e] for a higher standard of care than established in the Uniform 
Probate Code." Resp. Br. 12, ,r1. 
Johnson reasons that where (1) the law presumes a standard of care, (2) the contract does 
not provide a distinct standard of care, and (3) the cause of action alleges a breach of that 
standard of care, then the claim is made in tort and not contract. If Johnson's proposed reasoning 
were to prevail, a contract cause of action would rarely exist. The law presumes a standard of 
care in every contract, whether it be a standard of good faith and fair dealing or a higher standard 
based upon the relationship of the parties. Johnson's attempt to distinguish contract claims from 
tort claims based upon the document's identification of a unique standard of care is 
unsubstantiated and unworkable. 
C. The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate Under Idaho Code§ 5-327(2). 
l~ The Estate was unable to identify Idaho case law addressing the application of the 
I 
l 
language ofidaho Code§ 5-327(2) to claims of property damage. The Estate recognizes that the 
legislature's choice of arrangement and wording is inarticulate. The Court is left with the task of 
deriving the intent of the legislature. In accomplishing its task, the Court must determine if 
common sense and reason counsel a finding that the legislature intended to limit property 
damage cases to recovery for "medical expenses," "other out-of-pocket expenses" and "loss of 
earnings actually suffered" where those damages are incurred "prior to the death of such injured 










Opening brief, the Estate maintains that the legislature did not intend the second sentence to 
function as a limitation on property damage claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The property interests of a decedent survive the decedent, they do not die and they do not 
abate. The magistrate court erred in its expansive reading of Bishop and erred in its rigid 
interpretation of Idaho Code § 5-327(2). The Estate asks this Court to reverse the grant of 
summary judgment. 
DATED this 11th day of August, 2014. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
uel T. Creason, ISB #8183 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNY OF CLEARWATER 
) 
IN THE MATTER OF: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE ) 
M. CORNELL. ) 
CASE NO. CV 2012-277 
ORDER STA YING APPEAL 
' ' 
This appeal in this matter is stayed pending the filing of a final judgment pursuant to 
IRCP 54(a). 
Dated this h -t9ay of September, 2014. I 
, ,/ ,' . -,:t'"·,(: ) (>l 
Michael J. Griffin 
District Judge 
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- I 
.. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDIG!AL,DISTRICT . ~~- ~ 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY ?f CLEAR~ E~Hl.'i\' 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION . 
IN THE MATIER OF THE: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL 
Case N'o. CV 2012-277 
JUDGM~NT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
I 
The Motion to Dismiss filed by Toni C. Johnson of the Petition for Supervised 
Administration and Court Ordered Distribution filed by Kareen Cornell, converted into a 
Motion for Summary Judgment by the filing of Affidavits, IS HEREBY GRANTED and 
the Petition for Supervised Administration and Court Ordered Distribution is HEREBY 
DISMISSED. 
Dated thisJ..L/ day of September, 2014. 
~!1~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
COURT MINUTES 
IN THE MA TIER OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL, et al. , 
Presiding Judge 




Time: 11:30 a.m. 
) 
) 
) Docket No. CV12-000277 
) 
) APPEARANCES: 
) Karin Seubert 
) Sam Creason 
SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS: ORAL ARGUMENT 
COURTROOM #3 
BE IT KNOWN, THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO-WIT 
.Ms. Seubert and Mr. Creason present. 
Mr. Creason presents argument. 
Ms. Seubert presents argument. 





\113621 Court addresses counsel and will take matter under advisement and will 
issue v.Titten decision. 
113636 Court recess. 
TERESA DAMMON 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF TIIE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 
Tiffi STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNY OF CLEARWATER 
) 
IN THE MATTER OF: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
:MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE ) 
M.CORNELL. ) 
CASE NO. CV 2012-277 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
BACKGROUND 
Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell, husband and wife, created a trust (Cornell 
Family Trust) while living in California. They had two children, John Cornell and Toni Johnson, 
both of whom survived their parents. 
Arlie and Michael Cornell were originally co-trustees of their family trust. Arlie Cornell 
died on November 9, 2008. 
On August 6, 2009 Michael Cornell amended the trust and Toni Johnson was appointed 
sole trustee. 
Michael Cornell died on December 15, 2009. 
The trust provided that the trustee would divide the trust property equally between Toni 
Johnson and John Comell as soon as reasonably possible after the death of both trostors. Toni 
Johnson did not distribute any of the trust property to John Cornell. Toni Johnson used the trust 
property for her own benefit. 
John Cornell filed a Petition for Supervised Administration of the Cornell family trust, 




Oct.24.2014 1:07PM No. 6063 P. 7 
John Cornell committed suicide on August 20, 2012. 
The trust provided that if one of the beneficiaries died before receiving their share of the 
trust assets, then their share would be distributed to the deceased beneficiaries' issue, and if there 
was no issue, then to the surviving beneficiary. 
Kareen Cornell, wife of John Cornell, was appointed personal representative of John 
Cornell's estate on February 6, 2013-
Kareen Cornell also requested that Toni Johnson be removed as trustee and the 
administration of the trust be supervised. 
Affidavits were filed and the Magistrate treated the motion as one for summary judgment_ 
The Magistrate,s opinion was issued on February 15, 2013. That order dismissed John Comell,s 
petition for supervised administration of the Camell family trust and petition for removal of I oni 
Johnson as trustee. 
Toe Magistrate issued a summary judgment dismissing Kareen Cornell's petition on June 
21) 2013. 
The Magistrate determined that any claims of John Cornell to the property of the trust 
were abated upon his death. The Magistrate did not set forth reasons for not removing Toni 
Johnson as trustee. 
Toe matter was remanded for findings regarding not removing Toni Johnson as trustee. 
The Magistrate used his discretion in not removing Toni Johnson as trustee, even though she 
,• 
breached her fiduciary duties as trustee, because under the terms of the trust she would receive 
all of the property after John Cornell died. 
Kareen Camell appeals the Magistrate's order.of June 16, 2014. 
APPELLATE ISSUES 
Did the Magistrate err is determining that .Toni Johnson's breach of fiduciary duty to 
John Cornell was a tort which abated upon his death? 
LEGAL STANDARD 
The court defers to the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial competent 
evidence, but exercises free review of the law and its application to the facts. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION-2 
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DISCUSSION 
Paragraph 4.03 of the Cornell Family Trust provides that upon the death of the surviving 
trustor, the trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net assets of the trust into two 
equal shares, one for Toni Johnson, and the other for John Cornell. Toni Johnson had a fiduciary 
duty established by the trust and I.C. 15-7-301 to expeditiously distribute the net assets of the 
estate. Toni Johnson breached her fiduciary duty. 
Paragraph 4.03(a) of the trust document provides that if a beneficiary of the trust dies 
before their share is distributed, then that share would be distributed to the deceased 
beneficiaries' issue, and if no issue, then to the surviving beneficiary. 
J obn Cornell had no issue. 
By not distributing John Cornell's share of the trust estate to him for almost 3 years Toni 
Johnson reaped the benefit of not perform.mg her fiduciary duties. 
There was no evidence presented of a contract between John Cornell and Toni Johnson. 
CONCLUSION 
The Magistrate correctly classified John Cornell's cause of action as one in tort not 
contract. The Magistrate also correctly determined that a cause of action in tort abates under 
common law upon the death of the claimant. The Magistrate also correctly determined that the 
legislature has not provided any statutory exception to this abatement 
The Magistrate did not abuse his discretion when he did not remove Toni Johnson as 
trustee for breach of her fiduciary duties. 
The Magistrate's order dismissing John Cornell's, and later Kareen Cornell's, petitions to 
remove Toni Johnson as trustee of the Cornell Family Trust, and petitions for supervised 
administration of the trust should be affirmed. 
Dated thls·2._'ftiay of October, 2014. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNY OF CLEARWATER 
) 
IN THE MATTER OF: ) 
) 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE ) 
M. CORNELL. ) 
CASE NO. CV 2012-277 
ORDER RE: APPEAL 
The Magistrate's Order of June 16, 2014 is affirmed. 
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CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
of Estate of John Henry Cornell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CLEARWATER COUNTY 
) 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL. 
) Supreme Court No. ______ _ 
) District Court No. CV-12-0277 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
) I.R.C.P. 83 
) Fee Category: L( 4) 
) Filing Fee: $129.00 
--- ------------- ) 
TO: THE RESPONDENT, TONI C. JOHNSON, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, 
KARIN SEUBERT OF JONES, BROWER, & CALLERY, P.L.L.C., 1304 IDAHO 
STREET, POST OFFICE BOX 854, LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501, E-MAIL: 
KRSEUBERT@LEWISTON.COM, 
AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The Appellant, The Estate of John Henry Cornell, acting through its personal 
representative, Kareen Cornell, (hereinafter the "Estate") appeals against the above named 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 1 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
./ 
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Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Opinion and Order re: Appeal 
entered in the above entitled action on the 24th day of October, 2014, Honorable Judge Michael 
J. Griffin presiding, which affirmed the Magistrate Court's September 22, 2014, Judgment. 
2. That Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(2). 
3. The statement of issues on appeal that the Estate intends to assert is as follows: 
Issue 1. Whether the Court erred in finding that any claims to the Trust res 
by, through, or on behalf of John Henry Cornell abated upon the 
death of John Henry Cornell? 
Issue 2. Such other issues that may later be raised by Appellant. 
4. An Order has not been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. A reporter's transcript has not been requested. 
6. The Appellant requests no additional documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28. 
7. The Appellant requests no additional documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court. 
8. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of 
the trial or proceeding, though no transcript. has been requested, as named below at the address 
set out as follows: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 2 
Keith Evans 
K&K Reporting 
P.O. Box 574 
Lewiston, Idaho 83539 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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b. That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee 
because no transcript was ordered. 
c. That the estimated fee for fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid. 
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this ~ day of December, 2014. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 3 
uel T. Creason, ISBN: 
~ttomey for Personal Representative of 
Estate of John Henry Cornell 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 8350 1 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of December, 2014, a copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Karin Seubert 
Jones, Brower, & Callery, P.L.L.C. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 4 
__J{.__ FIRST-CLASS MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
__ FAX TRANSMISSION (208) 746-9553 
__ EMAIL krseubert@lewiston.com 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
772
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: ) 
) 
) 
THE RECOVABLE FAMILY TRUST OF ) 
CASE NO. CV2012-277 
MICHAEL S. CORNELL AND ARLIE ) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL M. CORNELL. ) 
) 
APPEAL FROM SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, CLEARWATER COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL J. GRIFFIN, PRESIDING 
Case number from district court: 
Order or judgment appealed from: 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Appealed by: 
Appealed against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate fee paid: 
Respondent's Request for additional 
Record filed: 
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript 
requested? 
If so, name of Reporter: 
CV2012-227 
Memorandum Opinion and Order RE: Appeal, , 
filed 10/24/14. 
Samuel T. Creason, P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, 
Idaho 83501 
Karin Seubert, P.O. Box 854, Lewiston, Idaho 
83501 
The Estate of John Henry Cornell, acting 
through its personal representative, Kareen 
Cornell 
Toni C. Johnson 














, . &J'J.o)uJ.11 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIA~ ~ISTRltf OF -fdEn 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 




) SUPREME COURT NO. 42822 
) 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
) OF EXHIBITS 
__________ ) 
I, Barbie Deyo, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Clearwater, do hereby certify: 
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being 
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS 
to the Record: 
1. Transcript of a Motion To Dismiss Hearing held June 4, 2013, filed August 2, 2013. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOf, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
Court at Orofino, Idaho this ;3-<'z day of February, 2015. 
CARRIE BIRD 
Clerk of the District Court 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JU~ICfA~ DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATE:7 
- . &}Ra l ~-9::11 
In the Matter of : 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 
MICHAELS . CORNELL AND ARLIE M. 
CORNELL . 
CV2 (i) 12-2 7 7 ;I .D:f!JTI' 
SUPREME COURT NO . 42822 
CERFITICATE TO RECORD 
I, Barbie Deyo, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Clearwater, do hereby certify that the above foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under 
my direction as, and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested 
by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed 
the District Court on the 2nd day of December, 2014 . 
CARRIE BIRD, Clerk 
By 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JU,DICIAL ft R~?,;:c,& ~C_T4 Q; "L THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF ~ LEARWATt~ 
In the Matter of: 
THE REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST OF 




SUPREME COURT NO. 42822 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Barbie Deyo, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Clearwater, do hereby certify that copies of the 
Clerk's Record were placed in the United States mail and 
addressed to Samuel T. Creason, Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, 
PLLC, P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, Idaho 83501 and Kar in Seubert, 
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC, P.O. Box 854, Lewiston, Idaho 
83501 this ;){Jl),,, day of February, 2015. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
'fl. 
the seal of the said Court thisJ..D- day of February, 2015. 
CARRIE BIRD, Clerk 
By 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
